THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF
COLONEL HOUSE
VOLUME I
THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF
COLONEL HOUSE
ARRANGED AS A NARRATIVE BY CHARLES SEYMOUR
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT YALE UNIVERSITY
VOLUME I
BEHIND THE POLITICAL CURTAIN
1912-1915
"House longed to get good aeeomplished and
was content that others should have the credit.’*
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON
ERNEST BENN LIMITED
8 BOUFERIE STREET LONDON E.C.
First published March slh, 2936
Reprinted . . March, 1926
Printed end Mede in Great Britain by
Mtttett, Watson & Viney, Ld^ London and Aylesbury,
TO
SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES
PREFATORY NOTE
By Colonel House
T his book written around my papers is in no sense
a conventional apologia such as, despite my best
intentions, I should probably have written had I
attempted to describe the stirring and controversial
events in which it was my fortune to play a part. The
reader must bear in mind that it treats only of such
matters as came within the orbit of my own activities.
The President and his Cabinet dealt with many questions
which could not enter into this narrative. My chief
desire has been to let the papers teU their own story,
and for this reason I have preferred to leave their
arrangement in the hands of an historian.
Dr. Seymour in arranging these papers has felt it his
duty to assume a highly critical attitude towards some
of the chief actors. Especially he has attempted to
present the great central figure of the period, Woodrow
Wilson, in a purely objective light. As for myself, I
frankly admit that I was and am a partisan of Woodrow
Wilson, and of the measures he so ably and eloquently
advocated. That we differed now and then as to the
methods by which these measures might be realized,
this book reveals as one follows the thread of the story,
and never more sharply than in the question of military
and naval preparedness.
The President, I believed, represented the opinion
prevailing in the country at large, apart from the
Atlantic seaboard; and I was not certain, had he
vii
viii PREFATORY NOTE
advocated the training of a large army. Congress
would have sustained him. But I was sure, given a
large and efficient army and navy, the United
States would have become the arbiter of peace and
probably without the loss of a single life. When the
President became convinced that it was necessary to
have a large navy. Congress readily 3delded to his wishes.
But, even so, it is not certain that had he asked for such
an army as I advocated he would have been successful.
The two arms do not hang together on even terms, for
the building of a great army touches every nerve centre
of the nation, social and economic, and raises questions
and antagonisms which could never come to the fore
over a large navy programme.
In my opinion, it iU serves so great a man as Woodrow
Wilson for his friends, in mistaken zeal, to claim for him
impeccability. He had his shortcomings, even as other
men, and having them but gives him the more character
and virility. As I saw him at the time and as I see him
in retrospect, his chief defect was temperamental. His
prejudices were strong and oftentimes clouded his
judgments. But, by and large, he was what the head
of a state should be — ^intdligent, honest, and courageous.
Happy the nation fortunate enough to have a Woodrow
Wilson to lead it through dark and tempestuous days !
Much as he accomplished, much as he coromended
himself to the gratitude and admiration of mankind,
by some strange turn of fate his bitterest enemies have
done more than his best friends to assure his undying
fame. Had the Versailles Treaty gone through the
United States Senate as written and without question,
Woodrow Wilson would have been but one of many to
share in the imperishable glory of the League of Nations.
But the fight which he was forced to make for it, and the
PREFATORY NOTE
IX
world-wide proportions which this warfare assumed,
gradually forced Woodrow Wilson to the forefront of the
battle, and it was around his heroic figure that it raged.
While he went down in defeat in his own country, an
unprejudiced world begins to see and appreciate the
magnitude of the conception and its service to man-
kind. The League of Nations and the name of Woodrow
Wilson have become inseparable, and his enemies have
helped to build to his memory the noblest monument ever
erected to a son of man.
NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Some three and a half years ago Colonel House gave to
Yale University, for deposit in the University Library,
his entire collection of political papers. For permission
to select and publish the most significant of these, I my-
self and all students of recent history are deeply in his
debt. The responsibihty for the choice and arrange-
ment of these papers, as well as their interpretation,
must rest upon me. Colonel House, whose sense of the
scientific historical spirit is very lively, agreed that no
essential document which might affect the historicity of
the narrative should be omitted. Whatever deletions
appear in the published papers have been dictated by the
exigencies of space or by a regard for the feelings of
persons still alive, and in no case do they alter the his-
torical meaning of the papers.
The comment and advice of Colonel House have been
invaluable. He has carefully avoided, however, any
insistence upon his personal point of view, at the same
time that he has offered priceless aid in throwing light
upon iimumerable aspects of the political story which
would otherwise have remained obscure. For the time
and interest and freedom which he has given me I am
profoundly grateful. It is a rare privilege for the his-
torian that his documentary material should be explained
by the chief actor in the drama. I am indebted also,
and beyond measure, to Colonel House’s brother-in-law.
President Sidney E. Mezes, and to his secretary. Miss
Frances B, Denton, for constant assistance and criticism.
xii NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
They have read the manuscript and proof, and by reason
of their intimate first-hand knowledge of the events
concerned, they have corrected many misinterpretations.
My gratitude must also be expressed for the help
given by many of those who themselves played an im-
portant political role during the past thirteen years ;
they have been willing to discuss freely the history of
that period and to permit me to publish their letters.
I would mention Ambassador James W. Gerard, Ambas-
sador Brand Whitlock, Ambassador H. C. Wallace,
Attorney-General T. W. Gregory, Postmaster-General
A. S. Burleson, Mr. Frank L. Polk, Mr. Vance McCormick,
Mr. John Hays Hammond, Mr. Gordon Auchincloss,
Viscount Grey of Fallodon, the Earl of Balfour, Mr.
Lloyd George, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Sir Horace
Plunkett, Sir William T5TTell, Mr. H. Wickham Steed,
Mr. J. A. Spender, Sir William Wiseman, M. Georges
Clemenceau, M. Ignace Paderewski. All of these came
into dose touch with Colonel House, and the personal
and political sidelights which they have thrown upon
him have been of inestimable value.
The volumes owe much to those who have cordially
permitted the publication of letters now in the House
Collection of the Yale University Library. I take
pleasure in thanking Mrs. Walter Hines Page, Mrs.
Thomas Lindsay, Mrs. Franklin K. Lane, Lady Spring-
Rice, Mrs. William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State
Robert Lansing, Secretary of the Treasury William G,
McAdoo, Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston,
Justice James C. McReynolds, President Charles W.
EHot, Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, Mr. A. H. Frazier, Mr.
E. S. Martin, Mr. (Jeorge Foster Peabody, Mr. James
Speyer.
In the arrangement of the papers and their interpreta-
tion I have made constant use of the numerous letters
NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT xiii
from President Wilson to Colonel House now deposited
in the House Collection. It seemed wise to the literary
legatee of the President not to grant permission to publish
these letters textually ; something of the personal
attractiveness of Mr. Wilson has thus been lost. But
the sense of the letters, setting forth his intimate feelings
and policies, has been freely translated into the pages
which follow. A list of the letters which I have thus
utilized is appended.^ None of them have been pub-
lished ; many of them were t37ped by the President
himself without a copy being made, often in the private
code used only by Colonel House and himself.
To the authorities of Yale University who have pro-
vided facilities for the care of the House Collection and
to the staff of the University Library, especially the
Librarian, Mr. Andrew Keogh, I would express warmest
gratitude, as weU as to those alumni of Yale who by
financial assistance have made possible the filing and
organization of documents given by Colonel House and
others. I am indebted in particular to my assistant in
the curatorship of the House Collection, Miss Helen M.
Reynolds ; every page of these volumes bears witness
to the devoted effort she has expended upon the construc-
tion of the manuscript, the verification of references,
and the correction of proof. Finally I must acknowledge
the constant encouragement and practical assistance of
my wife in the large task of selecting the most significant
documents and arranging them so as to make a coherent
narrative.
C. S.
Yale Univebsity
Jmmry i, 1926
1 See pa^e xv.
LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE
Utilized for the period, October 1911 — March 1917
DATE SUBJECT
1911
October 18 Wilson’s party regularity.
24 Desirability of abolishing two-thirds rule in National
Democratic Convention.
December 4 Engagement to dine with House and Dr. Houston.
22 Pre-Convention campaign organization.
26 Pre-Convention campaign organization.
1912
January 4 Personal. Bryan’s attitude.
27 Personal.
February 6 Personal.
14 Personal.
March 15 Pre-Convention outlook. Political strength of
Champ Clark, Underwood, Hannon.
May 6 House's political organization in Texas.
29 Personal. [Telegram.]
June 9 Plans for Baltimore Convention.
24 Convention organization.
July 17 Plan of electoral campaign.
August 22 Plan of electoral campaign.
31 Plan of electoral campaign.
September 11 McCombs's possible resignation as National Demo-
cratic Chairman.
November 7 Comment on result of election. Gratitude for
House’s services.
30 Personal. House’s Washington visit for study of
Cabinet material.
December 3 Personal. House’s Washington visit.
1913
January
February
May
rv
6 Discussion of Cabinet material.
23 Discussion of Cabinet material.
5 Cabinet appointments.
7 Cabinet appointments.
9 New York appointments.
xvi LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE
DATE
1913
May
July
September
October
November
December
1914
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
Sept^ber
SUBJECT
17 Federal Reserve Bill.
20 Personal. [Telegram.]
17 Personal. [Telegram.]
4 Personal.
18 Massachusetts appointments.
26 Request for House's help in personal matter.
29 Personal.
17 One Hundredth Anniversary of peace among English-
speaking peoples.
5 Mexico.
9 Message to Congress.
27 Personal.
3 Trusts.
6 Trust Message. [Telegram.]
9 Federal Reserve Board appointments.
28 Panama Canal Zone.
30 Personal. [Telegram.]
16 Federal Reserve Board appointments.
18 Federal Reserve Board appointments.
23 Federal Reserve Board appointments. Mexican situa-
tion.
7 Federal Reserve Board appointments.
30 Federal Reserve Board appointments.
2 Federal Reserve Board appointments.
2 Federal Reserve Board appointments.
13 Departure of House for Europe.
16 House’s mission in Europe.
22 French proposal for revision of commercial treaty be
tween France and the United States. Mediation
between the United States and Mexico,
26 House’s mission in Europe.
9 Endorsement of House’s mission
3 Situation in Europe.
4 Mediation in European War, [Telegram.]
5 Mediation in European War.
6 Mediation in European War.-^ Shipping Bill.
6 Mrs. Wilson’s death. [Telegram.]
17 Personal.
18 Personal.
25 Attitude towards European War.
27 Personal, [Tdegram.]
8 Approval of House’s letters to Zimmermann and Am-
bassador W. H. Page,
LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE xvii
DATE
1914
September
October
November
December
1915
January
February
March
April
SUBJECT
16 Approval of House's suggestion on taxes.
17 Appointments.
19 Approval of House's negotiations with Bernstorff.
[Telegram.]
10 Negotiations for purchase of cotton.
16 Negotiations for purchase of cotton.
19 Appointments.
22 Personal.
23 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page,
29 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page.
2 Personal. [Telegram.]
1 Presidential Message. Belgian relief.
2 Foreign relations.
9 Presidential Message.
14 Personal.
16 Personal. [Telegram.]
22 Personal. [Telegram.]
25 Personal.
26 Industrial relations. [Telegram.]
26 Trade Commission.
28 Personal.
28 Personal, [Telegram.]
31 Personal. [Telegram.]
5 Approval of House's letter to Zimmermann,
6 Appointments.
7 Federal emplojnnent bureau.
II Personal.
16 Mediation in European War.
17 Personal. [Telegram.]
28 Situation in Germany.
29 Personal, [Telegram.]
29 Purpose of House's European mission.
13 House’s negotiations in England. Note to the Allies.
[Cablegram.]
15 Gerard's information on situation in Germany.
[Cablegram.]
20 Relations with Great Britain. [Cablegram.]
25 House's negotiations. [Cablegram.]
1 Conditions in Germany, [Cablegram.]
8 House's negotiations. [Cablegram.]
23 British Order in Council. [Cablegram.]
2 Approval of House's negotiations. [Cablegram.]
xviii LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE
DATE
1915
April
May
June
August
September
- October
SUBJECT
15 Messages to President and Foreign Minister of France.
[Cablegram.]
22 Pan-American Pact. [Cablegram.]
— British blockade. [Cablegram.]
4 Sinking of Gulflight. [Cablegram.]
5 British blockade. [Cablegram.]
16 Possible compromise between British blockade and
German submarine warfare. [Cablegram.]
18 British blockade. [Cablegram.]
20 Possible compromise between British blockade and
German submarine warfare. [Cablegram.]
23 British blockade. [Cablegram.]
26 British blockade. [Cablegram.]
I House's return. [Cablegram.]
20 Personal. Wilson planning visit to House. [Tele-
gram.]
22 Wilson's visit to House. [Telegram.]
3 Mexico. [Tdegram.]
3 Mexico.
7 Mexico.
12 Counsellordiip of State Department. Note to Ger-
many.
14 Strained relations with Germany,
rg Contraband and cottcni.
20 British blockade.
22 Contraband and cotton.
27 Counsellorship of State Department. British blockade.
29 British blockade. BemstorS.
4 Appointments.
4 Mexico.
4 German plots.
5 Contraband and cotton.
7 Contraband and cotton.
21 Asking for advice on Arabic case. Attitude of Am-
bassador W. H. Page.
25 Bemstorff. German plots.
31 Pasc^.
31 Arabic crisis. Federal Reserve Board.
7 Austrian ptots. Sinking of
20 BemstorfE. Amite crisis.
27 Bemstorff. Arabic crisis.
29 Personal.
4 Personal.
4 Armed merchantman controversy.
18 Possible ofier of help to Allies.
LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE xix
DATE SUBJECT
1915
October 18 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page.
29 Personal.
November 10 Possibilities of peace. Domestic politics.
11 House’s messages to Grey. [Telegram.]
12 Conditions in Germany. Sinking of Ancona.
17 House’s mission to Europe.
24 British and German Ambassadors in Washington.
House’s mission to Europe.
1916
January 9 Assurance of American co-operation in policy seeking
to bring about and maintain permanent peace.
[Cablegram.]
12 The Senate and British blockade. [Cablegram.]
13 Approval of House’s negotiations. [Cablegram.]
February 16 Aimed merchantmen. [Cablegram.]
March 3 Personal. [Tel^am.]
20 Gerard’s report from Germany.
April 15 Appointments. [Telegram.]
21 Sttssex crisis.
22 Sttssex crisis. Domestic politics.
29 Sussex crisis. [Tdegram.]
May 5 Sussex crisis. [Telegram.]
8 Relations with Great Britain.
9 Possibility of peace.
10 Offer of help to Allies. Britidi blockade.
17 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page.
17 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. ^
18 Offer of help to Allies. Relations with Great Britain.
18 Request for advice on speech before League to
Enforce Peace.
22 Rdations with Allies. Request for material for
speech. Chaiiman^p of Democratic National
Committee.
29 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
June 6 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
10 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
11 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
[Tdegram.]
22 European situation. Mexico. Plan for electoi^
r amp aign.
July 2 Relaticms with England. Appointments. Electoral
campaign.
23 Briti^ Black-list.
27 Relations with Great Britain.
XX LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE
DATE SUBJECT
1916
September 20 Personal.
29 Electoral campaign.
October 10 Relations with Great Britain.
24 Electoral campaign.
30 Madison Square rally.
November 6 Personal.
21 Drafting of note calling on belligerents to state
terms of peace.
24 Relations with Germany. Attitude of Ambassador
W, H. Page.
25 Peace note.
December 3 Peace note.
4 Personal.
8 House's information from England.
19 Peace note.
27 Attempt to secure confidential peace terms from
Germany.
1917
January 16 Drafting of speech on peace terms before the Senate.
17 House's negotiations with Bernstorff.
19 House's negotiations with Bernstorff. Speech before
the Senate.
24 House's negotiations with Bernstorff.
February 12 Refusal to consider coalition government.
CONTENTS
VOLUME , I
CHAPTER
I. Introduction
II. Backgrounds (1858-1911)
War and Reconstruction in the South — House in
School, and College — ^Frontier Life and Friends
in Texas — Political Beginnings — State Electoral
Campaigns — ^The Governors' Adviser — National
Campaigns — ^Enter Wilson.
III. Beginnings of a Friendship .
First Impressions of Woodrow Wilson — ^The Pre-
Nomination Campaign — ^Persuading Mr. Bryan —
Organizing Texas — ^The Threat of Champ Clark
— The Baltimore Convention — Wilson Nomin-
ated — ^Discords among the Democrats — ^McCombs
and McAdoo — Soothing the Tammany Tiger —
Captain Bill McDonald — ^Democratic Victory.
IV. Building a Cabinet ....
'' Everyone wants something ” — Sifting the Possi-
bilities — House Refuses a Cabinet Post — ^The
Aloofness of Wilson — ^A Visit with Mr. Bryan —
Offers and Refusals — ^The Final State.
V. The Silent Partner . . . .
Relations of House and Wilson — " Mr. House is my
second self" — ^Wilsonian Table-talk — ^The Visits of a
President — ^Defects of Wilson as seen by House —
The Colonel as a Political Bufier — A Recipient of
Criticism — ^Relations with the Cabinet — ^Problems of
Appointments and Local Politics.
PAGE
I
9
46
86
118
xxii
CONTENTS
PAGX
VI. The Administration Starts Work . 155
The Radicalism of Colonel House — " Philip Dru " :
its Composition and Significance — ^Legislative Prob-
lems of the Wilson Actoinistration — Colonel House
and Currency Reform — ^Drafting the Federal Reserve
Act — ^Making up the Federal Reserve Board —
Results of the First Legislative Session : A great
exhibition of leadership.”
VII . Aspects of Foreign Policy . . . i8i
Problems of Diplomatic Appointments — ^The Am-
bassadorship to St. James's — Colonel House as
Confidant of Ambassadors — His Conception of a
Positive Foreign Policy — Relations with Great
Britain — ^Panama Tolls Exemption — ^Mexico —
Clearing the Ground with Sir Edward Grey — ^The
Visit of Sir William Tyrrell — ^An Informal Under-
standing — Repeal of the Tolls Exemption.
VIIL A Pan-American Pact .... 213
House Urges Need of Close Understanding with
South American States — ^First Draft of Proposed
Pact — Conversations with Naon, da Gama, Suarez
— ^Approval, in Principle, of A.B.C. Powers — ^Joint
Action Regarding Mexico — Development of the
Pact — ^Dif&culties and Delays — ^Lapse of Negotia-
tions — ^Historical Significance of the Attempt.
IX. The Great Adventure . . . 241
Heavy Clouds in Europe — House's Sense of
American Interest and Responsibility — ^A Scheme
to Meet the Danger — ^An Extraordinary Mission —
Atmosphere in Germany — The Talk with the Kaiser
— ^Planning Peace with the British — The Murder of
the Archduke-Colonel House's Letter to the
Kaiser — Failure.
X. Wilson and the War .... 282
Outbreak of the Confiscation — ^The Question of
Ameticsm Mediation — ^President Eliot's Suggestion
of Intervention — ^The Sympathies of Wilson — ^House
Urges Military Preparation— Allied Interference
with American Trade — ^Difficulties with the British
— ^Page and Spring-Bice.
CONTENTS
XXIU
CBA.PTER page
XI. Plans of Mediation .... 324
The Military Situation in Europe — German Defeat
on the Marne — Overtures of Bernstorff — Discussions
with Spring-Rice — ^Letters from Page and Gerard —
Growth of Feeling against United States in Belli-
gerent Countries — Sir Edward Grey on the Attitude
of American Government — Wilson Decides to Send
House to Europe.
XII. A Quest for Peace .... 365
House Sails on the Lusitania — ^First Conferences
with Grey and Asquith — ^The German Submarine
Threat — Suggestion of The Freedom of the Seas "
— Discouraging News from Germany — A Talk with
the King — ^The Personal Contracts of House — ^War-
time London — ^Decision to go on to Germany.
XIII. The Freedom of the Seas . . . 399
Paris — Interview with Delcass^ — ^Aspirations of
France — Berlin — Everybody seems to want peace,
but nobody is willing to concede enough to get it —
Feeling against America — House Suggests Freedom
of the Seas — Its Significance — ^Bethmann and
Zimmermann — Return to Paris — Poincard —
London again — Conferences with Grey — Sinking of
the Lusitania,
XIV. Submarine versus Blockade . . 436
House's Advice to Wilson — ^Lord Kitchener on
American Participation — ^Wilson's Note to Germany
— ^A Suggestion of Compromise between German
Submarine and Allied Blockade — ^Grey Approves
Compromise — Germany Refuses — ^Effect of Allied
Restrictions on American Commerce — ^House
Explains the Danger — Conferences with Lloyd
George, Bryce, Balfour, Crewe — House Returns to
America — Results of Mission.
Index
. At end of Vohrnie II
BEHIND THE POLITICAL CURTAIN, 1912-1915
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I look forward now to your book. It is, I hope, books like yours and
mine that will bring people to reflect soberly upon the war. If so, we
shall be helping to form a public opinion that will make for peace.
Viscount Grey of Fallodon to House, October i6, 1925
T he practice of interring historical documents in
securely locked archives, where they may lie
forgotten until popular interest in the period
evaporates, has much to be said for it. It prevents
their use for partisan political purposes ; it protects
the sensibilities of those political leaders whose r 61 e,
viewed at dose range, may have been less heroic than the
public imagined ; it guarantees, through the lapse of
time, the growth of that magical touchstone, “ historical
perspective,” which supposedly eliminates bias and
ensures the truth.
Unfortunately, if the materials of real history are
absent, those of legend replace them. “ History,” said
Voltaire, " is a fable which men have agreed upon.”
And one may ask whether it is not the duty of the
historian to establish the facts before the fable has
crystallized, and the duty of whoever possesses the
documents to make them available to the historian at
the earliest possible moment. The argument is the
stronger if we accept the view that mankind learns from
its past. Granting that a lesson of value is to be secured
from history, surely our own generation has a right to
insist that its benefits ought not to be reserved for the
unborn of the future. If the inner history of the decade
I— I
2 INTRODUCTION
which saw Europe caught in the horror of war and its
aftermath can help us to avoid another such disaster,
the disadvantages of keeping that history in cold storage
until the twenty-first century are apparent.
Such thoughts may have crossed the mind of Colonel
House when he determined to have published sufficient
of his papers to elucidate what he regarded as the true
story of the decisive years in which he played a r 61 e of
major political importance. A newspaper cartoon of
1916 represents the Muse of History (rather a frowzy
Clio, to be sure, bespectacled and distraught) presenting
a tightly corked bottle labelled Foreign Policy to a silent
and impassive Colonel House, and in desperation de-
manding the opener. After the lapse of a decade, the
Colonel has produced it.
The anxiety of the Historical Muse is comprehensible
as the student pores over the pile of papers which indicate
the extent and variety of the personal and political
contacts that House established. Here are great sheaves
of letters from the European statesmen of the war period
— Grey, Balfour, Bryce, Idoyd George, Plunkett, Reading,
Briand, Clemenceau, Zimmermann, Bemstorff, Spring-
Rice — with the Colonel’s repUes ; yet more extensive
files of his correspondence with the American Ambas-
sadors in the capitals of Europe — the Pages, Gerard,
Sharp, Penfield, Whitlock, Willard ; letters to and
from the m^bers of Mr. Wilson’s Cabinet, covering the
details of appointments and departmental policy ; and
finally the eight years’ series of correspondence with the
President himself, intimate and affectionate, which
explains the origin and development of Wilsonian
policies, domestic and foreign, from the beginning of
Wilson’s race for the Presidency in 1911 until the Peace
Conference of Paris in 1919.
INTRODUCTION 3
As he sorts the dusty files, the curious investigator
finds himself introduced into the very penetralia of
politics — the making of a Cabinet, the origins of currency
reform, the American attempt to prevent the World
War, American offers to help the Allies made and refused,
the intimate details of American co-operation in the war,
in the Armistice, and in the Peace Conference ; he sees
at dose range, the President himself, Bemstorff and the
Kaiser, the European Premiers and Foreign Ministers,
American Ambassadors and Cabinet members.
If it had not been for an aid of exceptional character,
the preservation of these papers would have been difficult
or impossible. Fortunately House possessed in Miss
Frances B. Denton, the daughter of an old friend, an
assistant who was more collaborator than confidential
secretary, and one whose r 61 e proved to be of increasing
importance. In the midst of the negotiations which
Colonel House carried on with Cabinets and potentates,
she found time to gather and file the material without
which the story could never have been told. She com-
bined the discretion and tact demanded by House’s
diplomatic activities with an instinct for the preservation
of documents that will always endear her to historians.
“ She has not only kept the record," wrote House in
1916, " but has kept the faith and with an enduring
loyalty and self-abnegation.”
Through Miss Denton was made possible the diary
which forms the heart of the entire collection of papers.
Every evening, with rare exceptions and during eight
years, Colonel House dictated to her his r 4 sum 4 of the
events of the day. Definitely and objectively he rdated
his conversations with, often the very words of, his
political associates, and he was associated with the m«i
who made the history of the decade. Ihe result is ^
INTRODUCTION
4
jouraal of more than two thousand pages, a record
drafted at the moment and with a frankness which
suggests that it was not designed for publication. It
has the Colonel’s comments on men and events, opinions
which he sometimes changed, prophecies which upon
occasion were fulfilled and again remained unfulfilled,
a personal document such as the biographer dreams of
and seldom discovers.
Upon the basis of such papers and his recollections.
Colonel House might have written the conventional
“ Memoirs,” which too often confuse the after-impression
with the event itself, but which, through the possession
of hindsight, preserve the author from ever having
committed an error. Instead, he chose to let the papers
tell their own story and permit the reader to decide
whether or not the Colonel was right in this incident
and in that. If there is prejudice in the pages that
follow — and what historical narrative is innocent of
prejudice ? — ^it is that of the man who, after many
months of arranging the papers so as to let them make
a story, came to see events through the eyes of Colonel
House himself. But at no time was a chapter begim
under the influence of a preconceived thesis, and nothing
could have been more exciting than to watch the
behaviour of the chief figures as each chapter took form ;
in this they did well, in that they were disappointing.
An objective narrative, such as the documents
themselves recount, was the more necessary in view of
the paucity of published information touching the career
and accomplishments of Colonel House. There are
few, if any, instances of men exercising so much political
influence about whom so little was known. The personal
story of a man holding public ofiQice must needs become
public property. A searchlight is immediately turned
INTRODUCTION
5
upon his past career. The press will have it so and, if
skilfully utilized, political propaganda of value may
conceivably be developed from it. Since we demand
of our public personages a certain blameless rectitude
of conduct, without which one is ill-advised to seek
office, the subject of inquiry, even though he may never
have accomplished anything of note, is generally well
pleased with the conventions of pohtical advertising
designed to engage the interest of the voters.
With Colonel House it was bound to be otherwise.
He sought no office for himself — ^in itself a peculiarity
and one that would naturally puzzle opinion — ^nor did
he seek office for his friends. His methods and purposes
were quite different from those of the party boss, for he
never worked through a “ machine ” ; he disliked the
details of party politics, and in later years he generally
managed to evade them. He aimed certainly at influenc-
ing political events, as the sequel will show, but he
accomplished his aim through personal influence very
different from that of the orthodox politician. The
story of how he acquired such influence is the explanation
of his success, and to understand it we must read his
political papers. But it is easy to comprehend at first
glance that to him conventional political advertisement
could bring no profit and might bring much harm. He
strove constantly to stifle the public adulation that
zealous press agents sought to inspire, and he was careful
to bring it about that credit for this or that measure in
which he was interested should go to the political office-
holders. House’s papers are filled with references to
the efforts he made to obliterate the intimate personal
sketch, so familiar in American politics ; and when
finally a brief biography appeared which gave him full
credit for his influence in the Wilson administration, at
6 INTRODUCTION
his special request the edition was withdrawn by the
publisher.
The desire to escape publicity was largely a matter
of common sense, for in this way only could he hope to
avoid political enmities and jealousies : President,
Cabinet members. Ambassadors, all knew that he stood
ready to help them and yet would seek no public recogni-
tion. It was also instinctive, springing not from undue
modesty, for Colonel House was as coldly objective in
judging himself as another, but rather from a philosophic
pleasure in accomplishment rather than reward, and
perhaps in part from a sardonic sense of humour which
was tickled by the thought that he, unseen and often
unsuspected, without great wealth or office, merely
through the power of personality and good sense, was
actually deflecting the currents of history. Whether
this supposition is borne out by the intimate papers
of the Colonel, the reader must judge.
The path which House laid out for himself was
entirely untrodden, and it is fruitless to seek an historical
parallel. Monarchs had shared their secrets with father-
confessors and extracted wisdom from their advice ;
Presidents had created their kitchen-cabinets. But
ndther the one nor the other suggests the unofficial
functions which House exercised. He was a combina-
tion of Richdieu’s Father Joseph and Thurlow Weed,
but he was very much more. At the same time that he
played the part of adviser to the President, of buffer
between office-seekers and Cabinet, of emissary to
foreign courts, he indulged in a complex of activities
which kept him in close touch with business men, local
politicians, artists, and journalists, lawyers and college
professors. His intimacy with European statesmen was
as dose and his friendship as warm as the personal
INTRODUCTION
7
associations he created at home. Long after the war,
when their political relations had become ancient history,
he visited Grey and Plunkett, Clemenceau and Paderew-
ski. Long after the Democrats lost power in the United
States, the officials of Great Britain, France, and Ger-
many sought his advice. His range of contacts was so
great that he became a sort of clearing-house for all who
desired to accomplish something. He avoided high office,
which comes to many men, but he reserved for himself
a niche which is imique in history.
Inevitably, the public was mystified, especially during
the early years of the Wilson administration. The circle
widened that recognized in him a powerful factor in
national and international politics, and yet few could
answer the simplest questions about him. Who and
what was he ? Many replies were given, but, as Colonel
House refused to say which were true and which false,
no one was the wiser. He became the Man of Mystery
and, since facts were lacking, fiction supplied their place.
Myths of the most varied sort developed about this
“ Texas TaUejrand,” this “ backwoods politician.” He
was represented as a loyer of devious methods, reticent
as the Sphinx, emotionless as a Redskin. Such tales
must be strung with the other mock-pearls of history.
And the interesting point to note is that the public,
deprived of facts, none the less refused to accept the
legoads fed to them which, had they been true, would
have disqualified House utterly for the work that he
undertook. Puzzled but untroubled, they accepted him
finally as “the President’s adviser.” Here and there
were to be heard grumbles at this strange departure in
American politics ; but in general, knowing little of his
activities and nothing of his advice, the people came to
look upon him as a wise institution.
8
INTRODUCTION
Thus Colonel House disdained fame and achieved it.
His fame, however, rested primarily upon the fact of his
relations with Wilson and not upon what he was or
what he did. Of that the Colonel and those close to
him alone could tell, and they told nothing. It is,
therefore, with the greater interest that the historian
turns over the mass of papers from which the story of
his dramatic career may be disengaged.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUNDS
Your success has been without a parallel in Texas pohtics.
Governoy-eUct Sayers to Home, May 17, 1898
I
“ "V X TE originally came from Holland and the name
\/y/ wasHuis, which finally fell into House. Father
V V ran away from home and went to sea when a
child, and did not return to his home until he had become
a man of property and distinction. He came to Texas
when it belonged to Mexico. He joined the revolution,
fought under General Burleson, and helped make Texas
a republic. For his services in this war he received a
grant of land in Coryell County. He lived to see Texas
come into the Union, secede, and return to the Union.
He lived in Texas under four flags.”
Thus wrote Colonel House in the summer of 1916,
when a brief lull in his political activities gave oppor-
tunity for him to reconstruct on paper something of
the background that lay behind his rapid rise to national
and international eminence. Although the family was
in its origin Dutch, his forbears were for some three
hundred years English, and it was from England that
his father ran away. House himsdf, a seventh son,
was bom in 1858, at Houston, TexaA, and this State he
has always regarded as his home. Even more than
those of Wilson or Walter Page, with whom he later
was so dosdy associated, his first years were touched
by the excitement and txumoil of the events of the time.
9
10 BACKGROUNDS
“ Some of my earliest recollections are of the Civil
War. I began to remember, I think, in ’62 and ’63,
when our soldiers were coming and going to and from
the front. I remember quite distinctly when Lincoln
was assassinated. Father came home to luncheon, and
I recall where Mother was standing when he told her
that the President had been shot. I remember, too,
that he said that it was the worst thing that had so far
happened to the South. He saw farther than most men,
and he knew from the beginning of the war that it must
end disastrously for the South. He knew the Northern
States possessed the resources which are potential in
war, and that the Southern States, lacking them, would
lose. The blockade which the Federal Government was
able to throw around the Southern coast, while not
absolute, was rigid enough to make it difficult to break
through and obtain from the outside what was needed
within.
"During the war he sent many ships out from
Galveston with cotton, to run the blockade to the near-
by ports, such as Havana and Belize, Honduras. At that
time we had a house in Galveston as well as in Houston.
The Galveston home covered an entire block. The
house was a large red-brick Colonial one, with white
pillars, and an orange grove took up most of the grounds,
and oleanders encircled them.
" In determining when to send his ships out. Father
was governed largely by the weather. Dark, stormy
nights were the ones chosen. In the afternoon he would
go up to the cupola of our house, and with his glasses he
would scan the horizon to see how many Federal gun-
boats were patrolling the coast. Then his ship would
go out in the early part of the night. In the morning,
at daylight, he would be again on the look-out to count
the Federal gunboats, to see if any were missing. If
they were all there, he felt reasonably sure his ship with
her cargo had gotten through the blockade.
" It would be months before he knew definitely
whether his ships had come safely to port or whether
BACKGROUNDS
II
they had been captured. When he lost one, the loss
was complete ; but when one got through, the gain was
large. He had a working arrangement with the Con-
federate Government by wMch the return voyage brought
them clothing, arms, and munitions of war of all kinds.
" The terrible days between Lee's surrender and the
bringing of some sort of order out of the chaos in the
South made a lasting impression on my mind. I cannot
recall just now how long the interim was, but it must
have been a full year or more.
" There was one regiment of Texas soldiers that came
to Houston and disbanded there. They looted the
town. They attempted to break into Father’s store-
house, but he stood at the doors with a shotgun. . . .
Murder was rife everywhere ; there was no law, there
was no order. It was unsafe to go at night to your
next-door neighbour’s. When Father had this to do,
he always reached for his shotgim or six-shooter and hdd
it ready to shoot while both gomg and coming.”
Those who later were to accuse Colonel House of ill-
considered pacifism, would doubtless have been surprised
to learn of the atmosphere in which he was reared. In
later life he was often asked whether he considered him-
sdf a pacifist. " Yes,” he replied, " so far as inter-
national affairs are concerned. War is too costly and
ineffective a method of settling disputes between nations.
But as an individual I have not been able to escape the
conviction that there are occasions in life when a man
must be prepared to fight.”
As a boy and later in early manhood, he learned from
personal experience the meanmg of lawlessness and
bloodshed. Because of this, perhaps, he was brought to
perceive not merely the horror but the stupidity of
war ; and it was easier for him, when he attained an
influential position, to utilize it to bring peace, in that
his personal courage was beyond question. It may have'
12
BACKGROUNDS
been from these early experiences also that he learned
the value of audacity. In the days of his great political
influence, Colonel House was frequently pictured as a
man dominated by the spirit of caution. Nothing could
be further from the truth. He believed always in careful
preparation and foresight whenever possible ; as an
English statesman once said, " House always sees three
months ahead.” But he believed more fervently yet
that nothing worth while could be accomplished without
a daring that might wisely be allowed to approach reck-
lessness. Like Cavour, whom he admired, he knew how to
wait for the supreme moment and then risk everything.
“ Even the children of the town [he wrote] caught
the spirit of recklessness and disorder, and there were
constant feuds and broils amongst us. My brother
James, six years older than I, was the leader of our
‘ gang.’ We all had guns and pistols. We had ‘ nigger
shooters ’ (small catapults), and there were no childish
games excepting those connected with war. We lived
and breathed in the atmosphere of strife and destruc-
tion.
" In the evening, around the fireside, there were told
tales of daring deeds, and it was the leader of such deeds
that we strove to emulate. Often the firebeUs would
ring as a signal that a riot was imminent, and the citizens
would flock together at some given point, aU armed to
the teeth. These disturbances were, as a rule, between
the old-time citizens and the negroes and carpet-baggers.
" I cannot remember the time when I began to ride
and to shoot. Why I did not kill myself, one can never
know, for accidents were common. My eldest brother
had the side of his face shot off and has been disfigured
by it all his life. He hung between life and death for
weeks, but finally came through with one side of his
face gone.
" I had many narrow escapes. Twice I came near
killing one of my pla3miates in the reckless use of fire-
BACKGROUNDS
13
arms. They were our toys and, as a matter of fact,
death was our playmate.”
The young House was taken to England as a boy and
went to school at Bath. His experiences with his
schoolmates by no means presaged the cordial relations
which he was later to establish with British diplomats :
" James attempted the same sort of rough play we
had been accustomed to in Texas, and we were constantly
in broils with the young English lads, who were not
familiar with such lawlessness. My old darkey nurse
used to tell me that if I had not been the seventh son
of a seventh son, I would never have survived.”
At the age of fourteen, after the death of his
mother, he was sent to school first in Virginia and
then in Connecticut. House’s recollections of the
former are not pleasant : ” I shall never forget my
depression when we arrived. . . . The nearest town
to us was thirty miles away, and a more desolate,
lonely spot no homesick boy ever saw." Scholastic
pursuits evidently made less impression on his mind
than the cruelty of the older boys, which soon furnished
an opportunity for House to display his mettle. He
says little of the particular incident which evidently
gave him a preferred place among the boys, but that
little indicates something of the determined temper
which was to appear on various occasions during his
political career.
” I made up my mind at the second attempt to haze
me that I would not permit it. I not only had a pistol
but a large knife, and with these I hdd the larger,
rougher boys at bay. There was no limit to the lengths
they would go in hazing those who would allow it. One
form I recall was that of going through the pretence
14 BACKGROUNDS
of hanging. They would tie a boy’s hands behind him
and string him up by the neck over a limb until he
grew purple in the face. . . . None of it, however,
fell to me. What was done to those who permitted it,
is almost beyond belief. . . . The only thing that recon-
ciled me to my lot was the near-by mountains, where I
could shoot and enjoy out-of-door hfe.”
Clearly a change, even to a Yankee atmosphere, was
an improvement ; and House hailed with relief, if not
enthusiasm, the plan which at the age of seventeen
sent him to New Haven, Connecticut.
" I had expected to be able to enter Yale, but I
found myself wholly unprepared and reluctantly entered
the Hopkins Grammar School of the Class of ’77. . . .
What I had been taught was of but little use, and I
would have been better off as far as Latin and Greek
were concerned if I had known nothing and had started
from the begiiming. I studied but uttle, and I soon
found I would have difficulty in joining the Class of ’81
in Yale. Meanwhile, Oliver T. Morton, a son of Senator
Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, and I had become fast
frioids and we agreed to tutor together and go to Cornell
instead of Yale. Both Morton and I were more bent on
mischief than upon books, and, while the mischief was
innocent, it made us poor students.”
It was less mischief, however, than budding enthu-
siasm for his lifelong interest that kept House and
Morton from their books. Already the young Southerner
was intoxicated by a passion for politics and public
affairs ; he read politics, talked poUtics, and m his first
year at the Grammar School, a boy of seventeen, he
brought himself into dose contact with the mechanism
of politics. It was the year of the famous Hayes-Tilden
campaign.
BACKGROUNDS
15
“ Every neax-by political meeting I attended, and
there was no one more interested in the nomination and
election of the presidential candidates of 1876 than I.
At every opportunity I would go to New York and hang
about Democratic Headquarters, which, I remember, were
at the Everett House in Union Square. I used to see
Mr. TUden go in and out, and wondered then how so
frail a looking man could make a campaign for President.
“ Bayard, Blaine, and others I heard speak whenever
the opportunity occurred, and I believe that I was as
nearly engrossed in politics as I have ever been since.
" Before the nominations were made, I was, of course,
hoping to see young Morton's father nominated for
President, and it was a bitter disappointment to us both
when the telegraph operator handed us out the first slip
g 'ving news that the Republicans had compromised upon
utherford B. Hayes. The operator knew us, for we
were continually hanging about the office instead of
attending to our studies. Morton's father was such a
power at that time that there was no difficulty in his
having access to any information that was to be had.
“ Ardent Danocrat that I was, and ardent Republican
that he was, young Morton and I had no unpleasant
discussions. After the election and during the contest
that followed, it was utterly impossible for me to bring
myself to think of desk or books. I was constantly
going to Washin^on with Morton, in order to be near
the centre of things. I was usu^y the guest of the
Mortons, who lived at that time at the Ebbitt House. I
knew much of ever3d;hing that was going on. Re-
publican leaders would come in day and night to consult
the distinguished invalid who was directing the fight for
Hayes. In this way, directly and indirectly, I saw and
met many wdl-known Republicans in pubhc life at that
time."
No clearer proof is necessary that the child is father
to the man, for, as his papers will show, the mature
Colonel House displayed an invincible obstinacy in
i6 BACKGROUNDS
making personal friends of his political opponents. The
characteristic proceeded, perhaps, from a natural inability
to remain on anything but good terms with those whom
he met, whether in conflict or co-operation ; it resulted
in giving him an insight into the motives that actuated
his opponents which was of no small pohtical value.
The election of 1876, we may remind ourselves, was
disputed and was ultimately settled by an Electoral
Commission which, despite the protests of Democrats at
the moment and heedless of the criticism of later his-
torians, awarded the Presidency to Hayes. Such a
conflict formed an incomparable opportunity for the
young House to study political operations, and one
which he did not fail to utilize, regardless of the fact
that school was in session.
" When the Electoral Commission was organized and
began to hold its sittings in the Supreme Court Room
at the Capitol, young Morton and I were permitted to
slip in and out at will, although the demand for admission
could only be met in a very small way. I heard Evarts
speak, but the speech that impressed me most was that
of Senator Carpenter, who, edthough a Republican,
pleaded for Tilden.
" In those days, too, I had the entree to the White
House. I remember General Grant and Mrs. Grant and
several members of his Cabinet. AH this was educational
in its way, but not the education I was placed in the
Hopkins Grammar School to get, and it is no wonder
that I lagged at the end of my class. I had no interest
in my desk tasks, but I read much and was learning in
a larger and more interesting school.
" When I entered Cornell, it was the same story. . . .
I was constantly reading, constantly absorbing, constantly
in touch with, public affairs. I knew the name of
every United States Senator, of practically every Repre-
sentative, the Governors of all the important States, and
BACKGROUNDS 17
had some knowledge of the chief measures before the
people.
“ I had found that I could neglect my studies up to
the last minute and then, by a few days of vigorous
effort, pass my examinations by a scratch, nothing more.
I cannot remember getting a condition, nor can I re-
member getting much more than a passing mark.
" My Washington experience perhaps changed my
entire career. Fortunately or unfortunately for me, I
saw that two or three men in the Senate and two or
three in the House and the President himself, ran the
^vemment. The others were merely figureheads. I
saw Senators and Representatives speak to empty
benches and for the purpose of getting their remarks in
the Congressional Record sent to their admiring con-
stituents. I saw, too, how few public men could really
speak well. I can count on the fingers of one hand all
the speakers that I thought worth while. In some the
manner was good, in others the substance was good,
but in nearly all there was lacking one or the other.
Therefore I had no ambition to hold office, nor had I
any ambition to speak, because I felt in both instances
that I woffid fall short of the first place, and nothing
less than that would satisfy me.
" Yet I have been thought without ambition. That,
I think, is not quite true. My ambition has been so
great that it has never seemed to me worth while to
strive to satisfy it.”
V
Matters might have been different had it not been
for the delicacy of House’s health. " Up to the time I
was deven or twelve years old,” he wrote, " I was a
robust youngster. One day while I was swinging high, a
rope broke and I was thrown on my head. Brain fever
ensued, and for a long time I hovered between life and
death. Upon my recovery, malaria fastened upon me,
and I have never been strong since.” The confining
routine of office was impossible for him. Especially did
1—2
i8 BACKGROUNDS
he suffer from the heat, which put residence in Washing-
ton during the summer months out of the question.
Thus early and for various reasons he set aside the
thought of a conventional political career ; but his
ambition, although unorthodox, was, as he admits, very
real, and, even though he does not admit it, we shall
see that he did much to satisfy it. He longed to play
an inffuential if not a decisive r61e in politics, and from
the beginning seems to have been inspired by the desire
to improve political conditions. Through all his corre-
spondence and papers runs this idealistic strain : to
make of government a more efficient instrument for
effecting the desires of the people ; to inspire in the
people a more sensible view of their welfare ; to take a
few feathers out of the wings of enthusiasm and insert
them in the tail of judgment ; above all, to hasten the
advent of a system which would protect the weak,
whether in the political or economic sphere, from ex-
ploitation by the strong. Even as a boy there was in
him something of Louis Blanc and Mazzini, strictly
controlled, however, by an acute sense of the practical
that recalls Benjamin Franklin.
His ambition, furthermore, was determined by an
ever-livdy sense of proportion, which means sense of
humour, that continually manifests itself in his papers.
It led hi m to seek accomplishment rather than notoriety.
Careless of title or office, even had his health per-
mitted him to seek them, yet determined to make of
politics his real career. House faced the problem that
confronts so many young idealists leaving college and
anxious to serve their country and mankind. How to
begin?
BACKGROUNDS
19
II
Mischance cut short the college career of House,
for after two years at Cornell he was called back to
Texas by the illness of his father, who died in 1880.
The two had been close companions, and the younger
man’s sense of loss was acute and the deprivation of his
father’s aid and experienced counsel was a serious blow.
“ My affection may blind me,” he wrote, ” and my
judgment may have been immature, but he seemed to
me then, as he seems to me now, among the ablest men
I have ever known. ... I owe more to my father than
to any person, living or dead. He not only made it
possible for me to pursue the bent of my inclinations by
leaving me a fortune sufficient for aU moderate wants,
but he gave me an insight into the philosophy of life
that has been of incalculable value. . . . While he
devoted his life largely to commerce in various forms
and while he acquired what seemed to Texas a large
fortune, he taught me not to place a fictitious value on
wealth. It was with him merely a means to an end.”
The year after leaving college. House married Miss
Louhe Hunter, of Hunter, Texas, and after travelling in
Europe for a twelvemonth, returned to make his home
first in Houston and then in Austin, Texas, Cotton-
farming and commercial enteiprises kept him busy, but
more and more he began to steal time from business to
indulge his vital interest in public affairs. During
what he calls " the twilight years,” after he had achieved
political success in Texas and before the opportunity
for national service had opened, he indulged his taste
for adventure by embarking upon various industrial
schemes, some of which were obvioudy calculated to
produce pleasure rather than profit for himself.
20 BACKGROUNDS
" In this connexion I undertook the building of the
Trinity and Brazos Valley Railway. The capital was
raised by my friend Thomas Jefferson Coolidge, jim.,
of the Old Colony Trust Company of Boston, who occa-
sionally visited me in Texas. I outlined the route and
he accepted my judgment as to its feasibility.
For two or tluree years this gave me much pleasure
and absorbed my entire interest. There was not a man
connected with the building of this road, except the
engineer, that had ever had the slightest experience
with railroad building. I wonder now at the temerity
of those Boston capitalists. My one thought was to
have around me men capable and honest, and to this 1
attribute our success. My secretary, Edward Sammons,
than whom there is no better accountant, looked after
the accounts ; and William Malone, the manager of my
farms, saw to it that we got such material as was paid
for. I put but little money m the project, for I had but
little ; therefore I made but a small sum from it, success-
ful as it was — some thirty thousand dollars. A larger
share of the profits had been allotted me by the S 3 mdicate
managers who had put up the money necessary to build
the road, but I divided it with those friends in Texas,
poorer than I, who aided in the actual work of building
the road.
“ It was a pleasure, though, to imdertake to build
a railroad honestly, without a dollar's profit to anyone
excepting to those who placed their money in the venture.
The money was raised in advance and everything was
paid for in cash, and no bonds were sold until after the
road was a going concern and sold to another system.
“ We imdertook to lay down one cardinal principle
which no road in Texas, up to that time, had deigned to
do ; and that was, to treat the public in such a way
that they became friends of the road instead of enemies.
If a farmer or any citizen along the route had a niaim
against the company, it was jpromptly and fairly adjusted.
Notices were put up and circulars sent out that there
would be no need to hire damage-claim lawyers when
BACKGROUNDS 2i
there was a claim against the T. and B.V. Railroad ;
that all honest claims would be adjusted immediately.
“ The result was magical, and it was not long before
the patrons of the road understood that we were acting
in their interest as well as our own, and any attempt
— and there were many — to blackmail us in the usual
way that railroad corporations have been blackmailed,
found no sympathy with any jury along the line of the
road.”
During the eighties Texas was just passing from the
condition of a frontier where law was frequently enforced
by the individual, according as his hand was quick and
his eye true, and where order was a variable quantity.
House speaks admiringly of " those citizens of Texas
who died with their boots on — a death which every
citizen of Texas of those days coveted.”
We must picture him, accordingly, as a man who
spent his early years not merely in Eastern colleges and
schools, in cotton-farming and politics, but as the com-
panion and friend of the older generation — ” that intrepid
band,” he calls them, " that made Texas what she is
to-day. I make obeisance to them ! Nothing daunted
them. They tore a principality from a sovereign state
and moulded a trackless wilderness into a great common-
wealth. These men were the heroes of my childhood ;
and now when I am growing old and have seen many
men and many lands, I go back to them and salute them,
for I find they are my heroes still.”
With the younger generation of frontiersmen House
was on close personal terms, and for a while, after returning
from college and beginning his business as planter, he
lived their life. One of the oldest and perhaps the best
of these friends was the noted and picturesque Ranger,
Captain Bill McDonald, whose career House Mt to be so
22 BACKGROUNDS
typical of the Texas of those days that he could not
rest until it was put into a book.
" I wanted to have Sidney Porter (O. Henry) do it.
I had it in mind that he should write twelve stories,
each representing some incident in Bill’s life. I wrote
to Porter, whom I had known while he lived in Texas ;
but the letter was held back by his mother-in-law until
a few weeks aiterwards, when she visited him at his
summer home at New Ground, Long Island. In the
meantime, not having heard from Porter, I got in touch
with Albert Bigelow Paine through James Creelman,
whom I knew, and he undertook the work. ... I
received a letter from Porter after Paine had undertaken
the task, in which he said he would have Uked to have
done it, for it would have been a ‘ labour of love.’
" I was amused at Paine when Captain Bill arrived in
New York. Paine and I were waiting for him at the New
Amsterdam Hotel, at Fourth Avenue and Twenty-First
Street, which was convenient to the Players’ Club, where
Paine intended to stay while writing the memoirs. It
was a wld, wet night, and Bill came in with his ‘ slicker ’
and big Stetson hat. We went upstairs with him.
He took off his coat, pulled from one side his *45 and
from the other his automatic. He did this just as an
ordinary man takes out his keys and knife. I explained
to Paine that Bill had to cany his artillery in this way
in order to be thoroughly ballasted — that he would
have difiBlculty in walking without it.
“At this time Paine was writing the life of Mark
Twain and was living most of the time at Mark Twain’s
home, which was then in lower Fifth Avenue. Mr.
Clemens invited us to dmner one evening. I could not
go because of a previous engagement, but dropped in
later. When^ I arrived, Mark and Bill were pla3dng
billiards and it was amusing to see Bill sight his cue just
as if it were a rifle and, three times out of four, send his
ball ofl the table. It entertained Mr. Clemens immensely.
When we went upstairs, Clemens ran and Bill ran after,
/
BACKGROUNDS 23
as if to catch him, but did not do so. Bill winked at
me and said,.* I bdieve the old man really thinks I could
not catch him.’ Bill is as lean and as a^e as a panther.
'* Another time Paine invited Bill and me to take
dinner with him at the Players’. I found Bill in the
lobby of the hotel without a collar. I said, * Bill, you
have no collar on.’ He reached up his hand and replied,
* That’s so ; I forgot it.’ However, he made no move
to get one. Paine came in a few minutes later and
asked if he were ready to go to dinner. Bill replied that
he was. Paine then said, ' Captain, you have no collar
on.’ Bill remarked, * My God Almighty, can't;a m aTi go
to dinner in New York without a collar ? ’ Pame did not
press the matter further and Captain Bill went to the
Club just as he was, much to the amusement of everybody
there.
“ In my early boyhood I knew many of the Bill
McDonald type, although he was perhaps the flower of
them all. I knew personally many of the famous
desperadoes, men who had killed so many that they
had almost ceased to count their victims. . . .
'* There were two t37pes of so-called * killers ’ — one
that murdered simply for the pure love of it, and others
that killed because it was in their way of duty. Bill
McDonald belonged to this latter class. So also did
Blue-eyed Captain McKinney of the Rangers, whom I
knew in my ranching days in south-west Texas.
*' McKinney was fin^y ambushed and killed, as
almost every sheriff of La Salle County was killed
during that particular period. Whenever I went to
our ranch, I was never certain that I would return
home alive. Feuds were always going on, and in some
of these our ranch was more or less involved."
Fort Bend and Brazoria Counties, where the elder
House’s plantation lay, seemed to be the breeding-
place for bad men.
** They were different from the ordina^ desperado,
and only killed upon insult or fancied insult. Duels
BACKGROUNDS
24
were frequently fought on the plantation and were
always deadly. I recall two in particular. George
Tarver’s brother and his room-mate had some slight
quarrel concerning the bed they occupied in common.
I think the room-mate put his muddy boots on the
bedspread. ' Here, you can’t put those boots on the
bed,’ said George's brother. ‘ I can if I choose,’ was
the reply. There was only one possible outcome to the
debate. They went out, stood back to back, counted
aloud, walking ten paces, wheeled, fired, and advanced
upon one another. They fell dead almost in each
other’s arms, both having several mortal wounds. They
were good friends a quarter of an hour before the duel.
“ Another incident I remember. Jim Thompson
fancied that some man, whose name I have forgotten,
was making fun of him. He demanded that the man
get his shot^n. The man hesitated and made a faiflt
apology, which Thompson would not accept. The man
then got his shotgun, stepped out of the house, both
fired, and Thompson killed him instantly. Thompson
was missed by a few inches. They were so close together
when they fired that the buckshot went almost like a
rifle ball, having no time to scatter.
“ I asked Thompson why he was so insistent upon
fighting. He said he knew that if he had not called the
man to account, he would not have been able to live at
Areola and would have been branded as a coward. It
was necessary, he thought, either to kill or be killed,
and without further argument. . . .
I can hardly realize that so short a while ago we
lived in an atmosphere where such things seemed proper
and even a matter of course. I was often with men
whom I knew would surely be killed soon, and perhaps
at a time I was with them.
“ Governor Hogg^ did more than any executive in
Texas to break up this habit of public killing. ... He
also broke up strikes during his administration. Cap*
tain Bill McDonald, of the Ranger Service, was the
* Governor of Texas from 1890 to 1894.
BACKGROUNDS
25
instrument he used. Hogg sent word to the leaders
that if they continued to uncouple cars, or to do any-
thing that might interfere with the movement of trains,
he would shoot holes through them big enough to see
through. When Bill conveyed this to the ringleaders
and presented himself as the instrument through which
it was to be done, lawlessness ceased.
" The nearest I ever came to killing a man was in
Breckenridge, Colorado. It was in 1879, when the
town was merely a mining camp. I had gone to
Colorado at the request of Whitney Newton, a college
friend who was in Breckenridge at that time buying
gold dust and sending it to the Denver Mint by special
messengers, the express companies refusing to carry it
because of the danger of robbety.
" In going to Breckenridge in those days, one left
the main line of the railway at the little station of Como,
which at that time had but one house. A so-called
stage carried one from there to the mining camp. There
is no need to describe it, for it was like aU other camps
of that sort — trough men, and rougher women, gambling,
drinking, and killing. I was in a saloon, talking to a
ma n whom I had known in Texas, when the incident
I speak of occurred. A big, brawny individual came
into the room and began to abuse me in violent terms.
I TiaH never seen the man before and could not imagine
why he was doing this. I retreated, and he followed.
I had my overcoat on at the time and had my hand on
my six-shooter in my pocket and cocked it. The owner
of the saloon jumped over the bar between us. In five
seconds more I would have killed him. An explana-
tion followed which cleared up the mystery. He had
taken me for someone else against whom he had a grudge,
and whom he had seen but once. I learned later that
he was a popular ex-sheriff of Summit County and that
if I had killed him I should have been lynched within
the hour.
“ It alwa3rs amuses me when I see the bad men m
plays depicted as big, rough fellows with their trousers
26 BACKGROUNDS
in their boots and six-shooters buckled around their
waists. As a matter of fact, the bad men I have been
used to in southern Texas were as unlike this as day-
light from dark. They were usually gentle, mild-
mannered, mM-spoken, and often delicate-looking men.
They were invariably polite, and one not knowing the
species would be apt to misjudge them to such an extent
that a rough word or an insult would sometimes be
offered. This mistake of judgment was one that could
never be remedied, for a second opportunity was never
given.”
In later years House expressed intense amusement
at the oaths and objurgations of Parisian taxi-drivers,
which, however violent, never seemed to result in physical
encoimter. ” In Texas,” he said, " it was the reverse.
No words were wasted. Frequently the jSxst symptom
of mild disapproval would be a blow or revolver-shot.
People praise us Southerners for our courteous de-
meanour ; we learned it in a school of necessity.”
in
It would be a mistake to picture House’s early life
as merely that of the frontiersman. Quiet and unobtru-
sive as one of the mild-mannered desperadoes he
describes, and as courageous, he loved to meet every
variety of individual and he had a gift for bringing him-
sdf into touch with the Rangers and men of the back
districts.! He loved the open country, the smeU of the
camp-fire, and the meal cooked over its embers. But
his time was spent mostly in the towns and especially
in the capital. He knew the business men of Texas, the
^ S. V. Edwaxds, Captain of Rangers, wrote House, May 24, 1902:
" If you want anything in this new district all you have to do is indicate it,
• « . I am with you to a finish in any old thing/*
BACKGROUNDS 37
editors, lawyers, and educators; later they tried to
make him a trustee of the University of Texas. The
Mayor of Houston writes to him as “ My dear Ed.” and
the Governor signs himself " Your friend.”
His father had bequeathed to him a social position
in the State which he enjoyed maintaining and develop-
ing, so that, apart from the frequent journeys that he
made to Europe, he came constantly into contact with
persons of interest. The home in Houston was the
place where nearly every distinguished visitor that
came to Texas was entertained, Jefferson Davis among
the rest. " Father counted among his friends,” wrote
House, " the rich and the poor, the humble and the
great.”
The younger House followed in his footsteps. After
moving to Austin, he built a large house which became
the focus of the social and political life of the region.
” The large veranda to the south [wrote House] was
the scene, perhaps, of more political conferences than
any similar place in Texas. It was there that the clans
congregated. I had long made it a rule not to visit,
and it was understood that if anyone desired to see me,
it must be at my home. I did this not only to conserve
my strength, but because it enabled me to work under
more favourable conditions. I had an of&ce which I
was seldom in, and latterly I refused to make any
appointments there whatsoever. This necessarily led
to much entertaining, and our house was constantly
filled with guests. Those days and guests are among
the pleasantest recollections of my life.
" Many distinguished people, passing through
Austin, from time to time were our guests. Among
those that I admired most was Dr. Charles W- Eliot of
Harvard. His life and devotion to public service were
a revelation to me. He seemed to regulate his life in
a way to get the maximum of service for the public good.
28 BACKGROUNDS
" Baron d'Estoumelles de Constant of France was
another guest whose society I enjoyed while he was in
Texas. I remember when leaving me at the station he
remarked : ‘ My friends in Paris would be amazed if
they could hear me say I was leaving Austin, Texas,
with keen regret.’ ”
Apart from the interest which he took in men and
in their activities, a further characteristic should be
noted: constant and omnivorous reading. This fact
is to be deduced less from his correspondence and papers
than from the existence of a private library which he
developed and enlarged without cessation. It is an
illuminating instance of the man’s real tastes that when,
after the Paris Peace Conference, he had made a book-
plate, he omitted in its composition all references to
his diplomatic or political career; he chose as salient
features above the horse, dog, and camp-fire, the gun
and powder-flask, reminders of his early life — an open
hearth and books. The books which he read were of
all sorts, poetry and essays, but chiefly biography,
history, and political science. The main strength oJE
Colonel House in his later political career was, of course,
his understanding of human nature, his ability to enter
into friendly relations with all types ; but it would be
a mistake to overlook the strength he derived from books.
In such an atmosphere House began the career in
politics which soon became his real vocation, and it was
during those years that he underwent the political
schooling that prepared him to assume a guiding r 61 e
in national and international affairs. With all the
cosmopolitan tastes which he developed by constant
travel, and with every intention of entering the arena
of national politics, he regarded his life in Texas as a
necessary and delightful prologue. Before he could
BACKGROUNDS
29
acquire national influence, he must win prestige in his
own State. An ardent Democrat, he saw in Texas,
with its tremendous influence in the party, an ideal
spring-board. A liberal and progressive, he could
throw himself into the fight for liberal and progressive
legislation which Governor Hogg — " the inimitable
Hogg,” House calls him — ^was directing. He was ready
for the opportunity, which was not slow to knock upon
the door.
rv
The year 1892 was one of politico-social ferment
in Europe and the United States ; the forces of liberal
progressivism were everywhere arrayed against reaction.
In Texas the struggle was sharp. Governor Hogg,
whose courage and force had made him a dominating
influence in the State, was the centre of the storm ;
and because of his advanced ideas, many of which
found incorporation in sweeping legislative reforms,
he had aroused against himself a powerful group which
protested against his nomination for a second term.
The fight offered to the young House the opportimity
for which he had been waiting. '* House was not
nominally manager of the Hogg campaign," writes
T. W. Gregory, later Attorney-General, who was then
active in Texas politics, " but was chiefly responsible
for the organization, and to him Hogg owed a large
share of his victory ." ' For ten years House had watched
the mechanics of State politics, pondered the mistakes
of politicians, developed personal contacts. Already
he possessed the technique necessary for the conduct
^ Manuscript memorandum communicated to the author, August
1924.
30 BACKGROUNDS
of a campaign, and it was infused with an enthusiasm
for reform.
“ When I found that the railroads and the entire
corporate interests of Texas were combining to defeat
Hogg [wrote House], I enlisted actively in his behalf.
Although he had known me but a short time, we had
many times discussed political ways and means, and
he asked me and the then State Health Officer to take
charge of his campaign. Later the burden of it fell on
me. We selected a committee and got my good friend
General W. R. Hamby to act as chairman. That
campaign was a battle royal. We had no money, and
every daily paper in Texas was against us. Hogg’s
opponent was Judge George Clark, of Waco. When
the Clarkites foimd we had sufficient votes to nominate
Hogg, they bolted the convention and nominated Clark.
The Republicans endorsed him and we had another
hard fight at the election, but Hogg won by a decisive
majority. It was a bitter fight and the wounds lasted
many years. It was the first firm stand the people of
any Americ^ State had taken against the privileged
classes, and it attracted attention throughout the Union.
" I felt that Governor Hogg’s confidence in me
was a great compliment, because of my youth and, as
far as anyone knew, because of my lack of political
experience.
“So in politics I began at the top rather than at
the bottom, and I have been doing since that day pretty
much what I am doing now — that is, advising and
helping wherever I might.”
With the success of the Hogg campaign, the political
position of House in Texas evidently became assured.
“ From 1892 to 1902 [Mr. Gregory writes] House
took- continual interest in the elections and the admin-
ktration of Texas. . . . From the first he displayed that
quality which made him of such value to the successive
BACKGROUNDS
31
Governors and to President Wilson, an almost uncanny
ability to foretell the effects which any measure would
have upon public opinion. He was offered by them
and declined many positions of honour and power, and
he might have been Governor himself, . . .
" In 1894 he managed Culberson’s successful cam-
paign. He was again in charge when Culberson was
re-elected in 1896, In 1898 and 1900 he directed the
successful campaigns of Major Joseph D. Sayers. He
was active in the Lanham campaigns of 1902 and 1904.”
Apart from the fact that House himself consistently
refused office, one notes especially, in the first place,
that he was invariably successful in his political ventures,
and in the second place, that he did not rely upon a
“ machine,” for House’s candidate for Governor was
almost invariably opposed by his predecessor. It was
a curious manifestation of electoral skill, political judg-
ment, or good luck, according as the reader may choose.
Thus in 1894 Governor Hogg and House disagreed upon
his successor. The Governor supported the veteran
Senator Reagan, who had served in Jefferson Davis’s
Cabinet ; House was behind the State’s Attorney-General,
Charles A. Culberson. Both were liberals. As always
in Texas, the real struggle was at the Democratic Con-
vention, where in addition to Reagan and Culberson
two other candidates appeared — one of them as leader
of the reactionary forces in the party which had been
suppressed by Hogg. House pointed out the danger
of division in the liberal camp. All the reform legisla-
tion of the past four years was threatened, and it could
be saved only if one of the two liberals withdrew.
The final interview between the Governor and his
recalcitrant adviser must have been picttiresque, Hogg
was immense, loud, commanding, with his "Young
man, you’ll do as I tdl you, if you know what’s good
32 BACKGROUNDS
for you.” House, of slight build and quiet manner,
speaking almost in a monotone, was inflexible in his
argument that liberalism in Texas depended upon the
union of the progressive forces and that to secure it
Reagan must withdraw. It ended with Hogg going
to Reagan, who magnanimously agreed to retire in
order to avoid the split in the liberal group. ” Texas
never produced a nobler citizen than Judge John H.
Reagan,” wrote House. " He was honest, he was able,
and he was fearless.”
Doubtless it was easier for House to pass this high
estimate upon his erstwhile opponent, in that his retire-
ment paved the way for the nomination of Culberson.
Great was the astonishment of the convention when the
man chosen to nominate Reagan, after beginning with
the conventional eulogy of his subject, proceeded in the
peroration to announce his withdrawal and to second
Culberson himself. House stayed in the convention
until his man had received a majority, then walked over
to the dub to congratulate him. It was characteristic
of his foresight that he had by him the expert accountant
Major Edward Sammons, who could add fractions in
his head, so that in the convention (where fractional
votes of delegations are common) he knew the result
some minutes before the derks themsdves. ” The
truth is, as I told you,” wrote Culberson to House,
August 17, 1894, ” I could not have won except through
your splendid management.”
” This is the only time in my political career [wrote
House] that I openly assumed the chairmanship of a
campaign. It has been my habit to put someone else
noDcmally at the head, so that I could do the real work
undisturbed by the demands which are made upon a
chairman.
BACKGROUNDS
33
“ The public is almost childish in its acceptance
of the shadow for the substance. Each chairman of
the campaigns which I directed received the publicity
and the applause of both the press and the people during
and after the campaign had been brought to a successful
conclusion. ‘ They passed out of pubhc notice within a
few months, or at most within a year ; and yet when
the next campaign came around, the public and the
press as eagerly accepted another figure-head. . . .
“ In every campaign I have insisted that the candi-
date whose fortunes I directed should in no instance
make any pre-election promises, either directly, indirectly,
or otherwise. I pointed out that it was bad morals
and worse politics. The opposition usually promised
everything, and it was not infrequent that two men
would meet that had been promised the same office."
Four years later a similar situation developed when
Governor Culberson, after a second term, supported
his Attorney-General, M. M, Crane, while House opposed
him — ^largely on the groimd that the Attorney-General-
ship was becoming a stepping-stone to the Governorship.
" I did not believe it was a good precedent to follow,"
he wrote, " because it would cause an Attorney-General
to become something of a demagogue, perhaps uncon-
sciously but nevertheless surely." He agreed, therefore,
to direct the political forttmes of a Texas Congressman
who during the entire campaign remained in Washington,
Major Joseph Sayers,
" Culberson urged me not to do this [wrote House],
declaring that defeat was certain. ... I did not heed his
advice. It looked as if it would be necessary to do what
was done in the Culberson-Reagan fig^ht four years
before, and that was, to break down the organization
which had been built up during the previous administra-
tion. This was not disagreeable to me, for I was never
a believer in political machines.
1—3
34 BACKGROUNDS
“ In the Culberson race I had to overcome the Hogg
organization which I had helped to brdld up. In the
Sayers-Crane campmgn it was necessary to defeat the
Culberson organization. ... In justice to that organiza-
tion, it pleases me to say that most of them came to
offer their services in behalf of Sayers if I demanded it.
T his I did in no instance, advising them to go where
their sympathies and interests lay.
“ The two other candidates in this campaign were
Lieutenant-Governor Jester and Colonel Wynne of
Fort Worth. At the start I assumed that Crane had
eighty per cent, of the chances for success. However,
there were no single counties in Texas he could call
clearly his own, while there were many counties that
could not be taken from Sayers.
“ We had our friends in these Sayers counties call
their primaries early. The Crane forces saw what we
were doing, but wctc unable to respond in kind because
they had no counties which they were absolutely certain
of canying. The result was that when county after
county declared for Sayers and we had practically reached
the end of our strength. Crane in a fit of depression
withdrew from the race.
“ The Dallas News called me over the telephone at
twelve o’dock at night and said that Crane had sent in
his written withdrawal. They asked me if I had any
statement to make. I replied I would make one in the
morning. I lay awake for nearly an hour, enjoying the
victory, and then went back to sleep. In the morning
before I arose I reached for one of my pockets, secured
an old envelope, and wrote in pencil our opinion of
Crane's withdrawal. I took occasion to compliment
Crane upon his great patriotism in bowing to the will
of the people, and I declared that it was certain that Mr.
Jester and Colonel W3mne would not be larTring in as
high patriotic motives^ and that the electorate of Texas
could look forward with certainty to their early with-
drawal. The result was that both Jester and Wynne
b^an to deny they had any intention of withdrawing.
BACKGROUNDS
35
But the deed was done, and Jester actually withdrew
within a few weeks and W3nine did not stand the pres-
sure much longer.”
Major Sayers displayed at the moment a gratitude
and modesty which the elect of the people are not always
prone to manifest.
” Your success in the management of my canvass
[he wrote House, May 17, 1898] has been unprecedented
in the history of political campaigns. You have taken
a disorganized and probably a minority force at the
outset and driven from the field the candidate of an
organized majority. You have not only done this, but
you have also held in fine the lukewarm and trivial of
our own party and have made them brave, vigorous,
confident, and aggressive. Your generalship has indeed
been superb, and considering that your own candidate
was absent from the State and has not made a political
speech outside of his own district in more than twenty
years . . . your success has been without a parallel m
Texas politics. ... I have felt that it would be wise in
me to leave the entire matter to yourself.”
The situation was not less piquant in that Culberson,
who opposed House’s candidate for Governor, was him-
self r unning for the United States Senate and asked
House to direct his campaign. The latter acceded, and
the election of Culberson proved to be the beginning of
a senatorial career that lasted a quarter of a century.
V
House’s political activities in Texas were by no
means confined to elections. Under both Hogg and
Culberson he took a constant interest in legislation and
gradually came to occupy the same position in the State
36 . BACKGROUNDS
as he was later to assume in national affairs. He believed
first in the necessity of reform, and next in an intelligent
and reasoned foundation for reform measures, and he
spared no study or effort in the preparation of bills.
His pride in the accomplishment of the Texas Governors
was great, and perhaps not unjustified.
“ House was always a progressive [writes Gregory],
and in many respects a pronounced radical, almost
invariably being more advanced in his ideas than the
persons he was working with. This genuine interest in
progressive legislation accounts -to a large degree for his
interest in politics. He wanted to see advanced ideas
placed upon the statute books. It is interesting to note
that, although rated as one of the wealthy men of Texas,
he was invariably aligned politically on the side of the
plain people and against most of those with whom he
was socially intimate.”
” In Texas I worked, I think [wrote House], not only
for Texas itself, but also in the hope that the things we
worked for there would be taken up by the country at
large ; and in this I was gratified. The great measures
which Governor Hogg advocated, like the Railroad
Commission, the Stock and Bond law, were largely written
into national law later. Texas was the pioneer of suc-
cessful progressive legislation, and it was all started
during Hogg’s administrations. ... I see it stated from
time to time that California, Wisconsin, and other States
were the first to impress the progressive movement upon
the nation. This is not true ; Texas was the first in the
field, and the others followed.
" Even in municipal reform, Texas led the way.
Galveston initiated the commission form of government,
and nearly all the other Texas cities of importance fol-
lowed. It was then taken up in Iowa and I oftoi hear
of the ‘ Dubuque idea.’ As a matter of fact, they took
over the idea from Texas.
" Governor Hogg, I think, we will have to place as
BACKGROUNDS
37
the foremost Texan, giving Sam Houston the second
place. He did not have the fine, analytical mind that
Culberson has, but he possessed a force, vision, and
courage to carry out, that few men I have known possess.
With Hogg it was always a pleasure to enter a fight,
for it was certain that there would be no compromise
until victory crowned the effort. He was afraid of
nothing and gloried in a conflict.
“ It is a great pity that he did not go into national
life when he left the gubernatorial chair. His proper
place would have been in the House of Representatives,
although he might have gone to the Senate had he so
desired.”
House’s relations with Governor Culberson were even
closer than with Hogg. Many people have wondered
how it was possible for the Colonel later to find a way
to make himself indispensable to President Wilson and
by what magic he maintained himself as the President’s
unof&cial adviser. There was less of magic than of
experience, for during his Texas days he had been doing
exactly the same sort of thing for the Governors.
” During Culberson’s terms as Governor pie recorded]
I devoted myself as constantly to his administration of
public affairs as I have since to Woodrow Wilson’s as
President. I went to his of&ce at the Capitol nearly
every day, and sometimes continued my work there
until nightfall.”
House’s files are filled with letters like the following :
” Knowing that you have a great deal more influence
with the Governor-elect than anyone else, and as I ask
nothing for myself, I venture to write you in behalf
of a friend of mine,” etc. And from the holder of an
appointive of&ce : “I presume the crisis will approach
BACKGROUNDS
38
very soon in matters political. When it comes, please
remember me in your prayers.”
The Governor evidently relied upon House both as
political confidant and personal friend. So much is
made clear by the numerous letters that passed between
them.
“You must take charge of things here [wrote Culber-
son] and organize the work. My room will be open to
you at all hours.”
And at the opening of a legislative session :
" It is impossible for me to be in Austin prior to the
organization of the legislature, and in fact I do not
know when I can get there. This busy time I wish you
would seek the Speaker, whoever he may be, and talk
with him about the committees on taxation and revenue,
finance and contingent expenses."
" In my day [ran a letter from Culberson, dated
February i, 1895] I have had many friends, but you
have been more than any to me. . . . There is nothing in
the way of happiness and prosperity and honour good
enough for you in my view, yet I hope for you all that
is attainable-.”
After Culberson entered the Senate, the friendship ,
evidently persisted, for he writes to House : “I wish I
could see you to-day and have a long talk. I feel that
way often these days. . . . Take a pencil and write me
confidentially how I stand with the Democrats in the
State now. Give me the thing straight, no matter how
the <Aips may fall.” And when a certain bill came up
m the Senate : “ What do you think of it ? Write me
fully and at your earliest convenience, because I want
to kudy it.”
BACKGROUNDS
39
It was Governor Hogg who provided House with the
title of " Colonel,” by appointing him, entirely without
the recipient’s suspicion, to his staff. The staff officer’s
uniform .could be, and was, bestowed upon an ancient
and grateful darkey, but the title proved to be adhesive.
There is a certain poetic justice, almost classical in
character, to be seen in the punishment thus laid upon
House, who spent his life in avoiding office and titles,
and during the World War exercised as much ingenuity
in escaping European Orders as in his diplomatic negotia-
tions : henceforth, despite his protests, he became and
remained “ Colonel House,” or even " The Colonel.”
With the succeeding Governors, House’s relations
were not so dose, but it is obvious that in 1902 his
influence in Texas affairs still dominated. He was the
directing spirit in the election of Lanham in that year,
who wrote to him in gratitude for ” your discreet advice
and promptness to suggest to me. Always say just
what you think, for it will be received in the spirit
tendered.” And again : ” The fact that your influence
was for me has been of incalculable benefit to me. . . .
The knowledge of your friendship for me will also deter
other entries into the field. ... I need and appredate
your counsel.” At the same period a letter from Con-
gressman, later Postmaster-General, Burleson indicates
that it had become a state tradition for House to draw
up the party platform.
** I tender my congratulations upon the skill you
have displayed in drafting the platform. ... It is such
a great improvement, from the standpoint of brevity,
over those you have ^ven us in the past, that I think
the State is to be felidtated upon the prospects of its
adoption.”
40
BACKGROUNDS
But tlie end of this phase of House's career was
approaching. “ When another election drew near,” he
wrote, ” I refused to interest myself in any way.” We
find him asked by both candidates for his advice, which
” I gave to each of them — advice which in no way con-
flicted.” Apparently the one heeded the advice, while
the other ” was so certain of success that he left his
campaign to be nm in the old slipshod way, to find
himself defeated.”
VI
” I had grown thoroughly tired of the position I
occupied in Texas,” wrote House. He had, it is true,
the satisfaction of participating in the administration
of a great commonwealth ; ten years of Texas success
had been admirable preparation. They gave him the
political experience and prestige he needed. But now
he felt equipped for a broader field. "Go to the front
where you belong,” wrote Governor Hogg in 1900.
“ During all these years [recorded House] I had never
for a moment overlooked the national situation, and it
was there that my real interest lay. In 1896 I was
ready to take part in national affairs. My power in
Texas was sufficient to have given me the place I desired
in the national councils of the party.
” The nomination of Bryan in 1896 and the free silver
issue made me feel the unwisdom of entering national
party politics under such conditions. I therefore bided
my time.”
He proved that he knew how to wait. Three national
campaigns followed in which the Democratic Party was
dominated by Mr. Bryan or by Eastern conservatives,
and House stood aloof. In each campaign overtures
were made with the purpose of giving him a responsible
BACKGROUNDS
41
share in its management, but on each occasion he
evaded them. The Democrats must embrace the liberal
creed, he insisted, but it must be cleansed of the Bryan
financial heresies. None the less. House came more and
more into touch with the national Democratic leaders
and with Bryan himself, and established a close personal
friendship.
“ Mr. Bryan’s daughter, Grace, had not been well and
' he wished to spend a winter south. Governor Hogg and
I undertook to arrange a home for the Bryans practically
within the same grounds as ours. ... So he, Mrs. Bryan,
and the children lived there next to us during the winter,
and I had many opportunities to discuss with him
national affairs and the coming campaign. It was the
winter, I think, of 1898 and 1899.
“ I found Mrs. Bryan very amenable to advice and
suggestion, but Mr. Bryan was as wildly impracticable
as ever. I do not believe that anyone ever succeeded
in changing his mind upon any subject that he had
determined upon. ... I believe he feels that his ideas
are God-given and are not susceptible to the mutability
of those of the ordinary human being.
“ He often told me that a man that did not believe
in ‘ the free and unlimited coinage of silver at 16-1 was
either a fool or a knave.’ He was so convinced of this
that he was not susceptible to argument.”
In 1900 Bryan went down to defeat for the second
time. In 1904 the quarrels of the Eastern and Western
Democrats would have ensured disaster even in the face
of a weaker candidate than Roosevd.t. “ I returned to
Texas,” wrote House, “ discouraged over the prospects
of the Democratic Party ever being able to rehabilitate
itself.” In 1908 came the third Bryan candidacy and
defeat.
But already the Democratic sun was about to rise.
42 BACKGROUNDS
The difficulties in the Republican Party, which threatened
under Roosevelt, became more obvious in the succeeding
administration. They were intensified after Roosevelt’s
return from travel abroad by his own outburst of dis-
content at the policies adopted by Mr. Taft, whose
~ sdection as President he had himself demanded. The
apparent control of the Republican Party by the Old
Guard, alleged to be tied up to the “ interests,” the
unsatisfied demand for measures of social reform, the
threat of the new Progressive movement in the heart
of the party itself, pointing to a possible split — all gave
hope to the Democrats. That this hope was not entirely
illusory seemed indicated by the state and congressional
elections of 1910, when the political pendulum swung
far in their direction.
Colonel House was watching the opportunity. The
great problem was to find a leader. In 1910 he came
East from Texas and, like Diogenes, sought a man.
“ I began now to look about [he wrote] for a proper
candidate for the Democratic nomination for President.
In talking with Mr. Bryan, he had mentioned Mayor
Ga3mor of New York as the only man in the East whom
he thought measured up to the requirements.
“ I felt sure the nomination should go to the East,
and I also felt it was practically impossible to nominate
or elect a man that Mr. Bryan opposed. I therefore
determined to look Mr. Gaynor over with the thought
of him as a possibility.
“ I used my good friend James Credman to bring
us together. Credman was nearer to Gaynor than any
other man. He arranged a dinner at the Lotus Club,
at which only the three of us were present, and it was a
ddightful affair. The food and the wine were of the
b^t, for Credman was a connoisseur in this line. The
dinner lasted until after twdve o’dock. I had been
told that Gaynor was brusque even to rudeness, but I
BACKGROUNDS
43
did not find him so in the slightest. He knew perfectly
well what the dinner was for, and he seemed to try to
put his best side to the front. ... He showed a knowledge
of public affairs altogether beyond my expectations and
greater, indeed, than that of any public man that I at
that time knew personally who was a possibility.”
” I proceeded to follow up this dinner by bringing
such friends as I thought advisable in touch with him.
“ One day Creelman and I went to the Mayor’s
office by appointment, to introduce Senator Culberson
and Senator R. M. Johnson, editor of the Houston Post
and Democratic National Committeeman from Texas. . . .
I got Culberson and Johnson to second my invitation to
Gaynor to go to Texas during the winter and address
the Texas legislature. Ga3mor consented. When I went
to Texas I asked some members of the legislature to
introduce a resolution inviting him to address them.
This was done and the invitation telegraphed to him.
A newspaper reporter of one of the small Texas dailies
sent Gaynor a telegram asking him about it. Gaynor
telegraphed back something to the effect that he had no
notion of coming to Texas to address the legislature and
had never heard of any such proposal.”
Reasonable explanation of this surprising volte-face
on the part of Mayor Gaynor has never been advanced.
It may have been that he failed to appreciate the value
of the support of Texas — a vital misjudgment, as the
Baltimore Convention of 1912 proved. Or it may have
been merely another example of the erratic and whimsical
nature of the Mayor which did so much to vitiate his
undeniably statesmanlike qualities. Colond House felt
certain, in any case, that Gaynor’ s blindness to the
opportunity he had created, indicated a lack of political
sagacity.
“ I wiped Gaynor from my political slate [he wrote],
for I saw he was impossible. I was confirmed in this
BACKGROUNDS
44
resolution when Dix was nominated for Governor of
New York, which I wanted Ga3mor to accept. Some of
the Mayor’s other friends thought that it would be a
mistake to accept the nomination, that to be Mayor of
New York meant greater honour and more power than
to be Governor of the State. I contended that the
people would hesitate to nominate or elect a mayor of
a city to the Presidency, but if he were elected Governor
he would become the logical candidate.”
House continued his search. He had carefully con-
sidered Senator Culberson, and frequently discussed with
him the possibility of the presidential nomination. But
Culberson's health was poor. Furthermore, House
believed that he was too purely a Southerner to make a
successful race. The candidate must come, if possible,
from the East ; he must attract the West by his liberalism. ,
” I now turned to Woodrow Wilson [House wrote],
then Governor of New Jersey, as being the only man in
the East who in every way measured up to the office
for which he was a candidate.”
House had never met Wilson, but his attention had
been called to him by Wilson’s ambitious reform pro-
gramme in New Jersey and the success with which he
was driving it through the legislature. He studied his
background, which was admirable in that he had no
political record and thus started with no political enemies,
while his troubled career at Princeton seemed to label
him as an opponent of aristocratic privilege. He
studied his speeches, which he believed should be
classed with the finest political rhetoric extant. There
was obviously in him the capacity for moral leadership.
Late in the year House returned to Texas convinced
that he had found his man, although as yet he had never
BACKGROUNDS 45
met him. “ I decided to do what I could,” he writes,
“ to further Governor Wilson’s fortunes. I spoke to all
my political friends and following, and lined them up
one after another. This was in the winter of 1910-1911.”
Thereafter we find House making arrangements to
bring the Governor to Texas, in clearing up doubts of
his party regularity, in securing the aid of Culberson
and striving for that of Bryan. A letter to E. S. Martin,
editor of Life, makes it plain that House’s support of
Wilson as yet rested less upon his personal admiration
for him than upon the conviction of Wilson’s availability.
“ The trouble with getting a candidate for President
[he wrote, August 30, 1911] is that the man that is
best fitted for the place cannot be nominated and, if
nominated, could probably not be elected. The people
seldom take the man best fitted for the job ; therefore
it is necessary to work for the best man who can be
nominated and elected, and just now Wilson seems to
be that man.”
Thus in his work for WUson, House was serving the
Democratic cause rather than the man, whom he had
never seen.
One afternoon late in November, Governor Wilson
called alone on Colonel House at the Hotel Gotham,
where the latter was sta3dng. From that moment
began the personal friendship which was so powerfully
to affect the events of the following years.
CHAPTER III
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
It looks to me as if they depended too much upon speech-making and
noisy demonstrations^ and not enough upon organization.
House to Wtlson, August 28, 1912
I
W oodrow WILSON and Colonel House first
met on November 24, 1911, a year before the
presidential election. Already House had
decided definitely that circumstances made of Wilson
the most available candidate, one who could arouse the
enthusiasm of the voters in the electoral campaign, and
one who, if elected, possessed the courage and the
imagination to lead a vigorous reform administration.
For these were the two qualities which the Colonel
believed essential to a successful President.
Governor Wilson, in his turn, must have found his
curiosity piqued by the friendly efforts of the unseen
House, word of which had been brought to him during
the summer. Without experience in national politics,
he knew little or nothing of the career of House in Texas,
nor of his relations there with the successive Governors
and with Bryan. But he appreciated the skill with
which House, working through Senator Culberson, had
disposed of the attacks on Wilson’s party regularity that
threatened to destroy his candidacy even while in the em-
bryonic stage ; and he was impressed by the success of his
address in Texas which House and Gregory had arranged,
46
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 47
This beginning of what Sir Horace Plunkett later
called “ the strangest and most fruitful personal alliance
in human history,” should properly have taken place
under more dramatic auspices. The small hotel room
where they met did not add glamour to the occasion
and neither could guess what the political future held
in store for them. But each evidently experienced an
instinctive personal liking for the other which ripened
immediately into genuine friendship. The first impres-
sions of Wilson can only be deduced from the almost
affectionate tone of the letters that he wrote to House
after the interview. Those of the Colonel have been
preserved in more definite form.
“ He came alone to the Gotham quite promptly at
four [recorded House], and we talked for an hour. He
had an engagement to meet Phelan, afterwards Senator
from California, at five o’clock, and expressed much
regret that he could not continue our conversation.
We arranged, however, to meet again within a few days,
when at my invitation he came to dine with me.
” Each time after that we met at the Gotham, as
long as I remained in New York that autumn and winter
and whenever he came to the city.
“ From that first meeting and up to to-day [1916],
I have been in as dose touch with Woodrow Wilson as
with any man I have ever known. The first hour we
spent together proved to each of us that there was a
sound basis for a fast friendship. We found ourselves
in such complete sympathy, in so many ways, that we
soon learned to know what each was thinking without
either having expressed himself.
“ A few weeks after we met and after we had ex-
changed confidences which men usually do not exchcmge
except after years of friendship, I asked him if he realized
that we had only known one another for so short a time.
He replied, ‘ My dear friend, we have known one another
always.’ And I think this is true.”
48 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
It is curious to note that it was the personal amiability
of Mr. Wilson, rather than his intellectual qualities or
political ideas, which impressed House at the outset.
He thus reported this first interview to his brother-in-
law :
Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes^
New York, November's, 1911
Dear Sidney :
I had a delightful visit from Woodrow Wilson yester-
day afternoon, and he is to dine with me alone next
Wednesday. . . .
I am glad that he has arrived, and we had a perfectly
bully time. He came alone, so that we had an oppor-
timity to try one another put.
He is not the biggest man I have ever met, but he is
one of the pleasantest and I would rather play with him
than any prospective candidate I have seen.
From what I had heard, I was afraid that he had to
have his hats made to order ; but I saw not the slightest
evidence of it. . . .
Never before haYe I found both the man and the
opportunity.
Fraternally yours
E. M. H.
Writing in November to Senator Culberson, House
expressed his thorough satisfaction with Wilson as a
candidate and solidified the support which the influential
Texan Senator was already prepared to offer. The more
I see of Governor Wilson the better I like him,” said
House, “ and I think he is going to be a man one can
advise with some degree of satisfaction. This, you know,
you could never do with Mr. Bryan.”
Wilson’s amenability to advice at this period per-
i Thea President of the University of Texas, later President of the
College of the City of New York,
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 49
mitted an important development which House suggested
and carried .through. The Governor had taken as his
chief text for campaign speeches the political control of
privileged interests under Republican Administrations.
He had not, however, emphasized the importance of
the real stronghold of privilege and the means by which
it might be attacked. If Wilson were to pose as the
champion of the “ common man,” he must not overlook
the tariff.
“ In reading the speeches he was making in 1911
[recorded Colonel House], I noticed he was not stressing
the tariff. _ I called his attention to this and thought it
was a mistake. Underwood and Champ Clark were
making this a feature. I was sure Wilson could do it
better than they, and, since it was becoming a prominent
issue of the campaign, I advised striking a strong note
on the subject in order at once to call attention to him-
self as a fit champion of the Democratic cause. I sug-
gested that he let me invite D. F. Houston,^ who had
made a lifelong study of the question, to come to New
York for consultation.
“The Governor agreed to the advisability of this
move, and Houston came. I gave a diimer at the
Gotham [December 7]. The others present besides
Governor Wilson were Houston, Walter Page, McCombs,
and Edward S. Martin. I seated Houston by Wilson
and arranged it so they could talk afterwards. Before
dinner I went over the data which Houston had prepared,
and added to it and eliminated from it whatever seemed
necessary. This data was afterwards given to Governor
Wilson, who based his tariff speeches largely on it.”
The effect of Wilson’s tariff speeches was destined to
put him in the popular mind as the chief antagonist of
» Formerly President of the University of Texas ; at this time Chan-
cellor of Washington University, and later a member of Wilson's Cabinet-
1—4
50 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
Republican policies and therefore the natural repre-
sentative of the Democratic point of view. The dinner
at the Gotham also assured the enthusiastic support of
Mr. Houston.
Dr. D. F. Houston to Dr. S. E. Mezes
Washington University, St. Louis
December ii, 1911
My dear Mezes :
... I have just returned from New York, where I
saw a great deal of Mr. House and something of some
other people. I will tell you all about it, including the
Wilson part of it. Wilson is the straightest-thinking
man in public life, and can say what he thinks better than
any other man. He may not be a great executive ofiEicer,
but neither was Lincoln, and I am for him. Wilson is
dean, courageous, and disinterested. It will be a
libersd education to the community to have Wilson do
the talking, such of it as he ought to do and will have
to do.
I can’t tell you how much I enjoyed my visit with
Mr. House, espedally on the train. He has a vision.
I should like to make him Dictator for a while. . . .
Cordially yours
D. F. Houston
II
The various booms for candidates were now beginning
to assume definite form. The Wilson movement was
regarded more seriously by the practical machine poli-
ticians than hitherto, but wiseacres bdieved that the
fin^ struggle would be between Underwood of Alabama
and Hsumon of Ohio. Both were regarded as repre-
senting conservative interests. Champ Clark of Missouri,
. esteemed a radical, was mentioned by those who realized
the dif&culty of success with a conservative standard-
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 51
bearer and who feared that Wilson, after his fight with
the New Jersey bosses, would not be inclined to accept
the orders of any machine.
Both House and Governor Wilson understood that
the approval of Bryan would be a factor essential to
the success of Wilson’s candidacy, and from the autumn
until the time of the nominating convention. House
worked ceaselessly to secure it. The intimacy with
Mr. Bryan which he had developed in Texas now proved
of inestimable value, for he knew exactly which of
Wilson’s qualities would attract Bryan and therefore
deserved emphasis ; he laid especial weight upon the
fact that the reactionary forces in the Democratic Party
were fighting both Bryan and Wilson.
“ Before I left for Texas, in December 1911 [wrote
House], it was imderstood that I should nurse Bryan
and bring him around to our way of thinking, if possible.
Before Mr. Bryan left New York for Jamaica, he asked
me to keep him informed concerning political conditions
and to send him such clippings as I thought would be
of interest. He said he was taking but few papers ;
the World, the Washington Post, I tmnk he mentioned,
because I wondered why he took either of them, since
they were both so antagonistic to him.
“ However, his request gave me an opportunity to
send him such clippings as I thought would influence
him most in our direction.”
As early as November, we find House writing to
Senator Culberson : “I saw Mr. Bryan just before he
sailed for Jamaica and I think I removed several ob-
stades that were in his mind, and I got him in almost -
as good an attitude as one could desire.” Thereafter
House called Bryan’s attention to all the Wilson char-
acteristics likely to attract his approval.
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
S2
Colonel House to Mr. W. J. Bryan
New York, November 23, 1911
Dear Mr. Bryan :
. . . Governor Wilson called yesterday afternoon
and was with me for an hour and a half.
I am pleased to tell you that when I asked him what
he thought of the Supreme Court ruling about which
we talked when you were here, he replied in almost
the exact terms you used to me. As far as I can see,
your positions are identical.
He is also opposed to the Aldrich plan,^ but I think
you are both wrong there. You will have to convert
me the next time I see you.
I am inclined to think that Aldrich is trying to give
the country a more reasonable and stable system. It
seems to me a long way in advance of the money trust
which now dominates the credit of the nation.
There is some evidence that Mr. Underwood and
his friends intend to make a direct issue with you for
control of the next convention, and it looks a little
as if they were receiving some aid from Champ Clark
and his friends.
My feding is that we can lay them low, but we must
not lag in the doing of it. . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
New York, December 6, 1911
Dear Mr. Bryan :
... I was called over the telephone last week by a
friend of Mr. Hearst, who made an appointment to see
me. He said that Mr. Hearst had been out to his
country place on Sunday and they had talked about
enlisting me in his behalf for the presidential nomination.
^ For a central bank. Wilson ultimately accepted House’s arguments
for centralized control of banking which materialized in the Federal
Reserve Act. See Chapter VI.
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 53
I told him that I was thoroughly committed to
Governor Wilson and that, even if I were not, I would
advise Mr. Hearst to submerge himself for a while and
work within the party for a season. After further
conversation it developed that he was grooming himself
for a dark horse.
I do not know what effect my talk had, but as yet
he has made no formal announcement.
I learned, too, that he was favomrable to Underwood
or Champ Clark and was against Governor Wilson.
I took lunch with Colonel Harvey yesterday. It
is the first time I have met him. I wanted to determine
what his real attitude was towards Governor Wilson,
but I think I left as much in the dark as ever.
He told me that everybody south of Canal Street
was in a frenzy against Governor Wilson and said they
were bringing all sorts of pressure upon him to oppose
him. He said he told them he had an open mind, and
that if they could convince him he was a dangerous
man he would do so.
He said that Morgan was particularly virulent in
his opposition to Governor Wilson. I asked him what
this was based upon, and he said upon some remark
Governor Wilson had made in Morgan’s presence con-
cerning the methods of bankers and which Morgan took
as a personal reference.
He told me that he believed that any ^ount of
money that was needed to defeat Governor Wilson could
be readily obtained. He said he would be surprised
if they did not put $250,000 in New Jersey done in
order to defeat delegates favourable to his nomination.
We are going to try to devise some plan by which
we can use this WjJI Street opposition to Governor
Wilson to his advantage. If the country knows of their
determination to defeat him by the free use of money,
I am sure it will do the rest. . . .
If you can make any suggestions regarding the best
way to meet the Wall Street attack, I would greatly
appreciate it.
54 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
From now, letters will reach me at Austin, Texas.
With kind regards and best wishes for all of you,
I am
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
There was in the foregoing letter a cleverness which
might escape the too casual reader. In the form of
simple narrative Colonel House underlined the activities
of Hearst, who was anathema to Bryan, and emphasized
Hearst’s preference for Clark over Wilson ; he then
indicated the interest Wall Street exhibited in the
defeat of Wilson ; and he concluded by an assumption
that Bryan would naturally align himself with the forces
that stimulated the enmity of Hearst and Wall Street.
Mr. Bryan evidently wavered. He had opposed Harmon
from the first, as a rank reactionary, and he refused to
consider Underwood. If Clark were to have the support
of the New York group, Bryan might be drawn to Wilson.
Mr. W. J. Bryan to Colonel House
KntGSTON, Jauaica, Decemberz'S, 1911
My DEAR Mr. House :
. . . Am anxious to get back and find out more of
the political situation. I shall attend the Washington
banquet on the 8th of January and will have a chance
to learn how things are shaping up.
I am glad Governor Wuson recognizes that he has
the opposition of Morgan and the rest of Wall Street.
If he is nominated it must be by the Progressive Demo-
crats, and the more progressive he is the better.
The Washington banquet will give him a good chance
to speak out against the trusts and the Aldrich currency
scheme.
Yours very truly
W. J. Bryan
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 55
The Washington banquet, to which he referred, gave
a good chance to Bryan himself to exhibit his personal
generosity, for just before it Wilson’s opponents published
a letter which, while President of Princeton, he had
written to Mr. Adrian Joline, some five years previous.
In the letter appeared this unfortunate sentence :
“ Would that we could do something at once dignified
and effective to knock Mr. Bryan once for aU into a
cocked hat.” It would have been only human nature
if the Commoner had then and there forsworn Mr. Wilson
and all his works. Instead, he did not permit himself
to show any pique and at the dinner manifested the ut-
most cordiality to the Governor, who himself in a speech
of rare discretion emphasized the admiration that aU
good Democrats felt towards Mr. Bryan.
It is possible that his friendliness towards Wilson
was enhanced by the controversy between the Governor
and Colonel George Harvey, which received much
publicity as the result of a spirited exchange of letters
between Mr. McCombs and Colonel Watterson. For
Bryan distrusted Harvey as a representative of New
York interests.
House appreciated keenly the part which Colond
Harvey had played in setting Governor Wilson on the
road to political fortune. Harvey had encouraged
biTn to give up his academic career and try the luck of
politics; he had influenced the New Jersey machine
to give him the nomination for Governor. From the
first he had worked with the possibility of the presidential
nomination in mind. But the fervour with which he
supported Wilson in Harper’s Weekly raised suspicions
in the Middle West that the Governor, through Harvey,
was putting himsdf under obligations to New York
financial interests. This was so obvious that House
56 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
had discussed with his friend E. S. Martin, editor of
Life and also an associate editor of Harper's Weekly,
the desirability of a less enthusiastic support of Wilson
by the Weekly. After House left New York, Colonel
Harvey put the question direct to Wilson, as to whether
the Governor felt this support to be injurious ; the
reply of the latter was perhaps too brusque an affirma-
tive. The affair might have passed as a minor incident,
had it not been for the emotion displayed in the press
by McCombs on the one side and Watterson on the
other. It was a moment when the conciliatory influence
of House, then absent in Texas, would have proved
valuable.
Colonel House to Mr. E. S. Martin
Austin, Texas, January i8, 1912
Dear Martin :
What a mess we have made with the Harper's Weekly-
Harvey-Wilson matter. I feel it is largely my fault,
and yet I had no thought of it taking any such direction.
I would rather be defeated for the Presidency than
even be under the suspicion of ingratitude, and, according
to Colonel Watterson, Governor Wilson was almost
brutal. I hope this is exaggerated.
All I had in mind was for Harper's not to be so
strenuous, but I never remotely considered wounding
Colonel Harveys feelings nor the breaking of the friend-
ship between Governor Wilson and himself, . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Both the Harvey episode and the publication of the
Joline letter ultimately worked in favour of Mr. Wilson.
In the Middle West and the South the impression became
current that the Governor had braved the New York
interests in refusing Harvey’s support and baH dis-
played honesty in telling Harvey that he did not want
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
57
it. In Texas Mr. Gregory skilfully utilized a remark of
Colonel Watterson, who had taken up the cudgels in
favour of Harvey. Watterson spoke rather sneeringly
of the “ austere truthfulness of the schoolmaster.”
There was in Texas, a rural community, a great free
school system and some forty thousand school teachers.
Mr. Gregory at once gave full publicity to the phrase,
asking whether Wilson should have lied in answer to
Harvey’s question and whether this was not a time
when austere truthfulness was desirable even from a
schoolmaster. The next day forty thousand Texan
school teachers were behind Wilson.
Bryan, reassured by Wilson’s quarrel with Harvey,
obviously felt kindly towards him after his own magnani-
mous treatment of the “ cocked hat ” incident. While
still warm with the sense of having acted in a rather
large way, he continued to receive the commendatory
letters of Colonel House that always emphasized, directly
or indirectly, the progressiveness of Wilson and the
opposition of Wall Street to him.
Colonel House to Mr. W. J. Bryan
Austin, Texas, January 27, 1912
Dear Mr. Bryan :
. . . Another thing that has pleased me beyond
measure is your treatment of the Joune-Wilson incident.
Your friend all knew your bigness of mind and heart,
but it was an object-lesson to those who thought of
you differently.
I am glad that you have taken the position that you
have regarding the Wilson-Harvey controversy. I know
a great deal about it, perhaps as much as anyone, amd
I hope that I may have the pleasure of discussing it with
you when you come to Texas. . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
58 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
Austin, Texas, Febncary 2, 1912
My dear Governor Wilson :
Mr. Bryan is now on his Rio Grande farm, and I have
asked him here before he leaves. In the meantime I
will continue to keep in touch with him by correspond-
ence.
Please let me know if there is anything you would
like to have suggested to him, for there can be no better
place to do this than by the quiet fireside.
I am, my dear Governor,
Your very sincere
E. M. House
Colonel House to Mr. W. F. McCombs
Austin, Texas, Fehmary 10, 1912
Dear Mr. McCombs :
. . . Mr. Bryan has gone to Tucson to see his son,
but he promises to stop over and see me at the first
opportimity.
He says he did not stop in going through, on account
of reaching Austin at four o’clock in the morning, which
he thought a little early for me.
I sent him some clippings favourable to Governor
Wilson, which he promises to use and asks for more.
If you could think to have sent me things that you
womd like to have used in the Commoner, I am sure that
I could arrange it.
I agree with you that Mr. Bean’s support is abso-
lutely essential, not only for nomination but for election
afterwards ; and I shall make it my particular province
to keep in touch with him and endeavour to influence
him along the lines desired.
He has evolved considerably in our direction, for
when I first talked to him in October he did not have
Governor Wilson much in mind.
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 59
Apart from his interest in winning Bryan to the
Wilson cause. House directed his energies to the organiza-
tion of Texas, the forty votes of which were bound to
exercise a powerful influence at the Democratic Nominat-
ing Convention. As one looks back, it is easy to see
that without Bryan and without the steadfast loyalty
and enthusiasm of the Texas delegates, Wilson could not
have been nominated. That Colonel House realized this
so long before the convention is an indication of the
degree to which foresight affected his plans.
When he arrived in Texas, in December 1911, he
found that, despite the success of Wilson’s Dallas
speech, sentiment had not crystallized in his favour.
An energetic campaign would have to be developed if
Wilson ddegates were to be chosen. “ That campaign,”
writes Mr. Gregory, who played an important role in it,
“ was the greatest work of organization that I remem-
ber. Colonel House had various pieces of his old poli-
tical ma chin ery l3dng around, which he soon brought
together ; but we had against us the political forces of
the state. The Chairman and thirty of the thirty-one
members of the State Executive Committee were opposed
to Wilson, the Governor did not favour him, and Soiator
Joseph W. Bailey stumped the State against him. Only
four of the Texas Congressmen favoured him.” ^
House mobilized his friends, who for three months
stimulated Wilson sentiment in critical districts, without
a blare of trumpets but none the less effectively, it
would appear, for by the beginning of March the Colonel
was willing to express the expectation of a solid Wilson
ddegation from Texas. He was the more optimistic
1 Memorandum of T- W. Gregory. Subsequently Governor Campbell,
a friend of Colonel House and later a member of the Texas ddegation at
Baltimore, supported Wilson vigorously in the National Convention.
6o
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
in that the Harmon supporters devoted themselves to
speeches rather than personal canvassing, a sure method,
according to House, of making a noise and losing the
fight.
Colonel House to Mr. W. F. McCombs
Austin, Texas, March 4, 1912
Dear Mr. McCombs ;
. . . Confidentially, I have not been at all satisfied with
our organization in this State ; but I am glad to teU you
that it is now getting in such shape that I feel I can say
that you need have no further concern about Texas.
I will not go into details now, further than to let
you know that it is in process of complete organization
and that we find the sentiment largely for Governor
Wilson.
Strangely enough, the opposition are doing practi-
cally nothing in an effective way, except to blow in the
newspapers. . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
Austin, Texas, March 6, 1912
My dear Governor Wilson :
^ I am pleased to teU you that we now have every-
thing in good shape in Texas and that you may con-
fidently rely upon the delegates from this State.
We may or may not have a presidential primary, but
the result will not be changed.
In two or three weeks our organization wiU be per-
fected, and then I shall leave for the East where I shall
have the pleasure of seeing you.
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Mr. Wilson replied that House’s news brought great
cheer when he most needed it. The Governor had been
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 6i
discouraged by the news from Kansas and Michigan,
where he felt the Wilsonian forces ought to have won,
and he declared that the Colonel’s success in Texas
and the knowledge that he would soon be East to offer
his counsel put him in heart again. Wilson was troubled
by the suspicion of a combination against himself of
Clark, Underwood, and Harmon, with a division of
territory, and by what he regarded as evidence of its
being financed from Wall Street. And he expressed
the fear that the “ dear old party” might become the
tool of reactionaries.
in
In April Colonel House returned to New York,
satisfied that Texas was safe for Wilson, but disturbed
by the failure of the Wilson forces to make the progress
elsewhere that had been expected. For the political
situation had changed since autumn. The conservative
leaders, who favoured Harmon or Underwood, appreci-
ated the strength of liberal feeling in the party and
realized that Wilson by assuming the leadership of the
liberals might run away with the nomination. To
defeat him the Harmon, Underwood, and Clark sup-
porters combined to concentrate in each State upon the
strongest candidate opposed to Wilson. The result
was that the threat of Champ Clark, in particular, began
to appear dangerous. Bryan had endorsed him as a
liberal and the conservatives preferred him to Wilson,
for he was a “ practical politician” with whom they
could negotiate. At least he would serve to deadlock
the convention against Wilson. “ Nobody regards
Clark seriously,” wrote House to Gregory, “ except as
a means to defeat Wilson.”
6a
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
After a few days in the East, House recognized the
strength of the combination that was putting Clark
forward. Pennsylvania went for Wilson, but the South
and the Middle West were cold. “ Illinois hit us a pretty
bad jolt,” wrote House to Burleson on April ii. “ It
was not that we expected to carry it, but we did not
expect to lose by so heavy a vote. A few days later
Nebraska declared for Champ Clark. The Colonel
recorded that at the end of May it looked as if the anti-
Wilson forces would triumph. Bryan remained neutral
as between Clark and Wilson.
“ I had seen Mr. Bryan in New York [wrote Colonel
House] almost immediately upon arrival in April, and
had persuaded him to declare his belief that either
Clark or Wilson would be an acceptable candidate. I
could not get him to go further than this, although I
pointed out that all his enemies were in the combination
to defeat Wilson.
“ Mrs. Bryan helped me in getting a favourable
decision for Woodrow Wilson. I remember I break-
fasted with the Bryans at the Holland House, and
every argument I made in behalf of Wilson was supple-
mented by Mrs. Bryan.”
The Commoner refused as yet, however, definitely to
commit himself, and Colonel House could not avoid the
suspicion that Mr. Bryan regarded it as a good Demo-
cratic year and would not scorn the nomination.
Colonel House to Senator C. A. Culberson
New York, May x, 1912
Dear Senator :
... It looks to me as if the opposing candidates
might again be Bryan and Roosevelt. In that event, I
thmk Roosevelt would beat him. He would get his
share of the progressive vote and most of the conserva-
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 63
tive vote. Bryan thinks he could beat Roosevelt, but,
in my opinion, he could beat Taft more easily.
Wilson’s best chance now, I think, is the fear of
many people that Bryan will be nominated and the
further fear that Hearst may succeed in landing Champ
Clark and then dominate the Administration.
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
As May passed, prospects appeared brighter ; and
the result of the Texas convention, which, as House had
predicted, was wholly in Wilson’s favour, gave impetus
to the cause. The Colonel relied upon the forty dele-
gates from Texas to stand firm, and his confidence was
justified. He told them to consider no second choice.
Mr. Gregory records that shortly before the convention,
“ Tammany made an offer to the Texas delegation that,
if they would drop Wilson, Tammany would support
Culberson ; but the delegation, which included Culberson
himself, simply laughed at them.”
House also relied upon the fact that many delegates
instructed for Clark or Underwood approved Wilson in
their hearts and would vote for him as soon as it became
obvious that their candidates could not be chosen and
they were released from their pledges. He now advised
Wilson to proceed carefully, for he felt that Bryan,
influenced by his wife, was more favourable, and he
feared the tactical mistake which at the last moment
so frequently spoils a candidate’s chances.
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
Bbveslt, Massachusetts
June 7. 1912
Dear Governor Wilson ;
I have a letter from Mr. this morning, t^ing
me that he has suggested some things to you, which I
hope you will not consider. . . .
64 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
In my opinion, everything is being done that should
be towards influencing the delegates in your beh^f.
Plans for organizing them into an efi&cient and effective
force at Baltimore are already under way, and will be
much more potent than anything Mr. has suggested.
If I see the situation rightly, there has never been a
time when your nomination seemed so probable as now,
and if I were you I would move cautiously and do no-
thing further for the present.
I do not doubt but that a large part of your time has
been taken up, as indeed has Mr. McCombs’s and mine,
by people giving advice which, if acted upon, would
defeat our ends.
Do you recall what I told you concerning the con-
versation I had with Mrs. B. ? I have a letter this
morning from her containing this most significant sen-
tence ; “I found Mr. B. well and quite in accord with
the talk we had.” ^
It encourages me to believe that Mr. Clark will never
receive that influence and that you wiU. It also means
that he [Bryan] will not want the nomination unless two
Republican tickets are in the field.
If your engagements will permit, I hope that we may
have the pleasure of seeing you here before the 25th.
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Governor Wilson replied in a manner that would
have surprised some of his later critics. He not merdy
thanked House for his advice, but confessed that he
stood in need of it, for at first he had been inclined to
follow Mr. ^’s suggestion. Not only did he admit
he was wrong, but he promised not to act independently
in the future.
‘ Evidently suggesting that Bryan was veering away from Clark.
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 65
IV
Colonel House was not at the Baltimore Convention
which nominated Wilson. Because of his health he was
accustomed to flee American summer heat, and even
the importance of this particular crisis did not prevent
him from following his regular habit, which was to
spend the summer in Europe. When the convention
met, he was on the ocean.
This absence did not eliminate his influence. In
Texas he had been present at only three of the nominat-
ing conventions that chose the candidates he had sup-
ported ; he was accustomed to lay his plans so carefully
that they could be clearly understood and definitely
executed by his lieutenants. Thus we find him, during
the weeks that iiimiediately preceded the convention,
in close consultation with Mr. McCombs and spending
long hours with the leaders of the Texas delegation,
which was promised the r 61 e of Old Guard in the ap-
proaching battle.
“ On June i [the Colonel recorded] McCombs and I
went to Beverly, Massachusetts, where we had taken a
house for the summer. McCombs was so run down in
health that I did not think he would be able to go to the
Baltimore Convention on June 25. Governor Wilson
thought I was mistaken about tms and that he was
tougher than his appearance indicated. I was sure,
however, he needed the rest ; and I was also sure he
needed what suggestions and coaching I might be able
to give him in regard to handling conventions, because
he had never had any experience in such matters.”
In these consultations Mr. T. W. Gregory and Mr.
T. A. Thomson of the Texas delegation played a pro-
minent part. They were to hold the fort against Clark,
1—5
66 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
who had already secured a majority of the delegates and
who, if his strength did not weaken on the early ballots,
threatened to gather enough more to obtain the neces-
sary two-thirds. Underwood was strong in the South,
but among the Southern delegations there was bitter
opposition to Clark which the Texans were able to
capitalize.
“ It looked to me [recorded House] as if Wilson had
a good chance, but nothing more. I urged both Gregory
and Thomson to use their influence with the Texas
delegation to hold it as a unit and to stay in the fight
in the same way we had been accustomed to do in Texas.
The history of the convention, records the work of those
forty ddegates from Texas, without whose loyalty and
intelligent support the President could never have been
nominated.”
What House advised was to assign to each influential
member of the Texas delegation the task of working
upon some other delegation with whom he had personal
relations, and to secure mutual understanding that in
no contingency would either 3deld to pressure from the
Clark forces. This plan had evidently long been in
Colonel House’s mind, for as far back as December 1911
he had written to a Southern friend, William Garrott
Brown : “It goes without saying that we will make no
move adverse to Mr. Underwood in his own State, but
we will expect our friends to see that delegates are
selected there not unfriendly to Governor Wilson for
second choice.” Mr. Gregory thus describes his own
activities :
“ Champ Clark had by far the largest convention
vote of any of the candidates, and it was evident that
he must first be disposed of before any of the other
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 67
candidates would have a chance. In these circumstances
the Wilson people made airtight agreements with a
sufficient number of delegates instructed for candidates
other than Clark, to the effect that under no conditions
would any parties to the agreement vote for Clark ;
there was no agreement as to what would be done after
Clark had been eliminated. The delegates involved in
this agreement constituted more than one-third of the
convention vote, and against this stone wall the forces
of Champ Clark battered in vain.”
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
Beverlv, Massachusetts
June 20, igi2
Dear Governor Wilson :
I am sorry beyond measure that it is my fate not to
be able to be at the Baltimore Convention. Both my
inclination and my deep interest in your success call me
there, but I am physically unequal to the effort.
However, I have done ever3rthing that I could do up
to now to advise and to anticipate every contingency.
I have had interviews with many delegates, and some of
my warm personal friends on the Texas delegation will
be here to-morrow in order to have a final word.
Colonel Ball, who is perhaps the most forceful man
on the Texas delegation and the one best equipped for
floor tactics, has wired me that he will be in Baltimore
to-day.
I have told Mr. McCombs of those upon whose advice
and loyalty he can lean most heavily, and now I feel
that I can do nothing further excepting to send my good
wishes.
If Mr. Clark’s strength crumbles on the second and
third ballot — ^which I hope may be the case — then I
bdieve that you will be nominated forthwith ; but if,
on the other hand, his vote clings to him and he begins
to get the uninstructed vote, he may be nominated.
We are sailing for England on the Cunard s.s. Laconia
on the 25th at six o’clock, but Mr. McCombs has promised
68 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
to teU me of the result by wireless ; and if you are
nominated I shall return almost immediately.
I shall at least have the benefit of the trijp over and
back, and that is one of the reasons I am going on the
25th rather than waiting until after I know the result. —
If you will permit me to act as your friend in an
advisory capacity, it will give me pleasure to use my
every effort in your behalf.
With kind regards and best wishes, I am
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Beverlv, Massachusetts
Juw 23, 1912
Dear Governor Wilson :
T. W. Gregory and T. A. Thomson, two of the
delegates from Texas, have just left me.
I have never known two better organizers than they
are, and I have outlined to them in detail what to do
at Baltimore with Mr. McCombs’s approval.
I am afraid that if thorough organization is not had,
we will find fifty of our friends working upon one dele-
gation and perhaps no one attending to another dele-
gation of equal importance.
I have suggested that the forty men from Texas be
divided into four xmits of ten, and each given one of the
doubtful Southern States. The same methods should
be pursued with New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin,
and other loyal delegations. In this way the work
becomes effective and good results follow.
I have urged them to make friends with the delega-
tions to which they are assigned, to influence and enter-
tain them in one way and another until the convention
is ended. . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
On June 25 Colonel House sailed, and on the same
day the Democra'tic Conv^tion met at Baltimore. Its
history has been told many times and we may merely
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 69
remind ourselves of the bitter struggle between the
liberal and conservative forces, and of how Clark,
originally put forward to break the Wilson movement,
soon threatened to run away with the convention. His
strength did not crumble, as House had hoped, after
the first few ballots and, if we may believe Wilson’s
secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, even McCombs despaired.
At this juncture appeared the value of the plans made
by House during the winter and spring. The Wilson
delegates, at first in a small minority, stood firm, led
by the band of forty from Texas. Gradually, as the
cause of Underwood appeared hopeless, Wilson began
to pick up votes from the delegations of which he was
second choice ; the Clark forces weakened. And at the
critical moment the arguments that House had so
constantly pressed upon Bryan, during the winter and
spring, bore fruit. The New York delegation, dominated
by Tammany, attacked Wilson and supported Clark with
such vigour that Bryan was finally convinced that
Wilson must be the right man. His intervention proved
decisive, and on the forty-sixth ballot Wilson received
the nomination.
Colonel House had not yet reached England when
the issue was determined.
'* I received the notification of the nomination of
Wilson by wireless, one day out from live^ool. It was
from H. H. Childers and read, ‘ Wilson wins.’ It came
at ten o’clock at night. Dr. Arthur Hadley of Yale
and some others were playing cards at the time. I
told Hadley that perhaps he would be glad to know
that Woodrow Wilson had been nominated at Baltimore.
I was sadly mistaken in my supposition that the know-
ledge of tms would give him pleasure, for I never saw a
man who evinced less enthusiasm.”
70
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
V
The real struggle of 1912 was for the nomination. It
would have been far otherwise had the Republican
Party remained united and presented its normal strength
at the polls ; in such a case the election of Wilson would
bave been difficult, if not impossible. But the dissen-
sions which during the spring had already threatened
Republican solidarity culminated in Republican disaster
at the Chicago Convention, where Taft was nominated ;
for the adherents of Roosevelt bolted, organized the
Progressive Party, and in August nominated their hero.
Most well-informed observers, while they conceded
the personal popularity of Roosevelt, believed that the
lack of an established organization would certainly
prevent his election ; nor did they believe that Taft,
now deprived of the support of the most vigorous
elements in the party, would prove a dangerous candidate.
Wilson might count upon the approval of many regular
Republicans who detested Roosevelt and who realized
that the surest means of defeating him would be to elect
Wilson. The issue proved the accuracy of such prog-
nostications. Generalizations are usually misleading,
but in this case the historian may venture the assertion
that in 1912 Roosevelt put Wilson in the White House.
Colonel House was among those who believed that
the result of the split in the Republican Party would be
certain Democratic victory. Hence he did not cut
short the travels that he had planned for the summer
of 1912, which included Sweden, Finland, Russia as far
east as Moscow, Germany, France, and England. In
August, however, he returned ready to throw himself
into the campaign, which soon captured all his time and
energy. He was delighted with the liberalism and
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 71
eloquence displayed in Wilson’s speeches, which gained
in effectiveness as the campaign progressed; and he
found a double assurance of success in the vehemence
with which Roosevelt emphasized the differences between
Republicans and Progressives, in his virulent attacks
upon Taft.
" In my opinion [he wrote Wilson, soon after his
return] the greatest asset that we have is the scare that
Roosevelt is giving the conservative Republicans, and
I have found that my efforts in proselytizing prominent
Taft adherents have been successful whenever I have
been able to show that a vote for Taft is a half-vote for
Roosevelt.”
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
Beverly, Massachusetts
August 28, IQ12
Dear Governor Wilson :
... I am tr3dng to get our friends to organize properly
in Vermont and Maine. It looks to me as if they
depended too much upon speech-making and noisy
demonstrations, and not enough upon organizations.
I have suggested that they get a committee in every
precinct, whose business it shall be to get out the Demo-
cratic vote and influence as many of the Republican
votes as possible.
Upon these committees I have suggested placing a
Taft Republican, who is supporting you for one reason
or another, a progressive Republican who does not want
to vote for Roosevelt and cannot vote for Taft, and the
best Democratic organizer that can be obtained.
If this method is followed, not only in Vermont and
Maine, but in every State in the Union, there will be
nothing left of your opponents that will be worth while.
Your very sincere
E. M. House
72 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
What interested House chiefly was not so much the
election of Wilson, which he regarded as certain, as the
question of harmony between the Democratic leaders.
Fortunately, the influence of Mr. Bryan was not among
the disturbing elements. He was naturally satisfled.
with the part he played at Baltimore, where he had
abdicated his own pretensions, and his attitude towards
the candidate whose success he had done so much to
assure was one of benevolence. Obviously he was not
inclined to interfere with the management of the cam-
paign.
Mrs. W. J. Bryan to Colonel House
Fairview, July 27, 1912
My dear Mr. House :
Have been in a mad struggle with mail lately— my
desk is cleared and I celebrate by writing a line to you.
Your letter was faithfully delivered by Mr. Thomson,
and the correctness of your diagnosis was even then
proven. I thought of you and Mrs. House several times
while the fight was on. I knew how anxiously you were
awaiting bulletins on shipboard.
Just between us three, it was a remarkable fight. I
was never so proud of Mr. Bryan — ^he managed so well.
He threw the opponents into confusion ; they could not
keep from blundering and he outgeneralled them at every
point. After all their careful planning, he wrested the
power from their hands. Under the circumstances I
am sure the nomination went to the best place and am
entirely satisfied with the result. WiU said all the time
he did not think it was his time, and when we found the
way things were set up we were sure of it.
The people through the country regard him as a hero
— ^he is filling Chautauqua dates in larger crowds than he
has ever had, and is perfectly well. The mail! The
secretary told me yesterday there are several thousand
Baltimore letters still unopened, and it is almost impos-
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
73
sible to handle the daily increase. I am not telling
you these things to boast, but because I know you are
interested to know how he is getting on since he has
been " buried ” again.
As to the possibilities in case of Democratic success :
I am not sure what he would do. I know he dislikes
routine work exceedingly, but believe he would do
anything to help the cause. . . .
Did you read the platform ? Will got in a provision
on national committeemen that will eliminate the whole
ring four years from now. — ^This letter seems full of
politics, but we are all interested. My best wishes for a
safe return and kindest regards to Janet, Mrs. H. and
yourself.
Sincerely yours
Mary B. Bryan
Reassured by the friendly attitude of Mr. Bryan,
Colonel House was none the less disturbed by the lack
of organization in the Democratic campaign and the
contentions that had arisen among the campaign leaders.
They are making the usual campaign of speeches,
publicity, and noisy demonstrations,” he wrote Mr.
Houston, " and if it were not for the split in the Repub-
lican Party the result would be fatal.” It was true that
the Republicans and Progressives firmly refused to
permit the Democrats to defeat themselves. But if the
latter were so tom by discord at the moment of victory
as to find it impossible to organize an harmonious adminis-
tration, there would be small profit in victory.
Much of the difficulty resulted from the illness of Mr.
McCombs, who had been chosen Chairman of the National
Committee and who during the summer found himself
unable to stay at Headquarters. Mr. McAdoo, Vice-
Chairman, took active control of affairs. Feeling between
the two men and their adherents became scarcdy short
74 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
of envenomed. It was the first news that reached House
upon his arrival from Europe.
“ We landed at Boston [he recorded] and motored
to Beverly, where messengers began to come telling of
discord and demoralization at Democratic Headquarters.
Those that brought their tales first were adherents of
McCombs, and my sympathy was largely with him.
“ McCombs himself came from the Adirondacks to
Boston for a conference with me. He told a story of
perfidy that was hardly believable. McAdoo was the
ringleader and he, McCombs, was the victim.”
For Colonel House the important matter was party
harmony. Unable to decide exactly where the trouble
lay, although to begin with he sympathized with
McCombs, he was determined that the first Democratic
Administration in twenty years should not be ruined at
the outset by the scandal of a public quarrel. The
initial step was to prevent the resignation of McCombs,
which he threatened at regular intervals. The next was
to come into touch with McAdoo.
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
Beverly, Massachusetts
September 2, igxz
Dear Governor:
McCombs is seriously thinking of resigning, and may
do so to-morrow.
There are reasons why his resignation at this time
would be a serious blow to the cause. I cannot go
into an explanation here, but you would readily under-
stand the reason if all the facts were before you. . . .
Mr. McAdoo has asked me to go to Maine, which I
shall do to-morrow night or Wednesday morning ; and
when I return I should be glad to come to New York if
you will let me know when you will be there.
Your very sincere
E. M. House
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 75
“ I returned to New York [wrote Colonel House] as
soon as the weather would permit, and had a conference
with Woodrow Wilson. I asked if he knew of the feud
that was going on between McAdoo and McCombs, and
I indicated my sympathy for McCombs. At that time
I knew McAdoo but slightly, having met him but twice.
Wilson asked me not to make up my mind about the
matter until I had learned the ins and outs of it by
personal contact at Headquarters.
“ I afterwards learned the wisdom of this advice,
for I had not been in New York more than two weeks
before I knew that there was another side. Later I
found that it was almost wholly McCombs’s fault and that
McAdoo was scarcel;^ to blame at all. McCombs was
jealous, was dictatorial. ... He was not well enough
to attend to the campaign himself, and he could not sit
by and allow McAdoo to carry on the work and get a
certain amount of newspaper publicity. This latter
was particularly galling to McCombs.”
At this moment (September 25, 1912) Colonel House
began to make those detailed daily memoranda which,
taken together, form a diary the historical importance of
which can hardly be overstated. Every night, with
rare exceptions, during the following seven years, he
dictated his record of the events of the day, while his
recollection was fresh and definite and with an astounding
frankness of expression.
From the fiirst of these memoranda it appears dear
that during these weeks his main task was always the
composing of quarrels. It was a function to which he
had become accustomed from his days at school, where,
according to a youthful friend, he loved to indte disputes
between his schoolmates in order to have an opportunity
to settle them.
In September and October there were not merdy the
difGlculties between the leaders at National Headquarters
76 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
which must be alleviated, but also the customary dis-
agreement between the National Committee and Tam-
many Hall. The New York organization had fought
the nomination of Wilson at Baltimore and would
evidently not " tote fair ” in the election unless Wilson
agreed actively to support the New York State ticket ;
and this Wilson would not do if it meant endorsing the
Tammany boss, Charles F. Murphy. As always, there
was the danger that Tammany would trade its support
of the presidential candidate against Republican willing-
ness to permit the election of the Democratic candidate
for Mayor of New York City the year following. And
this danger was increased by Wilson’s attack upon the
bosses and his refusal to approve the renomination of
Governor Dix, which Murphy demanded.
At National Headquarters there were divided
counsels. McAdoo, who may have himself hoped to be
nominated for Governor, was willing to fight the bosses ;
McCombs, both because of his feud with McAdoo and his
political afihliations, was willing to endorse them heartily.
House disliked the bosses and wrote on September 28,
" I believe McAdoo would be good material for the
Governorship,” But he held that an open breach with
Tammany must be avoided at all costs.
” The New York situation is acute [wrote House, on
September 25], and it is necessary for some definite
policy to be decided upon. The break between Murphy
and National Headquarters is becoming wider each day,
an^d the newspapers are printing numerous false inter-
views which make it yet wider. I am anxious to hold
the party together, so that every available means may
be used for the common good. My dislike of Tammany
and its leaders is perhaps stronger than that of Governor
Wilson ; yet, having had more political experience, I
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 77
am always ready to work with the best material at hand.
My idea is to have them decide upon some unobjection-
able Tammany man for Governor of New York who
would not bring discredit upon the party. . . .
“ There is much jealousy and back-biting at Head-
quarters, and tales are fetched and carried without
number imtil all harmony is lost. McAdoo and others
are anxious to give me a room for my personal use. I
do not desire a room. They want to give me half of
O'Gorman’s.^ Everyone offers me someone else’s room.
McAdoo continues most cordial and behes the charges
of his accusers. . .
Wilson, fulminating against the bosses, was on the
point of attacking Murphy and Dix by name and insisting
that the New York nominating convention formally
repudiate the control of Tammany Hall. It would
have meant an open conflict between the National and
the City and State organizations.
" Governor Wilson [House wrote, September 28]
came in last night from New England, leaving at twelve.
He asked me to take him out in our motor for a conference.
He was particularly anxious to discuss the State situation
before making his speech at McCombs's dinner. McAdoo
is urging him to come out actively against Dix and
Murphy. I urged him not to do this. McCombs is the
only link between the bosses and Wilson. The Governor’s
inclination is to go after them. He finally a^eed to
give out a letter Monday without mentioning either by
name. ...
"October 2: The New York situation is stiH in a
muddle. ...” ...
The solution finally discovered by Colonel House was
not without its elements of humour. At least it pre-
vented an open rupture between the National Democratic
1 United States Senator from New York.
78 BEGINNINGS OF A. FRIENDSHIP
organization and the New York organization. Mr.
Murphy, leader of Tammany, agreed to the demand of
Wilson, edited by House, that no man should dictate to
the nominating convention what it must do. Quietly
he permitted the impression to percolate that Governor
Dix need not be renominated. At the convention, he
(according to a New York correspondent), " once Boss
Miurphy, now metamorphosed by the talisman of
college men’s ideals into Leader Murphy, said nothing,
gave no orders — ^when nominations for Governor were
called reported himself ' present, not voting ! ’ ” The
convention, thus freed from the despotism of the bosses,
repudiating Dix, proceeded to nominate the Honourable
William Sulzer, the purest product of the New York
City organization. " The advocates of the bossless con-
vention had won and nominated a Tammany brave.”
Thus House saved Wilson from the tactical mistake
of a quarrel with Tammany, which would at this moment
certainly have failed to dislodge the bosses and must have
produced merely disorganization ; at the same time he
persuaded Murphy ostensibly to 3deld to Wilson's leader-
ship. Press reports gave him full credit : " Just what
the wise Texan whispered into the Princeton ears no
man may know. But the dub did not fall on the Tam-
many head. . . . The good ship is sailing strong and no
breakers ahead. Without Tammany New York was
gone. With Tammany New York City will give Wilson
the largest vote ever recorded for a Democratic candidate.
. . . The story of Democratic success is almost ready
to be told, Only one thing can prevent — Wilson himself.
If he makes no blunder ! He almost did in the matter
of New York — ^but Ed House is still here.” »
Later, when the leadership of Wilson in the party had
» Press despatch by Pat Lay, New York, October 4, 1912.
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 79
been assured. House urged a vigorous assault upon
Tammany ; but a less propitious moment than the
autumn of 1912 could not have been selected.
More difficult, however, was the situation caused by
the physical and nervous condition of the Democratic
Chairman. Much of House’s time and energy was
consumed in quieting the suspicions of Mr. McCombs, in
persuading him to avoid indiscretions and to forget
enmities. It was not the first or the last occasion upon
which Colonel House served the cause of harmony by
assuming the ungrateful r 61 e of buffer.
“ October 3 : McCombs and McAdoo had an interview,
and I hope that a more amicable relation will follow.
The Governor was particularly anxious to have this
brought about, and said he knew that I could do it if
it could be done at all.
“ October 8 : I went to see McCombs. I do not like
his affiliations or methods. He is very secretive and
will only interview one person at a time, although he
seems to have no secrets from me. He suggested getting
rid of McAdoo by giving him the presidency of some
railroad out West, which he said he could secure for
him. . . .
October 13 : McCombs is very emphatic that no
campaign promises, either direct or indirect, have been
made. I talked to Governor Wilson, urging him also
not to make any promises. He says he has not, but he
does not altogether trust McCombs in this direction. . . .
“ October 24 : McCombs is in a panic, and believes
there is a chance of losing New York, Illinois, and Wis-
consin. ...
“ October 25 : I went to Headquarters at eleven and
met McCombs as I was leaving. ... He was coimter-
manding everybody's orders, without regard to authority.
. , . McAdoo tells me that the Governor thinks it best
not to address him (McAdoo}. in future, and McAdoo
8o BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
asked Tiim not to consider him in any way. He said
he would do the best he could until the campai^ was
over, and then he wished to be forgotten. I did not
tell McAdoo that the Governor was doing this at my
suggestion and because I am afraid of an open scandal
between McCombs and himself. ...
“ October 26 : Very little is being done at Head-
quarters excepting routine work. I went over each
department, after seeing McAdoo at nine at his hotel.
McCombs is in conference most of the time with old-
style politicians. The whole character of the callers
has changed since he took charge, and for the worse.
I fear Governor Wilson wiU have trouble on account of
connections made at this time. ...
“ October 31 : McAdoo is not in evidence at aU, and
has almost effaced himself to secure harmony. . . .”
VI
At the height of the campaign the country was
shocked by the news that a fanatic had shot Mr. Roose-
velt, who was on a speaking tour, and that, while he
would recover from the wound, his personal campaign
was at an end.^ Colonel House, in opposition to the
members of the Democratic Campaign Committee, in-
sisted that Mr. Wilson should cancel his speaking engage-
ments, for it did not seem quite sporting for him to
continue his vigorous campaign so long as his most
redoubtable adversary was laid low.
" October 18 : Everything is upset to-day over the
attempted assassination of Theodore Roosevelt. . . .
"I telephoned Governor Wilson at Princeton while
Burleson was here, urging him to cancel all eiigagements
1 Mr. Roosevelt, whose life was saved by the manuscript of his speech
and his glasses' case in his breast pocket, recovered so rapidly that he was
able to addr^s an enthnsiastic rally in Madison Square Garden just before
the election.
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 8i
until Roosevelt was able to get out again. Wilson was
at first doubtful, but wrote out a statement, which he
read to me over the telephone, following my suggestions
as to what to say. AU of the Campaign Committee
were against me in this. They wanted the Governor
to continue speech-making, and so advised him. My
thought was that if he continued to speak after T. R.
had been shot, it would create S 5 rmpathy for T. R. and
would do Wilson infinite harm. The situation is a
dangerous one and needs to be handled with care. The
generous, the chivalrous, and the wise thing to do, so
it seems to me, is to discontinue speaking until his an-
tagonist is also able to speak. I am glad Wilson sees
it as I do. He suggested that we might delay a decision
imtil to-morrow and get the opinion of the full Committee,
but I disagreed with this and said that the delay would
be disadvantageous. Then, too, it would make it
embarrassing if the Committee differed from him, as
they certainly would, for their individual opinions have
already been expressed. Burleson thinks I took too
much responsibility in advising contrary to the rest
of the Committee. . . .”
The Colonel’s opinion carried the day, and Wilson’s
speaking tour was abandoned. The effect of this gesture,
combined with the exchange of cordial telegrams of
sjropathy and appreciation between Wilson and Roose-
velt, was certainly not disadvantageous to Wilson’s
campaign. "The best politics,’’ House used to say,
" is to do the right thing.’’
The attack upon Roosevelt immediately drew House’s
attention to the danger of a similar attempt upon Wilson’s
life, and he bethought himself of his old Texas friend the
Ranger, McDonald. Captain Bill would furnish com-
plete protection and ideal company for the Governor.
There was also the advantage that McDonald, as House
well knew, would waste no time in discussion as to
I — 6
S2 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
whether the trip from Texas were worth while or what
preparations he ought to make.
Come
tillery.
Colonel Rouse to Captain McDonald
[Telegram]
New York, October 15, 1912
immediately. Important. Bring your ar-
E. M. House
Captain McDonald to Colonel House
[Telegram]
Coming.
Quarah, Texas, October 16, 1912
McDonald
Colonel House to Dr. D. F. Houston
New York, October 22, 1912
Dear Doctor Houston :
... I got the Governor to let me send for Bill
McDonald after the T. R. assault. I merely wired Bill
to come at once. ... He thought I was in trouble, so
he borrowed a shirt from one of his friends, boarded the
train without money (which he borrowed on the way),
and landed here in a little over two days after leaving
Quanah.
I took him from the station to Headquarters, and
it happened that Judge Parker and Norman Mack were
in McCombs’s rooms when I brought BiU in. He had
on his big white Stetson and a four days' growth of
beard, and I need not tell you he created a sensation. . . .
Mrs. Wilson told me on Simday that she had slept
better Saturday night than at any time since T. R.
was shot. They all seem pleased with Bill.
I arranged to keep him out of the papers, and he
has refused to open his mouth to anyone about an 3 rthing.
I told him when he came not to say a word to anybody.
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 83
and he is carrying it out literally. I heard a reporter
ask him who I was, and that is the only time I have
heard him speak. He told the fellow that he was a
stranger in New York and did not know.
The mayor and police of one town that I know tried
to disarm Bill after he was out of the Ranger Service
and had no right to carry arms, but they were unable
to accomplish their purpose. I would like to see the
New York police try it.
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Wilson and his protector became fast friends. A
fortnight after McDonald’s arrival, House noted :
“ I arose at seven and went over to see Governor
Wilson and Captain Bill at the Hotel CoUingwood.
They were just leaving for the train, but we had a few
minutes’ conversation. Bill said the Governor was
the finest fellow in the world, and the Governor seemed
equally pleased with Bill and said he was taking good
care of liim.”
After the election McDonald returned to Texas, with
keen appreciation of his Eastern experiences, but without
reluctance to leave the hard city pavements. He once
complained to Colonel House : " Ed, I get awful tired
of walking on these rocks.” He was not entirely un-
critical of the protection provided eminent public servants
by the Government.
" November 8 : Old Bill arrived [recorded House],
and after talking with him I think it is best for him to
return home for the present. The Wilsons were so^
to see him leave. He looked over the Secret Service
men to see if he thought them fit. He told me that
they did well enough, but he did not like their carrying
•38’s. When he said this to the Secret Service men,
84 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
they did not Uke it and replied : ‘ A -38 will kiU a man
all right.' ‘ Yes,' said Bill, ‘ if you give him a week
to die in.’ I find that he has talked much of me and
my political work in Texas to Wilson. The Governor
wanted to know whether I had been successful in all my
political campaigns and what kind of men I had chosen,"
VII
The last days of the campaign were not marked
by the customary excitement, for the result of the
election had become a foregone conclusion. The contest
between Roosevelt and Taft had split the anti-Wilson
vote so effectively that a Democratic landslide in the
electoral college appeared certain.
As election returns came in on November 5, it soon
became clear that Democratic confidence in overwhelm-
ing victory was fully justified. Mr. Taft carried only
two States, Roosevelt only 88 electoral votes. It is
true that Wilson’s popular vote was less than a majority,
but his plurality in the electoral college was the greatest
ever received by a presidential candidate, and he carried
with him handsome Democratic majorities in the Senate
and House of Representatives.
" I went to Headquarters [wrote House on the even-
ing of election day], and saw a few people, but nothing
of importance was going on. By half-past six o’clock
it was evident that Wilson had won, so I sent him a
t^egram of congratulation. By seven o’clock returns
were in enough to enable one to see that it was a Wilson
landslide.
“ I went down to the Waldorf Hotel, where McCombs
had invited guests to hear the returns. He had taken
nearly one side of the hotel, and there were about twenty-
five people there. ...”
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 85
It was a season of triumph for McCombs, who as
Chairman of the Committee received fervid praise. It
was one of equal although less obvious triumph for
Colonel House, whose share in the campaign only a few
of the more keen-sighted realized. He held no office in
the party organization, his goings and comings at Head-
quarters were unostentatious. But there was no thread
in the campaign pattern which he had not touched, no
symptom of party discord which had not evoked his
genius for pacification,^ The new Wilson Administra-
tion might have been wrecked at the moment of victory.
This the President-elect understood and his gratitude to
House was unfeigned.
Two days after the election, repl3fing to House’s note
of congratulation, he declared that no small part of
Democratic success must be ascribed to the counsels of
the Colonel.
Whether or not the victory at tlie polls could be
capitalized to ensure a positive programme of reform
legislation, was the question of the future, and to it
Colonel House had already turned his attention.
^ * He would come into an office/ explained a Democratic Committee-
man, ' and say a few words quietly, and after he had gone you would
suddenly become seized with a good idea. You would put that idea forth
and receive congratulations for it ; it would work out first-rate. Long
after, if you thought the thing over, you would suddenly realize that the
idea had been oozed into your brain by Colonel House during a few minutes’
quiet conversation. You did not know it and the Colonel did not want
you to know it. As a matter of fact, before the campaign was over, in his
quiet way Colonel House came near being the biggest man about the works,
although he did not hold any position and would not take one/ ” — Current
Opinion^ vol. iv, no. 6, June 1913.
CHAPTER IV
BUILDING A CABINET
Yon can never build a Cabinet to please everybody. . . . When you
have about concluded that you have the proper man, someone will come
along and condemn him so vigorously that it will make you doubt. There-
fore, in the end, you will have largely to determine their fitness yourself.
House to Wilson^ November 22, 1912
I
T he victory of 1912 was the first won by the
Democrats in a presidential election since 1892,
an even twenty years. This long exclusion from
power laid a tremendous handicap upon the party and
its leaders when they came to organize an administra-
tion ; for in the United States the minority suffers as
much materially from being the under-dog as the majority
suffers morally from an over-long lease of control. The
older men of the party which has been in opposition
have developed critical rather than constructive faculties,
and it is long since they have exercised executive func-
tions ; comparatively few younger men of capacity have
been attracted to the party, and those few have had no
administrative experience. What is worse, long political
exile wiU have sharpened everyone’s appetite for ofSce,
and the first indication of success at the polls will sound
like a dinner gong, gathering the ravenous horde of
anxious place-hunters, whose ability is apt to be in
inverse ratio to their eagerness.
Mr. Wilson did not conceal from himself the particular
difficulties which he, as leader of the party and President-
86
BUILDING A CABINET 87
elect, must face. He was without political experience
except for his brief tenure of the New Jersey governor-
ship. Although he always maintained that a college
president found ample opportunity to develop political
genius, he did not, at this time certainly, overestimate
his own ability. He was threatened, furthermore, by
a flood of enthusiastic and contradictory advice. His
two chief campaign leaders, McCombs and McAdoo,
were at daggers drawn. The man who exercised strongest
influence in the party, Mr. Bryan, Wilson regarded as
impractical and notoriously mistaken in his personal
judgments. Other leaders, such as Underwood and
Champ Clark, he had fought vigorously in the pre-
nomination campaign. Still others, in Congress, upon
whom he must depend for the success of his legislative
programme, were ex-Populists, such as Gore of Oklahoma,
or machine politicians, such as Stone of Missouri ; both
types Wilson had attacked frequently and fearlessly,
and their assistance in this juncture was at least ques-
tionable.
Each and aU of them, furthermore, if not applicants
for office themselves, marshalled a sohd phalanx of
deserving Democrats who had long and faithfully served
the cause when there had been no hope of immediate
reward and for whom places must be found. As early
in the campaign as September 7, House wrote to Walter
Hines Page : “ The wise man will not envy Governor
Wilson even in success, for, as you say, the ofiice-seekers
will sorely beset him. They are cheerfully dividing up
the honours now, and the numbers engaged in this
pleasant pastime will increase as the campaign grows
older."
It was inevitable that Wilson should turn to Colonel
House for assistance. Apart from the warm affection
88 BUILDING A CABINET
he had conceived for House, he knew the reputation for
political sagacity which the Colonel had earned in Texas
and he recognized the value of his services in the pre-
nomination and electoral campaigns. House and Wilson,
furthermore, were in close accord upon all important
political issues. Both were ardent liberals, and Wilson’s
sympathy was not lessened by his realization that the
Colonel’s idealism was touched by a very real sense of
the practicable.
The factor which counted most heavily in stimulating
the confidence of Wilson was the obviously disinterested
attitude of Colonel House. At the beginning he made
it plain that he would ask nothing for his friends and
wanted no office for himself. He was too much the
philosopher to be attracted by the badge of public
position, and he was convinced that he could serve the
Administration more effectively out of office. “ I would
not exchange the confidence and friendship that Governor
Wilson seems to have for me,” he wrote in November,
” for any office in the land.” Nor would he give advice
on appointments until the President demanded it.
Colonel Bouse io Dr. S. E. Mezes
New York, November 4, 1912
Dear Sidney:
... My mail is getting heavy with applications, but
I think I fcaow how to handle it. As a matter of fact,
I do not care two whoops in hades who gets the offices,
and Governor Wilson knows it. . . .
He has the opportunity to become the greatest
President we have ever had, and I want him to make
good. He c^ do it if the office-seekers will give him
leisure to think, and I am going to try and help him
get it. . .
The Governor spent practically all day with me
BUILDING A CABINET
89
Saturday, most of the time at the apartment. It would
have done your heart good to have seen him walk in
after we had finished lunch, and Loulie's expression when
I asked him to join us. It is true that I took the food
from under the servants’ noses as they were about to
eat it, but the Governor enjoyed what he had neverthe-
less. . . .
Fraternally yours
E. M. House
Colonel House to Senator Culberson
New York, November 5, 1912
Dear Senator :
... It is Governor Wilson’s intention to leave in ten
days for a four weeks’ absolute rest, and during that
time I suppose the boys will decide definitely upon what
ofi&ces they will take.
As far as I am concerned, I am not interested in the
office end of it. ... I have urged Governor Wilson to
leave these matters largely to his Cabinet, to the Senators
and to the Congressmen, and let them be the buffer
between himself and the hungry host. I rather think
he will do this in his own defence, in order that he may
have some leisure to consider the complex problems
that will confront him. . . .
It is that end of his Administration in which I am
most interested. In other words, I am interested in
measures and not in men, and what time I have I shall
devote to helping him in that direction. . . .
Your very faithful
E. M. House
With everyone else trying to tell the President-elect
what he ought to do and everyone advising differently,
and with Colonel House refusing to press any claims,
Wilson characteristically put full trust in him. House
was ready. I^ng before the election, regarding Wilson’s
victory as assured, he had prepared to help him in every
BUILDING A CABINET
90
way that he could ; and he knew that the first call for
advice would be upon the subject of appointments.
However honest he might be in his interest in measures
rather than men, the personnel of the new Administra-
tion was the first great problem to be faced.
" I am on constant watch for good material [he wrote
on October 21] from which to select a Cabinet and other
important places. I wish to be well informed if
Governor Wilson should consult me.”
There was no danger that House would not be well
informed of those who desired office. The applicants
themselves saw to that. Party leaders already recog-
nized the influence he had acquired and guessed that his
approval might be the determining factor in an appoint-
ment. " A tremendous mail arrived from all directions,”
he wrote immediately after the election. ” Everyone
wants something.” AU attempts to disguise the import-
ance of the position given him by the President-elect
proved fruitless,, for Mr. Wilson's frequent visits to the
small apartment on Thirty-Fifth Street were too well
known. From October until the following spring, when
in desperation he left for Europe, the assault upon the
Colonel continued.
Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes
New York, October xx, 1912
Dear Sidney:
... It is not a pose with me, this keeping out of the
limelight ; but it is my judpient that I can do far more
efiective work and accomplish the things I have in mind
better by the methods I have heretofore followed.
I agree with you that it is going to be difficult to
keep out of the papers. . . .
The trouble is, the fact that I am dose to Wilson is
BUILDING A CABINET 91
becoming known ; and, since everybody wants some-
thing, they are doing their best to please me and this is
the way they think to do it.
A magazine is tr^g now to write me up and wants
my photograph, but if they get it, it will be when I have
lost my head more completely than I think I have as
yet.
Fraternally and hastily yours
E. M. H.
Pressure upon House was increased because Wilson
had determined to go to Bermuda for a rest and before
sailing was slow to confer with the politicians, who one
and all feared that they were not going to find a place
in the picture. The Colonel reassured them and urged
patience, at the same time that he pointed out to Wilson
the need of showing consideration for their sensibilities.
" I telephoned to the Governor [he wrote on Novem-
ber 14] and advised him to write a note to Mr. Bryan
telling him that he would confer with him after his
return from Bermuda. He said he would do so at once.
I am to see the Governor Saturday morning and will
advise him concerning other matters pending. In my
opinion he is making a mistake in not calling for advice
from political leaders, as they will become disgruntled.”
Two days later, before Wilson left, he and House drew
up a tentative list for Cabinet positions and discussed
the best means to satisfy those who, by their work in
the campaign, felt that they had earned proper rewards.
It was already agreed that Mr. Bryan must be given his
choice of positions. As far back as September, House
recorded that Wilson had accepted his argument that
" it would be best to make him Secretary of State, in
order to have him at Washington and in harmony with
the Administration, rather than outside and possibly in
92 BUILDING A CABINET
a critical attitude. Mrs. Bryan’s influence, too, would
be valuable.”
Whatever his capacity, Bryan had come to Wilson’s
rescue at Baltimore and might ask for political recogni-
tion. Furthermore, his influence in the party was such
that, if hostile, he could effectively block the legislative
programme and perhaps wreck the Administration.
Nothing illustrates more clearly the exigencies of govern-
ment under the party system. Mr. Wilson did not want
Bryan in his Cabinet and did not believe him fitted for
the Secretaryship of State ; but it was undeniable that
the new Administration could carry through its reform
programme more effectively with Bryan in it. At least
there would not be the danger to the public service that
threatened in 1897, when McKinley, in order to provide
a vacancy in the Senate which Mark Hanna might fill,
appointed Senator Sherman Secretary of State.^
The claims of McCombs and McAdoo were placed in
the forefront because of their campaign leadership.
Wilson regarded the abilities of the latter highly, but he
distrusted the former’s capacity, although he had long
had for him a personal fondness. McCombs was in
iU-health, lacked evenness of temper, and was ready to
make alliance with the t3rpe of old-fashioned politicians
whom Wilson hated. He had done much to stimulate
enthusiasm in the pre-nomination campaign, but the
experience of the electoral campaign itself seemed to
-indicate that his appointment to a Cabinet position
would not make for harmony, even if he possessed the
requisite administrative capacity.
* 'TOniain Roscoe Thayer wrote of ti^ manoeuvre ; " To force the
venerable Sherman, whose powers were already failing, into tiie most
important ofSce after that of President himself, showed a disregard of
coupon decency not less than of the safety of the nation." {The Life of
John Hoy, ii,'i56.)
BUILDING A CABINET 93
“ November 16 : Governor Wilson telephoned me
early [recorded Colonel House] and asked if it would be
convenient for him to come over [to House’s apartment]
at ten o’clock. He remained for an hour or more and we
went over all matters in the most confidential way.
Cabinet material was discussed. . . . We discussed what
to do with McCombs and McAdoo. He said he would
give the former a first-class foreign appointment in
order to get rid of him. He said he would be willing
to give hun the CoUectorship of the Port of New York
if it were not that he could build up a formidable
political machine. I told him McCombs would not
think of accepting the CoUectorship. I suggested
McAdoo as Secretary of the Treasury, Burleson as Post-
master-General. He thought Daniels would be better
for Postmaster-General, but I thought he was not
aggressive enough and that the position needed a man
who was in touch with Congress. He agreed that this
was true.
^‘We talked again of James C. McReynolds as
Attorney-General. We practicaUy eliminated Brandeis
for this position, ... He asked again about offering
Mr. Bryan the Secretaryship of State or Ambassador-
ship to England, and I advised him to do so. He said
that he would.”
II
With Wilson’s departure for Bermuda, House set
seriously to work investigating the claims and the capa-
cities of the applicants for office, from lowest to highest.
Much of the work was intaisely uncomfortable.
‘-Visited Headquarters l^e noted on November 18]
and spent a disagreeable time with X and Y. Sug-
gested to X the secretaryship of the Senate, which pays
$6,000 per year, but he scorns a position of this kind and
wants something much better. Y' is in the same frame
94 BUILDING A CABINET
of mind. Y abused McAdoo viciously. When I pressed
him, he could not verify any of his statements. He says
he will depend upon McCombs to look out for his in-
terests. ...
" I am overwhelmed with office-seekers who have
probably seen notices of Governor Wilson having called
on me on the i6th. I am busy getting up a list of
Cabinet possibilities with data attached, to send the
President-elect for his information. . . .”
Colonel House to the President-elect
New York, November 22, 1912
Dear Governor :
. . . James C. McRejmolds, of Tennessee, but more
recently of New York, is worthy of consideration.
Although a Democrat, Mr. Roosevelt made hini special
coimsel for the Government in the suit against the
Tobacco Trust and the Anthracite Coal Trust.
He won the Tobacco suit and he has won the suit
against the Coal Trust as far as it has gone. It is now in
the Supreme Court.
McReynolds severed his connection with the Govern-
ment because of his disagreement with Mr. Wickersham
regarding the dissolution of the Tobacco Trust. He
contended that Wickersham's plan nullified the effects
of the victory.
He is about fifty years old. He is considered radical
in his views by a large part of the New York Bar.^ His
character and legal attainments are of the highest.
I lunched with Mr. Brandeis yesterday. His mind
and mine are in accord concerning most of the questions
that are now to the fore. He is more than a lawyer ;
he is a publicist and he has an unusual facility for lucid
expression. ...
^ This reputation doubtless resulted from the vigour with which he had
prosecuted the suits against the trusts. As a member of the Cabinet Mr.
McReynolds displayed no radical proclivities, and after he assumed his
seat on the Supreme Court he was generally regarded as one of the most
conservative of the Justices.
BUILDING A CABINET
95
A large number of reputable people distrust him, but
I doubt whether the distrust is well founded, and it would
perhaps attach itself to any man who held his advanced
views.
Norman Hapgood^ lunched with us and I found in
him an enthusiastic admirer of Brandeis. They are
both going to Hot Springs for a few days as guests of
Mr. Charles R. Crane.
Franklin K. Lane, Democratic Interstate Commerce
Commissioner from California, was with me a large
part of yesterday. Lane is fine material, but he is
contented with his present position and would not
change it.
You will have some difficulty in selecting your
Secretary of the Interior. The West wants him, but it
would perhaps be a mistake to select him from there.
In the first place, he could not maintain himsdf with
his own people and satisfy the East. If he satisfied the
East, the West would rend him.® It would also be well
not to put an ultra-Eastem man in that position, for the
West would resent such action.
As you know, the East is all for conservation and the
Far West is for it in a limited way — ^that is, where it
does not conflict with their material interests. The
West is anxious to have the forests and mines opened up
and used to an extent that would aid them commercially!
They are also largely wedded to the idea of state versus
national control, which I think is wrong, but which we
need not go into here.
There is one thing I want to say, and that is this :
You can never build a Cabinet that will please every-
body. When you seek advice you will find but few
agreements, even amongst your friends. When you
have about concluded that you have the proper man,
* Editor of Collier* s Weekly, 1903-12 ; of Harper*s Weekly, 1913-16 ;
later appointed Minister to Denmark.
* Mr. Lane, who was ultimately appointed, belied this prophecy.
Although a Westerner and retaining the conhd^ce of the West, he was
generally spoken of by the Eastern press as one of the most capable mem*
bers of Wilson's Cabinet.
BUILDING A CABINET
96
someone will come along and condemn him so vigorously
that it will make you doubt. Therefore, in the end,
you will have largely to determine their fitness yourself.
Please do not bother to answer my letters unless
there is something you want me to do.
Your very faithful
E. M. House
Mr. Wilson wrote from Bermuda, thanking House
for his suggestions. He addressed him, as he had done
since the summer of 1912 and continued to do for five
years, as " My dear Friend,” and signed himself "Affec-
tionately yours.” He expressed himself as able to rest
with an equable mind if the kind American people would
not unload their correspondence upon him, and en-
couraged House in a prospective trip to Washington.
Colonel House’s visit to Washington was partly, as
he expressed it, " to find the lay of the land " so that he
might wisely advise Governor Wilson upon his return
from Bermuda, and partly to discover means to harmonize
the discordant factions in the party. The differences
that had arisen during the campaign were largdiy per-
sonal; those that now threatened were political and
seemed likely to cause more serious difficulties. There
was disagreement over the legislative programme,
especially in the matter of currency reform ; and a
storm of greater or less severity seemed likely to arise
over the question of the single term for President, which
was warmly advocated by Bryan and to which Wilson
was strongly opposed. House set himself to persuade
the party leaders to take no step which might later bring
them into conflict with the President. He worked
unobtrusively.. Mr. Burleson, a Democratic leader in
the House, asked Senator Gore what he thought of the
Colonel. . " Take my word for it,” replied Gore, " he
BUILDING A CABINET 97
can walk on dead leaves and make no more noise than a
tiger.”
His work was none the less effective in that it was
quiet, and it does not spoil the story to say that in the
end the currency and single-term problems were both
settled in accordance with Wilson’s wishes.
Colonel House to the President-elect
New York, November 28, 1912
Dear Governor ;
I spent two strenuous but interesting days in Wash-
ington.
While there I had an hour with Chief Justice White,
by appointment, and was with him at dinner later.
.Aunong those that called upon me were Speaker
Clark, Hoke Smith, Gore, Culberson, Bob Henry, Bur-
leson, Carter Glass, and many others. I mention these
by name, for each of them had something interesting
to say.
Mr. Clark has not gotten over his defeat. He is
inclined to be friendly with you, but his hatred of Mr.
Bryan amoimts to an obsession and it is not unlikely
that there will be a personal difiBiculty between them
when they meet.
Almost at the beginning, Clark asked me what you
intended to do. I replied, " About what ? " He. said,
"About anything or everything.” I told him that was
a pretty leading question and asked him to be more
specific. I finally told him that you inteoded to canry
out the Democratic policies as fat as you were able with
the aid of such leaders as himself and others. Before
he left, he was telling me the story of his life and we were
on very cordial terms. I think he would like to be
invited to see you when you return, and I believe it
would be a wise thing to do. . . .
I had a most interesting hour with Mr. Glass. He
candidly -confessed that he knew nothing about banking
1—7
BUILDING A CABINET
98
or the framing of a monetary measure. I congratulated
him upon this, for I told him that it was much better
to know nothing than to know something wrong. He,
too, indicated a willingness to do everything in his power
to give as speedily as possible a sound economic bill,
and upon lines advised by you. . . .
He expressed a desire to see you soon after your
return, and I think the quicker you see him the better
it will be. You will find him ready to co-operate with
you to the fullest extent.
Harvey was there for the purpose of furthering his
plan for a single term.
Mr. Taft favours this, and so does Mr. Bryan. Mr.
Taft favours a six-year term, and Mr. Bryan leans to
four jrears. Harvey told me that Bob Henry was work-
ing with Bryan along this line and that was going to be
our first difficulty. He was very pessimistic. He said
that no one knew your viewpoint concerning the matter
and that your friends were apathetic, and that before
they realised it a measure would be passed through both
branches of Congress and be ready for submission to the
people.
It does not require the signature of the President,
but, if it did, Mr. Taft would sign it.
Harvey is mistaken about your friends not being
alert in regard to it, because I talked to Burleson and
others and told them to watch every move.
Harvey thought it would be a wise thing to com-
promise on a six-year term which would include you.
In talking with Gore about it afterwards, he said the
difficulty there was that the Republican States would
hesitate to lengthen the term of a Democratic President
two years longer than was necessary. If the Republicans
refused to lengthen ffie term of a Democratic President,
then the Democratic States would in turn refuse to
lengthen the tom of a Republican President. . . .
■ The general consensus of opinion amongst those
with whom I talked and who had met Bryan, was that
he- would work in harmony with your Administration
BUILDING A CABINET
99
if he went into the Cabinet, but they aU thought that
there were two difficulties which should he met at the
outset : the question of a second term and the further
question of currency reform. . . .
I obtained a great deal of valuable information from
the Chief Justice. He talked to me frankly, with the
understanding that what he said was to be repeated
to no one excepting you.
He cheerfully slaughtered nearly all the gentlemen
about whom I wrote to you in my last letter. . . .
Your very faithful
E. M. House
With the return of Mr. Wilson, conferences multiplied,
and the following six weeks House devoted to sifting the
claims of importunate applicants and to a search for avail-
able but less vociferous candidates. A series of excerpts
from his daily memoranda will illustrate the process.
No letters were exchanged with Mr. Wilson during this
period, since the two were in constant touch through the
telephone.
" December 6, 1912 : 1 had a long conversation with
McCombs and Vick.^ I believe if I had been authorized
to offer McCombs a foreign embassy to-day, he would have
accepted it. Office-seekers are driving him crazy. I
suggested a foreign position and he said that he did not
have sufficient money ; but I told him that it would not
take much. He asked where I would suggest his going
— ^Vienna, Italy, or where ? . . .
“ Deumber ii, 1912 : Mr. David F. Houston c^e to
dinner and spent the evening. We discussed the different
Cabinet possibilities and other matters. He knows that
I have suggested biTTi to the President-elect for Searetary
of Agriculture. He thought it would be better to defer
legislation on currency and tariff until later, but I con-
^ Walter F. Vidr, one of Mr. McCombs’s (diief lieutenants in the electoral
campaign.
100
BUILDING A CABINET
vinced him of the importance of passing such measures
before all the patronage had been distributed. . . .
“ December i8, 1912 : Governor Wilson came at half-
past one. I talked to him about Morgenthau^ and
suggested him for Turkey. He replied, " There ain’t
going to be no Turkey,” ® and I said, " Then let him go
look for it.” . . .
” I thought if I were in Wilson’s place I would take
only men I knew, that in making a selection it was like
waUdng in the country — one coidd always imagine that
something better was beyond, but upon reaching the
given point the view was stiU in the distance like the
rainbow.
*' Bryan was also discussed fredy. I advised him
to ofier Bryan the Secretaryship of State, but afterwards
to suggest that it would be of great service if he would
go to Russia at this critical time. He thought Bryan
would want to discuss with him the personnel of his
Cabinet and that they could never agree. I argued
that there were many people and things that they could
agree upon, as their object was really the same only
their ways of getting at it were different. He might, I
thought, mention the names of Burleson, Daniels, and
others he was considering for the Cabinet who were also
friends of Mr. Bryan.
“ We discussed again the Attorney-Generalship. . . .
We went back to McRejmolds and I thought he seemed
to understand the different phases of the situation better
than anyone I had talked to. He asked if I considered
McAdoo suited for the Treasury, and I thought he was ;
under ordinary conditions I should say an Eastern man
would be a bad choice, but that in this instance I hearty
approved McAdoo.
. ” December 19, 1912 : Governor Wilson called me
over the tdephone and said that McCombs was distinctly
^ Cliaixman of -the Democratic Finance Coimnittee and later appointed
Ambassador to Turkey*.
- " * -Turkey in Europe seemed about to disappear as the result of the
-defeats administered by the Balkan JLeague.
BUILDING A CABINET
lOI
disappointed at the ambassadorial offer made him
yesterday, and no decision was arrived at. He wanted
to know again about Bryan and my advice about it.
I advised being cordial in making the offer, ^ and to make
it plain afterwards that he would appreciate his taking
the foreign post [the Ambassadorship to Russia].
“ B. M. Baruch, McCombs’s friend, told Wallace that
he had advised McCombs not to accept office, but to
resign from the National Committee and to go into the
practice of law as soon as his health permits. McCombs
seems terribly ‘ cut up ’ over the fact that Governor
Wilson has not offered him all that he desired and that
he tendered him an Ambassadorship instead of a Cabinet
place.
" I called up Governor Wilson to talk things over,
and he asked if I still held to my advice about Mr.
Bryan, and I answered ‘ yes.' This is the third or
fourth time he has asked me this. It shows how dis-
trustful he is of having Mr. Bryan in his Cabinet. . . .
“ December 21, 1912 : Tumulty telephoned about
the Governor’s and Bryan’s interview. Bryan was in
fine humour and everything was lovely.® He asked me
to send a further list of men whom I thought it best
for the Governor to see. I had already sent in a list
several days ago to Trenton.
“McAdoo ... is now anxious to go to Staunton,
where the Governor is to attend some celebration ^ven
in his honour on the 28th, and some of McAdoo’s friends
are urging him to go, telling him he is effacing himself
too much and will be forgotten. I advised to the
contrary, but wished him to use his own judgment.
“ December 23, 1912 [House and Colonel George
Harvey taking lunch together] : Martin was also at
lunch. Harvey told him that I was the best adviser
the President-elect had, and that he thought I should
be given the Secretaryship of the Treasury. Martin
1 Of th.e Secretaryship of State. *
® At this interview Mr, Bryan was offered the Secretaryship of State
and tentatively accepted it.
102
BUILDING A CABINET
wanted to know, if my health permitted would I take
it ? I replied, ‘ Not if I were as strong as a bull ! ’ ;
that, as it was, the Governor discussed everything
frankly and without fear of misunderstanding, but that
if I were an applicant for any position both he and I
would feel the restraint. . . .
“ The more I see of McAdoo, the better I like him.
He is a splendid fellow, whole-souled, and generous,
without a tinge of envy, and with it all he is honest and
progressive.
“ D&cemher 29, 1912 : Tumulty was with me from
five until half-past nine in the evening. We went
over the situation in detail. He is very desirous of
being Secretary to the President.
“ I asked Tumulty how many letters of protest the
Governor was receiving against himsdf for that position.
He admitted that there had been five or six hundred.
I inquired if he showed them to the Governor. He had
not shown them all, but had always told him of the
number received. He did not show him the letters
which came that were favourable to him either. . . .
“ January 5, 1913 : The Governor has invited
Burleson, Palmer, Culberson, Gore, Hoke Smith, and
Bob Henry, as I had suggested, to come to Trenton
this week. Tumulty said the Governor did not want
to invite them much, as he thought there was nothing
that he wished to discuss with them. Tumulty explained
to him that I thought he should see them in order to
compliment them rather than to expect much help from
their advice. He then consented to see them.
" January 7, 1913 : McAdoo came at five and re-
mained until seven o’clock. We discussed Cabinet
possibilities. He wanted to know what my general
idea was, and I told him that I thought the Governor
had poor material to select from. McAdoo replied, ‘ I
believe you are right, and you may include me too.'
I disclaimed any thought or reference to him, but he
cheerfully included himself. I explained that my reason
for saying this was that the Democratic Party had been
BUILDING A CABINET 103
out of power so long that no one had been in training
or in process of development for public office.
“ X tells me that he understands from Thomas
Nelson Page and others that Y is anxious for a recon-
ciliation. Martin says Y has a plan for disposing of
Bryan. I answered that a lot of people were busy with
such plans, but I thought Governor Wilson and Mr.
Bryan would be able to manage the matter them-
selves. . . .
" January 8, 1913 : I told him [Wilson] he was now
leaving Texas out of the Cabinet. His reply was, ' I
want you to go in the Cabinet.' ... He urged me not to
give a definite answer for the present and said he very
much wished me to be a member of his official family,
that it seemed to coincide with the fitness of things.
“ He generously asked me what place I would like,
evidently leaving me to choose. I regard this as a very
high compliment, for the reason that he has offered no
one a place in the Cabinet up to now excepting Mr.
Bryan, whom we agreed upon just after the election . . .
as a political necessity. Of course, I shall not take any
office, although I would do much to oblige him and to
be of service. My reasons are that I am not strong
enough to tie myself down to a Cabinet department and,
in addition, my general disinclination to hold office.
I very much prefer being a free lance, and to advise
with him regarding matters in general, and to have a
roving conunission to serve wherever and whenever
possible.”
To such reasons for remaining out of office should be
added one which Colonel House may not have definitely
formulated, but which must have affected him at least
subconsciously. His experience with the Texas Governors
had taught him that, however much in sympathy he
might be with their general policy, questions of detail
must arise on which his opinions would be at variance
from theirs. He bdieved that in essential matters he
104 BUILDING A CABINET
and Wilson would agree in principle, but they might
conceivably disagree as to method. If he were in an
official position such disagreement would compel his
resignation, unless he were to be placed in the unpleasant
position of carrying out a line of action which he dis-
approved. So long as he remained in a private capacity,
he could give what advice he chose ; and if the President ‘
did not follow it. House could shrug his shoulders and
turn his attention to other matters in which Wilson might
accept his guidance. “ Had I gone into the Cabinet,”
House once said, “ I could not have lasted eight weeks.”
Outside of the Cabinet he lasted for eight years.
Ill
The serious, although rather unconventional, responsi-
bilities laid upon the shoulders of Colonel House during
the process of drafting Cabinet possibilities were not
lightened by the political inexperience of the President-
elect and Ms temperamental inability to develop confi-
dential relations with the party leaders.
“ Such men as Speaker Clark [so ran a despatch
from Trenton to the New York Heralc[\, Representative
Oscar W. Underwood, Senator Hoke Smith, Senator
Culberson, and many others of importance in the
Democracy have journeyed to Princeton and gone away
sa3dng they had no more information than when they
came. One of them said to me : 'I know that Governor
Wilson was elected President on November 5. I know
that he will be inaugurated on March 4. Further than
that I know nothing about what has happened or is
going to happen.’ Several of the leaders frankly say,
when asked what will happen after March 4 : 'You
will have to ask either the President-elect or Colonel
House.’
1 The Herald, February 19, 1913.
BUILDING A CABINET
105
As the days passed the politicians took their hopes
and their ideas to House, who, somewhat embarrassed
by his position, nevertheless worked steadfastly to make
them feel less out in the cold. “ Making the suggestion
through you," wrote McCombs to House on January 2,
of a proposition for Wilson’s decision, " is the only way
I know of handling the matter.”
“ February 17, 1913 : X called at five o’clock [re-
corded House]. He wished to tell me many things, but
particularly how very competent he was to be Secretary
of the Treasury. He seemed hurt that Wilson had not
called him into consultation, or sent for him, or noticed
him in any way since the election. His position, he
seemed to think, entitled him to great consideration. I
explained that the President-elect had not called his
friends into consultation, and those who had been with
him had made the appointments themselves and had
not come at his invitation. This was invariably the
case, as far as I knew, with the exception of Mr. Bryan,
Speaker Clark, Mr. Underwood, and some members of
the Senate and House. He left in a fine humour, and
promised to write me his views if I would convey them
to the Governor. ..."
“ February 19, 1913 ; Y came at half-past five. He
complained bitterly of the way the Governor was treat-
ing him ; that he did not consult with him or tell him
about any of his plans. I asked if he knew of anyone
else that he consulted or to whom he told his pirns.
He confessed he did not, and I told him he had no right
to complain. ... He said there was a bitter feeling
among me party leaders that they were not being con-
sulted, and not taken mto confidence. Of course he
exaggerates this.”
It was all the more irnportant that when it came to
the composition of the Cabinet the wishes of the party
leaders should be carefully considered; for if, after
io6 BUILDING A CABINET
keeping his own counsel (or that of Colonel House), Mr.
Wilson chose a Cabinet of independents, he would soon
find a rebellious party in Congress. House was frankly
troubled.
“ Walter Page lunched with me to-day [the Colonel
wrote on January 14]. I found that he had been ad-
vising Governor Wilson very much along the fines I
have. . . .
“ I tried him out as to the department in which he
was most interested. If the Governor appoints him, I
shall advise that he be given the Interior. I told Page
that I was fearful that the Governor was thinking of
appointing too many independents and that he was not
looking for rock-ribbed Democrats.”
The Colonel struck the same note on the following
day in a talk with Mrs. Wilson, whose influence with her
husband he evidently coimted upon.
” I told her that the men the Governor had in mind
for his Cabinet were nearly all irregular party men and
that most of them had voted for Taft four years ago.
I cited as an instance. She spoke up immediately
and said, " But you would not keep him out of the
Cabinet on that account ? ” I replied no, not in his
case, but I would not put in too many with the same
sort of record, for the reason that the moment the
Cabinet was announced their political records would be
exposed.
” I thought that in twenty years from now no one
would know how the different departments of the
Government had been run and that the President’s fame
would rest entirely upon the big constructive measure
he was able to get through Congress ; and in order to
get them through he had to be on more or less good
terms with that body. This, I thought, was one of the
most irnportant things he had to consider, for fids future
reputation would rest almost wholly upon it.”
BUILDING A CABINET
107
Of all the politicians, the one whose influence during
the first legislative session would be most valuable was,
of course, Mr. Bryan ; and it was natural that House
should suggest that he be given a voice in the composi-
tion of the Cabinet, or at least an opportunity to com-
ment upon the tentative slate which Wilson had drafted
by early January. The Governor agreed, House recorded
on January 10, that it would be well for the Colonel to
go to Miami, where Bryan was building a Southern
home, and explain Wilson’s plans. He said I could
talk to him freely, but that it was to give him, Bryan,
information and not to ask his advice.”
The newspapers of the East had taken unholy plea-
sure in picturing Mr. Bryan in a truculent frame of mind
and inclined to dictate Mr. Wilson’s policy and appoint-
ments. House discovered the reverse to be true. " He
is in a delightful humour,” the Colonel wrote Wilson
on January 29. ” He likes the names suggested for the
family gathering.” And as House developed his views
he found Bryan careful not to press any specific appoint-
ments with undue ardour and surprisingly mild in his
criticisms.
Colonel House to the President-elect
Miami, Florida, January 30, 1913
Dear Governor :
I had a long conference with our friend last night
and again to-day. ...
He is very earnest in his advice that a Catholic, and
perhaps a Jew, be taken into the family. I told him
T[umulty]’s appointment as Secretary would cover "^e
one, but he thought not. He suggests Governor Higgins
of !l^ode Island as a possible choice. He shows a very
fine spirit and is exceedingly anxious for your success.
He also shows no disposition whatever to interfere, even
io8 BUILDING A CABINET
in Ms own department. He says he would like to name
Ms first assistant unless you have someone you want
to place there.
He knows all the disadvantages to Mm of accepting
place and mentions them in detail, but he says that
those things must not be taken into account.
He tMnks the Pacific slope should be recognized, but
he does not seem to get beyond Phelan and Lane, although
I do not tMnk he would seriously object to anyone
excepting Teal.
For tile first time, I think, he is finding out how
difficult it is to form this body.
He likes the suggestion you made to me for Germany
[Professor Fine of I^inceton], but has no one in mind for
England. . . .
He has accepted all your conclusions so cordially
that it has been a pleasure to me to discuss matters with
him.
Your very faithful
E. M. House
“ January 30, 1913 : Mr. Bryan was as pleased with
Ms new place [recorded Colonel House] as a child with
a new toy. He is really a fine man, full of democratic
simplicity, earnest, patriotic, and of a fervently rehgious
nature. Mrs. Bryan is the ‘ salt of the earth.’ She has
all the poise and good common sense wMch is lacking
in her distinguished husband. . . .
“ January 31, 1913 : It was so warm that we did not
go through the Everglades. Mr. Bryan came over in
the evening and we had another political talk. He was
much distressed when I told him that Governor Wilson
had offered the Chinese mission to Dr. Charles W. Eliot.
He thought it the poorest selection that could be made,
for the reason that Eliot was a Unitarian and did not
believe in the divinity of Christ and the new Chinese
civilization was founded upon the Christian movement
there. I asked Mm to state Ms objections in writing,
not unly as to Dr. Eliot, but as to any member of the
BUILDING A CABINET 109
proposed Cabinet. I said as far as Eliot was concerned,
it was too late ; but I did not believe Dr. Eliot would
accept, for he had told the Governor that he would take
it only if his wife approved and he was afraid she would
not. Mr. Bryan was hopeful she would not.”
“ He is only trying to help,” wrote House again to
Wilson, “and does not mean to urge.” “Everything
he said,” the Colonel noted later, “ showed a fine spirit
in Mr. Bryan and seemed to me to be a hopeful sign for
future harmony.” It appears from the terms of the
following letter that Wilson left these negotiations entirely
to House.
Colonel House to the President-elect
St. Augustine, Florida
February 6, 1913
Dear Governor:
Our friend has asked me many times whether I had
heard from you in response to his suggestions. He
wired me just before he left for Havana, asking the
same question.
If I were you, I would send him a line indicating
that you appreciated his interest and had found his
suggestions helpful. He will be back in Miami next
Thursday, and if he found a note from you awaiting
him it would please him greatly. . . .
Your very faithful
E. M. House
IV
Upon Colonel House’s return, early in Febru^,
-Wilson felt himself prepared to make the definite appoint-
maits. It was already settled that Bryan .should be
Secretary of State, McAdoo had accepted the Treasury
portfolio,' and Burleson was to be offered.that of Post-
II2 BUILDING A CABINET
“ I asked him not to worry [wrote House], that the
getting of Lane in the Cabinet was of much more import-
ance than the losing of Palmer for Attorney-General ;
that Lane could take that place, if necessary, and fill
it with distinction, and that we could keep Baker ^ for
the Interior. . . .
“ February i8, 1913 : Newton Baker [recorded House]
rang me up to say that he had arrived. When I was in
Princeton, the Governor wrote him a note asking him to
come to New York on Tuesday or Wednesday, as was
most convenient, and to telephone me and that I would
make an appointment for him to meet the Governor at
my apartment. I asked Baker to dine with us at seven
o’clock and I requested him not to let his presence in
New York be known and, above all things, not to let
anyone know he was coming to my apartment or was
having an appointment with the President-elect. . . .
“ I met Governor Wilson and brought him to the
apartment. We had about forty minutes before Baker
came, and we discussed the Cabinet and other appoint-
ments. . . .
" Baker came and we had a very delightful dinner ;
politics were not discussed at all, stories were told,
Mark Twain and various other persons and matters
were talked of. After dinner I left the Governor and
Baker. ...
“ In about a half-hour, I returned. The Governor
said he had offered Baker the Secretaryship of the
Interior and that he was considering the matter. Baker
finally decided he could not take it. He said there was
no one to carry on the work in Cleveland which he had
begun, and he thought the government of our American
cities was the greatest disgrace to our citizenship ; that
Clevdand was emerging from that state and would
soon be an example to her sister cities throughout the
land. :
Both the Governor and I urged him to take a broader
idew of the situation and do the bigger work. He finally
-Kewton D. Baker, reform Mayor of Geveland.
BUILDING A CABINET 113
decided to take the matter under consideration for the
night, and said if he changed his mind he would wire
me to-morrow, quoting a line from Shakespeare which
I would understand.”
The cryptic line from Shakespeare was never sent,
and it was found necessary to look further for a Secretary
of the Interior. Baker’s refusal led Wilson definitely
to decide that he would return to House-’-s original
suggestion of McReynolds as Attorney-General. The
Colond pointed out that Walter H. Page might be offered
the Interior and Lane be shifted to the War Department.
Wilson acceded and authorized House to see whether
Page would accept. He at once called him upon the
telephone, but learned that he had left town ; he there-
upon sent him a tdegram asking him to call as soon as
he returned.
Chance plays its part in history. Had Mr. Page
been in town, he would have been offered and would
have accepted the Secretaryship of the Interior, and he
would not have gone to London as Ambassador. But
before his return, the party leaders in Congress learned
of the suggestion and objected strongly. Page, they
pointed out, was a Southerner, and no Southerner should
be Secretary of the Interior because of his control of
pensions. In view of these objections, Wilson decided
to keep Lane in the Interior and look for another man for
War. House was left to explain his telegram to Page
to rile best of his ability when the latter returned. He
proved equal to the interview, which might conceivably
test his tact and powers of invention.
• “ February 24, 1913 : Walter Page arrived in response
to my tdegram. When I wired him we expected to
place him in the Interior and move Lane up to War, but
I — 8
BUILDING A CABINET
114
in talking with the Governor last night it was decided
best not to put a Southerner in that place.
“ I told Page the reason we had summoned him was
because there was likely to be a slip-up in some of the
Cabinet places, and we wanted to know definitely
whether he could be used in case it was necessary. I
also told him the Governor wished me to discuss with
him the material already gotten together. He suggested,
and I advised, his going at once to Trenton to take the
matter up with the Governor.”
A few weeks later House told Page how near he had
been to becoming Secretary of the Interior, a story which
excited in Mr. Page more amusement than regret.
The final choice for the portfolio of War was ddayed
until the last moment. Colonel House had strongly
recommended Mr. H. C. Wallace, who later became
Ambassador to France. Mr. Wilson approved the selec-
tion and offered the post to Wallace. But the latter
found it impossible to accept. The ultimate decision
was made on the spur of the moment. During the
morning of February 24, House recorded ; “ Tumulty
suggests, and we are going to look up, a New Jersey man,
Vice-Chancdlor Garrison, and see whether he will fill
the bill.” Wilson evidently lost no time, for in the
evening :
” Tumulty telephoned while Page was here, sa5dng
that the Governor had sent for Vice-Chancellor Garrison
and was very much pleased with him, and had offered
him the post of Secretary of War.”
The reader can hardly escape a shock of surprise at
the apparently nonchalant manner in which the President-
dect chose his Cabinet. In reality he had recdved an
immense quantity of carefully sifted information, and
BUILDING A CABINET
115
the eligibility list of possibilities was drafted with care.
But he made his final selection with a suddenness of
decision that startled House himself.
“ The thing that impresses me most [he recorded] is
the casual way in which the President-elect is making up
his Cabinet. I can see no end of trouble for him in the
future unless he proceeds with more care.”
The Cabinet, as finally selected, was a wMange of
administrators selected because of personal ability and
of political leaders whose influence demanded recognition.
The number of purely political appointments was less
than is customary, a tribute to Wilson’s original deter-
mination to consider ability alone in his appointments.
Because of this fact and also because of his consistent
refusal to discuss the Cabinet intimately with anyone
but House, the wiseacres were largely at fault in their
prognostications. Ten days before the Inauguration,
the New York Herald announced " Rifts in Cabinet
Secrecy.” But the list which it published of the probable
Cabinet proved to be far from accurate.^ Of the ten
final appointees, only four were recognized beforehand
by the Herald as possibilities.
The publication of the official family aroused more
surprise than enthusiasm. In Republican circles the
new Cabinet was naturally regarded as inferior, and
by the country as a whole it was looked upon as mediocre.
This was inevitable, since Wilson’s choice was limited
not merdy to Democrats but to radicals who would
approve of the drastic reforms he contemplated. For
half a century the Democratic party had been out of
power, except for the two terms of Clevdand’s Presi-
dency ; and during that period there had been a steady
^ See Appendix to chapter.
BUILDING A CABINET
ii6
gravitation of men of practical ability into the opposite
political camp, which was more and more affiliated
with the great money and business interests.
“ It has thus come about [a New York paper pointed
out] that most of the men eminent in the administration
of national affairs have become defenders of existing
conditions, in spite of the growing importance of a
newly awakened national consciousness of intolerable
wrongs in the political and economic life of the country.
. . . Such men as seem to give promise of solid ability
and administrative success lack importance in the
public mind. . . . [Mr. Wilson] expects the country to
be surprised by the absence of commanding or dis-
tinguished figures in his selection, but feels that the
men he is to call into power will in time develop reputa-
tions that will justify him.” ^
Colonel House himself was satisfied rather than
enthusiastic, and in meeting the criticism of his friends
emphasized the difficulties of the problem more than
the innate strength of the Cabinet.
“ Walter Page [he noted on February 24] came after
dinner and told of his trip to Trenton. He regretted
that it was too late to keep Daniels out of the Cabinet.
The President-elect had already written him. I knew
this, because he told me he intended writing McRe3molds,
Daniels, and Burleson notes on Sunday. . . . He said to
Page, ‘ You do not seem to think that Daniels is Cabinet
timber.’ Page replied, ‘ He is hardly a splinter.’
“In discussing the Cabinet, Page thought it dis-
tinctly mediocre and thought the country would so
regard it. I asked him how he could better it ; and
when he attempted to do so, like all the rest he failed
signally. ... I think, in all the circumstances, we have
done weU.”
^ EventTtg Mail, New York, January 17, 1913.
BUILDING A CABINET
117
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of War
Attorney-General
Postmaster-General .
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Interior
APPENDIX
The *njerald'^ List
of February 22 .
. W. J. Bryan
. W. G. McAdoo
. Charles R. Crane
. A. Mitchell Palmer
/ Josephus Daniels
lAlbert S. Burleson
. Lewis Nixon
{ Alva Adams
EUiward L. Norris
. Obadiah Gardiner
The Cabinet as
Appointed.
W, J. Bryan
W. G. McAdoo
Lindley M. Garrison
J. C, McRe3molds
Albert S, Burleson
Josephus Daniels
F. K. Lane
D. F. Houston
W. C. Redfield
W. B, Wilson
(Labour)
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Commerce and \
Labour • . . >Louis D, Brandeis
CHAPTER V
THE SILENT PARTNER
The source of his power was . . , the confidence that men had in his
sagacity and unselfishness.
E, S. Martin, in " Harper*$ Magazine** February 1912
I
"* Ti /r HOUSE is my second personality. He
\ /I is my independent self. His thoughts and
-L V JL mine are one. If I were in his place I would
do just as he suggested. ... If anyone thinks he is
reflecting my opinion by whatever action he takes, they
are welcome to the conclusion.”
Such was the reply given by President Wilson to a
politician who asked whether House represented him
accurately in a certain situation. It indicates the
degree of confidence which he placed in the Colonel.
The President made it dear that, although House had
refused of&dal position of any kind, he was determined
that the Administration should not lose the political
services which House was qualified to perform. On
the very day of his inauguration he asked and summarily
accepted his recommendations for important appointive
posts.
“ The President-dect tdephoned [Colond House
wrote on March 4] and asked Loulie and me to meet
his family party at the Shoreham Hotd at 9.45, in order
to accompany them to the Capitol for the inauguration
ceremonies. I took Loulie to the Shoreham and left
her with the Wilsons, but I did not go to the Capitol
mysdf. I went instead to the Metropolitan Club and
118
THE SILENT PARTNER
119
loafed around with Wallace. Functions of this sort
do not appeal to me and I never go.
" Mrs. Wilson invited us to the White House to see
the fireworks. When we arrived we found the President
was over in his of&ce. I went there and was with him
for a few minutes in order to tell him that I had in-
vestigated John H. Marble for Interstate Commerce
Commissioner, in place of F. K. Lane, and had found
Tiim satisfactory. The President had never met Marble
and had made no inquiries concerning him further than
mine. He said he would send his name in to-morrow,
along with the names of his Cabinet. He made the
appointment in this way in order to avoid the great
pressure which would be made upon him by candidates
for this important of&ce. ...
“ March 8, 1913 : The President asked me to be
at the '\^te House this morning at nine.
The offices were nearly deserted at so early an
hour. The President was (hressed in a very becoming
sack suit of grey, with a light grey silk tie. It was
rather an informal-looking costume, but very attractive.
I sat with him for nearly an hour and we had a delightful
talk. We discussed the Cabinet mainly, and he laugh-
ingly told me his estimate of each one and how they
acted at the first meeting. . . . The President spoke
finely of Bryan and said their relations were exceedingly
cordial. . . .
“ The President suggested that we could have a
cypher between us, so when we talked over the telephone
or wrote we could discuss men without fear of revealing
their identity. He took a pencil and started out with
Bryan, saying, ‘ Let us call him “ Primus.” ’ McAdoo
is already known as ‘ Pythias,’ McCombs being ‘ Damon.’
Garrison he suggested as ‘ Mars,’ McReynolds ‘ Coke,’
Burleson ‘ Demosthenes.’ ”
Thus began House’s career as Silent Partner.^ It
1 The appellation was first used by Peter Clark Macfarlane in an
article in CoUier*s, and soon became generaL
120
THE SILENT PARTNER
was a relationship which rested chiefly upon the political
co-operation of the Colonel in meeting the problems of
government. His labours were of the most varied
kind, and he sought every opportunity to ease the load
that bore upon the President, to bring him information,
to work out details of policy. There was, however, an
essential personal basis to the relationship, since it would
have been impossible for a man of Wilson’s temperament
to put full political confidence in a man who did not
evoke his affection as an individual.
“ I have an intimate personal matter to discuss
with you [he said to House in the summer of 1915].
You are the only person in the world with whom I can
discuss everything.^ There are some I can tell one
thing and others another, but you are the only one to
whom I can make an entire clearance of mind.”
The letters of Wilson to House invariably displayed
an intensity of personal feeling that would have astounded
those who attributed to him about the same degree of
warmth as that of a Euclidean proposition and failed
to realize the human qualities that lay concealed under
his armour of exterior austerity. He wrote him fre-
quently of his desire to talk with him and the need
and desire for his advice on many a complicated matter.
At the end of the first legislative session, he put his feeling
into emphatic language.
“ Your letter on the passage of the Tariff BiU [the
President said] gave me the kind of pleasure that seldom
comes to a man, and it goes so deep that no words are
adequate to express it. I think you must know without
my putting it into words (for I cannot) how deep such
\ Tliis was after Mrs. Wilson's death and before the President’s re-
marriage.
121
THE SILENT PARTNER
friendship and support goes with me and how large a
part it constitutes of such strength as I have in public
affairs. I thank you with all my heart and with deep
affection.”
The friendship between the two, however rapidly it
bloomed, was progressive. It is not uninteresting and is
perhaps significant to trace its development through
the forms of salutation used by the President in his letters.
They met in November 1911, and until the following
spring Wilson addresses him as “ Dear Mr. House.” But
after his nomination, in August 1912, he begins to address
him as “ Dear Friend,” signing himself ” Faithfully
yours,” or “ Sincerely yours.” After his election in
November 1912, he signs himself ‘‘Affectionately yours,”
and this is constant with the salutation of “ Dear Friend ”
for two and a half years. In moments of great emotion,
as at the time of Mrs. Wilson’s death, he addresses him
as " My dear, dear Friend.” In the summer of 1915,
at the period of the Arabic crisis when he was tom by
doubt and worry, the President begins to address him as
“ Dearest Friend,” a salutation which remains invariable
until after his re-dection in November 1916. In January
of 1917 the President reverts to the form of address,
” My dear House,” although he continues the conclusion,
“Affectionatdy yours.” Otherwise it is impossible to
detect in Wilson’s letters any change of tone. It is
certain that the political rdationship between the two
men remained as dose during the two years that followed ;
but it is possible that their personal friendship was most
intense between the years 1912 and 1917-
Close spiritual communion was not dependent upon
physical propinquity, for the heat drove Colond House
far from Washington in the spring and frequently several
months would pass without their meeting. Separation
122
THE SILENT PARTNER
seems to have made no difference in their understanding.
“ I never worry when I do not hear from you,” wrote
House. “No human agency could make me doubt
your friendship and affection. ... I always understand
your motives.” At the end of each summer, enter-
prising and ill-informed newspapermen would regularly
feature a “ break.” “You are a little behind your
schedule this year, my friend,” said House to a reporter
one September day, after the publication of the annual
story.
During the cool months, however, Wilson and House
saw much of each other, for the latter made frequent
trips to Washington, and on each of these trips Wilson
devoted long hours to intimate discussions with his
adviser. The President lacked the capacity and inclina-
tion for meeting and entertaining varied t57pes of people
which, under the Roosevelt regime, made the White
House a magnet for explorers, litterateurs, pugilists,
and hunters — everyone who had an interesting story
to tell. Wilson had the college professor’s love of a
quiet evening by the fireside with the family, and an
early bed, varied by a visit to the theatre, preferably a
simple vaudeville.
House was one of the few admitted to the small
family circle. “ At night,” said Herbert Corey in the
Commercial Advertiser, “ after Mr. Wilson had wound
the dock, and put out the cats and politidans. House
stayed for a little further talk.” To the President’s
study House brought the impressions he had formed of
public opinion, gathered from his numerous contacts
with office-holders, business men, and editors, and there
Wilson gave free vent to his political theories, his aspira-
tions, and his fears. There, too, the President found
rdaxation in reading poetry and essays to his friend.
THE SILENT PARTNER
123
“ May II, 1913 : I spoke to the President about
conserving his strength, and suggested various means
by which it could be done. I thought it was essential.
He said it looked as if the people were tr5dng to kill
him, and he spoke of the loneliness of his position, in
a way that was saddening. . . .
" I spoke of his probable renomination and re-election.
He replied, ‘ Do not let us talk about that now. My
dear friend, if I can finish up my legislative programme,
I do not desire re-election.’ I urged him to keep up
his courage, for if he ever faltered in the slightest he
would lose his leadership and influence. He realized
this and declared he would maintain his courage to the
end.
" October 16, 1913 : One thing the President said,
which interested me, was that he always lacked any
feeling of elation when a particular object was accom-
plished. When he signed the Tariff Bill he could not
feel the joy that was properly his, for it seemed to Mm
that the thing was over and that another great work
was calling for Ms attention, and he thought of tMs
rather than the present victory.
“ November 12, 1913 : He [Wilson] said he believed
in the Executive becoming the leader in putting into
law the desires of the people. He thought there was
no danger in tMs course, for the reason that unless a
President had the force of public sentiment back of Mm,
he could never get a law through. That the reason he
Mmself had been successful with the tariff and the
currency bills was because the people demanded them,
and Congress knew it. It was not the pressure from
him, but the pressure of the nation back of Mm.
“ He read some extracts from Ms works on govern-
ment, in order to define better Ms views. He expressed
Mmself as being in sympathy with the movement for
amending the Constitution with less difficulty than at
present. . . .
“ He said he had not slept well the night before ;
that he had nightmares, and that he thought he was
THE SILENT PARTNER
124
seeing some of his Princeton enemies. These terrible
days have sunk deep into his soul and he will carry their
marks to his grave.
“ Decewher 22, 1913 ; At dinner there was no one
present but the family, and the conversation ran along
general lines. I asked the President how high he ranked
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. He said, very, very high.
He had also noticed that great orations and great poems,
when spoken or written under deep emotion, were simple
in language. He mentioned Burke as an example. Some
member of the family took exception to this opinion and
cited Browning and also suggested that Shakespeare
made his heroes say grandiloquent things under stress
of great emotion. . . .
“ I spoke of his success, and he said his Princeton
experience hung over him sometimes like a nightmare ;
that he had wonderful success there, and all at once
conditions changed and the troubles, of which every-
one knew, were brought about. He seemed to fear that
such a denouement might occur again. . . .
“ It was twenty minutes to twelve when we left his
study for bed. He was solicitous of my welfare and came
into my room to see that everything was properly
arranged.
“ A'pril 27, 1914 ; The President spoke of not feeling
at home an3nvhere now ; that is, he had a feeling that
he had no home. He said he felt the same way when he
was at Princeton and occupied the house of the President ;
that while he was perfectly comfortable and happy in
his surroundings, yet he always had that unsettled feding
if as he had no permanent abiding-place.
'‘April 28, 1914 : At breakfast I spoke of Edward
S. Martin’s d^dous humour, and I thought he waS'Uot
only humorous but had as much good sense as anyone
I knew. The President replied that ‘ humour and good
sense go together.’ . . .
I asked if he would like to be editor of a daily paper.
He replied that nothing would appeal to him less, for the
reason that no one could write every dayman opinion of
THE SILENT PARTNER 125
value. It was difficult enough to do this once a week,
but impossible to do it each day. He said he enjoyed
Punch very much. That ‘ while there were no laughs
in it, it was full of smiles.’
“ May II, 1914 : No one dined with us excepting
Grayson,^ and after dinner he left us. The President
read poems to me for nearly an hour. It was Words-
worth, Matthew Arnold, Edward Sill, and Keats. What
he particularly liked was ‘ A Fool’s Prayer ’ by SiU, and
‘ A Conservative ’ by Gilman. When he finished reading,
I took out my budget.*
“August 30, 1914 ; The last morning I was with the
President [in the country] he planned to play golf early
enough to get back for lunch and leave on the 2.40 train
for Washington. It was my intention to leave . . .
when he started for the golf field. This necessitated our
getting up early and about the same time. He arose a
half-hour earlier than was necessary, merely to give me
the uninterrupted use of our common bathroom. Tliis
illustrates, I think, as weU as anything I could mention,
his consideration for others and the simplicity^ of the
man. I notice, too, in his relations with hus family that
he is always' tender, affectionate, and considerate.
“ September 28, 1914 : We talked much of leadership
and its importance in government. He has demon-
strated this to an unusual degree. He thinks our form
of government can be changed by personal leadership ;
but I thought the Constitution should be altered, for
no matter how great a leader a man was, I coffid see
situations that would block him unless the Constitution
was modified. He does not feel as strongly about this
as I do. ...
“ November 7, 1914 : There were no outside visitors
for dinner, but the President artfully _ evaded getting
alone with me in his study. He was afraid I would renew
the McAdoo-Tumulty controversy. However, he need
* Dr. Caiy T. Grayson, physician to the Preadent. . -
* Meaning the items of political business that demanded the President's
attentionH.
126 THE SILENT PARTNER
not have worried. We had a delightful evening. He
began by talking about German political philosophy
and how wrong their conclusions usually were. He
spoke of himsdi as a disciple of Burke and Bagehot.
This is literally true, for he is always quoting from one
or the other, mostly from Bagehot.
“ He began to speak of a flexible or fluid Constitution
in contradistinction to a rigid one. He thought that
Constitutions changed without the text being altered,
and cited our own as an example. At the beginning,
he thought, there was no doubt that there was no dif-
ference of opinion as to the right of the States to secede.
This practically unanimous opinion probably prevailed
down to Jackson’s time. Then there began a large
sentiment for rniion which finally culminated in our
Civil War, and a complete change of the Constitution
without its text being altered.
“ Just then the la&es came in the sitting-room where
we were, and I got him to read some poems, something
he very much likes to do. He read William Watson’s
' Wordsworth’s Grave,’ and afterwards, at my request,
Gray’s ‘ Elegy.’ He also amused himself with any
number of limericks. We did not go to bed until around
10.30.
“ December 19, 1914 : As usual, no one excepting
the family was present at dinner. After we had finished
the President read aloud for nearly two hours, ‘ The
Adventures in Arcadia of the Idle Rich.’ ”
When President Wilson came to New York, he
almost invariably stayed with Colond House. The two
would motor in the country, often to Piping Rock,
followed by the Secret Service automobile and three cars
of newspapermen who hovered around the President
" like birds of prey,” the Colonel wrote, to be ready in
case of an accident. More pleasant were the evenings
spent in the small apartment on Thirty-Fifth Street and
later on Fifty-Third Street. House disconnected the
THE SILENT PARTNER 127
telephone, barred the door, and left to the President the
blessed choice between going to bed or a talk upon some
subject unconnected with politics— literature, ethics,
the immortality of the soul.
Like Napoleon, Wilson enjoyed suddenly descending
upon his friends,
“ November 14, 1914 : Last night Loulie and I went
to dinner and theatre with the Bertrons. He had the
Belgian Minister and Madame Havenith. The play
was ‘ The Only Girl,’ which I found amusing. Upon
my return to the apartment I found a call from the
White House. In answering it, they told me the Presi-
dent would arrive at six o’clock this morning and would
expect me to breakfast at six-thirty. This changed my
plans and I had to notify the Police Commissioner and
several others, so it was weU after midnight before I
went to bed, and I arose at half-past five.
“ The matter of entertaining a President within such
confined quarters as our little apartment is not an easy
undertaking, especially since I have no clerical force
excepting my one secretary.
" October 8, 1915 : To-day started off with the usual
bustle incident to a visit from the President. Tdegrams,
tdephone calls. Secret Service men, newspaper reporters,
notes, etc., etc. However, the confusion will cease the
moment the President arrives, for I do not permit the
tdephone to ring and we are undisturbed by letters,
notes, telegrams, or visitors. When he is once here,
ever3Tthing appears as peaceful as if there were no such
things as noise and confusion in the world.”
II
House’s admiration for the President’s qualities was
as keen as his personal afiection was deep. He regarded
Wilson’s power of leadership as supreme, and in certain
128 THE SILENT PARTNER
respects he placed a high estimate upon his intellectual
qualities.
“I have seen a_ great deal of the President on this
visit [he wrote April 17, 1914], and we have opened our
minds to one another without reserve. I am impressed
by the analytic qualities of his mind and the clearness
with which he expresses his thoughts. I have come
in contact with minds of greater initiative and imagina-
tion, but never one that had more analytical power
and comprehension,
‘‘ November 14, 191^ : The President ... is efficient
in his manner of working. For instance, when we were
discussing Ms message to the people concerning the
Belgian Relief funds he said : ‘ Now let us decide what
points are best to cover.’ He took a telegraph blank
having lines on it, and began to take down in shorthand
the different points, he making some suggestions and I
making others. There were about five points to be
covered, and he asked me to think if that were all. When
we concluded, there was notMng more ; he called Ms
stenographer and dictated the message in full.
“ He has one of the best ordered minds I have ever
come in contact with, although he is always complaining
of forgetfulness.”
On the other hand. Colonel House was too objective
not to observe certain qualities in the President wMch
weakened Mm as an executive and the effects of wMch
might ultimately seriously endanger his influence.
” One peculiar phase of the President's character
devdops itsdf more fully from time to time [he wrote,
November 22, 191^] ; that is, he ‘ dodges trouble.’
Let me put sometmng up to him that is disagreeable
and I have great difficulty in getting him to meet it. I
have no doubt that some of the trouble he had at Prince-
top. was cau^ by tMs delay in meeting vexatious
problms.
THE SILENT PARTNER
129
“ Another phase of his character is the intensity of
his prejudices against people. He likes a few and is
very loyal to them, but ms prejudices are many and
often unjust. He finds great difficulty in conferring
with men against whom, for some reason, he has a
prejudice and in whom he can find nothing good.
“ July 10, 1915 : I am afraid that the President’s
characterization of himself as ‘ a man with a one-track
mind ’ is aU too true, for he does not seem able to carry
along more than one idea at a time. I say this regret-
fully, because I have the profoundest admiration for his
judgment, his ability, and his patriotism.
“ December 8, 1915 : The President, as I have often
said before, is too casual and does the most important
things sometimes without much reflection.”
An example of such casualness is to be found in
Mr. Wilson’s speeches, which at times he delivered
almost impromptu. He had the power of arranging
in his head, at short notice, the order of the topics he
would treat and even of constituting the phrases he would
use. On May ii, 1914, he came from Washington to
deliver a memorial speech at the Brooklyn Navy Yard
as tribute to the sailors who had died in the capture of
Vera Cruz. House met him at the station and asked
him about the speech. ” He had not prepared any-
thing,” wrote the Colonel, ” but he* would think it out
en route from the Battery to the Navy Yard. It is his
way of doing. Sometime he will make a serious blunder.
It is an occasion for. something great, and he may or may
not rise to the occasion.”
Unfortunately, President Wilson lacked the power
to conceal his prejudices and he was not equipped by
temperament or experience to appear a good ” mixer.”
A Senator passed the word to House that ” the Senators
are in an ugly mood and critical of the President. One
1—9
130 THE SILENT PARTNER
grievance is that when they go to the White House for
conferences, they are offered nothing to drink excepting
water and nothing to smoke.” “ The President,” House
commented, “ does not drink excepting occasionally
at meals and he never smokes ; consequently he does
not offer such things to his guests.”
More serious was the fact that the President did
not convey the impression of great respect for the
Senators, either individually or as a body. “ Sena-
tor ,” he hazarded, " is the most comprehensively
ignorant man I have ever met.” And later, referring to
the same statesman, Wilson said to House, “ Someone
wanted to know the other day if I didn’t think So-and-
So the most selfish man in America. I replied, ‘ I am
sorry, but I am already committed to Senator .’ ”
Such remarks, frequently as apt as they were indiscreet,
did not tend to promote cordial relations between the
two branches of government.
Mr. Wilson, however, evidently felt that the criticism
passed upon him for aloofness and cold self-confidence
was quite unjustified.
“ December 22, 1913 [conversation between House
and Wilson] : I said my long experience with public
officials had made me fearful of anyone after they were
dected to office ; that the adulation of friends and
partisans and the position itsdf seemed to go to their
heads and they did not do rational things. . . . He
thought there was no fear of this with him ; that his
long university training had shown him how necessary
it was to confer about important matters ; that he
sddom went into a conference and came out with the
same ideas as when he went in.
“ April 15, 1914 : I asked [Wilson] whom he con-
ader^ the greatest man in the early days of the Re-
public. He thought Alexander Hamilton was easily
THE SILENT PARTNER 131
the ablest. We spoke of Washington and how much
he depended upon Hamilton’s advice. I thought this
in itself indicated Washington’s greatness. The fact
that he was able to pick out Hamilton from among Ms
associates, as his guiding mind, and that he used him
in tMs way, showed a breadth of view that was remark-
able. I told him that all the really big men I had known
had taken advice from others, while the little men
refused to take it. , . .
“ At another time in our conversation, he remarked
that he always sought advice. I almost laughed at tMs
statement, for McAdoo had just been telling me to-day
that he was at White Sulphur with the President and
Ms family when the despatch came from Admiral Mayo
concerning his demand of Huerta to salute our flag, and
he said the President never even mentioned the matter
to him. The President does get a lot of information
and suggestions from others, but it mostly comes
gratuitously and not by Ms asking. McRe3molds,
Houston, Lane, and all the others have the same story
to tell. . . .
“ April 18, 1914 : Houston and I lunched with
Martin Recorded House]. Henry Watterson was also
there. He spoke kindly of the President and said they
did not differ regarding Ms policies, but he was a man
that he, Watterson, could not successfully co-operate
with, indicating that the President was cold and in-
different. I told Mm that as far as my own experience
had been, he was just the opposite, for I had never had
a sweeter, kinder, or more affectionate friend than
Woodrow Wilson. ...
" June 27, 1914 [in London] : I lunched with Page.^
Afterwards we went into the private park in front of
Ms house and talked for an hour or more. He asked
me to bring to the attention of the President the fact
that he, the President, was not seeing enough business
men and was not talking to them, as he expressed it,
* in their language.’ He thought the President had a
1 Walter Hines Page, Ambassador to the Court of St, James's.
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132
broad and philanthropic view of the situation, and that
ever5d;hing he was doing for the country was absolutely
right, but he failed to give proper assurances to the
business world that he had their welfare at heart and was
not unfriendly as they thought. He suggested that the
President should invite some of them to lunch and show
them some marked social attention. I did not think he
would do this — ^he was not constituted that way ; that
I had been at the White House a great deal, but, with
the exception of seeing Cleveland Dodge there once, I
had not met anyone other than the immediate family.
“ I told him, too, how very tired the President was
and how he had to conserve his strength, and that we
must take him as he was and not as some people would
like to have him. He said a prominent American told
him the other day that the President did not confer
with anyone excepting me ; ... he thought a President
should not confine himself to a single individual. Page
asked how he knew this was true. He replied that it
was a matter of common knowledge in America.
told Page the President consulted with the
individual members of his Cabinet about their depart-
ments, but he did not consult with them on -matters
affectinjg their colleagues, and I thought he was right.
If he <Ed tins, he would soon have every Cabinet officer
meddling with, the affairs of the others, and there would
be general dissatisfaction.”
Keenly aware of the wave of criticism that threatened
the President because of his retired habits, and realizing
that Wilson’s strength lay in the formulation and exposi-
tion of policy rather than in the despatch of business
through personal conference. House set himself to the
labour of innumerable interviews and multifarious corre-
spondence, which might offset the criticism and lighten
the burden of detail that weighs upon every President.
He intercepted importunates on their way to the White
House and. promised to arrange their b us iness with the
THE SILENT PARTNER 133
President more rapidly than they could themsdves.
He sifted applications for appointments. He discussed
industrial relations with capitalists and labour leaders.
He advised the chiefs of industrial corporations how
to settle their difficulties with the Government. And
afterwards, reporting the gist of these interviews to the
President, he brought him into touch with the currents
of opinion and affairs.
“ March 22, 1913 : Mr. Frick came at deven. He
wished to know whether I thought it was possible to
settle the United States Steel Corporation suit outside
of the courts. He declared that he came of his own
initiative and no one knew he was doing so. He wanted
the matter kept confidential, excepting the President and
Attorney-General. We discussed the matter at some
length. I pointed out the difficulties, with which he
concurred. He seemed fair. I promised to mention
the matter and to see what could be done. . . .
“ March 24, 1913 : I told him [Wilson] about Mr.
Frick’s call and his suggestion in regard to the United
States Sted Corporation suit. Before the President
replied, I said, ‘ You had better let me teU Frick that you
referred me to the Attorney-General and suggested that
whatever proposal came to you should come through
the Attorney-General’s Office.’ The President smiled
and said, ' You majr consider it has been said.’
“ We discussed it at some length. The Preadent
thought that the Sted Corporation should have the same
consideration as any other, neither more nor less, and
that they should be allowed to make a proposition for
an agreement as to a decree of court in the suit. . . .
‘'April 18, 1913 : I went to the White House early
and met the President on his way to the memorial service
hdd for the late President of the Honduras. I found a
large number of people waiting, Mitchdl Palmer bdng
one of them. I asked if I could not attend to his matters
for him, explaining how busy the President was and how
134 the silent partner
uneasy we were for his health if the pressure continued.
He said he wanted to know about Guthrie’s chances for
an ambassadorship. I was able to tell him that the
President had him down for Japan. I asked, ‘ What
next ? ’ He wished to know about Berry for Collector
of the Port of Philadelphia. I was able to tell him that
McAdoo and I had threshed that out the day before and
we would both recommend his appointment.
“After that he wanted to know about Graham, who
wishes to go in the Attorney-General’s Ofi&ce. I told
him that McRe3molds and I had discussed that the day
before and that he intended to appoint him. This satis-
fied Palmer and he went back to the Capitol.
“Jerry Sullivan from Iowa was waiting to see the
President, and I treated him as I did Palmer. He had
just been appointed on the Appraisers’ Court in New
York. . . . He was uncertain as to whether he ought to
leave Iowa and wished to know how much time he could
have to decide. ... I asked him not to bother the
President, but to take it up with me and I would thresh
it out with the Attorney-General and take it to the Presi-
dent in concentrated form. He had several other
desires, which I advised him to put in writing and to send
to me at his convenience.
“ I wish I could always be here to do these things for
the President and give him time to devote himself to
the larger problems which confront the country. . . .
"August 2, 1913 ; John Mitchdl, President of the
Federation of Miners, and Timothy Healy, President of
the International Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen,
limched with me to-day. I talked to them earnestly
concerning the future of labour. I urged upon them the
necessity of taking a broad view, and not letting the
unimportant things of to-day interfere with the larger
ones which are to come. . . .
“ Noven^er 19, 1913 : I limched with Charles Grasty
of the Baltimore Sun. The other guest was Mr. Daniel
Willard of the Baltimore and Ohio. I found Willard
had a dear knowledge of railroad rates. Many of the
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135
facts given me by Secretary Lane, Commissioner Marble,
and Frank Trumbull are misleading. Mr. Willard is very
agreeable. He used the tablecloth instead of paper to
make diagrams and to illustrate his points, and he ate
no lunch to speak of, but talked all the time, though not
tiresomely. ...”
Not the least important function taken over by the
Colonel was that of receiving complaints against the
Administration — ^which his personal friends, who fre-
quently did not share his admiration for the President,
passed on to him with a rugged disregard for his peace of
mind. With j oumalists and editors he kept always in dose
touch, and they seemed to find in him a man to whom it
was worth while to send criticism.
Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House
May 18, 1915
Dear House :
. . . Cass Gilbert was at lunch. I said to him:
" The most that I shall do to-day will be to send clippings
to House. Why do people do such things for House ? ”
And then we went on to discuss House.
Well ! I hope House is pretty well and that the
swivd in his honourable neck is working easily, so that
when his head is turned with consortations with the
mighty he can twist it back without too much effort.
Good luck !
E. S. Martin
1914
Dear House :
I commend to your thoughtful consideration the
story I read in the paper, that in some districts in India
where they held a bee and deaned out the tigers, the
wild pigs so multiplied that they ruined the crops.
Are the wild pigs going to . . . devour us when we
pass the anti-trust mils with the labour union exemptions
and muzzle the railroads and skin the millionaires ?
136 THE SILENT PARTNER
I think that is quite a parable about the tigers and the
wild pigs.
The I.W.W.’S, the labourites, the socialists, all the
cranks and all the hoboes, they are the wild pigs.
Yours
E. S. M.
May II, 1915
Dear House :
. . . Woodrow, after a three-day conference 1 ex-
clusively with himself, made a short speech yesterday
which I didn’t like ; but no matter. I wished he had
talked to himself and conferred with someone else.
They say he has not conferred one single lick with Bill
Bryan . . . and that is good. So we profit by the
virtues of Woodrow’s defects. . . .
I think Wilson will do right, but if he gets sloppy
I’m going to get right in with the Powers of Darkness
[Roosevdt and his followers] and help drive the Bryan
and Daniels crowd out into the wilderness. This I say,
not that it is true, but to enable you to feel the temper
of the public. . . .
Good luck.
E. S. M.
Mr. George W. Wickersham to Mr. E. S. Martin {forwarded
to Colonel House)
New York, February 3, 1914
My dear Martin :
Your editorial for February ii is very sane. The
trouble with Mr. Wilson is that he lives in an imaginary
world. He fancies that a thing should be so, and it is
so. Which is all very well untfi a large enough number
of people begin to inquire, “Is it so ? ’’ Then, like
“ the unsubstantial fabric of a vision,” it vanishes.
Unlike it, it does leave a mark behind.
Yours faithfully
George W, Wickersham
137
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Mr. James Speyer to Colonel House
New York, Match 12, X914
My dear Colonel House :
I am glad you are coining back soon ! I am satisfied
that the gentlemen in Washington do not realize the
seriousness of the financial situation through the general
impairment of railroad credit. The Interstate Commerce
Commission shows no disposition to hurry its decision,
as to an advance in rates ; on the contrary, they have
again extended the time for hearings and are asking
more questions, etc. Meantime gross and net earnings
are declining and the weaker roads like the Erie, Southern
Railway, Chesapeake and Ohio, etc., cannot sell their
bonds except at bankruptcy figures, if at all. I can
only repeat that, in my opinion, which I do not express
publicly, we are face to face with the possibility not of
one but of several receiverships of the big railroad systems.
And you know how harmful that would be and how
slow the recovery. Mr. Rea’s statement, of which I
enclose a copy, is absolutely true and so is the enclosed
article from the Railway Gazette.
Something must be done and done soon, in a big and
courageous way, to stop these attacks by Government
agencies both federal and state, if disaster is to be
averted. We need a practical and constructive policy
and measures.
I wish I could write more cheerfully, but even I am
not sufficiently optimistic to dose my eyes to existing
conditions.
With kind regards
Sincerely yours
James Speyer
Major Henry L. Higginson to Colonel House
Boston, Mass^cbusbtis
January 13, 1915
My dear Colonel House :
... It does not seem dear to Washington that the
action there and in the States is keeping business men on
pins, and that, having lost considerable money and lost
138 THE SILENT PARTNER
almost entire confidence, they are not willing to risk their
credit. They have simply withdrawn their money in a
large way from active business, and are waiting to see
whether it is safe for them to pledge their names and
their honour in carrying out either old or new enter-
prises. ... It is not what Mr. Wilson’s Administration
has wished ; it is not his intention or that of Congress,
no doubt, but they do not see, they do not realize how
people feel.
I was glad to vote for Mr. Wilson, and have liked a
great deal that he and Congress, with his guidance, have
done ; but this shipping bill is a terrible mistake. If
we can only have peace and nothing new, trust placed in
railroad directorates and in other great concerns, we shall
go on very well. . . .
Perhaps these matters could be laid before influential
men and do some good, and perhaps not.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours
H. L. Higginson
Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House
New York, Fehruafy lo, 1915
Dear House ;
Your press agent is stfll working overtime.
Who is he, anyhow ?
Here are a few clippings.
Our poor country is working along under shortened
sail since you left.^ I don’t know any more than I can
help about what is going on, and read the papers through
smoked glasses. I understand that your friend W. W.
has clenched his teeth through the remnants of the
shipping bill and means to hold on. He has a heroic
bite. I am afraid it is his destiny finally to adhere to
something that will sink with him. But who can tell ?
We are all in the Lord’s hands and should be hopeful,
however anxious. . . .
Yours
E. S. Martin
^ For six months in Europe.
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139
House received the complaints cordially, explained
the situation, and promised to do what he could to better
it. To members of the Cabinet he passed on the criti-
cisms and insisted upon the need of meeting the_ factors
that produced them.
“ November 7, 1913 ; Bishop Brent came at half -past
five to tell of conditions in the Philippines. He says
they have a very wrong impression of the Administration,
bdieving that the Democratic Party’s advent to power
means immediate self-government for them. He does
not believe it possible to give them self-government
until the school children of to-day become old enough
to take an active part in public affairs.
“ I complimented him upon the work he is doing,
and suggested that any time he wished to reach the
President or to accomplish something which he could
not accomplish through the ordinary channds, he could
communicate with me.”
Colonel House to Mr. William GarroU Brown
New York, April lo, 1913
Dear Mr. Brown :
Martin tells me that you think too many Southerners
are being given office under this Administration.
You are quite right, but it is hard to help it. The
best material that has been suggested for office comes
from the South, and it is almost as hard to get satis-
factory Democrats from the North as it would be for a
Republican Administration to get satisfactory Republi-
cans from the South.
In naming Mr. Page for England the President went
into the subject carefully, and by process of elimination
Mr. Page seemed to be the most available. And so it has
been in every instance
It seems to me that we will have to assume the
burden of responsibility and let it go at that. If tl^
Administration succeeds, as we now hope, then it will
140 THE SILENT PARTNER
be a great tribute to the South ; and if it fails, we must
necessarily shoulder a larger part of the blame. . . .
With warm regards and best wishes, I am
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House
New York, October 21, 1915
Dear House :
It uplifted me very much to talk to you.
It always does.
You must be a hypnotizer. Anyhow you always
make me feel that we're going to do our duty.
Here’s next week’s Life with a good cartoon.
More power to your dbow !
E. S. M.
Colonel House to Secretary McAdoo
Austin, Texas, March 7, 1914
My dear Friend :
I am enclosing you two letters from Colonel Nelson
of the Kansas City Star, which I think it would be well
to have the President glance over.
Every day some complaint of this sort reaches me,
I never tire of reading the generous chorus of praise of
the President’s first year in office, and no one knows
better than we how richly he deserves it. However,
long experience has taught me how quickly this may
turn in other directions. If this should happen, I feel
sure it wiU not be from any act of the President himself,
but because those of us whom he has trusted on the
watch tower have failed in their duty toward him. . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
III
The extraordinary position of Colonel House, without
office and yet an integral part of the Administration,
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141
was made possible not merely by the personal regard of
the President and the infinite variety of services which
House performed for him, but by the intimacy of rela-
tions he maintained with the Cabinet. He carried on
constant correspondence with them, sometimes personal,
sometimes political, always cordial in character. Each
time that he visited Washington he evidently took pains
to study the problems of their departments and to acquire
for them whatever information he could. Brief selections
from his memoranda indicate the informality of their
intercourse.
“ March 20, 1913 ; From Burleson I went to call
upon the Secretary of the Interior, and spent a very
pleasant quarter of an hour. After that I returned to
the Cosmos Club, where I met McAdoo and Houston.
They immediately began to berate me for having put
them in the Cabinet. They wanted to know what they
had done to have such jobs imposed upon them. Houston
said he had work enough to do for six healthy men. , . .
“ April 13, 1913 : Secretary Lane came an hour
before the time set for the dinner to be given Ambassador
James Bryce. He desired to talk of his department and
to outline some plans for the future. . . .
“ November 24, 1913 : We arrived at the Bryans’ at
nine and went almost immediately to bed. It was
imderstood that we were to have breakfast at half-past
seven, but, much to our relief, Mrs. Bryan knocked on
our doors a few minutes later and announced that Mr.
Bryan would take his horseback exercise before breakfast,
so we would not have it until half-past eight — an un-
usually late hour for the Bryan household. . . .
“ November 25, 1913 : To-day was Cabinet day, and
I remained to meet the different members as they came
in, for there was something I had to say to each. . . .
“ December 12, 1913 : Houston and Burleson came
around to see me. I first took up with them the question
of Cabinet officers not making speeches without the
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142
President’s permission, and perhaps not making any
speeches unless the President had something in particular
for them to say to the country about their departments,
I thought the present habit of members of the Cabinet
making indiscriminate speeches was very bad, and often
embarrassing. I suggested that if the President would
designate them to speak upon certain subjects at certain
times, what they said would have much weight and
would be almost equal to a presidential utterance.
“ I found there was some feeling among the members
of the Cabinet because the Friday Cabinet meetings had
been discontinued. I agreed to mention it to the
President and ask him to resume them. Later in the
day I did this, and the President consented to do so.
“ The President was pleased when I told him I had
spoken to a sufficient number of the Cabinet to ensure
the adoption of my suggestion that no speeches should
be made in the future without his consent, and only
when he thought the occasion demanded it. . . .
“ November 15, 1915 : Last night the Secretary of
War sent a specid messenger from Washington, bearing
a letter for me concerning his report. He desired me to
discuss with the President the advisability of putting his
report out in advance of handing it to the President.
The President does not wish him to do so, and I am to
convey to Garrison this unpleasant information, Mr.
Bryan has wired requesting that I ask the President to
appoint a friend of his as Marshal here._ This he also
declined to do, because he said the man was not fit for
•that particular place. . . .
“ December 22, 1913 : McAdoo’s carriage met me [upon
arrival in Washington] and I drove to his home for
breakfast. He came to my room in his pyjamas, half
asleep. He had been up practically all night so as to
be in touch by tdephone with the House and Senate
Conference Committee, which did not reach a conclusion
until five o’clock this morning,
“ During the morning I remained in McAdoo’s private
office, telephoning some of the Cabinet members and
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143
making some memoranda of things I desired to discuss
with the President. . . .
“ December 23, 1913 : I walked with McAdoo to the
Cabinet meeting and saw the others as they assembled.
Redfield was particularly anxious to show me some
statistics regarding our exports, which he considered
interesting. . . .
“ January 16, 1914 : I spoke to each member of the
Cabinet as they came in, and talked to Lane about the
conservation of our radixim deposits, strongly urging
it. . . .
“ April 28, 1914 : McAdoo and I went back to the
White House, as there was to be a Cabinet meeting.
There I met all the Cabinet, but had no conversation
with any of them excepting Houston. I advised him
that the President felt he could not spare him from the
Department of Agriculture for the present, but later
would probably place him on the Federal Reserve
Board. . . .
" May 8, 1914 : From the Treasury I went to the
White House Offices in order to see members of the
Cabinet before they convened. McReynolds, Burleson,
Lane, Garrison, and others each held me for a moment.
Lane was anxious to know whether I thought it advisable
for him to go to California at this time to take the LL.D.
degree which the University of California has offered
him. I advised taking it up with the President and
being governed by his wishes. . . .”
No more striking example of the cordial feeling of
Cabinet members towards Colonel House can be found
than the offer made by the Postmaster-General and the
Attorney-General to resign, if their withdrawal would
make it easier for the President to appoint House Secre-
tary of State. This occurred in the early autumn of
1915, after Bryan’s resignation.
"Burleson and Gregory [noted House on June 20,
1915] thought perhaps I was refusing to become Secretary
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144
of State because it would give Texas three men in the
Cabinet and all from Austin. They therefore offered
to send in their resignations if I would accept.
“ When I told the President about Burleson and
Gregory offering to resign so as to leave me free to accept
the Secretaryship of State without embarrassment to
him, he said, ‘ I am glad you told me, for it is something
I shall always remember with pleasure.’ ”
Colonel House to Postmaster-General Burleson
Roslyn, Long Island
]wne 21, 1915
Dear Albert ;
Gregory has given me your message, and nothing
has ever touched me more deeply.
There is no consideration, I think, that would influence
me enough to make me accept an of&ce. My endeavour
must always be in the path I have so long followed. If
I could be brought to think of it at all, it would be to
serve my friends and not to accept sacrifices from them.
You and Gregory have made me feel that life is worth
hving and that all I have tried to do has not been in
vain.
Your friend always
E. M. House.
To House, members of the Cabinet brought the most
varied problems. He responded with an imsparing
expenditure of time and energy and, like Kipling’s hero,
frequently showed them a quiet and safe way round, out,
or under. They evidently relied upon his judgment in
mattes of appointments. " Will you kmdly have this
pair looked up,” wrote McAdoo, “ and tell me what is
thought of them ? ” And two days later : ” Please hurry
up report on Mr. Vernon [appointments].” And again,
still later : “ Here is a sample of my troubles. Will
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145
you be good enough to look into the character of this
man and let me hear from you quickly ? ”
" May 10, 1914 : Attorney-General McRe3molds
lunched with me [recorded House]. We went over much
the same ground covered in Washington. We discussed
a vacant federal judgeship . . . and I insisted upon his
making an immediate appointment. The docket is
becoming clogged and there is no reason for his delay.
I had X to see him this morning in order that he might
look him over. His only objection to him was that he
had no chin. The two men I sent him last week as
candidates for United States Marshals seemed to be all
right excepting that they were too fat. I have another
suggestion to make for an appointment, but the man has
a large mole on the back of his ear. I shall ask him
to be careful not to expose that side of his head.
" Later in the day, Gregory and I were laughing at
this eccentricity of McRe3molds. Gregory says he is
such a big, fine-looking fellow himself that he cannot get
it through his head that anyone has any ability that is
not built upon the same lines.”
Attorney-General McReynolds to Colonel House
New York, May 11, 1914
Dear Mr. House :
I’ve devoted some time to the judgeship, and this
is the way it lies in my mind ;
X is well recommended and would not be a bad
appointment ; neither will he ever make more than an
or^ary judge. He did not make a good impression
on me personally.
Y made a better impression, but I do not regard him
as the very best kind of material. If I should act
wholly on my own impressions, I’d guess in favour of
However, if you gentlemen think it wisest to select
X, I will recommend his appointment and take the
I — 10
146 THE SILENT PARTNER
chance. He said that he was not certain about acceptance
if tendered. We ought to know whether he will, before
any formal tender is made to him.
Will you see that the rest is done ?
Called you on the 'phone, but you were reported out
with the President.
Sincerely
McReynolds
I
House's opinion was finally approved.
With Gregory, who succeeded McReynolds when the
latter was appointed to the Supreme Court, Colonel
House’s association was even more intimate. The
Colonel discussed frankly with him the relations of a
Cabinet member with the President, and gave him the
benefit of his own experience ;
“ Never to go into long-winded arguments upon any
subject, but to state his position in brief terms and never
repeat. That when he and the President agreed upon
a matter, never to give him reasons for so agreeing, as
the President was too busy to listen to unimportant
details. I was sure he would always be able to see the
President whenever necessary if he did not burden him
with unimportant and unnecessary verbiage, . . .
" Gregory is very able and has been exceedingly
successful with New Haven affairs, but it has not spoiled
him in the least. He is one of the few that I have ever
met who, I believe, would never get ‘ the big head ’
no matter how successful he became. He is not only
able, but is as loyal as the Legion of Csesar.”
Colonel House to Attorney-General Gregory
Pride’s Crossing, Massachusetts
August 20, 1914
My DEAR Friend :
... I am so eager for your success and so anxious it
may be brought about without any impairment of your
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147
strength that there are many suggestions that have come
to me since our last talk.
Do be careful about making appointments too soon.
Take your time about them and do not let friendship
have any undue influence upon you. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
On his side, Mr. Gregory wrote continually to House,
evidencing invariably the strongest affection both for
him and for the President. " How can I ever repay
such confidence or justify it? ” he wrote on August 22,
1914. “ How can I ever even up matters with you, who
have given him so exaggerated an idea of my ability ? ”
And four days later : “ Come to Washington soon, give
us all the suggestions you can spare, and do not doubt
that I know you to be, as you have been for years, my
very best friend.”
Apparently the Cabinet counted on House not merely
to discover available material for appointments, but also
to inform imsatisfactory office-holders that they need
not expect reappointment or continuance. The function
could not have been attractive. House writes to
McAdoo : " I am always ready to meet any suggestion
that you make, but if you know Mr. X at all you would
know that it would be utterly impossible for me or any-
one else to notify him ‘ in a tactful way ' and ' in a way
not to hurt his feelings ’ that his services were to be
discontinued. I woidd as soon undertake to square the
circle or to prove the fourth dimension.”
Mr. X, who was evidently a gentleman to be handled
diplomatically, seems to have made difficulties, for
some time later Mr. Gregory wrote as follows to the
Colonel :
148
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Attorney-General Gregory to Colonel House
Washington, Novetnber 25 , 1914
My dear Friend : , . • -u^ 4 i, j
I went to the White House last night and had a
long talk with the President about X. I do not think
the President wiU agree to appoint him to the
position, although a final conclusion was not reached.
The President made a memorandum of X s case and is
going to make an efiort to provide for him in some way,
and I will keep the matter in mind. ,, , •. j-
I do not want X, however, to be eternally bombarding
my private secretary and me with telegrams demanding
’his immediate appointment to the place, and I mu^
say that he is making a nuisance of himself. I wish
you would get this idea conveyed to him in some diplo-
matic way. ...
Sincerely and affectionately yours
T. W. Gregory
Much more interesting and congenial was the task
which Colonel House set himself whenever in Europe—
that of studying all sorts of reforms so as to be able to
pass on new ideas to the heads of departments in Wash-
ington.
“ This afternoon [he wrote in London, June 20, 1913]
Sir Horace Plunkett came to call and remained for an
hour. We discussed the betterment of the faraiing cl^s
along the lines of more effective farming, farming credits,
co-operative marketing, and the making of country life
more pleasant and desirable. He wished me to come
to Ireland and visit him for three days before we safi,
and I have promised to go. I am much interested in
ihig phase of governmental work. I want to see what
has been done in Ireland under his direction so that
I may take some practical knowledge of it to the Presi-
dent and to Secretary Houston for their information.”
THE SILENT PARTNER 149
House knew of the lifetime of service which Plunkett
had devoted to the science of agricultural improvement
and to its application to Ireland, of his friendship with
Roosevelt, and his love for America. He looked upon
him as among the most eminent of living British states-
men, and he hoped to win his interest and help in the
solution of American agricultural problems. Plunkett,
on his side, had been on the watch for a chance to come
into contact with the new Democratic Administration
and was delighted to find in the President’s adviser a
congenial spirit, between whom and himself sprang up
an enduring companionship. “ Thus began,” said Plun-
kett, twelve years later, “ this precious friendship of my
later years.” ^
Sir Horace Plunkett to Colonel House
Washington, D.C., October 16, 1913
My dear Colonel House :
You leave me wondering how you can show such
extraordinary kindness to a stranger in the land, of
whom you know so little, and how I can ever repay such
hospitality and help. Yesterday morning and last night
will long remain delightful memories. You gave me the
opportunity I badly needed to explain things to Mr.
Houston, and in this, judging by his kindness to me
to-day, I think I must have had some success. I had
a most useful time with him and others at the Depart-
ment this morning and shall probably resume my studies
to-morrow. I paid my respects to the President and
was shocked to see him looking so worn. The change
since January last is terribly marked, and you ought to
try and force him to take a week’s complete rest the
moment the strain is relaxed — even at the sacrifice of
some public business.
You will be glad to know that already the atmosphere
^ Conveisatioii mth the author, August i, 1925.
150 THE SILENT PARTNER
at the Department of Agriculture has noticeably changed.
I am going to think quietly over what I have learned
and shall probably write you from Battle Creek a sug-
gestion for a line which, if taken by the President in his
first annual message, might greatly assist the Agricultural
Department. You would know whether to mention it
to the President. Any suggestions I may have from
time to time for the Department I shall send direct to
the Secretary. . . .
With renewed thanks and kind remembrances to
Mrs. House, I am
Sincerely yours
Horace Plunkett
Most characteristic is the following letter, which
suggests the remarkable position held by Colonel House.
Mr. Lane had in mind resigning from the Cabinet in case
a certain other high office should be opened to him.
Quite obviously he regarded House’s approval as neces-
sary, and yet his fondness for the Colonel was such that
he was unwilling to embarrass him by approaching him
directly.
Secretary Lane to Dr. S. E. Mezes
Washington, July 4, 1916
My dear Sid :
. . . Now don’t think me importunate or cheeky or
impatient. I’m here to do my " bit.” I'll stand guard
all night without a whimper. All I want is for you, in
that superlatively tactful way of yours, to find out if
my chances are worth considering at this time — and if
they are, will the Colonel make them something better
than mere chances. If they are not, I shall continue
sawing wood, and whistling most of the time.
I am not asking for what Ned calls “ bull-con ” or
for any pat on the back. If you can give me a tip, I
THE SILENT PARTNER 151
shall be obliged ; if not, I shall be ag always your most
devoted and sometimes humble servant,
F. K. L.
P.S. Treat this rather frivolous epistle upon a most
important subject as entirely between us. I wouldn’t
for a good right leg want Colonel E. M. to think me to
be butting in.
IV
The activities of Colonel House were not confined to
assisting the National Administration. We find him in
consultation with the Boston city authorities when
appointments were to be made, and the New York City
and State Democrats looked to him for counsel and aid.
An infinite number of lesser problems were cheerfully
deposited upon his doorstep by friends, acquaintances,
and strangers. He soothed disgruntled journalists, and
discussed the plans of inventors who would save the
Republic from material destruction in the next war and
social enthusiasts who would preserve its soul during
the peace.
“ I have had as fine a collection of cranks to-day [he
wrote on October 20, 1913] as it has been my lot to meet
for a long time. Mr. Bryan sent one. Secretary Daniels
sent another, and I inherited yet another from the
President. The talk has ranged all the way from ofi&ce-
seeking to the control of the planetary system. . . .
“ October 23, 1914 : My, my, what a busy day !
Commencing with Governor Gljmn, McAdoo, Dudley
Malone, Commissioner Adamson, former Corporation
Counsel Archibald Watson, Stuart Qbboney, Clarence
Sheam, Montgomery Hare, Francis Lynde Stetson,
McAneny, and so many others I cannot even think of
them. Every phase of the New York state election
has been referred to me to-day. Telegrams, party notices.
THE SILENT PARTNER
152
arrangements for meetings, have all passed up for visa.
I am literally tired out and shall be glad when the elec-
tion has come and gone. . . .
“ May 23, 1914 [on an Atlantic liner] : I had several
wireless messages, one from Mrs. , who desires her
husband, who is now Consul at , appointed to the
vacancy in London. Even at sea there is no rest from
the office-seekers. . . .
“ November 4, 1914 : Loulie and I took the 12.08 for
Washington. Major-General went with us by
invitation. I shall be more careful next time, for he
literally talked me to death. If he can fight as hard
as he can talk, no enemy in the world could resist
him. . . ."
Colonel House regarded his position in public affairs
with philosophical eye and not without a touch of
humour. “ The funny part of it is,” he wrote to his
brother-in-law, ” that people seem to think that I have
done something unusual, when as a matter of fact it is
only because the newspapers have begun to say extrava-
gant things about me. Such, however, is the stuff of
which fame is made.”
The interest of the Colonel's life was beyond question,
but none the less it must have proved wearying. The
more people realized the dif&culty of reaching President
Wilson personally, the more strenuous were the efforts
they made at least to reach House.
" The Governor comes in again this afternoon [wrote
House to Dr. Mezes] to spend the night with me and go
to the theatre. It is an exceedingly pleasant diversion
to have him, but you have no idea how much work it
oitails.
“As soon as the papers blaze forth in the morning,
'my troubles immediately begin anew and I receive
communications from unheard-of quarters as well as from
friends who have been lost for many years. . .
THE SILENT PARTNER
153
And later :
“ . . . I am suffering from the after-effects of the
President’s visit. All the latent cranks in the country
are at me. Some to kill,^ some to amuse, but most of
them to instruct concerning what is best to be done in
every phase of government. . . .”
House also asked himself what would be the effect
of his growing reputation upon the mind of the President
and others in official positions. The role of Eminence
grise was one that demanded a never-failing tact. It
may have been flattering to be so placed that every-
one shoffid regard his consent to a proposal as equivalent
to success, but it was politically perilous as well as
physically tiring.
Colonel Home to Dr. S. E. Mezes
New York, April 24, 1913
Dear Sidney :
... I was in Washington ten days, and when I re-
turned I literally had to wade through mail to get to
my desk. Every office-seeker and every crank in the
United States is on my trail, and I get photographs
from all sorts and conditions of people who thmk in
this way they can impress their identity more securely
upon me.
It aU comes from the newspaper notoriety, and the
end is not yet. The next edition of Collier’s, I believe,
is to do the thing in grand style. The article is to be
entitled “The President’s Silent Partner." I urged
th^ to name it anything but that, but nothing but that
would satisfy them. They said that title had much
1 The following, although belonging to a later period, is typical of the .
threatening letters House received : Sorry I missed the President when
he left your home. I had a nice bullet for him for a wedding present I
I get yet and yon to, because you are a fadcer, A friend of Justice.”
THE SILENT PARTNER
154
more punch in it than any other. I a^ee to that, but
I am afraid that I will get some of the licks.
I do not know how much of this kind of thing W. W.
can stand. The last edition of Harper’s Weekly spoke
of me as “ Assistant President House.” I think it is
time for me to go to Europe or take to the woods.
Fraternally yours
E. M. House
House decided to go to Europe, where he spent the
summer of 1913. But he returned to find liis influence
undiminished and his energies engaged in a succession
of major problems, at first domestic and then international
in character.
CHAPTER VI
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
President Wilson has brought his party out of the wilderness of Bryan-
ism. It has been a great exhibition of leadership.
New York Tnbune, December 24, 1913
I
** HE main thing, I think [wrote House to Wilson,
I July 3i» 1915]. is always to do the job better
JL than anyone else has ever done it, and the
political end will take care of itself. This has always
been my theory, and I have found it satisfactory and
successful.”
This note, which recurs continually in House’s
letters, would doubtless have surprised many persons
who, without adequate information, looked upon the
Colonel primarily as a political manager and an expert
in party tactics. Another misconception lay in the
belief that House acted as a brake upon the President,
constantly restraining him from over-enthusiasm in
reform and urging caution in speeches and legislative
measures. His papers by no means bear out this sup-
position. One may deduce from them, indeed, the
definite conclusion that the Colonel was the more radical
of the two and was ever in fear lest this Administration,
like so many others, once it came into power should be
content merely to govern and forget to pave the path
for progress. House always insisted upon the need of
courage and of radical reform. A dear example of his
feeling is found in two conversations, almost a year
*55
156 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
apart, between House and the President. The first
occurred at the moment when tariff lobbyists were
threatening the political annihilation of Wilson if he
persisted in driving through the Tariff Bill without
regard to the demands of special interests. The second
took place when reactionary forces were stirring feeling
against him because of his proposed anti-trust legis-
lation.
" May II, 1^13 : Captain Bill McDonald once told
me that he attributed lus still being alive to the fact
that he had never hesitated the fraction of a second,
but had always gone straight towards the point of
danger, and the courage of the other fellow had always
failed. I urged this attitude upon the President as
strongly as I knew how, and told him it was the most
essential thing of all. . . .
“ April 27, 1914 : We talked of the desirability
of pushing the progressive cause forward. I thought
unl^s we did this, we could not justify being in the
position we were. We spoke of the political results of
such a course, and came to the conclusion that it was
best not to consider that aspect at all, but to go resolutely
forward with the reform programme and let the futrure
take care of itself."
The extent of Colonel House’s influence upon the
legislative plans of the Administration may be gathered
from a remarkable document, which deserves some
attention. In the autumn of 1912, immediately after
the presidential election, there was published a novel,
or political romance, entitled PhiUp Dm i-AAmirdstrator.
It was the story of a young West Point graduate, in-
xapamtated for military service by his health, who was
caught by the spirit ol revolt against the t3n:aimy of
privileged interests. A stupid and reactionary Govern-
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 157
ment at Washington provokes armed rebellion, in which
Dru joins whole-heartedly and which he ultimately
leads to complete success. He himself becomes dictator
and proceeds by ordinance to remake the mechanism
of government, to reform the basic laws that determine
the relation of the classes, to remodel the defensive forces
of the republic, and to bring about an international
grouping or league of powers, founded upon Anglo-
Saxon solidarity. His reforms accomplished, he gives
effect once more to representative institutions as for-
mulated in a new American Constitution, better fitted
than the old for the spirit and conditions of the twentieth
century.
As a romance, the book was not notable, for the
effort of the anon3mious author had evidently been
spent upon the careful working-out of the political and
social ideas of the young Philip Dru rather than upon
its literary form. Certain reviewers, however, were
piqued by the daring and the ingenuity of these ideas
and, treating the book as a political manifesto rather
than a novel, acclaimed it as a remarkable publication.
Speculation as to the personality of the unknown author,
who was described merely as “a man prominent in
political councils,” naturally followed. There seemed
to be general agreement that he could not belong to
either of the two older parties. " We trust he is to
be found among the Democrats,” wrote one reviewer,
” but we greatly fear he is of the New Party.” Another
reviewer was of similar opinion : ” We trust that the
author’s counsel and assistance will be available at Wash-
ington, if not during the present Administration, surely
when the Progressive Party assumes control.” There
were, indeed, numerous suggestions that Mr. Roosevelt
himsdf was the author.
158 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
Five years after its publication an enterprising book-
seller, noting the growing influence of House in the
Wilson Administration, wrote with regard to the book :
“ As time goes on the interest in it becomes more intense,
due to the fact that so many of the ideas expressed by
Philip Dru : Administrator, have become laws of this
Republic, and so many of his ideas have been discussed,
as becoming laws." And he ends with the question,
" Is Colonel E. M. House of Texas the author ? If
not, who is ? ”
Colonel House was, in truth, the author ; to his other
occupations he had added that of novelist. He tells
us himself in a brief memorandum how, in the autumn
of 1911, he conceived the idea of writing a novel as a
medium to express his economic and political theories.
That winter in Austin he was seriously ill.
“ When I began to convalesce at home, and before
I was able to get about, I wrote Philip Dru : Adminis-
trator. I was surprised at the rapidity with which I
wrote, for I was not certain when I began that I could
do it at all. . . .
“ I w^ also surprised to find how much I was in-
terested in doing this kind of work. I had written
platforms, speeches, etc., for different candidates and
officials, and newspaper articles for campaign purposes,
but this was an entirely new departure. I did not
spend more than thirty days upon the first draft of the
book. Mezes read and approved it, and I sent it to
HoTKton to look over, largely with the view of getting
his judgment as to the economic features of it.
^'He kept the manuscript until I passed through
St. Louis on my way East. He declared his belief that
it was economically sound, but held that the fiction
in it was so thin that he advised rewriting it as a serious
work, as he had suggested originally."
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 159
Colonel House to Dr. D. F. Houston
Austin, Texas, March 12, 1912
Dear Doctor Houston :
... I expect to elaborate somewhat concerning the
functions of the National Government.
I particularly want to make it dear that the Executive
and his Cabinet wiU be more nearly akin to the English
Premier than to the French, inasmuch as I want him to
have the right to propose measures directly and without
referring them to a committee.
If you have any suggestions along this or any other
lines, please let me have them.
I have done some padding — as, for instance, the
story of the tenement fire — ^which I expect to take out
later and put in more serious stuff.
It is not much of a novel, as you wiU soon discover ;
at the same time, unless it were known by that name its
audience would be reduced at least ninety-nine per cent.
If it was called what I really mean it to be, only those
who think pretty much as I do would read it, and those
I am trying to reach would never look at it.
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
But this was the spring of 1912, and all of House's
energies were taken up with the pre-convention cam-
paign that ended with the nomination of Wilson. The
early summer he spent in Europe. Evidently not
wishing to give the time necessary to putting it into the
form that Mr. Houston advised, by elimination of the
romance, and fearing that a scientific essay would not
reach a large public, he decided merely to smooth it out
so far as possible while on the Atlantic.
" I worked assiduously on PHUp Dru all the way
over and all the way back, but had no time for it in
Europe. . . . We returned early in August, and the
i6o THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
first thing I did was to shake myself clear of Philip
Dm.
" E. S. Martin read the manuscript and wanted me
to rewrite it, saying that ‘ some of it was so good that
it was a pity that parts of it were so bad.’ I had no
time, however, for such diversions, for the political
campaign was engrossing my entire time and the pub-
lisher was urging me to give him the manuscript so it
might be advertised in the autumn announcements.
" I was so much more interested in the campaign
than I was in the book that I turned it over to the pub-
lisher, having determined to let it go as it was.”
Whatever the literary merits of Philip Dru, it
gives us an insight into the main political and social
principles that actuated House in his companionship
with President Wilson. Through it rxms the note of
social democracy reminiscent of Louis Blanc and the
revolutionaries of 1848 : ” This book is dedicated to the
unhappy many who have lived and died lacking oppor-
tunity. ...” ** The time is now measurably near when
it will be just as reprehensible for the mentally strong
to hold in subjection the mentally weak, and to force
them to bear the grievous burdens which a misconceived
civilization has imposed upon them.” Government,
accordingly, must be inspired by the spirit of charity
rather than the spirit of ruthless efficiency. Especially
must privileged interests be excluded from governmental
influence, for by the natvue of things their point of view
is selfish.
Through the book also runs the idea that in the
United States, government is unresponsive to popular
desires — a “ negative ” government. House calls it —
for it is at more pains to do nothing with safety than to
attempt desirable reforms which might disturb vested
interests and alienate the voters. ” We have been
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK i6i
living under a Government of negation.” The theory
of checks and balances has developed so as to re-enforce
this negative character of government ; closer co-opera-
tion between the President and Congress, perhaps in
the direction of parliamentary methods, is necessary
if the tendency of American government is to be made
active and positive.
The specific measures enacted by Philip Dru as
Administrator of, the nation indicated the reforms
desired by House.
The Administrator appointed a " board composed of
economists and others well versed in matters relating
to the tariff and internal revenue, who . . . were in-
structed to work out a tariff law which would contemplate
the abolition of the theory of protection as a govern-
mental policy.”
“ The Administrator further directed the tax board
to work out a graduated income tax. . . .”
Philip Dru also provided for the “ formulation of a
new banking law, affording a flexible currency bottomed
largely upon commercial assets, the real wealth of the
nation, instead of upon debt, as formerly. ... Its
final construction would completely destroy the credit
trust, the greatest, the most far-reaching, and under
evil direction the most pernicious trust of all.”
“ He also proposed making corporations share with
the Government and States a certain part of their net
earnings. . . .”
Such were some of Dru’s plans which shortly found
actual life in Wilsonian legislation. No wonder that
Cabinet members like Mr. Lane and Mr. Bryan com-
mented upon the influence of Dru with the President.
I— -ii
i62 the administration starts work
“ All that book has said should be,” wrote Lane, ” comes
about. . . . The President comes to Philip Dru in
the end.” ^
Other excerpts indicate the extent of House’s pro-
gressiveness.
“ Labour is no longer to be classed as an inert com-
modity to be bought and sold by the law of supply and
demand,”
Dru “ prepared an old-age pension law and also a
laborer’s insurance law covering loss in cases of illness,
incapacity, and death.”
" He had incorporated in the Franchise Law the
right of Labour to have one representative upon the
boards of corporations and to share a certain percentage
of the earnings above the wages, after a reasonable per
cent, upon the capital had been earned. In turn it was
to be obligatory upon them [the labourers] not to strike,
but to submit all grievances to arbitration.”
To such an extent had Colonel House formulated his
ideas upon national problems before the election of
Wilson. ” In regard to Philip Dru” wrote House in
1916, " I want to say that there are some things in it
I wrote hastily and in which I do not concur, but most
of it I stand upon as being both my ethical and political
faith.”
II
Four great legislative problems confronted Wilson,
and their solution constitutes his chief claim, in matters
of domestic politics, to the title of statesman. They
concerned, the revision of the tariff, with the introduction
^ Letters of Franklin K, Lane, p. 297.
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 163
of an income tax law, the creation of the Federal Reserver
banking system, the control of trusts, and the regulation
of industrial relations. In meeting them Wilson dis--
played the inspiring leadership essential to success ; he
showed himself as convincing and sympathetic when he
dealt with Congress as a whole, as he was reserved in
his dealings with individual Congressmen. By the end
of the special session which passed both the Tariff and
Currency Acts, his moral supremacy was firmly estab-
lished and his mastery of the party was complete. He
was hailed as the Moses who had led the party out of
the legislative ineffectiveness supposedly characteristic
of all Democrats.
In each of the great problems House took deep
interest. He brought to the President the variety of
opinions which he culled from his nmnerous personal
contacts, he utilized his relations with party leaders
to assist the passage of the bills through Congress. But
it was in the currency question that he took chief interest,
for this he had long studied and from its solution might
be expected positive, tangible benefits in a short time.
As cotton planter and one-time banker in Texas he
appreciated the dangers of an inelastic currency, and as
a liberal he distrusted the financial power which certain
metropolitan banking firms were able to wield over
national commerce and industry.
Organized capital, “Wall Street " in popular par-
lance, had secured a control of banking credits which,
if it were extended, might place the industrial life of the
country in the power of private and at least partially
irresponsible interests. Against this so-called “ credit
trust ” Mr. Bryan had protested in 1896 : “ Let the
Government go out of the banking business,” the financial
magnates had cried ; to which Bryan retorted, “ Let
i64 the administration STARTS WORK
the banks go out of the Government business.” If
private individuals could release or withhold credits
at will, it meant a control of industry and inequality of
opportunity at complete variance with traditional
American principles.
Colonel House to Senator Culberson
Magnolia, Massachusetts
July 26, 1911
Dear Senator:
... I think Woodrow Wilson's remark that the money
trust was the most pernicious of all trusts, is eminently
correct.
A few individuals and their satellites control the
leading banks and trust companies in America. They
also control the leading corporations; and if they are
to be permitted on the one hand to use the corporations
as a bar against loss to any speculation which they may
make, and to use on the other hand the banks and trust
companies to borrow all the funds they may need for
su(^ speculations, the stockholders of the corporations
which they dominate and the business world that de-
pends upon funds from the trust companies and banks
which they dominate, are bound to suffer. . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
During the autumn of 1912 and the spring of 1913,
even in the midst of the campaign and the process of
forming a Cabinet, House worked constantly on the
currency problem, in order to be prepared to assist the
Ihesident when he should meet the congressional com-
mittees. The task which Colonel House set himself
was primarily to prevent the President-elect from com-
mitting himself to any one scheme rmtil the problem had
been thoroughly studied ; later he guided the measure
so that it was left in the control of experts and preserved
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 165
from the heresies of political incompetents. The Colonel
was the unseen guardian angel of the bill, constantly
assisting the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairmen
of the Senate and House Committees in their active and
successful labour of translating it into law. Wilson,
who was accused of a tendency to avoid advice, proved
himself in fact to be far from the self-confident doctrinaire
pictured by his opponents, and in the matter of currency
reform he was determined that the bill should be founded
upon expert opinion.
" The greatest embarrassment of my political career
[he said to an enthusiast on this subject] has been that
active duties seem to deprive me absolutely of time for
careful investigation. I seem almost obliged to form
conclusions from impressions instead of from study, but
I intend to go much more thoroughly into this matter
before sa5dng anything about it ; and I heartily agree
with you that this, the most fundamental question of
all, must be approached with caution and fearlessness
and receive dispassionate and openminded treatment.
I wish that I had more knowledge, more thorough
acquaintance, with the matters involved. All that
I can promise you is sincere study. I wish that I could
promise you a constructive ability.”
Colonel House was indefatigable in providing for the
President the knowledge that he sought. He collected
in his study the banking laws of every nation of Europe.
He gathered reports and abstracts from college professors
of economics and banking. But he laid chief stress upon
his frequent conferences with the bankers themselves,
especially those who had had practical experience in
drafting previous bills for Republican Administrations.
“ December 19, 1912 : I talked with Paul Warburg
over the telephone regarding currency reform. I told
i66 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
of my Washington trip and what I had done there to get
it in working order ; that the Senators and Congressmen
seemed anxious to do what Governor Wilson desired and
that I knew the President-elect thought straight con-
cerning the issue.
“ February 26, 1913 : I went to the Harding dinner
and talked with the guests invited to meet me. It
was an interesting occasion. I first talked to Mr. Frick,
then with Denman, and afterwards with Otto Kahn.
“ March 13, 1913 : Vanderlip and I had an interesting
discussion regarding currency reform.
“ March 27, 1913 : Mr. J. P. Morgan, jun., and Mr.
Denny of his firm, came promptly at five. McAdoo came
about ten minutes afterwards. Morgan had a currency
plan already formulated and printed. We discussed
it at some length. I suggested that he should have it
typewritten and sent to us to-day.” ^
" The Governor [recorded Colonel House on January
8, 1913] agreed to put me in touch with Glass, Chairman
of the Banking and Currency Committee, and I am to
work out a measure which is to be submitted to him.
“ He spoke of his fear that Br3ran would not approve
such a bill as I have in mind. I said it was better to con-
tend with Mr. Bryan’s disapproval and fail in securingjany
bill at all, than it was to get one which was not soun^d.
" March 24, 1913 ; I had an engagement with Carter
Glass at five. We drove, in order not to be inter-
rupted. . . .
" I urged him not to allow ... the Senate Committee
to change what we had agreed upon in any of the essential
features. He promised to be firm. I advised using
honey so long as it w^ effective, but, when it was not,
I would bring the President and Secretary of the Treasury
to his rescue.
“ I spoke to the President about this after dinner and
advised that McAdoo and I whip the Glass measure into
* Typewritten, in order to avoid the impression that might be j^ven by
a printed plan that Morgan's were so sure of their fitiancial power that
they could impose a cut-and-dried plan.
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 167
final shape, which he could endorse and take to Owen^
as his own. My opinion was that Owen would be more
hkely to accept it as a presidential measure than as a
measure coming from the House Committee on Banking
and Currency."
The Currency Bill was brought into the House of
Representatives early in the extra session, its main
features unchanged from the first drafts decided upon
by the President, McAdoo, and the Chairmen of the
House and Senate Committees. The initial difficulties
threatened by certain elements in the party which
tended towards economic freethinking, were safely passed.
There remained, however, the opposition of a number of
Senators, behind which lay the dislike of the bill expressed
by prominent Eastern bankers, who evidently feared that
it meant a weakening of Wall Street’s power and an
amateur or political control of national financial problems.
House spent much of his summer in defending the bill
and more of his autumn in securing political support
for it.
“ July 23, 1913 [conversation with Josiah Quincy,
former Mayor of Boston] : I tried to show him the foUy
of the Eastern bankers taking an antagonistic attitude
towards the Currency Bill. The Administration is
endeavouring to serve the country as a whole, and it is
the better part of wisdom for the Eastern bankers to
join hands in working out a measure for the general good.
“ Quincy wanted to know what I thought the r^ult
would be of their threat to withdraw their national
bank charters and take out state charters. I thought
the threat was puerile, and not to be discussed, and that
the bill would be passed no matter what action they took
in that direction."
On the following day House dined with the members
^ of the Senate Committee.
i68 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
of the Boston Clearing House Association to discuss the
bill. He went in no optimistic frame of mind. “ I
have a feeling,” he wrote, " that they are not coming
for the purpose of discussing the measure with open
minds, but are antagonistic to it. I shall be alone to
defend the measure.”
His forebodings were apparently realized, for he noted
after the dinner : “I found the bankers singularly
barren of suggestions. They seem to stand upon the
general proposition of being against the Administration
bill, but without any constructive suggestions looking
to its betterment.”
House found more consolation and satisfaction in a
long talk with Major Henry L. Higginson, at the end of
August.
“ I can wen understand [wrote House] why he is
considered by many, Boston's first citizen. We talked
of the currency question and I found that he had a
breadth of view unusual amongst those of his calling.
He seemed to want what was best for the entire country,
and not something for his particular locality and pro-
fession. I explained with what care the bill had been
framed. Just before he arrived, I had finished a review
by Professor Sprague of Harvard of Paul Warburg’s
criticism of the Glass-Owen bill, and will transmit it
to Washington to-morrow. Every banker like Warburg,
who knows the subject practically, has been called upon
in the making of the bill. Major Higginson seemed
thoroughly satisfied with the endeavours the Adminis-
tration have made to construct a good and beneficent
measure.
Colonel House to Mr. E. S. Martin
Beverly, Massachusetts
Dear Martin : September 2, 1913
. . . The Currency BiU should go through the House
next, week, but it will have a harder road in the Senate.
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 169
I have been working upon it assiduously. McAdoo has
been here three or four times, and it seems to me that I
have seen every banker and political economist in the
East.
The bankers, sad to relate, know next to nothing about
it, and none of them agrees as to what is best. The only
unanimity of opinion amongst them is that the bill should
be made for them and be operated by them, and they
cannot understand that the manufacturers, merchants,
railroads, farmers, and others have any rights in the
premises.
I think the bill is getting in good shape. Houston was
with me last week and he says that in his opinion, and in
the opinion of ninety per cent, of the political economists
throughout the cotmtry whose opinions are of value, it
is the best bill that has ever been constructed — ^infinitely
better than the Aldrich BiU. . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
“ October 19, 1913 : I saw Senator Reed of Missouri
in the late afternoon and discussed the currency question
with him. He says the President seems to be more
concerned in regard to haste than he does as to the
measure itself. In this, of course, he is mistaken. The
President is satisfied with the measure approximately
as it is, and he knows that Reed and the other Demo-
cratic Senators who are delajdng it are doing so from a
failure to study the measure as it has progressed through
the House, and he is impatient in consequence.
" October 31, 1913 : Paul Warburg was my first caller,
and he came to discuss the currency measure. There
are many features of the Owen-Glass Bill that he does
not approve. I promised to put him in touch with
McAdoo and Senator Owen, so that he might discuss it
with them.
“ Senator Murray Crane ^ followed Warburg. He has
been in touch with Senators Weeks and Nelson of the
^ Republican Senator from Massachusetts.
170 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
Currency Committee, and urged them to bring about
quick action in order that the business commimity
could have done with this imcertainty and could go ahead
with the renewed hope a proper currency measure will
give them. He telephoned me later that he had been
in communication with Washington, and he advised that
we bring some pressure upon the Democratic insurgents
of the Committee. I called up McAdoo immediately
and asked him to convey this information to the President
and to gently start the pressure. I also arranged for
him to meet Warburg here on Monday.
" November 17, 1913 : Paul Warburg telephoned
about his trip to Washington. He is much disturbed
over the currency situation and requested an interview,
along with Jacob Schiff and Cleveland H. Dodge. Mr.
Dodge came in advance of the others. He said he felt
obliged to come at their request, because they had just
given him a substantial subscription for the Y.M.C.A.
fund. He had a feeling that the President knew what
he was doing and did not need any more advice than he
was getting from the channels he himself selected. I
told him I shared this view and that, since all the experts
disagreed, it left one in doubt as to what to do.
" Mr. SchifE and Mr. Warburg came in a few minutes.
Warburg did most of the talking. He had a new sugges-
tion in regard to grouping the regional reserve banks,
so as to get the units welded together and in easier touch
with the Federal Reserve Board. Mr. Schiff did not
agree as to the advisability of doing this. He thought
the regional reserve banks should be cut down to four
and let it go at that.
" They wanted me to go to Washington with Mr.
Warburg and Mr, Dodge, Mr. Schiff saying I was the
Moses and they would be the Aarons, He asked if I
knew my Bible well enough for this to be clear to me.
I told him I did. I combated the idea that the President
"was stubborn in his stand upon the currency measure.
I thought he had to be firm and had to make up his mind
as to what was good and what was bad in the innumer-
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 171
able suggestions that came to him, and that was aU he
was doing. I advised against going to the President
with new suggestions. I thought they should be taken
to Secretary McAdoo, Senator Owen, and Mr. Glass ;
if they agreed as to the advisability of accepting them,
the President would probably also accept them.”
Pressure from both sides and from above, as exercised
by the President, finally compelled the acquiescence of
the opposing Senators ; and on December 20, “a gala
day” House called it, the Federal Reserve Bill passed
the Senate. It was hailed generally as a greater triumph
for Wilson even than the Tariff Act, and in the Colonel’s
matured judgment was the most important single legis-
lative act of the entire Wilson Administration. Even
the strongly Republican New York Tribune could not
withhold words of commendation : " President Wilson
has brought his party out of the wilderness of Bryanism.
It has been a great exhibition of leadership.”
Few persons suspected the share taken by Colonel
House in the formation and passing of the Federal
Reserve Act, and he said nothing that might enlighten
the public. Towards the end of December 1913, after
the Senate had approved the biU, House was discussing
it with two outstanding journalists, Lawrence of the
Associated Press and Price of the Washington Star.
“ I wish you would let me tell about your activities in
making the bill,” send the latter. But the Colonel was
obdurate in his insistence upon silence. " Will you
stay over to see it signed ? ” asked Lawrence. But now
that the main job was accomplished. House admitted
he lacked sufficient interest in any mere ceremony to
keep him in Washington.
172 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
ni
As events developed. Colonel House’s connexion
with the Federal Reserve Act was by no means ended
when it became law, for there remained the problem of
the appointment of the five Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board who, with the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the co-
ordinating body of the system. The personnel of the
Board was obviously a matter of the first importance,
not merely for the sake of administrative ejfficiency, but
also because the easiest way to win public confidence
in a measure which has been questioned is to appoint
men whom the public admires and trusts.
Colonel House acted in much the same capacity when
it came to the appointment of the Board as he did in
the selection of the Cabinet ; that is, he gathered lists
of possibilities, interviewed them, culled opinions about
them, sifted the names and passed them on to President
Wilson and Secretary McAdoo. The following excerpts
are t3q)ical :
“ January 19, 1^14 : Mr. X came to lunch. I had
a very frank talk with him, sa3nng I had thought of him
in connexion with the Federm Reserve Board and in-
tended to present his name to the President provided I
did not find someone else whom I thought better fitted
for the place. The more I see of him, the more I like
him. He is not the biggest mentality I have met, but
he has good sense and has many fine qualities.
" Mr. Y came to be looked over for the Federal
Reserve Board. He differs from X inasmuch as he is
an applicant, while I sought X out myself without any
suggestion from anyone. ... He is older and has had
more experience, but he is not so fine a t3q)e. I played
the part of schoolmaster, as usual, and questioned him
dosely about himself and his business career.
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 173
“ January 21, 1914 : After dinner we [Wilson and
House] went to the President’s study as usual, and
began work on the Federal Reserve Board appointments.
I insisted that it was the most important constructive
legislative measure that had been passed since the
foundation of the Repubhc and thought its success or
failure would largdy depend upon the personnel of the
Board. He rephed, ‘ My dear friend, do not frighten
me any more than I am now.’ I saw no need for sdarm,
because for this particular Board there was plenty of
good material to choose from. . . .
" In discussing the Federal Reserve Board, there was
one man whose name I presented by sa3nng that he had
been getting his friends to endorse him and had secured
many eminent people to ask for his appointment. The
President replied to this, ' Let us ehminate him without
further discussion.’ ”
Secretary McAdoo to Colonel House
Washington, February 15, [1914]
Dear Colonel:
... I wish some people would quit tr3nng to put
over political appointments on the Board ! That is the
most insidious and difiScxilt thing to deal with. I am
firmly opposed to making these banks political instru-
mentalities, and yet I am going to offend many of my
best friends because they can’t see the importance of
eliminating politics absolutely from the organization of
the banks. Of course this doesn’t apply to you ! I'm
speaking of politicians.
With warm regards, always
Cordially yours,
W. G. McAdoo
CoUmd House to the Presideni
Austin, Texas, February 21, 1914
Dear Governor :
I find that Mr. X of Dallas is too old to be considered,
so he will have to be eliminated.
17/t. the administration starts work
Burleson, who is here to-day, teUs me that Doctor
Y, of whom you speak, is a crank of the first water and
would not do.
I do not know Mr. Z, and the objection to him might
be that he is not sufficiently prominent for his appoint-
ment to carry weight. That is something to be con-
sidered in this Board if it is to be thought of in the same
sense as the Supreme Court.
I can think of some men that I am sure would be
equal to the job, but they would not carry confidence
and therefore would be poor appointments.
If the elder Simmons were appointed for the two-year
term, you could replace him by Houston afterwards, if
you desired. Then, with Miller from the Pacific Coast
and Wheeler or someone else from Chicago, you would
have the West taken care of. . . .
If Z does not bear inspection, then your suggestion
of Gregory^ would not be bad. Gregory is something
of the same t3rpe as Carter Glass, and, while he knows
nothing of the matter now, yet within six months he
would be as well-informed upon the subject as Glass was
after that period of time.
Call me when you need me, for I am always under
orders.
Yours with devotion
E. M. House
P.S. Any recommendation made by members of
Congress should be pHma facie evidence of unfitness,
and I would not take any suggestions from that quarter
without the most careful investigation. What I mean
is that their recommendations would be political, and
therefore largely worthless.
" March 25, 1914 : Houston, McAdoo, Williams, and
I [wrote House] discussed the division of the country
into districts and the location of the regional reserve
banks.
^ T. W. Gregory, later Attoniey-OeneraL
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 175
“ In the evening the President and I dined alone
and went immediately to his study to have an old-time
business session in regard to the Federal Reserve Board.
I found he had added no names to those I had given
him before I left for Texas. We concluded, however,
that I should get up some new material and submit it
to Wm next week, when he hopes to be able to visit
me in New York.”
Colonel House to the President
New York, April 3, 1914
Dear Governor :
I am terribly disappointed that you could not come
this week, and more particularly since Mrs. Wilson’s
condition is the cause.
I have been working assiduoudy towards getting a
list of suggestions to submit to you for the Federal
Reserve Board. Since you are not coming, I am enclos-
ing them in this.
If Richard Olney would take the two-year term, it
would be fine, for Houston could then be appointed to
succeed him. I have asked a number of people whose
opinions are worth while, in regard to Olney, and they
all approve it. I do not know whether he would accept,
but I have been told that he might do so.
There are a number of names on the list that seem
to me admirable, but they would need a little more
looking into. If you will indicate the ones that appeal
to you, I wiU investigate further. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
During the following weeks, McAdoo and House had
many conferences, as a result of which the Presidsat was
ready by the end of April to make his appointments.
House would have been pleased to have Houston ap-
pointed Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, but
Wilson would not consent to his leaving the Cabinet
176 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
at this time. “ I wish there were two Houstons instead
of one,” he had told House on February i8. “ I really
do not see how I can spare him from the Secretar3^hip
of Agriculture, particularly at this juncture when we
are considering rural credits and when we are just
beginning to be able to guide the farmers in new direc-
tions. We have not yet entirely convinced them of our
usefulness.”
Instead, the President accepted House's suggestion
of offering the post of Gk)vemor to Richard Olney of
Boston, Secretary of State under President Cleveland
and one of the most distinguished figures of the party.
Paul Warburg of New York, because of his interest and
experience in currency problems imder both Republican
and Democratic Administrations, and W. P. G. Harding
as a leading banker of the South, had always been
sponsored by House and were accepted by the President.
To represent the Middle West and the Pacific Coast,
H. A. Wheeler of Chicago and A. C. Miller of California
had finally been selected. Warburg, Harding, and
Wheeler were professional bankers, Olney a lawyer, and
Miller a college professor whose distinction in the field
of economics had brought him into the Department of
the Interior. Political affiliations were not a factor in
their appointment ; but of the five two were Republicans,
two Democrats, and the fifth an independent.
Notes made by House of conversations with Wilson
in April throw light on the final process of appointment.
” April 15, 1914 : We motored for an hour and a half
and had a delightful talk. We discussed the Federal
Reserve Board at length, and McAdoo's attitude toward
the different names proposed. I had taken the precau-
tion to thresh these matters out with McAdoo and could
tell the President his state of mind. I am anxious for
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 177
this Board to administer the currency law successfully,
for I am certain the President’s reputation in history will
rest largely upon its success or failure.
“ April 28, 1914 : After dinner we went to the office
for the President to sign his mail. We read the Mexican
despatches together and afterwards got down to the real
finish of the Federal Reserve Board. He took his pen
and wrote down their names : Richard Olney first, then
Paul Warburg, Harding, Wheeler, and Miller. He
turned to me and said, ‘ To whom would you give the
ten-year term ? ’ I advised giving it to Miller, which he
did. He gave Olney the two-year term, Warburg four
years, Harding and Wheeler the six- and eight-year
terms.
“ I told him McAdoo preferred Hamlin.^ He replied,
‘ But I prefer Olney and I happen to be President.’
He also said, ‘ McAdoo thinks we are forming a social
club.’ This, of course, was because McAdoo had con-
sistently urged a Board that would work in harmony
with him.”
Olney, however, found it impossible to accept. He
wrote the President that he had rmdertaken trusts
which he could not resign and that the provision requiring
each member of the Board to give his entire time to its
work would prove an insuperable obstacle to his accept-
ance. " You can hardly be sorrier than I am,” he said,
“ that I am able to do so little in aid of an Administration
whose first year of achievement makes it one of the most
notable the country has ever known.” The appoint-
ment was therefore given to Mr. Hamlin, according to
McAdoo’s wishes.*
1 Mr. Hamlin was an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury whom McAdoo
desired to take out of the Department and put upon the Board.
> A further change in the original composition of the Board r^ulted
from Mr- Wheeler's inability to serve. After some delay the place was
given to F. C. Delano of Chicago.
I — 12
178 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
IV
The close of the first legislative session of the Wilson
Administration was a season of triumph for the Demo-
cratic Party. Two of the major problems had been met
with vigour and honesty, and settled, in principle at
least, to the satisfaction of the nation. The income
tax provisions of the Tariff Act and the Federal Reserve
System of the Currency Act established a solid basis
upon which national finances could rest securely during
the da3rs of stress that followed the outbreak of war in
Europe. The triumph of the Administration was the
greater in view of the failure of the preceding Republican
Administrations to settle the currency problem. The
main principles of the solution finally carried through
by Wilson, the Republicans had advocated, individually
or collectively ; but they had lacked either the courage
or the strength to write them into law.
Wilson’s success justified largely the inclusion of
Mr. Bryan in the Cabinet. The Commoner’s sense of
loyalty had kept him from an attack upon the Federal
Reserve Act which, it would appear, he never entirely
understood ; but had he been outside the Cabinet, with
his influence in the party, he could have destroyed the
measure which failed to accord with his personal
doctrines.
Ambassador W. H, Page to Colonel House
London, Dec&mber 20, 1913
My dear House :
. . . I’ve just read of the passage by the Senate of
the Currency BiU. What a record that is ! The Tariff
Act and the Currency Act at one sitting. I don’t know
the final form of the currency measure, but no matter.
The getting of it through is an unmatched achievement.
. . . It's all wonderful ; and I’ll be proud to do or to
THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 179
endure anything for the man at the helm who steers the
old ship in this fashion. If I’d lived a hundred years
ago I’d have said, “ There’s the hand of God in this.”
Yours
W. H. P.
Mr. Jacob W. Schiff to Colonel House
New York, December 23, 1913
My dear Colonel House :
I want to say a word of appreciation to you for the
silent, but no doubt effective work you have done in
the interest of currency legislation and to congratulate
you, that the measure has finally been enacted into law.
We aU know that an entirely perfect bill, satisfactory to
everybody, would have been an impossibility and I feel
quite certain fair men will admit that unless the President
had stood as firm as he did, we would likely have had no
legislation at all. The bill is a good one in many respects,
anyhow gfood enough to start with and to let experience
teach us in what directions it needs perfection, which in
due time we shall then get. In any event you have
personally good reasons to fed gratified with what has
been accomplished, and trusting that this feeling may
increase your holiday spirit,
I am with good wishes
Faithfully yours
Jacob W. Schiff
Secretary Lane to Colonel House
Washington, D.C., December 25, 1913
My dear Colonel :
. . . This should be a glad time for you. I know of
no one who has more fully realized his ambition or who
may with more justification take pride in the good he
has done.
I was Sony not to see you when the President signed
the Currency Bill. He made a speech in aU ways worthy
of himself — which is saying much. . . .
Sincerdy yours
Franklin K. Lane.
i8o THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
The fact that he had had some share in the legislative
accomplishment of these months was the reward that
House sought for the pains and effort he had given to
help in making Wilson's Administration a success. To
a friend who wrote complaining that House’s aversion
for holding office would deprive him of the public credit
that belonged to him, the Colonel replied : "I am satis-
fied with the consciousness of having taken part in things
that are worth whUe.”
The sentence was not entirely accurate, for, although
Colonel House was obviously careless of the fact that the
extent of his activities was not widely suspected, he
wanted to exercise his energy in a broader field. He
was wearied by the details of party politics and appoint-
ments; even the share he had taken in constructive
domestic legislation did not satisfy him. From the
beginning of 1914 he gave more and more of his time to
what he regarded as the highest form of politics and that
for which he was peculiarly suited — international affairs.
They shortly became his main preoccupation, and it is
in this field -that he rendered his greatest services.
CHAPTER VII
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
If some of the veteran diplomats could have heard us, they would have
fallen in a faint.
Str William Tyrrell to House, November 13, 1913
I
N T OTHING is more strange than the chain of
circumstances which finally brought President
^ Wilson to play a r61e of supreme importance in
the affairs of the world, and to centre his whole being
upon a policy of international service. At the beginning
of his political career, and even during his first two years
as President, diplomatic questions were of far less interest
for him than his legislative programme ; he was slow
to develop what might be called a definite policy, and
he left his Ambassadors to work out their problems
themselves. Shortly after the appointment of Mr. Page
as Ambassador to St. James's, Colonel House reports
that he asked Wilson "if he had given Ambassador
Page special instructions. ... He had not, but took
it for granted that he would be diplomatic and
conciliatory.”
This seems casual, but we may remind ourselves that
neither the traditions of the Democratic Party nor the
background of Mr. Wilson could lead to the expectation
of keen interest in other than domestic matters. The
Democratic platform touched on foreign affairs only in a
brief reference to the Philippines, and Wilson himself in
his fiJTst inaugural address confined himself aitirely to
questions of social and indust^ reform.
i 82 aspects of foreign policy
For Colonel House, on the other hand, foreign
problems were always of the first interest and importance.
When he says that he shaped his early career so as to
prepare him and permit him to satisfy his penchant for
politics, he interpreted the word " politics ” in its
broadest sense, and included international relations.
During his career in Texas he had never ceased to study
current diplomacy ; and running all through his varied
activities as the President’s adviser in 1913 there is
obvious the desire to free himself from details of domestic
politics and to find time to help in the formulation of a
positive foreign policy. With the passing of the legis-
lative programme of 1913, he felt convinced that the
moment had come for Wilson to lay its broad foundations.
A year and a half later, on June 24, 1915, he wrote :
" To my mind, the President has never appreciated the
importance of our foreign policy and has laid imdue
emphasis upon domestic affairs. I thoroughly approved
this up to the end of the special session of Congress,
when the tariff, banking, and such other measures were
involved. . .
However slow to formulate a positive policy. President
Wilson was acutely aware of the danger that always
menaces American interests abroad when a change of
administration occurs, and to his credit be it said that
he fought constantly against the threatened intrusion
of the spoils system. His first choices for the more
important diplomatic posts were President Eliot, Richard
Olney, Professor Fine of Princeton ; and before his
inauguration he expressed to House his desire to elevate
" the foreign service by appointments as nearly akin to
that of Dr. Eliot as he could find favourable material.”
The problem was not a simple one, in view of the difficulty
of (fiscovering distinguished Americans with the neces-
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
183
sary combination of intellectual background and material
resources, and also in view of the purely partisan influ-
ences which regarded the foreign service as primarily
designed to fximish occupation for political supporters.
The invincible good-nature of Mr. Bryan made it hard
for him to refuse an application for a diplomatic or
consular appointment, especially when made by some
loyal adherent of 16-1 in ’96. Surely such a one had
earned his reward ! ^
House was entirely of the President’s opinion. He
urged that even the highest consular offices should be
kept under Civil Service Regulations, and it was at his
insistent recommendation that diplomates de carnlre^
such as William Phillips and H. P. Fletcher, who had
proved their ability under Republican Administrations,
were brought back into the diplomatic service or pro-
moted. And he warned the President against appoint-
ments that might seem connected with business interests.
“ April 18, 1913 : I told Mr. Bryan [recorded House]
of my conversation with the President regarding the
question of keeping the Consuls under the Civil Service.
. . . The President stated that he would hold to Roose-
velt’s executive order in regard to Consuls. Mr. Bryan
is a spoilsman and is in favour of turning the Republicans
out and putting in Democrats. He argued strongly and
eloquently for his position. I remained quiet, for my
^ Thus the Secretary of State wrote to the Receiver of Customs in
San Domingo, who had been appointed through the influence of Mir,
McCombs : ** Now that you have arrived and are acquainting yourself
with the situation, can you let me know what positions you have at your
disposal, with which to reward deserving Democrats ? , . . You have
had enough experience in politics to know how valuable workers are when
the campaign is on ; and how difficult it is to find rewards for all the
deserving- , . - Let me know what is requisite, together with the salary,
and when appointments are likely to be made.*' (Letter dated August 20,
1913, and published in the New York Sun, January 15, 1915-)
i84 aspects of FOREIGN POLICY
sympathy is with the President’s policy even though it
keeps some of our very good friends from their desires.
“ January i6, 1914 : We discussed the President’s
Civil Service views [House wrote of a later conversation
with the Secretary of State], which, of course, do not
agree with Mr. Bryan’s. I can see some feeling develop-
ing between them ... on the question of patronage. Mr.
Bryan has no patience with the Civil Service. He said
the President told him I had recommended , and
the President desired to appoint him. Mr. Bryan said,
‘ Of course he can do as he pleases, but I am certain
is one of those supercilious persons who will be
constantly looking down upon me.’ ”
Colonel House to the President
New York, October 8, 1914
Dear Governor :
One or two people have asked me to suggest X for
the Mexican Embassy.
I hardly think it is necessary to caution you about
this, but I feel that perhaps I had better do so.
X, I have always been told, was a part of the Y, Z
Oil Company and a bosom friend of Z. The fact that
you offered him Argentina makes them fed that he
would have a chance for this place, which I have no
doubt he would accept quickly enough.
When this appointment is made, I would be certain
that the appointee was chemically dean from oil or ore.
Affectionatdy yours
E. M. House
When it came to the more important diplomatic
appointments, Wilson appealed constantly to House for
information and advice. At one moment the President
commissioned him to discover an applicant’s attitude
on rdigion, as he was being considered for China and the
President wanted to know whether or not he was an
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 185
orthodox Christian.^ House undertook the delicate
task, and the following day put the presumptive candi-
date through an examination on religious principles.
“ He did not seem to have any worth while," recorded
the Colonel, and the appointment was not made. With
House the President discussed at length the choice of
men for St. James’s, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, and Paris.
For the Court of St. James’s, Wilson expressed himself
as anxious to find a man who could continue the traditions
established by Adams, Bayard, and Hay. But first
President Eliot, and then Richard Olney, declined the
post. Colonel House, who was himself frequently
suggested for this position, urged Walter Hines Page.
The latter was personally magnetic, possessed a genial
and discriminating wit, and could boast of a distinguished
journalistic career. On March 20, House, recording a
conversation with the President in which Mr. Wilson
expressed his discouragement at the lack of material
for the important ambassadorships, wrote : “I think
he will eventually offer the London mission to Walter
Page.”
" March 24, 1913 : We first took up foreign appoint-
ments [House noted of a later conversation with Mr.
Wilson]. He thought that Walter Page was about the
best man left for Ambassador to Great Britain. I was
not only the first to suggest Page for this place, but,
since Eliot and Olney dechned it, I have advocated him
earnestly. He asked if I thought Page would take it.
I assured him that he would, and promised to find out
definitely to-morrow.
" We discussed a great number of other people for
foreign appointments. ... I thought Thomas Nelson
Page should have Italy, and he agreed. . .. .
I This interest upon the pact of Mr. Wilson was dictated by 1^. Bryan's
insistence that none but an orthodox Christian could be appointed as
Minister to China*
i86
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
“ March 26, 1913 : I called up [Walter] Page and
said, ‘ Good morning, Your Excellency.’ He wanted to
know what it meant. I replied it meant a great deal.
He seemed quite agitated and asked whether I was not
joking. I replied that I was not, for the President had
authorized me to ask him if he would accept the Am-
bassadorship to the Court of St. James’s. We arranged
for him to call at 4.30.
" Page arrived promptly. He was excited over the
news I had conveyed. He asked me to tell him exactly
how it happened. I told him I had suggested his name
to the President two months ago. ... I had talked to
the President from time to time about the matter, and
when I dined with him on Tuesday he had authorized
me to find whether he, Page, would accept.
“ He was immensely pleased with the compliment,
but expressed doubt as to his ability to fill the place.
It was so entirely different from anything he had pre-
viously done. . . .
" March 28, 1913 : Walter Page telephoned aroxmd
nine o’clock : ‘ I have decided to turn my face towards
the East,’ which meant he would accept the post to
Great Britain. I felicitated him and expressed my
pleasure. He wished to know the next move. I told
him I would notify the President and that he would
write him -a formal note offering him the Ambassador-
ship.
I called up the President at Washington a little
after nine, to tell of Page’s acceptance. He replied,
‘ That is fine ; I am very glad.’ He promised to write
him at once.
" I telephoned Page to let him know how pleased
the President was. He expressed great appreciation for
what I had done. . .
Having confided to House the mission of infor ming
Mr. Page of his choice, the President thought little more
about it and was apparently in no hurry to communicate
hims^ with the appointee — an attitude which surprised
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 187
and troubled the new Ambassador and recalls the
manner in which Secretary Houston had been appointed
to the Cabinet :
" March 30, 1913 : Walter Page and Secretary
Houston came to dinner [wrote House], and we had a
delightful time. Houston and I tried to make Page
feel happy in his new field of endeavour. He seems
fearful lest he might not be able to maintain himself,
and yet he said he had enough sporting blood to under-
take it. He was somewhat disturbed because he had
not heard from the President, and asked me whether
I thought it was actually settled.
“ Houston then told of his experience. He said,
‘ I have never to this good day received any notification
of my appointment as Secretary of Agriculture, excepting
that which I received from Mr. House.’ And further,
’ I was imcertain whether I should come to Washington,
but I concluded I had better do so. I came, and I had
no notification there. Finally some cards were sent
to my wife and to me, inviting us to lunch at the White
House after the Inauguration. We went, the President
shook hands with me and said he was glad to see me,
but nothing else. The President’s Secretary sent me
word that the President expected me at the White
House at eleven o’clock the next day for an informal
meeting of the Cabinet. I felt that matters were getting
warm and I was getting nearer my job. I went to the
informal meeting and, since I seemed to be expected,
concluded that in due time I would be notified ; but I
never was. Then I read in the newspapers that my
name had gone to the Senate, and finally I received my
commission.’ . . .
“ April 12, 1913 : I lunched at the White House
[recorded House]. Loulie, Mr. and Mrs. Page, and Mr.
and Mrs. Wallace were the other guests. Soon after
lunch I rang up Mr. Bryan to tell him that Mr. Page
desired to pay his respects. He asked us to come over
to the State Department at once. Bryan was very
i88
ASPECTS OF FORIGN POLCY
gracious to Page, which pleased him because he has
not said many kindly things of Mr. Bryan. Page hoped
Mr. Bryan would place him in the kindergarten and
teach him as rapiddy as possible the essentials of his
work. Bryan laughmgly replied, ‘ I will have to learn
myself first’ . .
These were busy days for Colonel House. It was
the period when he was trying to concentrate upon the
framing of the Federal Reserve Act ; but on the one
hand the President, and on the other everyone who
desired a diplomatic post, assailed him for advice and
assistance.^
March lo, 1913 : Another stream of callers all
day, and long-distance tdephones from Washington and
elsewhere. This job of being ‘ adviser to the President ’
may have its compensations, but it certainly has its
drawbacks. . . .
“ March ii, 1913 : Again another day of of&ce-
seekers. Thomas Nelson Page called. He did not
mention his. own aspirations, but I -brought up the
subject rnysdi. I told him that it had been the Pre-
adent’s intention to appoint him either to France or
■Italy,, but i was afraid now that he psir. Wilson] had
-reached Washington he would be stormed by those
desiring the appointments for others.
" Page said he would prefer Italy to France, though
France was a greater honour. . . .
“ April 12, 1913 : The dinner to the French Am- .
bassador. Monsieur Jusserand, was interesting. I talked
with Senator Lodge. He wants a man from Nahant
retained in the Boston Custom House, and I promised
to try. and arrange it if he was competent.
" Thomas Nelson Page was at the dinner, and I
informed him that if no change was made he would
^ The character and the amount of the work carried on by Colonel
House suggests the advisability of including in the Cabinet a member
without portfolio.
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 189
go to Italy. I advised him to keep away from the
President. . . .
" Apyil 16, 1913 : A Colonel who would be a Brigadier-
General, and a Secretary of Legation who would be
transferred from Japan to France, caught me at break-
fast. The diplomat is wealthy, so I requisitioned his
motor and had him take me from place to place until
Irmch time. . . .
“ April 20, 1913 : Justice Gerard came to see me
about his chances for ambassadorial honours. I thought
they were slight, but they were better now than they
had been. He laughed and said, ‘ I do not believe that
until right recently I had any chances at all.’ That,
I replied, was true. I told him, furthermore, if Mc-
Combs and Morgenthau were given foreign appointments
that five out of the nineteen major places would have
gone to New York, which was out of all proportion to
her share. He saw the point. He did not believe
McCombs would accept. He evidently does not know
McCombs ; he is as likely to do one thing as another. . . .
“ September 29, 1913 : X is sitting on the doormat
again. Rumours that McCombs is not to take the
Ambassadorship to France have started his hopes
afresh. . . .”
II
Because of his interest in foreign affairs and diplo-
matic appointments, House was brought into dose
touch with the Ambassadors, and the cordial relations
that resulted went far to facilitate the spedal missicms
which he undertook in Europe during the war, Thomas
Nelson Page wrote after his appointmait :
" Neither letter nor cable can in the least convey
the appredation I have of your kindness to me since
our first acquaintance. I am just going to let the
debt stand as it is, and reckon oursdves as old friaids
whose community of feding and sentimait does away
with any count of mere time."
190 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
Brand Whitlock wrote from Brussels :
" My dear friend, I hope it's only un petit au revoir.
. . . Your last letter brought me joy. ... It increased, if
that were possible, my desire to see you and to have
again one of those long chats. ... I have need of such
sympathetic intercourse."
Willard at Madrid, Penfield at Vienna, Morris at .
Stockholm wrote frequently to him, and House evidently
spared neither time nor effort in keeping them informed
of political developments at home.
The Colonel’s correspondence with Gerard at Berlin
and Walter Page at London was voluminous.
“ I told Gerard [recorded House] that he would get
very meagre information from the State Departoent
concerning the happenings in Administration circles,
and I promised to keep him measurably well-posted
in order that he might confer without embarrassment
with the Kaiser or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In
turn, he said he would write me every ten days."
Colonel House’s relations with Mr. Gerard became
of great political importance in the stirring days that
were to come, for the Ambassador kept his promise.
His war letters to House were pungent and prophetic,
and through them President Wilson was to be informed
accmately of the complicated forces that governed
Germany. Nothing is further from fact than the legend
that the President lacked available and authentic
information of the political underworld on the continent
of Europe. Mr. Gerard was excelled by none in the
dignity and capacity with which he maintained the
interests anti furthered the policy of his Government
in the most trying diplomatic situation of the war zone.
He knew how to establi^ cordial relations with the
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 191
Berlin Government, and he gave thought to the details
that make for friendliness. But he never forgot Bis-
marck's aphorism : “A good Ambassador ought not
to be too popular in the country to which he is ac-
credited.”
Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House
Berlin, November 4, 1913
My dear Colonel :
Now that I have presented my letters to the Kaiser,
I have something to report.
Pursuant to your suggestion I stopped in London
to see Page, and had to wait nearly a week for him,
as he was in Scotland with Carnegie. I found him a
most agreeable and attractive man, and, from all I
heard in London, he is a great success.
I spent the remainder of my time in Paris, principally
in furniture shops, but arrived here the 6th October. . . .
The Kaiser was away and I was not received until last
Wednesday.
The Kaiser has permitted me to wear ordinary
clothes, wtdch disposes of the infernal uniform question,
so there I am now better off than Page, who has to wear
knickers to Court functions.
Before seeing the Kaiser I called on the Imperial
Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg — a very tall, pleasant,
Abraham Lincoln sort of man. He is one of the few
officials who does not speak English, but we got on very
well in French and some German. The Minister of
Foreign Affairs is away, but his substitute, Zimmennann,
is a very jolly sort of large German who was once a
Judge, which made us friends at once. The rest of my
time I put in at Embassy work, of which there is plenty,
and in calling on the various Ambassadors and calling
on others who call on me. I think I have the house
question settled and will take an old quiet-looking
house formerly owned by Prince Hatzfeld, then by the
von Schwabacho . . . and just now bought by an ad-
joining bank. It will cost me a good deal to put it
192 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
in repair, but, as it is large enough for the Embassy
ofi&ces, if I get the same aUowance as heretofore made,
I shall pay much less rent than the Paris man or than
Page in London, who, by the way, has secured a most
suitable and “ fashionable ” house in Grosvenor Square.
I have taken up a lot of things which former Am-
bassadors did not. I am taking an active part in the
American Benevolent Society, the American Church
(where Lanier and I sit every Sunday in the front pew),
the American Institute, and the American Lunch Club,
the American Association of Commerce and Traders,
etc., and my wife will become President of the American
Woman Club, a very worthy charity which takes care
of the numerous girl students in Berlin.
We must have made a wonderful sight when we were
presented to the Kaiser ; they sent the Royal carriages
for us with footmen standing behind in powdered wigs,
outriders, etc., though we looked rather dismal in our
dress suits. In the glass carriages we must have looked
like a funeral. The Kaiser is a much more majestic-
looking man than I expected. . . . We mostly talked
business and sport, and he asked why we didn’t have
an Embassy budding in Berlin and congratulated me
on at last housing the Embassy in a decent house.
When I presented the staff to mm, he asked why we
did not ^ ride in the Thiergarten and I told him we
would challenge any Embassy in Berlin to any known
form of sport.
Friday I went to Potsdam by train in a Royal
.military carriage and was driven to the new Palace,
where I was presented, alone, to the Empress. She is
a tad, fine-looking woman, and we talked of nothing
in particular, just "white conversation.’’
I made a speech at a German art banquet and have
been doing a good deal of work for the Panama Ex-
position. There is an agreement between England and
Germany that neither shall exhibit unless both do. . . .
Yours ever
James W. Gerard
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 193
With Walter Hines Page, as with Gerard, Colonel
House maintained constant and intimate relations.
The new Ambassador to St. James’s was pleased to have
a correspondent to whom he might write frankly and
through whom he might influence the President. When
House came to London in June 1913, Page greeted bim
warmly and shared with him his hopes and difficulties.
" I dined with Page last night [wrote Colonel House
on June 19] and remained with him until half-past
twelve. ... He finally walked home with me to our
hotel.
" He had many curious and interesting experiences
to relate and he was much disturbed at some of his
social blunders. The one which distressed him most
was at the Duke of Norfolk’s the other evening. He
took Princess in to dinner and afterwards, when
they were in the drawing-room, he left her without
being dismissed. The reason he did this was that he
had been reminded that he was the one to leave first,
and for the moment he forgot that with a member of
the Royal Family the reverse course was proper.
" He considered taking a duchess or royalty out to
dinner was hard sledding. They refused to exert them-
selves in the shghtest to keep up the conversation, and
he said it was the hardest work he had yet encountered
in his Ambassadorial duties. He spoke particularly of
the Duchess of . She was a woman of good sense,
he understood, but she kept it quietly to herself when he
was with her. He had gotten quite ' chummy ’ with
the Duke of Connaught, and Was doing all he could to
make himself agreeable to the important people in
England.
“ He asks me to aid him in formulating some con-
structive policy that will make the Presid^t’s Adminis-
tration and his nojtable in the annals of this Embassy.,
He said of all men, I could help him most in this regard.
He is always gen^ous in his praise of me. I shall try
I-13
194 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
to out^e some plan before I leave, for I have some
tilings in mind wMch I think may redound to the advan-
tage of both countries."
Mr. Page had great success in winning the regard and
respect of the British people and the Government to
which he was accredited. His bonhomie, his trans-
parent honesty of purpose and method, his evident
anxiety to discover means of promoting Anglo-American
friendship, soon placed relations between the two
Governments upon a cordial personal basis, which Page,
like House, believed to be the only firm foundation for
intercourse between nations. The Ambassador and his
wife had won the hearts of the British even before the
tr3dng months of the war, in which Page's hatred of
German militarism intensified British affection for him .
On July 13, 1914, Colonel House noted of a conversa-
tion with the English journalist, Sidney Brooks :
“ In speaking of the Pages, Brooks said Mrs. Page
had made the greatest success of ‘ any Ambassadress
within his memory.’ This is delightful to hear."
Mr. Page, however, as he himsdf confessed, was
subject to moods. " I sometimes think,” he wrote to
House, “ they are the dommant ihoods of my life, when
I fed that I don’t want any official position at all. . . .
I have so long been entirdy free and so independent that
official restraint is yet unnatural.” He found it hard
fo- ^k his individual convictions in carrying out instruc-
tions .from. Washington. He enjoyed his work, but the
difficulties always attaching to the life of an American
-■ Ambas^dor abroad galled him, and his sensitive nature
Suffered: under vexations which some of the other
- Ambassadors hardly noticed. To House he poured out
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 193
his soul. In a letter of December 12, 1914, he con-
cluded : “ I didn’t mean to write you aU these things. . . .
But I must once in a while blow off to somebody. You
have the misfortune to be the only man to whom I can
blow off.” With characteristic frankness, the Ambas-
sador let the Colonel understand with some definiteness
that he regarded the conduct of the State Department
imder Mr. Bryan as worse than unfortunate. And yet
at the conclusion of almost every long letter came the
assurance that in the main he was enjo5dng his task,
and the intimation that the vexations were minor by-
products. “ As for this Embassy,” he wrote April 27,
1914, ” we’re getting on better. We now get answers
to questions, and if I had ever been disposed to complain,
there’s no excuse for complaining now,”
All the difficulties with which the State Department
had to contend. House explained : the need of a period
of experience, the pressure of political factors, the lack
of funds. " Please bear in mind too,” he wrote to
Page, ” that just now the State Department is working
day and night and is all too short of help. They expect
a bill of relief from Congress shortly, and then you will
get more secretaries and they will get more help.” With
serpentine wisdom, he replied to Page’s criticism of
individuals in Washington by repeating complimentary
ronarks which those very individuals had recently
passed regarding the Ambassador. Thus, on October 29,-
1914, in a letter to Page : “ Your criticism of X came to
me the day that Wallace was tdling me of a talk he had
with him the day before, in which he, X, said : ‘ Y and
Z together have not done as much as Walter Page, and
yet they advertise themselves so well that the American
people think that comparatively no one else has done
anything.’ This is to be forgotten.”
196 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
The relations of House with the American Ambas-
sadors abroad were paralleled closely by those which
he maintained with foreign diplomatists in Washington.
Before the outbreak of the war he was on intimate,
almost confidential, terms with Spring-Rice and Bem-
storff, Jusserand and Dumba. He was thus admirably
equipped to study plans for developing the positive
foreign policy upon which he hoped President Wilson
would soon embark.
Ill
Colonel House’s conception of such a policy was far-
reaching. He believed that the time had passed when
the United States could pose effectively as the protector
of aU the American states, and he wanted to bring about
a definite friendly imderstanding with the great South
American states upon the basis of an equal partnership.
He realized acutely the feeling in South America, hostile
to the United States and based upon the consciousness
that the Monroe Doctrine (as they interpreted it) was
thoroughly one-sided and accordingly distasteful to
Latin-American sensibilities. If it could be trans-
formed into a common policy and a common responsi-
bility in which all American states participated, it would.
House insisted, benefit the United States no less materi-
ally than morally. Such a partnership, he believed,
might develop into a league for the preservation of peace
and tranquillity in the Americas, and would be of the
utmost service in handling situations such as had arisen
in Mexico.
This ambitious plan, reminiscent of Blaine's Pan-
American proposals, carried another, even more am-
_bitious, as its inevitable consequence. A general Pan-
American Pact was bound to interest the European
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 197
Powers, some of which, such as the British Empire, were
also American Powers. House was one of the few
persons in the United States who realized before the war
how thoroughly the previous thirty years had altered
our relations with Europe and made of the United
States, intellectually and economically, one of the family
of World Powers. Pohtical companionship, he was
convinced, must follow. Never lacking in boldness, he
was willing to accept the consequences ; and just as he
felt that the mythical protectorate of the Monroe Doctrine
should be transformed into an American partnership,
so he believed that the legend of political isolation from
Europe was the outworn remnant of an age that was
past. What he wanted was some sort of co-operative
understanding with the great European Powers that
might help to preserve the peace of the world, in which
the United States had vital material interest. This
conviction was not lessened by his realization that the
European situation was critical and might at any moment
result in a general European war.
Such a policy implied a frank recognition that the
factors upon which American traditions rested had
disappeared. If it were to be developed successfully,
a working understanding with Great Britain would be
necessary, both because the presence of the British in
Latin America could not wisely be ignored and also
because the imperial power of Great Britain was neces-
sary to any feasible plan of international co-operation.
Anglo-American relations were not unfriendly at the
beginning of the Wilson Administration, but a cordial
and intimate understanding could not be reached until
two clouds were removed, of which the most important,
at least in the public mind, concerned the Panama tolls
controversy. During the last year of Mr, Taft's
198 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
Administration, Congress had passed an act exempting
vessels engaged in coastwise trade of the United States
from Panama Canal tolls, notwithstanding a clause in
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of igoi which provided that
the Canal should be open to ships of all nations on " terms
of entire equality.” Feeling in the United States,
especially in Irish districts, favoured such exemption
warmly, on the ground that it was ” reasonable,” and
made an “ open canal.” A plank in the Democratic
platform approved it. Feeling in Great Britain sup-
ported with equal warmth the contention that, reason-
able or not, such exemption directly contravened
engagements taken in 1901 ; the issue was not one of
logic, but simply whether the United States would keep
its word.
Even before Wilson assumed office, he and House
seem to have agreed that, despite the overwhelming
majority in Congress that favoured exemption, the
American contention ought not to be upheld.^ It was
of supreme importance to emphasize international ethics
by an insistence upon the sanctity of treaties. On
January 24, 1913, House discussed the matter with
Wilson :
" I asked him concerning his views in regard to the
Panama Canal tolls controversy with Great Britain. I
was glad to find that he took the same view that I have,
and that is that the clause should be repealed.”
Action could not be taken by the President during
the extra session of Congress. It was first necessary
that he establish firmly his leadership, for what he
-» " The repeal of the tolls exemption was opposed by nearly all of the
D^o^tic leaders in Congress. To drive the repeal through the TTo use
and the Senate. Wilson was compelled to have recourse to Cabinet TnoTnTMwi
especially Burleson and McAdoo.” (Note by £. M. H.)
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
199
planned was nothing less than a complete conversion
of the party upon an issue intensely troubled by the
strong anti-British feeling characteristic of many Demo-
cratic strongholds. The topic was therefore not raised
during the extra session. Ambassador Page did not
fail to call constant attention to the importance of the
question, indulging in promises of the benefits of repeal
that might be regarded as exaggerated.
%
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
London, August 28, 1913
My dear House ;
... If the United States will . . . repeal the Canal
toll discrimination, we can command the British fleet,
British manufacturers — an3rthmg we please. Till we
do these things, they’ll regard us as mean and stingy
and dishonourable on occasion and, therefore, peculiar
and given to queer freaks ; they like us, but don't know
what to think of our Government. Our Government,
they don’t trust or admire. . . .
Heartily yours
WALTER H. Page
If the British felt they had cause of complaint with
the American Government over the matter of the Canal
tolls, the American Government, on the other hand,
felt that the British were hampering Wilson's policy in
Mexico. The British Ambassador in Mexico, Sir Lionel
Carden, was known to be an advocate of Huerta and was
supposed to represent the British oil interests of Lord
Cowdray. Huerta was believed to have made extra-
vagant promises of concessions to those interests in the
event that his regime became firmly established. The
American Government assumed that the British Foreign
Ofhce stood behind the British oil interests and that
200 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
the British provisional recognition of Huerta meant
that they would fight Wilson's policy of non-recognition.
Obviously the difficulties with the British resulted
largely from misunderstanding and misinformation on
both sides. What was necessary was a frank interchange
of views, and House welcomed the opportunity given
him in the summer of 1913 to approach the British
Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey.
It was on July 3, 1913, that the two first met, at
a small luncheon given by Sir Edward at his house,
33 Eccleston Square. The only others present were
Ambassador Page and Lord Crewe, then Secretary for
India. Colonel House doubtless looks back upon the
luncheon as an event in his career, since he came to have
for Grey an affection and a respect unsurpassed in his
relations with foreign statesmen. This feeling resulted
in large measure from a singular commimity of personal
tastes and ideals, which from the moment they met made
a deep impression upon Colonel House. He found
in Sir Edward a philosopher, like himself careless of
conventional honours, with no apparent sense of his
own importance, driven, over-hard perhaps, by what
he felt to be his duty and taking no credit therefor.
As statesman, moreover, the British Foreign Secretary
approached House’s ideal, supremely distinguished as he
was by sincerity of purpose and honesty of method ;
above all a diplomat who did not regard diplomacy as a
mysterious intrigue, but rather as a means by which
the representatives of different states could discuss
frankly the coincidence or the clash of national interests
and reach a peaceable understanding. House was then
and always convinced that foreign policy should be con-
ducted like personal business, from which it differed only
in degree of importance; and he wanted to introduce
201
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
into diplomacy the characteristics of personal intercourse,
with its code of individual honesty and friendliness. In
Grey he discovered a man with whom he could treat
upon this basis. We shall find them discussing the most
delicate points of national policy with the fran^ess that
officials of the same department of a government might
use.
Their first conversation was of importance, for it
led in the autumn to an understanding on the two
vexatious questions at issue. House explained Wilson’s
Mexican policy and attitude on the tolls exemptions ;
Grey intimated that British support of Huerta was
neither definite nor final.
“ July 3, 1913 : While Lord Crewe and Page were
discussing the eradication of the hookworm in India
and other coirntries [recorded House], Sir Edward
and I fell to talking of the Mexican situation. I told
him the President did not want to intervene and was
giving the different factions every possible opportunity
to get together. He wished to know whether the Presi-
dent was opposed to any particular faction. I thought
it was immaterial, as far as our Government was
concerned, which faction was in power, if order was
maintained. I thought our Government would have
recognized Huerta’s provisional Government if they had
carried out their written promise to call an election at
an early date and abide by its decisions.
“ Sir Edward said his Government had not recognized
the Huerta Government excepting as a provision^ one,
and that if Huerta undertook to run for President in
spate of his promise not to do so, their recognition of
him would come up again as an entirely new proposition.
He intimated that in those circumstances they would
not recognize him.
“ He wished to know what would happen if we inter-
vened, and suggested that perhaps the same condition
2 oa ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
would prevad as in Cuba. I replied that this was a
question for the future, but personally I did not believe
intervention woidd be as serious as most people thought.
“ We then drifted to the Panama Canal tolls question.
He said his Government intended to put two propositions
squarely up to our Government ; i.e. whether we desired
to take up the discussion of the treaty as it stood, or
whether we would prefer arbitration. His Government
have no objection to our Government giving free passage
to coastwise vessels, so long as it did not interfere with
British shipping or was not unfavourable to it ; but just
what plan could be devised to bring this about, he did
not know. However, he was willing to take up the
discussion with our Government in the event the free
tolls were not abolished by the biU now before our
Senate.
" I suggested that the matter should not be pressed
for the moment, but be left open for the long session of
Confess beginning in December. I explained that the
PresidOTt was exceedingly anxious to get through his
legislative programme at the extra session ; that a
reduction of the tariff and the reform of our currency
system were almost vital to the success of his Administra-
tion, and that in the Senate he had only a narrow margin
on the tariff and he did not wish to press anything else
until these measures were through.
“ Sir Edward said he quite understood the President’s
position and S3mipathized with it, and his Government
were perfectly willing to allow the matter to rest as
suggested.”
Ambassador W. S. Page to Colonel House
Dear Mr. House :
London, July 8, 1913
I had an interview to-day with Sir Edward Grey
about a matter of state business ; and, when I rose to
go, he followed me to the door and stopped me and said
that he owed me much for the pleasure I had given
m makmg him acquainted with you ; and he wished me
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 203
to tell you that he should expect to see you whenever
you should come to London : "I was much interested
in what he told me — a man that I'm glad to know,”
said he.
I send you this while it is still hot in my mind. . . .
It was a duchess last night — an easy and friendly
one ; to-night it’s a bishop, quality yet imknown ; to-
morrow night, the Russian Ambassador, a fine old Slav
whom I know.
Yours heartily
W. H. P.
Thus, at the moment when Anglo-American relations
threatened to become clouded by popular feeling over
Panama tolls, the personal intervention of Page and
House went far to secure complete ofi&cial cordiality.
Grey was evidently assured of the friendliness of the
President, as manifested through his personal adviser.
On the other hand, the forbearance of the British in not
pressing the tolls question convinced Wilson of what
House and Page insisted upon ; namely, that Grey was
anxious to work with the United States and that a cordial
understanding ’was possible if only outstanding issues
could be frankly discussed.
T ha t Sir Edward was impressed by the value of his
talk with House is indicated by his decision to send his
secretary. Sir William Tyrrell, to the United States to
canvass the whole matter of Anglo-American relations
with the President and his adviser. This was the more
important in that the new British Ambassador, Sir
Cecil Spring-Rice, was ill and unable to take up his
duties actively. T3nTeU proved to be an ideal selection.
He shared the complete confidence of Grey and his
views on international relations, so that not merely
could he give to Wilson Gre/s exact ideas, but he might
nlaim from the President an equal frankness. No one
204 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
understood better the ins and outs of Continental politics,
or realized more acutely how great an asset to the British
American sympathy might become in case of trouble in
Europe. He possessed, moreover, an almost bo3dsh
enthusiasm for the task in hand, which completely won
the affection of the Colonel and the confidence of the
President. He came in doubt as to the willingness of
the Americans to co-operate with Grey. He returned
convinced that they would play the game. " T3nTell’s
back," wrote Ambassador Page to House, in December,
a changed man. He says that you and the President
and Houston did it. That's all to the good."
House took pains to come into touch with Sir William
immediately after his arrival, and explained to Wilson
the importance of his mission.
" November ii, 1913 : The President saw me at once,
although I had no appointment. I expressed concern
in regard to Mexico and explained more in detail about
Sir William Tyrrell. In talking to Sir William we were
practically talking to Sir Edward Grey, and I thought
it would be foolish not to utilize the opportunity in order
to bring about a better understanding with England
regarding Mexico. I told him of my luncheon engage-
ment at the British Embassy on Wednesday, and
thought if he would give me a free hand I might do some-
thing worth while. He authorized me to talk to Sir
William as freely as I considered advisable. . . .
" November 12, 1913 : I suggested again that in my
talk with Sir William Tynrell it would be well to urge
him to get England to bring the other Powers to exert
pressure upon Huerta in order that he might eliminate
himself.
" The President asked me to come to the White
House and remain with him overnight. I told him I
had counted upon returning home, but my going de-
pended upon the success of my interview with Sir
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 205
WiUiam. I promised to get in touch with him, the Pre-
sident, as soon afterwards as it was convenient to him,
provided anything worth while developed. He said
he had wished to get with me yesterday. He also
told of how very tired he was. . . .”
Colonel House had met Sir William in New York,
but the decisive interviews took place in Washington,
at the British Embassy and the White House.
" November 12, 1913 ; At one o’clock [recorded
House], I lunched with Lady Spring-Rice at the British
Embassy. . . .
" Sir Cecil Spring-Rice was not well enough to
appear, and sent me words of regret. After lunch. Sir
William T3UTeIl and I went into another room and
discussed the questions uppermost in the minds of both.
He began by showing me despatches from his Govern-
ment and his own replies. He declared Lord Cowdray
had no concessions from Huerta, and if he could get them
in the future, his Government would not recognize their
validity. He thought a deliberate attempt was being
made to connect Cowdray with these matters in order
to create a sentiment for intervention. He said Sir
Lionel Carden was not antagonistic to America ; he was
fair and would do in spirit, as well as in act, just what
he was told to do by his Government. He admitted
he was very pro-British, but, other than that, no criticism
could be made of him.
“ I replied that both the President and Mr. Bryan
held very different views of Lord Cowdray and Sir
Lionel Carden, and I was glad to hear the other side.
He spoke of Sir Edward Grey’s desire to bring about a
cessation of armaments, for he thought our present
civilization would eventually be destroyed upon that
rock. He thought, too, that an armament trust was
forcing all Governments not only to pay excessive prices,
but was creating war scares — ^they being the only people
2o6 aspects of foreign policy
having any interest in having the different Governments
keep up large expenditures for war purposes.
‘ ‘ We talked of the Panama tolls question . Sir William
said Sir Edward Grey’s idea was that no possible good
came to nations if either the letter or the spirit of a treaty
were broken. He said the English people felt keenly
upon this subject, and no one more so than Sir Edward
himself ; and the only reason he held office was his
desire to promote the peace of nations.
“ I replied that the President felt as keenly as Sir
Edward ^d about the inviolability of treaties, and I
thought when he talked with him, the President would
make his position clear. I expressed the desire im-
mediately to bring the President and Sir William to-
gether, and he was delighted to have the opportunity. . .
President Wilson was not generally expansive in
conferences with persons whom he met for the first
time, and House was somewhat surprised and even more
pleased that the interview developed the degree of
frankness that characterized it.
" November 13, 1913 : The President received T3m:ell
in the Blue Room. He had on a grey sack suit, while
Sir William wore a cutaway. They both appeared a
little embarrassed. The President opened the con-
versation by saying I had told him of my conversation
with him yesterday; and then outlined the purpose
of our Government regarding Mexico, very much as I
had done the day before. Sir William replied, much
as he had to me. The President spoke fr ankl y and
well ; so did Sir William. It was an extremely interest-
ing discussion.
“ The President, of his own volition, brought up
the arbitration treaty and the Panama tolls question
and, much to my surprise, told Sir William what he.
had in mind, not only as to his views, but also how he
expected to put them into force. He asked him to
eonvey to. Sir Edward Grey his sympathy with the
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 207
view that our treaty with England should remain in-
violable, but to ask him to have patience until he had
time to develop the matter properly. He thought an
overwhelming majority of our people held his views,
but there was an opposition composed largely of Hi-
bernian patriots, both in the Senate and out, that always
desired a fling at England.
" We talked of the necessity of curbing armaments
and of the power of the financial world in our politics
to-day. Sir William was just as earnest in his opinion
regarding this as either the President or I. . . . The Pre-
sident said, ‘ It is the greatest fight we all have on
to-day, and every good citizen shoifid enlist.'
“ The hour was up, and the President had to leave
for other engagements. ... I talked vuth Sir William
for a moment after the President left. He was pleased
with the interview and thanked me cordially. He said
he had never before had such a frank talk about matters
of so much importance. We all spoke with the utmost
candour and without diplomatic gloss. He said, ‘ If
some of the veteran diplomats could have heard us, they
would have fallen in a faint.’ Before leaving, we agreed
to keep in touch with one another. He is to telephone
me whenever he receives despatches which he thinks
I should see, and I am to go to Washington when neces-
sary.”
IV
The basis of House’s diplomacy was always complete
frankness whenever he negotiated with men who -were
willing to place their cards on the table ; and the rela-
tions he developed with the British through Sir William
Tyrrell were intimate. T3nrrell responded readily.
" You will forgive, I know,” he wrote to House on
January 20, 1914, " the frankness of my utterance, but
that is the basis of our relationship, isn’t it ? ” As a
result of this intimacy, a quite informal, but none the
less significant, understanding was reached.
2o8 aspects of foreign policy
The British Foreign Office made plain to Sir Lionel
Carden that he must not take steps to interfere in any
way with Wilson’s anti-Huerta policy in Mexico.
Tyrrell on November 26 showed to House despatches
from Grey, plainly indicating this ; and henceforth the
Administration profited by the British influence. It
is hardly an exaggeration to say that the abdication and
flight of Huerta, in July 1914, was directly related to
the withdrawal of British support. Huerta's elimina-
tion was the first and perhaps the only diplomatic
triumph Won by Wilson in his Mexican policy, and it
is right that future historians should understand that
something of it was due to British co-operation.
On the other hand. President Wilson promised to
push the repeal of the clause exempting American coast-
wise shipping from the Canal tolls, provided the British
would not hurry him. To this they gladly agreed, and
on December 13 House wrote to Page : “ Sir Cecil
Spring-Rice will leave the Panama toUs question entirely
in our hands.” The conversation with the British
Ambassador to which House refers is interesting in view
of the events of 1914, for it indicated how thoroughly
Sir Edward Grey was determined to base his foreign
policy upon the principle of the sanctity of treaties.
" December ii, 1913 : I lunched at the British
Embassy. I was the only guest. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice
and I talked of the Panama tolls question, and he agreed
to leave the matter alone and let us take it up at our
leisure and handle it in the way we thought best. He
said that as far as the monetary end of it was concerned,
the British Govermnent would perhaps lose some thing
inore by their interpretation of the treaty than by
ours ; but the thing they had most in mind was main-
tainidg inviolable treaty obligations. He said in southern
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 209
Europe that question was consteintly to the fore ; and
the next time it arose after the United States had violated
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, the fact would be thoroughly
threshed out, and it woiild be said that Britain made
no objection to the violation of a treaty where the
United States was concerned, but when one of the
smaller nations of eastern Europe did so a great hue and
cry was raised.”
House had taken up the toUs problem with Wilson
in October, at a time when the President’s legislative
programme seemed to be nearing completion, and he
found Wilson determined to force repeal of the exemp-
tion upon Congress, although he recognized that it would
test his party leadership more than any question that
had thus far arisen. The President thought “ that
trouble would be encountered in the Senate, particularly
in the opposition of Senator O’Gorman, who constantly
regards himself as an Irishman contending against
England rather than as a United States Senator uphold-
ing the dignity and welfare of this country.”
The Colonel, according to his habit, preferred to
persuade the opposition before open debate began,
rather than fighting out the issue in Congress. He
brought the situation to the attention of Senator
O’Gorman’s son-in-law, Dudley Malone, a warm sup-
porter of the Administration, who had just resigned
from the State Department to become Collector of the
Port of New York.
” November 26, 1^13 • Malone and I discussed the
Panama tolls question. He indicated that Senator
O’Gorman would make a strenuous fight to uphold Ms
position on tMs subject. I diplomatically showed
reasons for this country to keep on good terms with
Great Britain I explained how the President’s hands
I— 14
310
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
would be tied in Mexico if he did not have the sympathy
of Great Britain in his plans. Malone saw the point
and agreed to help in bringing Senator O’Gorman around
to a more reasonable view. He promised to start upon
this at once, and I agreed to confer with O'Gorman later
and try to persuade him to accept the President’s
policy. , . .
" January 21, 1914 : We [Wilson and House] . . .
decided it was best to bring the matter to the attention
of Congress immediately, so that the British Government
would have something to go on when Parliament con-
vened February 10. We decided it was best not to see
Senator O’Gorman alone, but to call the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in as a whole, Republicans and
Democrats alike, and explain the situation to them ;
that it would be well to tell them how important it was
at this particular time that our relations with Great
Britain should be xmdisturbed ; that it was better to
make concessions in regard to Panama rather than lose
the support of England in our Mexican, Central and
South American pohcy.
“ The President has called the Committee for Mon-
day. I shall look forward with some anxiety to the
outcome. I suggested that a poll be taken of the Senate
in advance, in order to find what support he would have.
Senator James was decided upon for this work. Senator
Stone would have been selected, but he has not been
weU and is in the South for the moment.
“ The President said one of the strangest things that
had come about was that he and Stone had become
good friends and that the Senator seemed to have a
positive affection for. him. ..."
It proved impossible to push the matter forward as
rapidly as House had hoped, for the opposition was still
strong in both Committee' and Senate. It yielded,
: however, before Wilson’s insistence. On March 5, the
suppOTt of the Senate Committee apparently assured to
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 211
him, the President in a message to Congress formally
asked the repeal of the clause exempting from tolls
vessels engaged in coastwise trade. He based his demand
chiefly upon the fact that ever3nvhere, except in certain
quarters of the United States, opinion held that the
clause violated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.
" Whatever may be our own differences of opinion
[said Wilson to Congress] concerning this much-debated
measure, its meaning is not debated outside the United
States. Ever5rwhere else the language of the treaty is
given but one interpretation, and that interpretation
precludes the exemption I am asking you to repeal.
We consented to the treaty ; its language we accepted,
if we did not originate ; and we are too big, too powerful,
too self-respecting a nation to interpret with too strained
or refined a reading the words of our own promises just
because we have power enough to give us leave to read
them as we please. The large thing to do is the only
thing that we can afford to do. . , ."
The President also had in mind, of course, the value
of British influence in meeting the Mexican problem,
and to this he made veiled reference which excited endless
speculation and of which he himself never gave public
explanation. " I ask this of you,” he said, ” in support
of the foreign policy of the Administration. I shall not
know how to deal with other matters of even greater
delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it
to me in ungrudging measure.” The other matter of
great delicacy was the elimination of Huerta and the
imderstanding with Great Britain.
The obvious determination of the President, the sense
of loyalty to his leadership in the Democratic Party, and
fhft active labours of Burleson and McAdoo, who had
charge of getting the measure through House and Senate
212 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
respectively, finally bore fruit. In June the repeal of
the special exemption became law. From this time
forward, the United States Government could count
upon the sympathy of Sir Edward Grey.
“ June 27, 1914 [London] : I lunched with Sir
Edward Grey, Sir William Tyrrell, and Walter Page
[wrote Colonel House]. We talked from 1.30 until 3.30.
... Sir Edward and I did practically all the talking,
Page and Sir WiUiam only occasionally joining in.
“ We spoke first of the Panama tolls repeal bill. Sir
Edward expressed pleasure at the fine way in which the
President did it and without any negotiations between
the two Governments in regard to it. He spoke of his
having done it of his own volition because of his high
sense of justice. He purposes paying this tribute to the
President in Parliament when a fit opportunity occurs.”
The fit opportunity did not occur, for only a month
later the European war broke out and the mind of Sir
Edward was caught by problems that were nearer home.
But the sentiment of American friendliness lingered in
the Foreign Ofi&ce even during the vexatious discussions
regarding blockade and neutral rights. Through his
insistence upon the sanctity of international engagements,
furthermore, Wilson was able to assume a tone in his
controversy with Germany which would have been im-
possible if he had yielded to the dictates of expediency
in the question of Panama tolls.
CHAPTER VIII
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
It will be such a great accomplishment that there will be nothing he
[Wilson] can ever do afterwards that can approach it in importance.
Ambassador Naon to Colonel House, December 29, 1914
I
T he success with which President Wilson forced
the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption upon
an unwilling Congress, thus securing the goodwill
of the British as well as vindicating the good faith of
the United States, was followed almost immediately by
the flight of Huerta from Mexico. This diplomatic
victory was of even less significance than the fact that,
by refusing to intervene actively in Mexico and by
calling for the mediation of the A.B.C. Powers, he had
given a powerful stimulus to the cordiality of South
American feeling. Mr. Fletcher, Minister to Chile, wrote
enthusiastically to Hoiise of " the President’s success in
the Mexican difficulties — ^turning, as he did, a situation
fraught with difficulties and danger to our American
relations into a triumph of Pan-Americanism.”
Colonel House was anxious to capitalize the advan-
tage of the moment, in order to develop a positive and
permanent Pan-American policy, based upon the prin-
ciple of conference and co-operation. The world had
witnessed the bankruptcy of European diplomacy, which
the outbreak of the Great War made manifest in August
1914, and which, in House's opinion, resulted primarily
from the lack of an organized system of international
*13
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
214
co-operation. Such a system he was anxious that Wilson
should develop for the Americas ; and when the Presi-
dent visited him in November he laid his plans before
him.
" November 25, 1914 : I advised him [recorded the
Colonel] to pay less attention to his domestic policy and
greater attention to the welding together of the two
western continents. I thought the Federal Reserve Act
was his greatest constructive work and was the thing
that would stand out and make his Administration
notable. Now I would like him to place beside that
great measure a constructive international policy, wMch
he had already started by getting the A.B.C. nations to
act as arbitrators at Niagara. I thought the time had
arrived to show the world that friendship, justice, and
kindliness were more potent than the mailed fist.
“ He listened attentively to what I had to say, and
asserted that he would do it and would use his speech
at San Francisco, when he opened the Exposition, to
outline this policy.”
A few da37S later, so eager was he to see such a policy
developed while circumstances were propitious. Colonel
House permitted himself a rare luxury — ^that of enforcing
his verbal advice by a letter.
Colonel Home to the President
New York, November 30, 1914
Dear Governor :
... As I said to you when you were here, I feel
that the wise thing for you to do is to make your foreign
policy the feature of your Administration during the
next two years.
The opportunity to weld North and South America
together in closer union is at your hand ; do you not
thmk you should take some initiative in this direction
before your speech at the Panama Ejqposition? You
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 215
might take that occasion to amplify it, but in the mean-
time there are many things that might be done to give
it further acceleration. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
Some weeks later the plan had taken more definite
form in the Colonel's thoughts and he decided that he
would go to Washington to impress it upon the President
— a still more unusual step on his part and one that
indicated how much importance he attached to the
scheme. What Colonel House had in mind was nothing
less than a rather loose league of American states which
should guarantee security from aggression and furnish
a mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes.
The reader will doubtless observe that what House
planned bears a close relationship to the League of
Nations which Wilson ultimately advocated for the
world at large. Especially significant is the account
which the Colonel gives of the following conversation
with the President, for it indicates that at this moment
was bom almost the exact wording of Article X of the
League of Nations Covenant.
“ December 16, 1914 '■ I then explained the pt^ose
of my visit to Washmgton. I thought he [Wilson]
might or might not have an opportunity to play a great
and beneficial part in the European tragedy ; but there
was one thing he could do at once, and that was to
inaugurate a policy that would weld the Western Hemi-
sphere together. It was my idea to formulate a plan,
to be agreed upon by the republics of the two continents,
which in itself would serve as a model for the European
nations when peace is at last brought about. ^
"I could see that this excited his enthusiasm. My
idea was that the republics of the two contMents should
agree to guarantee each other’s territorial integrity and
2i6
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
that they should also agree to government ownership of
munitions of war. I suggested that he take a pencil
and write the points to be covered.
" He took a pencil, and this is what he wrote :
" ‘ ist. Mutual guaranties of political independence
under republican form of government and mutual
guaranties of territorial integrity.^
“ ‘ 2nd. Mutual agreement that the Government of
each of the contracting parties acquire complete control
within its jurisdiction of the manufacture and sale of
munitions of war.’
" He wished to know if there was an5rthing else. I
thought this was suf&cient, taken in conjunction with
the Bryan Peace Treaties which had already been
concluded between the republics of the two continents.
“ He then went to his little t3q)ewriter zind made a
copy of what he had written, and handed it to me to
use with the three South American Ambassadors with
whom it was thought best to initiate negotiations. We
discussed the method of procedure, and it was agreed
that it should be done quite informally and without
either himself or the Secretary of State appearing in it
imtil after I had soimded the different Governments at
interest. We did this for another reason, and that was
not to hurt Mr. Bryan’s sensibilities. It was agreed
that I should explain the matter to Mr. Bryan and should
teU him why it was thought best for me to do it rather
than the President or himself.
"The President was evidently somewhat nervous
about Mr. Bryan's attitude. It was easy to see that
he did not want him to interfere in any way with my
procedure, and yet he was afraid he might be sensitive
regarding it. I thought I could work it out satis-
^ Cf. Article X of the League of Nations Covenant ; " The members
of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the tenitoiial integrity and existing political independence of all
Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any
threat or danger of such aggression '&e Counc^ shall advise upon the
means by wMch this obligation shall be fulfilled.'*
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 217
factorily, for Mr. Bryan is generous and big-minded in
matters of this sort. . . .
" December 17, 1914 : I arranged for an interview
with Mr. Bryan at 9.30 this morning. I outlined the
plan the President and I were preparing for the linking
of the Western Hemisphere and showed him what the
President had written, explaining why it was thought
best that I should do it. He acquiesced in a most
generous way, which proved my forecast to the President
was correct. . . . After but a few minutes' conversation
upon the subject of this proposed league, he began to
d^cuss the Venezuela Minister’s proposal concerning the
calling of a convention of belligerent and neutral
nations, for the purpose of securing the rights of neutrals.
He also discussed the Russi^ treaty, which had been
tentatively suggested as being possible at this time.
After that he got off on prohibition, and I was glad to
take him to his of&ce and proceed to other business. . .
Mr. Bryan, in truth, appeared to take but little
interest in this Pan-American policy, for he had complete
confidence in the “ cooling-off ” treaties he had arranged,
which provided for a period of investigation, in case of
dispute, before hostilities could be started. Some days
later, after House had reported progress to the Secretary
of State, the Colonel recorded :
December 20, 1914: Mr. Bryan seemed pleased
with what had been done, but drifted off into the
question of patronage and the best way to ‘ do up
Senator X.’ . . . He followed me all the way to the
automobile, bareheaded in the cold bleak wind, to get
in as tnnrh as he could upon that subject.”
n
Given a free hand. Colonel House proceeded with
surprising rapidity. On December 19 he saw the three
Ambassadors of the A.B.C. Powers and was much
2i8
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
encouraged by their attitude. What he planned was
obviously to the advantage of the South American
States, in that it would bring them into equal partner-
ship with the United States and would transform the
Monroe Doctrine from a protective assurance on the
part of one state into a mutual covenant. Whether or
not a Pan-American Pact of the kind he suggested would
prove an effective guarantee of peace might be doubtful,
but it would certainly eliminate the imphcation of
inferiority which South America deduced from the
traditional form of the Monroe Doctrine. To secure
such moral advantages, however, the South American
States must renounce all aggressive designs. Would
they prove equal to the opportunity offered them ?
The plan assumed also that the smaller Latin-American
States had attained a degree of political stability which
would permit them to maintain the promises which they
made. The assumption was at least questionable.
" December 19, 1914 : Justice Lamar telephoned that
the Argentine Ambassador was back. I made an
engagement with him at half-past eleven. I hurriedly
gathered together what data I could get concerning
Argentina and upon Naon himself. When the Justice
introduced me, he excused himself for a moment and
took Naon aside to inform him how thoroughly I repre-
sented the President. He then took his leave.
" I began the conversation by complimenting Naon
upon the advanced thought in his country, particularly
in regard to penal reform. I considered the Argentine
fifty or one hundred years ahead of Europe and the
United States in that direction. I marvelled at the
statesmanship that saw as long ago as 1864, when they
had their war with Urugua)^, that a victorious nation
had no moral right to despoil the territory of the van-
qtdished. After I had made these few remarks, I had
fertile soil upon which to sow the seeds of my argument.
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 219
" Naon took the typewritten memorandum which
the President had given me and warmly approved both
sentences one and two. He was tremendously impressed
with the significance of the first article, and said it
struck a new note and would create an epoch in govern-
mental affairs. When I told him the President had
written the memorandum on the t 37 pewriter Mmself,
he asked permission to keep it, saying it would become
an historical document of much viue.
" I urged him to communicate with his Government
by cable and to give me an answer by Monday or Tuesday.
He felt confident the reply would be favourable. He
took my address in New York, and said he would com-
municate with me without delay. I let him understand
that when the South American Governments had acted
upon the matter and it had been pretty well buttoned-up,
I would step aside and have the President and Mr.
Bryan act officially. When I left, he followed me to
the door and said he considered it a joy to work toward
the consummation of such a policy as ‘ your great and
good President has promoted.’ . . .
“ At lunch I reported to the President the substance of
my conversation with the Ambassador from the Argentine,
and he was delighted. Naon thought I would have more
difficulty with the Brazilian and Chilean Ambassadors.
“ The President said in talking with them I could
go very far, and he was emphatic in the statement that
the United States would not tolerate . . . aggression upon
other republics.
"In the afternoon I saw them both. Da Gama^
was easy of conquest and with practically the same
argument I used with Naon. Suarez * was more difficult
because he is not so clever, in the first instance, and,
in the second, Chile has a boundary dispute with Peru.
He asked if I knew of this, and I told him I did, but
we would arrange in the final drawing of the agreement
to cover such cases, since there were other boundary
^sputes which would have to be adjusted, hke that
■ The Brazilian Ambassador. . ^ The Chile^ Ambassador.
220
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
between Costa Rica and Panama. They both agreed
to cable their Governments and strongly recommend
the ratification of the proposal.”
This was rapid work for the first day of negotiations
and Colonel House, who knew something of diplomatic
delays, did not conceal his satisfaction. He was pleased
stni more by the speed with which the Ambassadors
of Brazil and Argentina extracted replies to his sugges-
tion from their Governments. Brazil was the first to
respond, less than a week after the original suggestion
of the Colonel had been offered.
Ambassador da Gama to Colonel House
Washington, December 24, 1914
My dear Colonel House :
I have just received the answer from my Minister
of Foreign Affairs to the telegram I sent him on Saturday,
igth, transmitting the two propositions of the President’s
project of convention.
The answer was delayed pending further information
that I sent on Monday and then consultation with our
President, who gladly authorizes me to declare that
both points of the President’s proposal are agreeable, it
being xmderstood that only American territories are
contemplated in the first of those paragraphs.
I suppose that the sounding having proved favourable,
the formal overture of the negotiations will soon follow.
This will be an epoch-making negotiation.
Yours sincerely
DA Gama
Colonel House to the President
Nbw York, December 26, 1914
Dear Governor :
I am enclosing you a copy of a letter from da Gama
which I have just received and which I know will please
you as much as it has me.
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
221
As you know, I had a telephone talk with Naon ;
but he spoke such broken English and the connexion
was so bad, that I could not gather the sense of his
message. He promised to write, but I have nothing
from him yet. I gleaned enough to know that he
wanted to have another conference ; therefore I told
him I would be in Washington early next week.
This is a matter of such far-reaching consequence
that I feel we should pay more attention to it just now
than even the European affair, for the reason that, if
brought to a successful conclusion, the one must have a
decided influence upon the other. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
Three days later House went again to Washington,
where he had a gratifying conference with the Argentine
Ambassador. Naon handed to him the following de-
spatch, which had just come in from Buenos Ayres :
" The Government receives with sympathy the proposi-
tion with the understanding that such a proposition
tends to transform the one-sided character of the
Monroe Doctrine into a common policy of all the Ameri-
can countries.”
“ Decewiber 29, 1914 ; Naon was very enthusiastic
[House recorded] over the entire proposal and said,
‘ It will be such a great accomplishment that there
will be nothing he [Wilson] can ever do aftOTward that
can approach it in importance.’
“ He thought Chile would hesitate to come in. . . .
He had talked with the Chilean .Ambassador since I was
in Washington and had not received much encourage-
ment. I told him that the United States would no^
favour the acquisition of territory by the othCT republics,
either by war or otherwise, and that Chile might as well
accept that condition in a formal convention. He
replied that Argentina hdd the same view and would
222 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
not willingly permit territorial aggrandizement in South
America.”
The Colonel returned to the White House to report
to Wilson,
“ We discussed the best means of buttoning-up the
South American proposition, and it was agreed that he
should see Senator Stone immediately upon his return ;
and we again discussed whether it would be advisable
to bring the matter before the entire Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, or before the Democratic members
of it. He would not discuss anything of importance
with Senator for the reason that he immediately
gave it to the press ; in this instance it was necessary
to have the matter presented to the country properly
when they fiurst heard it, and not get a garbled or dis-
torted account from a political opponent.
“ I told him Naon desired to know whether it was
our purpose to make twenty-one different treaties or
a single convention. I had replied that it was the
intention to make a single convention, which the Presi-
dent thought was right. Naon suggested, I told him,
that the A.B.C. Powers and ourselves should first thresh
out the terms to a satisfactory conclusion before bring-
ing in the smaller republics. This, too, the President
agreed to.
" December 30, 1^14: We had breakfast, as usual,
at eight. The President and I talked a few minutes
afterward and laid out the business that I should attend
to. I made an engagement with the Chilean Ambassador
for eleven o’clock.
“ I found he had not heard from his Government.
He gave a change of ministry as the reason, and was sure
he would receive a favourable reply. I could not see
how he could fail to do so. This was not really in
accordance \rith Naon’s statement to me, but I found
Naon wrong in the first estimate of the manner in which
-Brazil and Chile would receive the proposals.
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 223
“ January 13, 1915 : I found the Chilean Ambas-
sador very cordi^, but he had not heard from his Govern-
ment regarding the President’s proposal. I told him
the Senate would adjourn in about sixty days and would
not meet again for nearly a year, and that it was import-
ant for him to get into communication with his Govern-
ment again and ask them to send a response. I informed
biTTi of the favourable responses from both Brazil and
Argentina ; but before proceeding to a further discus-
sion of the convention we wished to hear from Chile.
The President requested me to say to him that he had
approached Senator Stone of the Foreign Relations
Committee and had found him sympathetic, and he
felt sure there would be no dif&culty from that
source. . . .
“ I went ... to see the Brazilian Ambassador to
inform him also that the President had taken the matter
up with the Senate Foreign Rdations Committee, and
he would soon call them together for a more intimate
discussion of the details of the convention. ^ Da Gama
was pleased with this procedure and thought it was wise
for the President to get the Senate in line before any
public announcement was made.
“ I returned to the White House for lunch, and while
the President was dressing for his golf I told of my
morning’s work.”
Chile was dow in responding, but on January 21,
1915, Colonel House received the following letter from
Ambassador Suarez :
Ambassador Suarez to Colonel House
Washington, January 19, 1915
My dear Sir : , .
... I wi^ed to inform you that I have smce two
days the expected reply from Chile. It is favourable in
principle and praises the idea as a generous and pan-
american one.-
224 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
Although it is sometimes not a little difficult to find
the proper expressions to render an idea agreeable to
several parties, I hope we shall succeed when the moment
of discussing the development of our first accord
comes.
Mr. Bryan has told me lately to be in full acquaint-
ance with the matter; and under this understanding
I assume I can communicate with him in your absence.
I am, my dear Mr. House,
Very sincerely yours
Edo. Suakez
This was ambiguous, but House, who was on the
point of leaving for Europe, to be engaged upon quite
different but equally important affairs, urged the Presi-
dent to accept the letter at its face value and push the
agreement through.
Colonel House to the President
New York, January 21, 1915
Dear Governor :
I am enclosing you a copy of a letter which has come
from the Chilean Ambassador this morning.
Ever3rthmg now seems to be in shape for you to go
ahead. I believe the country will receive tWs policy
with enthusiasm and it wUl make your Administration
notable, even had you done but little else. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
m
Colond House left for Europe on January 31, 1915.
Henceforth his time and his energies were chiefly
occupied with the problems that arose from the Euro-
pean war, but his interest never flagged in the Pan-
American policy which he had done so much to inaugu-
rate. He insisted upon its general value as an example,
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 225
which might later be followed in Europe, of international
organization in place of international anarchy ; he
emphasized its special value in view of the persistent
uneasiness resulting from the always unsettled Mexican
problem. For the elimination of Huerta had not led
to any diminution of disorder ; attacks upon American
lives and property continued, and American public
opinion, at least in certain circles, called for a positive
policy that might end the crisis.
House himself was constitutionally unable to approve
a purely negative line of action, and, while he realized
the dangers of forcible intervention in Mexico by the
United States alone, he believed that with the co-opera-
tion of the South American Powers, the mediation of
which had already been utilized in 1914, the Mexican
problem could be settled. Such a step would fit in
perfectly with the plan for a Pan-American Pact. Just
before leaving for Europe he urged it upon the President
and the Secretary of State.
“ January 24, 1915 : I suggested [to Wilson] that
the Mexican problem could best be solved now by calling
in the A.B.C. Powers and ourselves. The President
thought this an excellent idea and that it was merely a
question of when to put it in operation. I offered to see
the Ambassadors to-morrow if he thought well of it.
He believed this would be too soon, for conditions were
not quite ready in Mexico for such a move, and he was
afraid the A.B.C. Ambassadors would not want to move
so quickly. . . .
“ January 25, 1915 : I talked to Mr. Bryan of my
suggesting a commission form of government for Mexico,
with the A.B.C. Powers and ourselves acting jointly.
He thought fairly wdl of it, but was not as enthusi^tic
as the President. I talked of the South American
concord and many other matters.”
I— 15
226 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
Colonel House to the President
Paris, France, March 15, 1915
Dear Governor :
Since I have been over here, every now and then
Mexico raises its head.
It would be of enormous advantage to your prestige
if you could place that problem well on the road to
settlement before this war ends, I have heard it time
and again — not directly, but through others — that the
bdligerent Governments will become insistent that order
be restored there.
Winslow tells me that he hears it constantly in
Berlin. I have wondered whether you have taken the
matter up with the A.B.C. Powers, as you contemplated
when I left. This seems to me to Ido the wisest solution.
I think you have now given them [the Mexicans] every
chance to work it out themselves, and help should be
offered them and insisted upon. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
President Wilson, however, was unwilling to take so
decided a step at this time. Three months later he
himself drew a graphic picture of conditions in Mexico ;
“ Her crops are destroyed, her fields lie unseeded, her
work cattle are confiscated for the use of the armed
factions, her people flee to the mountains to escape being
drawn into unending bloodshed, and no man seems to
see or lead the way to peace and settled order Mexico
is starving and without a Government.” Even so, he
hesitated to take any positive action.
Colonel House was in Europe from January to June.
On his return he foimd that, despite the cordial approval
given by Argentina and Brazil, no progress had been
made by Wilson or Bryan in pus hing the Pan-American
^ Lanier Winslow, attache in Berlin.
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 227
Pact to a definite conclusion. Clearly, much of the
delay might be attributed to the hesitations of the
Chilean Ambassador, but it seemed plain also that the
Secretary of State had not taken up the matter with
energy. He lacked the sort of ability necessary to
translate ideas into facts. Mr. Bryan had imagination
and foresight ; many of his ideas which began as sub-
jects of ridicule ended by becoming laws, but, except in
rare instances, not through his own efforts.
“ The most important event of the day [recorded
House on June 18, 1915] was a visit from Henry P.
Fletcher, our Ambassador to Chile. We discussed the
South American situation as it related to the proposal
I made the President before I left, concerning the weld-
ing of the two continents. I find nothing has been done
in this matter during my absence. The Chilean Ambas-
sador and Government have been the cause of the delay.
They evidently do not want to tie themselves to a non-
aggressive policy. ... I do not feel, however, that the
situation has been handled to the best advantage ; and
I shall take it up with the President again and suggest
some means by which it may be expedited.
“ Fletcher thought if we got the A.B.C. Powers to
declare for the Monroe Doctrine it would be sufficient.
I told him that this would in no way be sufficient and
that he did not grasp the idea or scope of it. We desired
to see the Americas knitted together so as to give the
world a policy to be followed in the future. Haste was
necessary for the reason that the European war made
the time opportime, and, if it did not go through before
the end of the war, it might never do so.
“ I suggested to Fletcher the advisability of his
visiting the different South American countries to further
the proposal. I thought if Chile continued to obstruct,
we should go ahead without her. The smaller republics
would agree and, with Argentina and Brazil, it made but
little difference whether Chile came in or remained out.”
228 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
With the appointment of Mr. Lansing as Secretary of
State, in July 1915, following Bryan’s resignation, new
impetus was given to the proposals which House had
initiated. “lam again urging action in that direction,”
the Colonel wrote on July 18 to Thomas Nelson Page.
A week later, Mr. Lansing came up to the North Shore
to spend the day with him.
“ July 24, 1915 ; Secretary and Mrs. Lansing arrived
on the 10,30 train. Lansing and I at once went into
executive session and talked continuously until lunch.
There was much to go over. I wished to tell him of
European conditions, as I found them, and to give him
an insight into what had been done in the Department
concerning some important matters. . . . The South
American proposal was one. I was surprised to find that
Lansing was ignorant of what had been done. He said,
as far as he knew there was nothing on file in the Depart-
ment. I was surprised, too, that the President had not
talked with him more freely and given him fuller in-
formation concerning pending matters. . . .
“We took up the Mexican situation and he is getting
under way the arrangement to have the A.B.C. rowers
join us in composing the dif&culties there. He did not
know the suggestion was mine and was made as far back
as January and l3dng dormant until now. I do not think
the President can altogether relieve himself of blame in
this dday, for, while he would probably have gone
ahead with it if ... he had had as Secretary of State
a better executive, yet it might have been done even
under the unfavourable circumstances with which he
had to contend. . . .
“ I find him [Lansing] thoroughly familiar with the
machinery for such designs, and he seems to be energetic
and ambitious to make a record.”
Practical effects of this conference were not slow to
appear. In the first place, Mr. Lansing took up at least
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
229
part of the suggestion that Colonel House had made the
preceding January and which the President and Secre-
tary Bryan had not pushed forward ; namely, that the
South American Powers should be called in to assist in
the settlement of the Mexican problem. In August,
upon the invitation of Mr. Lansing, the diplomatic
representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Guatemala, and Uruguay met at Washington to discuss
the Mexican settlement. From this conference there
resulted an invitation to the different Mexican leaders
to meet in pacific conference to arrange for general
agreement and orderly elections. All the leaders, with
the exception of the chief of the Constitutionalists,
Carranza, agreed to the invitation, and yet it was Car-
ranza who seemed to exercise the widest powers in
Mexico and whose co-operation was essential. Wilson
did not deceive himself into the belief that Carranza was
friendly to the United States, but both the President and
House recognized in Carranza’s lieutenant, Obregon,
certain qualities which might prove equal to the problem
of Mexican pacification.
“ September 23, 1915 : We breakfasted at eight [wrote
House]. After breakfast Tumulty talked to me for
nearly an hour. The President rescued me and took me
up to his study. We discussed Mexico. He laughingly
said that Carranza had once or twice put it over us and
in a very skilfiil way. He thought when the A.B.C.
Conference resumed on the 8th of October, we would
perhaps have to recognize Carranza. We were both of
the opinion that General Obregon was responsible for
the accderated fortunes of Carranza and that he would
perhaps finally turn out to be the ‘ man of the hour ’ in
Mexico. ,We agreed that if Carranza was to be recog-
nized he must first guarantee religious freedom, give
amnesty for all political offences, institute the land
230 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
reforms which had been promised, give protection to
foreigners, and recognize their just claims.”
Despite the steady negative returned by Carranza to
the invitation to meet with the other Mexican leaders
the conference of American states at Washington refused
to be snubbed ; in October it decided that the Carranza
regime constituted a de facto government in Mexico and
recommended its recognition. This recognition was
granted by the United States Government on October 19.
The Mexican problem was not thereby settled, but
general opinion would probably have agreed with that
of Ambassador Gerard, who wrote Colonel House in
October ; “ Carranza has his faults, like most of us,
but it seems to me that it is the proper thing to recognize
him and a good solution of a bad situation.”
Once again the method of solution was of more
importance than the result. Students of the Latin-
American situation insisted that it was of the first sig-
nificance that the United States should have taken this
step in conjunction with and upon the recommendation
of the chief South American states. President Wilson
did not fail to capitalize the friendly sentiments aroused
in South America when he ddivered his aimual message :
” The moral is that the states of America are not
hostile rivals, but co-operating friends, and that their
growing sense of community of interest, alike in matters
politic^ and alike in matters economic, is likdy to give
them a new significance as factore in international affairs
and in the political history of the world.”
..Under the influence of this display of the United
States’ desire to co-operate rather than to control, Mr.
Lanark found it possible to continue discussions on the
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 231
definite Pan-American Pact. On October 19, House
wrote to Walter Hines Page : " Lansing is pushing the
South American proposal. The President, Lansing, and
I went into this thoroughly some two weeks ago and
decided upon a course of action which we believe will
accelerate matters and perhaps bring it to a conclusion
before Congress meets.”
As a result of long discussion, the original proposition
made by House had been revised so as to eliminate one
obvious source of practical dif&culty ; namdy, the veto
upon the private manufacture of arms. For reasons
which the League of Nations Commission later were to
find cogent, the abolition of private manufacture was
deemed not feasible. Indeed, the new draft of the Pact
carried merely a provision for an automatic embargo
on munitions in case of revolutionary attack upon an
existing government. Articles providing for investiga-
tion and arbitration in the settlement of disputes were
added. The first and most important article, guarantee-
ing “ territorial integrity ” and “ political independence
under republican forms of government,” was retained.
Secretary Lansing to Colonel House
Washington, November i8, 1915
My deae Colonel House :
I enclose a revision of the four propositions for the
proposed Pan-American Convention.* Possibly the
President has already sent you a copy, but I am doing
so on the supposition that he has not.
Before Ambassador Naon sailed, I submitted to him
the propositions and he was entirely satisfied with them.
This morning I saw the Brazilian Ambassador and he
also approved. This afternoon I asked the Chilepi
Ambassador to come and see me, and after a long dis-
* See App^idix to chapter.
232 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
cussion of the whole question he changed his views in
regard to the convention and said that he could see no
reason why Chile could not accept the propositions as
redrafted. I urged on him the advisability of speedy
action and he agreed that he would at once communicate
them to his Government and ask that the new Cabinet,
which comes into office on December 20th, would act
immediately and cable him instructions accordingly.
I fed convinced that the Ambassador will do all he
can to secure favourable action by his Government.
I thought you would be interested to know the
present status of the negotiations and when I see you
will explain more fully the substance of my conversation
with Mr. Suarez.
I hope to be in New York at the Army-Navy football
game on the 27th and shall stay over tmtll Sunday night.
Possibly I may' have an opportunity to see you then if
you are not in Washington before that time.
With warm regards, I am
Cor(hally yours
Robert Lansing
IV
As in the case of the League of Nations Covenant
three years later. Colonel House was less interested in
the wording of the draft than in the spirit behind the
agreement and in securing definite and unanimous
acceptance. " I think you have now gotten the four
propositions down to the best possible form,” he wrote
Mr. Lansing on November 20. And he urged the
President to get the business " buttoned-up.” Indeed,
the matter seemed so dose to completion that on
January 6, 1916, Mr. Wilson, in his address to the Pan-
American Sdentific Congress, stated publidy the gist
of the proposals.
But more ddays intervened. House again left for
Europe in December, remaining abroad until March ;
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 233
and, apparently, during his absence little progress was
made in overcoming the final difficulties. While in
Europe, although engaged on complex and even more
far-reaching business, the Colonel did not forget the Pan-
American Pact and took what occasion he might to assist
it. It was the subject of discussion between him and the
Chilean Minister to Great Britain, Senor Eduardes, and
also members of the British Cabinet. He was hopeful
of British support, and even considered the possibility
of the participation of Canada in the Covenant.
“ February 20, 1916 ; I had a conference with the
Chilean Minister before lunch [he wrote]. He said his
Government was pleased with the proposed pact between
the American republics. He mentioned the fear Chile
had of Japan, He spoke of the advantage Chile could
be to the United States because of her coast-line as a
base, and because of her nitrate and copper deposits.
He believed that Chile during the coming year would
take second place among copper-producing countries.
While talking with him, it occurred to me it would be a
good time for Great Britain to indicate that she was in
sympathy with the Pan-American Pact ; and I told
Eduardes I would suggest to Sir Edward Grey to-morrow
that he have some member of the House of Commons
put a question to him asking if the Government was
cognizant of this Pact, how they reg^ded it, and what
effect it would have upon Great Britain. ^ I shall suggest
that Grey reply that Great Britain views it sympathetic-
ally ; that, being one of the largest American Powers, she
looks with favour upon any arrangement which will
make for a closer tinion of American states.
“ Eduardes was ddighted with this suggestion. Later
in the day I proposed it to Lansdowne.^ He was startled,
and said it was a matter needing careful consideration
because Japan might consider it was directed at her. I
1 Minister without Portfolio.
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
234
thought Japan should be taken at her word. She has
repeatedly said she had no designs in the Western
Hemisphere, and Great Britain need only accept her
assurances at their face value. Lansdowne favoured the
proposal, but declared it of such importance that careful
thought should be given it.
“ February 21, 1916 : The first question I took up
with Grey was the suggestion which came to me yester-
day regarding the Pan-American Pact. I told Grey I
had mentioned it to Lansdowne and he thought it a
great move, provided it was so guarded as not to offend
the Japanese. Grey took the same attitude I did, that
the Japanese could not possibly consider it directed at
them. He enthused over the idea and asked me to dictate
the question I thought should be put to him in Parliament.
I did so, while he wrote it down. It was, whether the
Government was taking cognizance of the Pan-American
Pact recently announced, guaranteeing the political
and territori^ integrity of the American republics, and
what effect it would have upon the British Dominions
in America.
“ The thought then occurred to me, and I expressed
it to Grey, that after this was done and after I had con-
sulted with the President, the British Government might
join the American guarantee as far as their American
colonies were concerned. This, I told him, was one way
[for Great Britain] to bring about a S3anpathetic alliance
not only with the United States, but with the entire
Western Hemisphere. In my opinion, it was an oppor-
tunity not to be disregarded and its tendency would be
to bring together an influence which could control the
peace of the world.
“ Grey . . . thought it should be done. I afterwards
cabled the President, telling him what I had proposed to
Grey, but without giving details. . . .
- " I. gave Lorebum ^ a summary of what I had told
Grey concerning the Pan-American Pact and what Grey
had promised to do in the House of Commons provided
I^rebttm, an advanced Liberal and former Lord Chancellor,
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 235
the Canadian Prime Minister approved. Grey felt that
a matter appertaining solely to American affairs should
first be submitted to the Canadian Government, and this
was being done by cable.
“ I suggested to Lorebum that he prepare a speech in
advance, without sa3dng anything to Grey, so when the
announcement was made in the Commons he could give
it his warm approval in the House of Lords. He was
eager to do this, for he said it presented to his mind a
magnificent prospect.
“ February 22, 1916 ; He [Grey] told me that Bonar
Law was of the opinion it would be somewhat hasty
to have the question asked in the House of Commons,
and an answer given just now, about the Pan-American
Pact. He has cabled the Canadian Prime Minister
and the matter will be brought out at the time con-
sidered most opportune.”
Returning to the United States on March 5, House
heard from Grey soon afterwards that the British thor-
oughly approved of the Pan-American Pact and were
interested in the plan of aflSliation with it, but evidently
feared to make any public statement before its con-
summation seemed better assured.
Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House
Foreign Office, March 23, 1916
Dear Colonel House :
Soon after you left, the Chilean Minister volunteered
a statement to Sir M. de Bunsen ^ of his conversation
with you about the Pan-American proposal.
In consequence of what Sir M. de Bunsen told me I
thought it desirable to see the Chilean Minister before
saying anything in public. I found him pleased with
what you had said to him, but insisting very carefully
that the idea of partnership must be emphasized and that
of tutelage suppressed.
^ Ambassador to Austria tmtil 1914 ; appointed Special
Ambassador to States of South America in 1918.
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
236
He admitted that you had done this, but he made it
clear that if I made any public statement it must be
evident that I was founding myself not only on what
President Wilson had said, but on the feelings of the
A.B.C. countries in South America as well.
I asked him to send me a statement which he said the
President of Chile had made favourable to the idea, so
that if I had to say anything in public I might refer to
it as well as to what President Wilson had said.
The Canadian Government were quite willing that I
shoidd say what I thought of sa5^g in favour of it, but
finding I should be on rather delicate ground as regards
the A.B.C. countries, I think I will wait till the matter
comes up in the Press again before making any public
utterance.
I made it clear to the Chilean Minister that we were
favourable to the plan as put before him by you, and
that you had spoken to me in exactly the same way as to
him, but I said nothing of having discussed with you the
question of a public statement here.
Yours sincerely
E. Grey
Notwithstanding the cordial protestations of the
Chilean Minister in London, House soon discovered that
the attitude of Suarez in Washington was not encouraging
and that, as a result of the hesitations of Chile, the early
enthusiasm of Brazil was beginning to evaporate. The
situation was complicated by a new Mexican crisis.
On March 8, Villa, in revolt against Carranza and pursuing
the temporarily profitable career of bandit under the
diaphanous guise of liberal patriot, crossed the frontier
and murdered seventeen American citizens at Columbus,
New Mexico. The punitive expedition under Pershing
which was sent after him across the border, led to verbal
and military retaliation on the part of Carranza which
threatened to produce formal warfare between Mexico
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 237
and the United States. The atmosphere during the
spring and summer months was by no means favourable
to the completion of the Pan-American Pact. Further-
more, Mr. Fletcher, who had been given charge of the
negotiations, discovered an unwillingness to settle upon
details that nullified the agreement upon the principle
which the South American states had professed.
The differences were slight on the surface, but they
proved sufficient to delay and finally to prevent signature
of the Pan-American Pact. It was impossible for the
United States to urge action, without arousing the
suspicions of Chile that the Pact in reality was to serve
our special interests rather than those of the Americas
in general. On August 8, Frank Polk, then Under-
secretary of State, wrote to Colonel House that the
Pact “ seems dead for the moment.”
On the following day, Mr. Fletcher reported that
progress had stopped. Senor Naon desired delay in
order that the tense feeling aroused by the crisis in
Mexico and the dispute with Carranza might subside.
The attitude of Chile became increasingly aloof.
“ In view of the check put on the negotiations by
Mr. Naon’s unwillingness to sign [wrote Fletcher to
House], I could not open out the treaty to the other
republics. So the matter rests in statu quo. Chile is
definitely and decidedly opposed to the treaty. - • • I
fed sure that if we go on without Chile, that is, isolating
her from the American concert, she will turn naturally
elsewhere in finance and trade and that gradu^y a
spirit of hostility against the United States will be
engendered.”
Thus the summer dragged along. In September,
following the subsid^ce of the Mexican crisis, the
Argentine Ambassador dedared himsdf ready to sign ;
238 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
but Chile still held ofi and Brazil tended to follow her
example. The last reference in Colonel House’s papers
for 1916 to the plan which he had started nearly two
years before, is dated October i ;
“ Fletcher called to report on the Pan-American
Peace Pact. He did not go further with Ambassador
Naon, who is willing to sign for Argentina, because
Lansing had promised Dr. Muller, Brazilian Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, that he would not move
actively in the matter until the 15th of November,
which would give Muller time to return to Brazil and
ascertain the will of his Government. Muller has been
in the United States for the past six weeks at a health
resort.”
The weeks that followed were filled first with election
activities and then with the negotiations that succeeded
Germany’s first peace note. The Pan-American Pact
was pushed to one side and, with the entrance of the
United States into the European War in the spring of
1917, it dipped into a forgotten grave.
The failure to carry through the plan to its com-
pletion must have brought harsh disappointment to
Colonel House, who followed the progress of negotiations
with invariable interest, although he ceased to retain
active direction of their course. But even imfulfilled»
the plan occupies a position of historical significance.
It was designed not merely to bring the American
states more dosdy together, but also to serve as a model
to the European nations when they had ended the war.
Both in its specific language and in its general intent,
&e Pan-American Pact is the inunediate protot37pe of
the Covenant of the League of Nations. By the summer
of 1916 Colondl House could see its failure with greater
equanimity because his eyes already caught the vision
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 239
of the United States entering and vivifjdng a larger
concert than that of purely American states. The
development of our relations with Europe, forced by the
war, brought upon the horizon the need of a world
organization into which the Americas might conceivably
be drawn.
Even before the war House realized that the
traditional separation of the United States from Europe
in matters political could not be maintained indefinitely
and that the time had come when political events of
moment in Europe must inevitably prove of direct
importance to the United States. It was this realization
that led. him to give over the active direction of the Pan-
American scheme while his chief interest was caught
in the European situation. It led him to visit the
Kaiser in June 1914, and thus to enter upon an adven-
ture that determined the course of his main activities
during the following six years. Nothing with which he
had hitherto been connected, whether of a diplomatic
character or in the fidd of domestic politics, compares
in importance with the European mission he imdertook
in the early summer of 1914, to which we must now turn
our attention.
APPENDIX
Pan-American Pact — ^Revised Draft
ARTICLE I
That the high contracting parties to this solemn covenant
and agreement hereby join one another in a common and mutual
guaranty of territorial integrity and of political independence
under republican forms of government.
ARTICLE II
To give definitive application to the guaranty set forth in
Article I, the h^^h contracting parties severally covenant to
240 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
endeavour forthwith to reach a settlement of all disputes as to
boundaries or territory now pending between them by amicable
agreemeaat or by means of international arbitration.
ARTICLE III
That the high contracting parties further agree. First, that
all questions, of whatever character, arising between any two
or more of them which cannot be settled by the ordinary means
of diplomatic correspondence shall, before any declaration of
war or beginning of hostilities, be first submitted to a permanent
international commission for investigation, one year being
allowed for such investigation ; and. Second, that if the dispute
is not settled by investigation, to submit the same to arbitration,
provided the question in dispute does not affect the honour,
independence, or vital interests of the nations concerned or
the interests of third parties.
ARTICLE IV
To the end that domestic tranquillity may prevail within
their territories, the high contracting parties further severally
covenant and agree that they will not permit the departure
from thdr respective jurisdictions of any military or naval
expedition hostile to the established government of any of the
•hi gh contracting parties, and that they will prevent the exporta-
tion from their respective jurisdictions of arms, ammunition,
or other munitions of war destined to or for the use of any
person or persons notified to be in insurrection or revolt against
the established govermnent of any of the high contracting
parties.
Nov^er 1915
CHAPTER IX
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run stark mad. . . •
There is some day to be an awful cataclysm. . . ,
House to Wilson, May 29, 1914, from Berlin
I
A t the beginning of Wilson’s Administration there
were few citizens of the United States who pro-
fessed a knowledge of, or an interest in, European
politics. The traditions of the nineteenth century still
held the public mind — ^traditions which laid down, as
the primary principle of American policy, a complete
abstention from the political affairs of* Europe. They
had their origin in sound judgment. During the early
days of the Republic, as both Washington and Jefferson
realized, entanglement in foreign alliances would have
meant that the United States, lacking material strength,
must have become the catspaw of an alien power. On
the other hand. Nature had provided a wonderful oppor-
tunity if the independent colonists would turn their
backs upon the Atlantic and devote themselves to
developing the resources of their own land.
Thus during the early nineteenth century the young
country spent its energy upon domestic problems : an
aggressive extension of the frontier, a fierce wrestle with
the backwoods, a struggle for political unity, the building
of transportation lines, the creation of an industrial
system. The people knew and cared little of what went
on across the Atlantic.
I— 16
*41
242 THE GREAT ADVENTURE
But by the beginning of the twentieth centmy,
conditions had changed. Not merely had the Pacific
coast been reached and the intervening territory con-
quered, but through the merchant and the missionary
American interests had been established in the Orient,
and the fortunes of war had brought the Philippines
under the United States flag. Our Government claimed
a position of equality with the European Powers in the
Far East and, under the direction of Hay, had entered
into dose co-operation with them there. The acquisition
of Porto Rico, the control of Cuba, the cutting of the
Panama Canal, assured predominance in the Caribbean.
Almost unconsdously, the country had become a world
power, and it was certain that political contacts with
Europe must become more frequent and dose, for the
great European states were also world powers and their
interests touched ours at many points. Economic and
intellectual intercourse with Europe was intimate and
constant ; political intercourse was henceforth inevitable.
This fact had been realized by President Roosevdt,
who insisted that responsibility must accompany power.
So keen was his sense of responsibility that in 1905 and
1906 he took an active, albeit unguessed, part in the
negotiations that led to the Algeciras Conference, which
averted the threat of a European war. This was a
crisis in which the United States had no direct interest,
and one which concerned purdy European states. Roose-
vdt participated in the negotiations merdy because of
his conviction that the United States must fulfil its
duties to the rest of the world in the cause of peace.
In such a cause he was willing to scrap the tradition of
isolation.
The war douds of 1906, however, continued to hang
low over Europe. The reconciliation of France and
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
243
Great Britain, consummated in the Entente of 1904, had
disturbed the Germans, who saw in it an encouragement
to the French political renaissance and to the active
foreign policy of the French Foreign Minister, Delcasse.
They had hoped to break the Entente by raising the
Moroccan issue, but failed. In 1907 they were still more
disturbed by the Anglo-Russian reconciliation. It seemed
to them that an iron ring was being drawn about Germany.
They feared especially the development of an aggres-
sive Russian policy in the Balkans that would destroy
Germany s ally, Austria, and cut off the road to the
south-east. Once more, in 1911, they tried to break the
Entente, now the Triple Entente, and again they failed.
Counsels in Germany were evidently divided. There
were those, such as the Chancellor, von Bethmaim-
Hollweg, an amiable but anaemic personality who hoped
to find a solution in a peaceable imderstan^ng — especi-
ally with the British, without whose help Russian plans
in the Near East could not succeed. But there were
others who insisted that Germany must precipitate a
war at the first favourable moment, before Russia was
ready. The aggressive spirit had been taught for a
generation by the professors, it was rampant in military
circles, and it had caught the naval ofi&cers.
The temper of these groups, who doubtless did not
represent exactly the ruling opinion of the nation, would
have been a less serious factor, if it had not been sup-
ported by the widespread conviction that the Entente
was planning to close in on Germany. In this case,
as so often, fear proved to be the mother of recklessness.
Should the control of German policy be captured even
temporarily by the firebrands, backed by a panicky
public sentiment, the danger of a decision to risk every-
thing on a sudden attack was very real. And because
244 the great adventure
of the complexity of the diplomatic groupings, such an
attack would mean a general European war.
In England the peril was realized acutely, but the
Government faced an unpleasant dilemma. The rapid
development of German sea-power could not but be
regarded as a threat to British security, which naturally
led to the keenest sort of naval competition. Any
slackening in British naval preparation would be flying
in the face of Providence. In view of the engagements
which the British had made with France, which, however
informal, were none the less morally binding, military
preparation was also necessary. Such preparation, on
the other hand, could only intensify the diplomatic
crisis by increasing the fears of Germany auid giving a
lever to the German militarists who desired war.
In Russia and in France military development was
the order of the day. There were many who looked
upon the general war as inevitable ; the Dual Alliance
must get ready and must omit no step which might
increase its diplomatic and military weight. Any other
policy would lay those in control open to the charge
of criminal negligence. But each step taken seemed
to transform the Dual Alliance from a defensive to an
offensive combination and inevitably stimulated the
fears and the belligerence of Germany.
Europe thus prepared for war, and as William Graham
Sumner used to say, “ What you prepare for you get.*’.
It is true that in 19^3 the immediate danger seemed to
pass when the efforts of Sir Edward Grey brought a
pacific solution to the Balkan crisis. For a few months
a dUefOe in Anglo-German rdations, assisted by the offer
of British co-operation in German plans for the Bagdad
Railway, appeared to provide a means for ending the
conflict of alliances. But as the British Premier later
THE GREAT ADVENTURE 245
wrote, the diplomats were conscious that they “ were
skating on the thinnest of ice and that the peace of
Europe was at the mercy of a chapter of unforeseen and
unforeseeable accidents.” ^
II
Like Roosevelt, House was convinced that a European
war must necessarily attain such proportions that every
part of the world would be touched, and that it was both
the duty and the interest of the United States to do all
in its power to avert it. The days had passed when
America was isolated from the Eastern Hemisphere ;
she had much to fear from European trouble and she
could do much to appease it.
Even before the inauguration of President Wilson,
House planned a policy of co-operation which should
include the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.
He saw that the crux of the danger lay in the animosity
of Germans and British, and he hoped that it might be
allayed by getting the two countries to work towards
a common end. Germany’s expansive energy, he
thought, might be turned into more useful chaimels than
Krupp factories and dreadnoughts.
" January 22, 1913 : Martin lunched with us [Colonel
House recorded]. ... I told him that I wanted to get
Governor Wilson to let me bring about an understanding
between Great Britain, this country, and Germany, in
regard to the Monroe Doctrine. . . .
" I also told him that it would be my endeavour
to bring a^out a better understanding between England
and Germany ; that if England were less intolerant of
Germany's aspirations for expansion, good feding could
be brought about between them. I thought we could
^ Asquith, Genesis of the War, i66.
246 THE GREAT ADVENTURE
encourage Germany to exploit South America in a
legitimate way ; that is, by development of its resources
and by sending her surplus population there ; that such
a move would be good for South America and would
have a beneficial result generally.”
During the first year of the Wilson Administration,
the pressure of domestic problems left the plan only half
formed in House’s mind. But he kept turning it over,
and, as occasion offered, he raised the subject with
persons whose influence and information might prove
useful.
“ A^ril 23, 1913 : I have a letter from James Speyer
[he wrote] asking me to meet at lunch downtown Count
von Bemstorfl, the German Ambassador, who has
expressed a desire to know me. I never go downtown,
and declined. . . .
” April 25, 1913 : James Speyer telephoned and again
asked if I would lunch with the German Ambassador
uptown instead of downtown, and I promised to do so. . . .
” May 9, 1913 ; I lunched at Ddmonico’s with the
German Ambassador, Count von Bemstorff, and Mr.
Speyer.
“ The Coimt talked rather more fredy than I antici-
pated a diplomat of his training would. He spoke of
Mr. Bryan and of the different assistants in the State
Department with a good deal of freedom. He als n
criticized ex-Secretary Knox and Huntington Wilson,
his First Assistant.
“ The most interesting part of his conversation was
after lunch, when Mr. Speyer left us and Bemstorff and
I walked down the Avenue alone. I suggested that it
would be a great thing if there was a sympathetic under-
standing between England, Germany, Japan, and the
United States. Together I thought they would be
able to widd an influence for good throughout the world.
They could ^sure peace and the proper devdopment
THE GREAT ADVENTURE 247
of the waste places, besides maintaining an open door
and equal opportunity to everyone ever3rwhere.
“ Much to my surprise, he agreed with me. He said
the understanding between Germany and England was
much better of late, and if they had some mutual field
of endeavour he thought a good understanding could
finally be brought about between them. He suggested
that perhaps China was the most promising field at
present for concerted action, for the United States could
work there with Germany and England. ...”
Two months later, in London, House discussed the
broad lines of this plan with the American Ambassador.
Page sympathized thoroughly with House’s scheme of
utilizing the force of nations for purposes other than
military or naval. “ It is a time,” he wrote to House,
“ for some great constructive, forward idea — an idea for
action. If the great world forces could, by fortunate
events and fortimate combinations, be united and led
to dean up the tropics, the great armies might gradually
become sanitary police, as in Panama, and finally
gradually forget the fighting idea and at last dis-
solve. ...”
But Page felt that the Europeans were too tradi-
tionally minded to embark upon such a plan, which had
in it something suggestive of the Secretariat of the League
of Nations. “ On the Continent of Europe,” he wrote,
“ the Kaiser is probably the foremost man. Yet he
cannot think far beyond the provindal views of the
Germans. In England, Sir Edward Grey is the largest-
visioned statesman. Yet even he does not seem to have
a definitdy constructive mind.”
House did not force his ideas upon the British at
this time, but he discovered that in Sir Edward Grey
he would deal with a man who may have lacked imagina-
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
248
tion, but who was sincerely desirous of attempting any
scheme that might lead towards the maintenance of
peace. On July 3, 1913, Colonel House had lunch with
Grey, Lord Crewe, and Page.
“ We discussed the feeling between Germany and
England. Sir Edward remarked that the great cause
of antagonism between nations was the distrust each
felt for the other’s motives. Before leaving this subject
I told him of my luncheon with Count von Bemstorff,
German Ambassador at Washington, and that I had
been surprised to hear him say he believed that good
feeling would soon come between England and Germany.
My puipose in repeating this was to plant the seeds of
peace.”
On his return to the United States, House was caught
in the swirl of appointments and the passage of the
Federal Reserve Act. But whenever he had the
opportunity, he returned to his study of the European
problem.
“ September i, 1913 : I have had some interesting
conversations with Dumba,» particularly in regard to
some phas^ of the political situation in south-eastern
Europe. He was at one time Minister at Bucharest,
and, of course, knows the Balkan situation thoroughly.”
In November arrived Sir VTUiam Tyrrell, Gre3r’s
secretary, with whom House found it possible to discuss
in aU candour every sort of international question. After
arranging with T3nTell the understanding as to Wilson's
Mexican poUcy and Panama toUs, the Colonel proceeded
to impart his new plan, which he had formulated with
some definiteness. The existing crisis he hoped to tide
over by an understanding that would lead to a limitation
■- , VAostro-Himgariaa Ambassador.
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
249
of armaments. If this succeeded, he would follow
it up with the plan he had already suggested to Bem-
storff — a co-operative policy of developing the waste
places of the world.
“ December 2, 1913 ; I told him [Tyrrell] the next
thing I wished to do was to bring about an understanding
between France, Germany, England, and the United
States, regarding a reduction of armaments, both military
and naval. I said it was an ambitious undertaking, but
was so well worth while that I intended to try it.
He thought it one of the most far-reaching and beneficent
things that could be done. He thought if we continued
as at present, ruin would eventually follow, and in the
meanwhile it would prevent us from solving the vexatious
industrial problems we are all facing. He considered
I had ‘ a good sporting chance of success.’
“ I asked him to suggest my procedure, and we
discussed that at length. He thought I should go to
Germany and see the Kaiser first, and afterwards the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance. He said I
would find them responsive to the idea, but that the
Minister of Marine, von Tirpitz, was a reactionary and
largely responsible for the present German policy.
“ He did not think it necessary for me to take any
credentials. He advised having our Ambassador in
Germany whisper to the Kaiser that I was ‘ the power
behmd the throne’ in the United States. That if this
were done, I would have to warn our Ambassador to
tell ofiicial Berlm I did not care for ‘ fiws and feathers ’ ;
otherwise I would have red carpets laid for me all over
Berlin.
“ He thought I should proceed quietly ^d secretly,
but should secure an audience with the Kaiser and say
to him, among other things, that England and America
‘ had buried the hatchet ’ and there was a strong feding
that Germany should come into this good feeSng ^d
evidence their good intention by a^edng to stop build-
250 THE GREAT ADVENTURE
ing an extravagant navy, and to curtail militarism
generally,
“ Sir William assured me that England would co-
operate with Germany cordially, and had been ready
to do so for a long while. He saw no cause for difference
between them. With England, United States, France,
and Germany [agreed], we both thought the balance of
the world would follow in line and a great change would
come about. He said the Kaiser was a spectacular
individual and partook more of French qualities than he
did of German. He likened him to Roosevelt.
“ Sir William promised to give me all the memoranda
passed between Great Britain and Germany upon this
question of disarmament, in order that I might see how
entirely right Great Britain had been in her position.”
Ten days later, House discussed the plan with
President Wilson and received his approval. “ I might
almost say he was enthusiastic,” wrote House to Page.
It was decided that in the early summer the Colonel
should go directly to Berlin and take the plan to the
Kaiser. If he proved complaisant. House would go to
England.
During the winter and spring he made his prepara-
tions. In January he wrote to Gerard to make sure of
the Kaiser’s plans ; he learned that Wilhelm II would
be in Corfu in the late spring, that he would return to
Potsdam, go on to Kiel for the races, then on a cruise
in Norwegian waters, and later to his estates on the
Rhine.^ House chose the earliest moment available
and cabled Gerard to arrange the interview for June,
after the Kaiser’s return from Corfu.
1 House to Gerard, January i, 1914; Gerard to House, February ii,
March. 15, 1914- The matter is of historical interest, since it has been
asserted that the Kaiser sailed to Norway as a blind to cover German war
plans. It is clear that his itinerary was arranged long before the murder
of the* Archduke.
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
251
The Colonel felt himself already in such dose touch
with the situation in Great Britain that he believed the
chief task he must undertake would be a study of current
German psychology and especially the character of
William II. In January we find him taking lunch with
Benjamin Ide Wheeler and quietly extracting informa-
tion.
January 1, 1914 : We had a delightful time together.
He is just back from Germany and has seen much of the
Kaiser, not only this time but upon former visits. He
visits him in the most informal manner and spends many
hours with him and his family. He gave me nearly all
the information I need regarding the Kaiser and his
entourage. Wheeler is also a dose friend of Roosevdt’s,
and I was interested in his comparison of the two men.
He considers them very alike, particularly in regard to
memory and impulsiveness, but they are dissimilar
inasmuch as the Kaiser has a rdigious turn of mind and
is more cultured in his manners.
“ In order to obtain the information I desired, I had
to disdose my object in questioning him ; and he en-
couraged me to believe that I might have some chance
of success in bringing the Kaiser around to an agreement
for disarmament. He thought the Minister of Marine
would be the obstade, just as Sir William Tyrrell had
pointed out. He said the Kaiser had told him that his
object in building a navy was not to threaten England,
but to add prestige to Germany’s commerce upon the
seven seas. He had spoken of how impossible war
should be between England and Germany, or, in fact,
how utterly foolish any general European war would be.
He thiiiks the coming antagonism is between the Asiatics
and the Western peoples and that within twenty years
the Western peoples recognize this and stand together
more or less as a unit.
“ Wheder told of how narrowly a general Europe^
war was averted last March over the Balkan embroglio,
and how the Emperor thinks he saved the day by his
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
252
suggestion of creating the State of Albania.^ The
Kaiser told Wheeler that he had warned Russia if they
attacked Austria, he would strike them immediately.
The Kaiser also told him he felt kindly towards England
and that he was Queen Victoria’s favourite grandchild.
“ In his talks with the Kaiser, he said the Kaiserin
seldom joined in the conversation, but would sit quietly
knitting and only entered the discussion when it fell
upon domestic problems.
“ Another difference between the Kaiser and T. R.
was that the Kaiser was a good listener when necessary,
and is courteous in doing so.”
Colonel House spent most of the winter in Texas.
But as soon as he returned to the East in March, and
notwithstanding the time and effort he was giving to
the Federal Reserve appointments, he continued prepara-
tions for his European venture. In April he had long
conferences with Irwin Laughlin, Counsellor of the
American Embassy at St. James’s.
“ April 9, 1914 : We fell to talking about my plan
for decreaang armaments. Laughlin was three years
First Secreta^ of the American Embassy at Berlin.
During that time he talked with the German Chancellor
regarding disarmament, and he did not believe there was
one chance in a million of my getting Germany to consent
to a naval holiday.
" I surprised him by teUing him of the direct informa-
tion I had of the Kaiser himsdf — ^none of which, though,
was favourable to my plan, but rather coinci^g with
^ughlin’s views. But what impressed him was the
method I had in mind of accomplishing results. I
^ After the defeats of the Turkish army by the Balkan League in the
autumn of 1912^ Austria protested against the acquisition of any part of
the Admtic littoral by Serbia. A conference of the Great Powers was
held at, London, where Great Britain and Germany worked for a com-
pron^ and where the independent State of Albania was created. Serbia
acquired Macedonia, thus precipitating a quarrel with Bulgaria.
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
253
explained my purpose not to take it up from a senti-
mental or purely ethical viewpoint, but to try and prove
that it woidd be of material advantage to Germany.
“ I went into some detail as to giving Germany a
zone of influence in Asia Minor and Persia, and also
lending a hope that they might be given a freer hand
commercially in the Central and South American re-
publics. I changed his views as to the desirability of
making the effort, but he wanted time to think it over
and promised to let me know his conclusions later.
Laughlin knows the Germans weU, and he told me of
the difiiculties of reaching the Emperor under right
conditions. . . -
“ Afril 10, 1914 : Mr. and Mrs. Irwin Laughlin
lunched with us. Laughlin and I went into my disarma-
ment plan at some length. I used him as a dummy, as
it were, knowing he would catch me if I tripped at any
point. I discussed my intentions thoroughly, and talked
to him as I would talk to the Kaiser were we to meet.
“ After thinking of the matter overnight and hearing
my plans more in detail, Laughlin believes I should make
the eflort. . . .
“ April 16, 1914 : At half-past nine I left to go to
the Borden Harrimans’ in order to meet the guests,
since Mrs. Harriman had told them I would do so.
Prince Munster, Prince Paul Troubetskoy and his wife,
Ambassador Dumba, General Wood, and several others
were there. I talked with Prince Munster for a while
about the German Emperor, in order to get more informa-
tion about him. . . .
“ April 28, 1914 ; I spoke to the President about
what I was doing in regard to Germany and the Kaiser,
and he remarked, ‘ You are preparing to make the
ground fallow.’ I asked again whether he was certain
that he wished me to go at this particular time. He
replied, ‘ The object you have in mind is too important
to neglect. . .
“ May 7, 1914 : Hugh Wallace saw Count von
Bemstorff and told him I was going to Germany on the
254 the great adventure
sixteenth day of May. Von Bemstorff said the German
Foreign Office had ^eady informed him I was coming
and had asked him to give them a report upon me, which
he had sent. He said he intended sending another,
which I thought was perhaps inspired by Wallace. . . .”
Thus Colonel House set forth on his extraordinary
mission, a private American citizen whose only relevant
title was “ personal friend of the President," a single
individual hoping to pull the lever of common sense that
might divert the nations of the Old World from the
track of war to that of peace. To inject himself success-
fully into the core of the European maelstrom demanded
as much courage as diplomatic deftness. These qualities
he possessed, as well as a sense of proportion which
caused him often to laugh at the stark humour of the
odds against him. But the stake for which he played
was tremendous. It was the peace of the world. If he
failed no harm was done. And if he succeeded !
He called his mission the Great Adventure.
Ill
CoUmd House to the PfesiAent
American Embassy^ Berlin
May 29, 1914
Dear Governor :
I was fairly well informed as to the situation here
when I reached Germany. Prince Munster and the
Count von Moltke were feUow-passengers, and I came to
know von Moltke wdl.^
Munster is what we would call a reactionary, and
I let him do all the talking. Von Moltke, on the con-
trary, is perhaps the only noble in Germany who has a
^ This Count von Moltke was a nephew of the great Field-Marshal and
a cousin of the German Chief of Sinff during the invasion of Belgium and
Erance who was superseded by Falkenhayn after the failure of the German
offensive.
THE GREAT ADVENTURE 255
detached point of view and sees the situation as we do.
He gave me valuable information, which merely tended
to confirm my opinion as to the nearly impossible chance
of bettering conditions,
I have not seen the Kaiser, but have been invited to
lunch at Potsdam on Monday. Just what opportunity
there may be to talk with him is an uncertainty, . . .
I have had long talks with von Jagow, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and Admiral von Tirpitz. Jagow is a
clever diplomat without much personality. Von Tirpitz
is the father of the greater navy and is forceful and
aggressive. Neither has ability of the highest order.
I was told not to talk to von Tirpitz, because of his
well-known opposition to such views as we hold ; but,
finding that he is the most forceful man in Germany
excepting the Kaiser, I concluded to go at him. We had
an extremely interesting hour together, and I believe
I made a dent. Not a big one, but sufficient at least to
start a discussion in London.
I am careful always not to involve you. Opmions
and purposes I give as my own, and you come in no
further than what may be assumed because of our rela-
tions.
The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism
stark mad. Unless someone acting for you can bring
about a different understanding, there is some day to
be an awful cataclysm. No one in Europe can do it.
There is too much hatred, too many jealousies. When-
ever England consents, France and Russia will dose in
on Germany and Austria. England does not want
Germany wholly crushed, for she would thra have to
reckon alone with her ancient enemy, Russia ; but if
Germany insists upon an ever-increasing navy, then
England will have no choice.
The best chance for peace is an understanding between
England and Germany in regard to naval armaments,
and yet there is some disadvantage to us by these two
getting too dose.
It is an absorbing problem, and one of tremendous
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
256
consequence. I wish it might be solved, and to the
everlasting glory of your Administration and our Ameri-
can civilization.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
What Colonel House soon realized was that in Ger-
many there was a sense of fear as well as aggressiveness,
the fear of the man tortured by uncertainty and ready
to jump at the throat of the first who seemed to move.
Conscious of the enmity which it had aroused, Germany
kept its revolver cocked and would let it off at the least
whisper.
“ May 27, 1914 ; I had insisted before coming [re-
corded House] that we should not be entertained. There
are only a few people I desire to meet. However, the
Gerards did not literally follow our desires and we had
several people every day. On Tuesday they gave a
dinner of twraty-four covers, at which were A<hniral von
Tirpitz, Minister of Marine, von Jagow, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambas-
sador, and Count and Countess von Moltke, who were
invited at our request.
" Von Tirpitz and I left the dining-room together and
we stood in one of the drawing-rooms and talked for an
hour. He evidenced a decided dislike for the British, a
dislike that almost amounted to hatred. One of the
things that amused me most was his suggestion that the
English ‘ looked down upon Germans and considered
them their mfeiiors.’
“ Von Tirpitz spoke of the anti-German feeling in the
United States and cited our newspapers in evidence of
it. He also spoke of Admiral Mahan’s articles which
have a pro-British leaning, I assured him our news-
papers did not indicate our real feeling, and asked him
whether the press of Germany represented the feding of
the Germans towards us. He replied, ‘ Not at all.’ He
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
257
said the Government had absolutely no control over the
German newspapers, but in England, he noticed, the
English brought their papers around to the Government
point of view whenever the situation required it.
“ I spoke of the courage and character of the Presi-
dent. This I illustrated by different incidents — one
being his insistence in taking part in the funeral parade
of the Vera Cruz sailors, and another his refusal to be
intimidated or coerced into recognizing Huerta. I drew
clearly the distinction between the President and Mr.
Bryan. I wanted ofhcial Germany to know that if any
international complications arose between our two coun-
tries, they would have to deal with a man of iron courage
and inflexible will.
“Von Tirpitz and I talked largely of armaments, I
pleading for a limitation in the interest of international
peace and he stating vigorously the necessity of German^s
maintaining the highest possible order of military and
naval organization. He disclaimed any desire for con-
quest and insisted it was peace that Germany wanted,
but the way to maintain it was to put fear into the
hearts of her enemies.
“ I pointed out the danger in this programme, for,
while Great Britain did not desire to see Germany
crushed because it would leave her to reckon alone with
her ancient enemy, Russia, at the same time she could
not view with equanimity the ever-increasing naval
strength of Germany combined with her large and
efficient standing army. If it came to a decision as to
whether Germany should be crushed or be permitted to
have a navy sufficient to overcome British supremacy at
sea, their policy would clearly be to let Germany go
under.
“ I thought an understanding could be brought
about between Germany and England. He hoped so,
but he did not trust England, because the English w^e
not ‘ reliable.’ Von Tirpitz was the most anti-English
of any of the German officials with whom I talked, I
am giving my conversation with him very fully, for it
I— 17
258 THE GREAT ADVENTURE
indicates the general trend of my conversations with
others.
“ Among other things we did was to go to the Aviation
Field and see what they were doing in that direction. I
found it difficult to get any estimate of the aerial strength
of Germany. One of the airmen was brought up to the
club by the German Major in charge and introduced to
us. He then went up and did some spectacular flights
for our benefit. He came directly over our heads and
looped the loop several times. He performed all sorts
of dangerous and curious manoeuvres. I was glad
when he came down, for I was afraid his enthusiasm
to please might result in his death. The Major told
me that thirty-six had already been killed on that
field.
“ The airman was named Fokker, and he told me he
was a Dutchman and had recently come from Holland
at the request of the German Government.”
Thus was Colonel House, before the war, given a
glimpse of the aviator whose name was to become terribly
familiar.
IV
Not without difficulty and the exercise of diplomatic
adroitness, Ambassador Gerard had arranged that House
should have a private talk with the Kaiser. Official
Berlin protested. The Foreign Office was perfectly
willing that the Colonel should receive the satisfaction
of an interview, but they insisted that some member of
the civil Government must be present. House was
equally definite in his insistence that it must be a tHe-
drtete or nothing. “ If that is not possible,” he had
written Gerard, “ then please do not bother about it at
all.'’’ He wanted to be sure that the frankness of the
conversation should not be impeded by official red-tape.
Later he wrote : ” It was a bluff on my part, but I
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
259
declined to see him unless it could be arranged that I
could see him alone.”
Whatever the magic influence may have been, and
House ascribes it to the diplomacy of Ambassador
Gerard,^ the bluff accomplished its purpose, and Gerard
finally received word that if he and House would come
to Potsdam on June i, an occasion would be made for
the latter to talk alone with the Kaiser. On that day
took place the ceremonies of the Schfippenfest,^ a gorgeous
presentation of devotional militarism in the Prussian
style, such as the Kaiser loved dearly. House and
Gerard, in their black evening dress suits, provided a
grotesque sombreness quite out of keeping with their
surroundings — " like two black crows,” as the Kaiser
himself described them with more pungency than
politeness.
“ June I, 1914 : Gerard and I [recorded House] set
forth for Potsdam at half-past nine. We arrived too
early and wandered about until nearly eleven, and then
entered the Palace. We found ourselves to be the only
guests invited to the Schrippenfest.
“ We were taken through a beautiful sweep of rooms,
running across the park front, imtil we came to a side
entrance. Here we waited a few minutes until the
1 House wrote later, I cannot state too strongly my appreciation of
the part the Ambassador played in finessing witii Wilhelmstrasse in
order to bring about the desired result."
* The Schrippenfest, literally the " White Roll Feast " (a Schrippe being
a roll of white bread), was held annually on Whit-Monday for the model
Battalion, in Potsdam. Traditionally it was the one occasion of the
year when the common soldier received white instead of black bread, and
when he was also treated to such luxuries as meat courses, stewed prunes,
and wine. The feast was given by the Kaiser, who invited foreign military
and naval attaches, ambassadors, and distinguished strangers. It was
attended by the Kaiseiin and the younger members of the imperial family.
The outstanding feature of the ceremony was the^ Kaiser's presence at the
table, sitting in the midst of his troops, eating their white rolls, and drinking
from a glass already used by one of the common soldiers.
26 o the great adventure
Kaiser was announced. He came up and shook hands
and passed out with his suite into the park. We followed
after the royal party, which consisted of the Emperor,
the Empress, and the Princes and their wives. We were
given a position near the royal family.
“ After religious exercises came the parade, then the
decorations were given, and afterwards we went across to
the other P^ace, where the soldiers were having their
lunch. During this time I was largely with Herr Zim-
mermann, Under-Secretaiy of State for Foreign Affairs
and Acting Secretary wMe von Jagow is absent [on his
hone3mioon]. I found him quite responsive to my ideas
concerning a sympathetic understanding between Great
Britain, Germany, and the United States. We discussed
every phase of the present European situation.
“ We lunched in the famous Shell Hall [“ probably
the ugliest room in the world,” remarked Gerard].* The
table was crescent-shaped and was beautifully decorated.
Gerard and I were seated directly opposite the imperial
party. On my right was the Minister for War, General
von Falkenhayn ; » the man to my left was some general
from Saxony, but I did not catch his name. The Em-
peror talked across the table with our party, mostly with
General von Falkenhayn. . . , The food was delicious
and the meal not long, perhaps fifty minutes. . . .
” I had cautioned Gerard before coming to Berlin
not to use the title of ‘ Colonel ’ when referring to me
or when introducing me after I arrived. This did not
serve my purpose, for Bemstorfi had cabled of my
coming, so I became ‘ Colond ’ imme^atdy. Most
of my time at luncheon was used in explaining to my
neighbours the kind of Colonel I was— not a real one in
the Europe^ sense, but, as we would say in America,
a geographical one. My explanation finally reached
Falkenhayn's consciousness, but my neighbour from
^ The walls of the room were composed of sea-shells which encrusted
the plaster.
* F^enhayn becamo later Chief of Staff and directed the German
offensive of xgxS against Verdun. Following the failure to take Verdun,
he WM succeeded by Hindenburg,
THE GREAT ADVENTURE 261
Saxony was hopelessly befuddled and continued until
the last to discuss army technique. . . ,
“Afterwards we adjourned to one of the larger
drawing-rooms, where I was presented to the Empress.
We talked of Corfu, the beauty of Germany in the spring,
and other generalities. When this formality was over,
the Kaiser’s Aide-de-Camp came to say that His Majesty
was ready to receive me on the terrace. . . .
“ I found that he had all the versatility of Roosevelt
with something more of charm, something less of force.
He has what to me is a disagreeable habit of bringing
his face very close to one when he talks most earnestly.
His English is dear and well chosen, and, though he talks
vehemently, yet he is too much the gentleman to monopo-
lize conversation. It was give-and-take all the way
through. He knew what he wanted to say, so did I ; and
since we both talk rapidly, the half-hour was quite sufficient.
“ Gerard and Zimmermann stood in conversation
some ten or fifteen feet away, quite out of hearing. At
first I thought I would never get His Majesty past his
hobbies, but finally I drew him to the subject I Imd come
to discuss. ... I found him much less prejudiced and
much less belligerent than von Tirpitz. He declared
he wanted peace because it seemed to Germany’s interest.
Germany had been poor, she was now growing rich, and
a few more years of peace would make her so. ‘ She
was menaced on every side. The bayonets of Europe
were directed at her,’ and much more of this he gave me.
Of England he spoke kindly and admiringly. England,
America, and Germany were kindred peoples and should
draw closer together. Of other nations he had but
little opinion. ...
“ He spoke of the foUy of England forming an
alliance with the Latins and Slavs, who had no syinpa^y
with our ideals and purposes and who were vacillating
and unreliable as allies. He spoke of them as being semi-
barbarous, and of England, Germany, and the United
States as being the only hope of advancing Christian
civilization. . . .
262
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
“ I thought Russia was the greatest menace to Eng-
land, and it was to England’s advantage that Germany
was in a position to hold Russia in check, and that
Germany was the barrier between Europe and the
Slavs. I found no difficulty in getting him to admit this.
“ He spoke of the impossibility of Great Britain being
able to make a permanent and satisfactory alliance with
either Russia or France. I told him that the English
were very much concerned over his ever-growing navy,
which, taken together with his enormous army, consti-
tuted a menace ; and there might come a time when
they would have to decide whether they ran more danger
from him and his people making a successful invasion
than they did from Russia, and the possibility of losing
their Asiatic colonies. I thought when that point was
reached, the decision would be against Germany.
" I spoke of the community of interests between
England, Germany, and the United States, and thought
if they stood together the peace of the world could be
maintmned. He assented to this quite readily. How-
ever, in my opinion, there could be no understanding
between England and Germany so long as he continued
to increase his navy. He replied that he must have a
large navy in order to protect Germany’s commerce
in an adequate way, and one commensurate with her
growing power and importance. He also said it was
necessary to have a navy large enough to be able to
defend themselves against the combined efforts of Russia
and France.^
1 In a memorandum made later. House recorded : “ I forgot to say that
I asked the Kaiser why Germany refused to sign the ‘ Br 3 ran treaty ’
providing for arbitration and a ' cooling-off period ' of a year before hostili-
ties could be inaugarated. He replied : ‘ Germany will never sign such a
treaty. Our strength lies in being always prepared for war at a second’s
notice. We will not resign that advantage and give our enemies time to
prepare.’ ”
Had Germany signed this treaty, it would not have been posnble for
the United States to enter the war on the submarine issue imtil after the
lapse of a twelvemonth, except on the ground that German use of sub-
marines constituted acts of war against the United States.
THE GREAT ADVENTURE 263
” I asked when he would reach the end of his naval
programme. He said this was well known, since they
had formulated a policy for building, and, when that was
completed, there would be an end ; that Great Britain
had nothing to fear from Germany, and that he personally
was a friend of England and was doing her incalculable
service in holding the balance of power against Russia.
“ I told him that the President and I thought perhaps
an American might be able to better compose the diffi-
c^ties here and bring about an understanding with a
view to peace than any European, because of their
distrust and dislike for one another. He agreed to this
suggestion. I had undertaken the work and that was
my reason for coming to Germany, as I wanted to see
him first. After leaving Germany it was my purpose
to go directly to England, where I should take the
matter up with that Government as I had done with
him.
“ I explained that I expected to feel my way cautiously
and see what could be accomplished, and, if he wished
it, I would keep him informed. He asked me to do this,
and said letters would reach him ‘ through our friend
Zimmermann here in the Foreign Ofi&ce.’ . . .
“ I talked to the Kaiser on the terrace for thirty
minutes and quite alone. Gerard and Zimmermann
stood some ten feet away. There was a special train
scheduled to leave Potsdam at three o’clock, and the
time was growing periloudy near and everyone was
becoming uneasy. The Empress herself came upon
the terrace at one time for the purpose of breaking up
our conversation, and, prior to that, she had sent one
of her sons for the same purpose. Neither, however,
approached us, for they saw tiie earnest and animated
manner in which we were talking. She finally sent the
Grand Chamberlain, who approached in a hdting and
embarrassed way, and told the Emperor of the difficulty.
He scarcely noticed him and dismissed him curtly and
continued our conversation for at least ten minutes
more.
264 THE GREAT ADVENTURE
" By this time I had said all I cared to and was
ready to leave myself ; therefore I stopped talking and
was very quiet in order to indicate that I, at least, was
through. This had the desired effect and we bade each
other good-bye. Gerard told me afterwards that there
was the greatest amount of interest displayed concerning
what the Kaiser and I were discussing, and that all
Berlin was talking of the episode and wondering what the
devil we had to say to each other for so long and in such
an animated way.”
V
Colonel House left for Paris in the evening that fol-
lowed his memorable interview with the Kaiser. He
was evidently well pleased with the reception that his
plan had met, for although the Emperor made no
promises, he left House with sufficient encouragement to
proceed in taking up matters with the British, ” I am
glad to tell you,” he wrote Wilson from Paris, ” that I
have been as successful as I anticipated. ... I am very
happy over what has been accomplished and I am eager
to get to London to see what can be done there. I have
a feeling that the soil will be much more fallow.”
What impressed House chiefly in Germany was not
so much a will to war based upon any definite plan,
but an unreasoning nervousness which might at any
moment result in a reckless attack, and a complete
inability to approach the problem with intelligent poise
and capacity for compromise.
“ I find that both England and Germany [he wrote
the President] have one feeling in common, and that is
fear of one another. Neither wants to be the first to
propose negotiations, but both are agreed that they
shotild be brought about, though neither desires to make
the necessary concessions,”
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
265
In the meantime President Wilson, whose attitude
towards the European situation had originally been not
far from indifferent, began to appreciate the possibilities
of the Great Adventure. He wrote House of the thrill
of pleasure he experienced on receiving the Colonel’s
report and of his confidence that House had begun
a great thing and was carrying it through in just the
right way with characteristic tact and quietness.
In Paris discussions proved to be impossible. France
was caught by a Cabinet crisis and the capital would
think of nothing but the shooting of Calmette by Madame
Caillaux and all the political consequences thereof. Fol-
lowing his custom when conditions seemed impropitious,
House retired into his shell, whence for a few days he
continued merely to observe.
" June 8, 1914 : I have spent a quiet week in Paris,
my most arduous duty being to dodge Americans and
others wanting to see me. We have had many invitations
to dinner and luncheon, all of which have been declined,
although one came from our Ambassador.
“ I called on Herrick, ^ it having been understood that
I would do so when I was ready to talk with him. Mr.
Roosevelt had been with him the day before, and he
told me something of T. R.’s mental and physical
activities. Herrick made the prediction that T. R.
was getting ready to go back home and to ^ve the
Democrats a thoroughly unhappy time. I repHed that
I was sure he could do nothing that would distress us
so much as it would his feUow-Republicans.
“ Herrick read passages from his forthcoming book
upon rural credits and told me that within a short time
he would have it finished and ready for publication.
He would then like to return to America. ...
“ June 12, 1914 [London] : I came from Paris on
the 9th. I lunched with Page on the loth and he
^ The Ameiican Ambassador*
266 THE GREAT ADVENTURE
lunched with me yesterday, so we have had an exchange
of ideas. He was kind enough to say that he considered
my work in Germany the most important done in this
generation. I thought before making an estimate we
would have to see how far I could get with it here. He
replied I would find this Government very sympathetic
and he felt a beginning was as good as accomplished.
We decided to approach Sir Edward Grey first and leave
it to his judgment whether to bring in Asquith and the
King. ...”
House arrived in London at the height of the season,
and there was no possibility of securing political results
with speed. Social affairs held sway, and it was not
until a full week after the Colonel’s arrival that Am-
bassador Page could find a free day for the lunch with
Sir Edward. In the meantime House followed his habit
of seeing people of interest and information — chatting
with Sir Horace Plunkett and Lord Bryce, lunching at
the Embassy with Roosevelt and other notables, and
meeting such varied t3q)es as Lord Curzon and Henry
James, the Bishop of London and John Sargent, dining
at Burdett-Coutts’s palatial home in Piccadilly and dis-
cussing its ait treasures and manuscripts, and reckoning
the wealth of nations with Sir George Paish, of the
Statist.
On Jime 17, House, Sir Edward Grey, Sir William
Tyrrell, and Page had lunch together. The Colonel told
of his visit to Germany and his proposition to the Kaiser.
“ Sir Edward was visibly impressed [recorded Colonel
House], and we discussed every phase of the European
situation, particularly as it applied to Germany and
England. He agreed with me that the French states-
men had given up all idea of revenge and of the recovery
of Alsace and Lorraine, and that they would be content
with the position of France as it now is. . . .
THE GREAT ADVENTURE 267
“ We spoke of the difficulties of bringing about
negotiations. I suggested that the Kaiser, he, and I
meet at Kiel in some way ; but this was not gone into
further.
“ The relations between Russia and the British Empire
were talked of freely and with the utmost candour. Sir
Edward explained that Great Britain and Russia touched
at so many points in the world that it was essential for
them to have some sort of good understanding.
" I thought they should permit Germany to aid in
the development of Persia. He said it might be a good
move to play the one against the other, and yet the
Germans were so aggressive it might be dangerous. Sir
Edward was very fair concerning the necessity for
Germany to maintain a navy commensurate with her
commerce, and sufficient to protect herself from Russia
and France. I told of the militant war spirit in Germany
and of the high tension of the people, and I feared some
spark might be fanned into a blaze. I thought Germany
would strike quickly when she moved ; that there
would be no parley or discussion ; that when she fdt
that a difficulty could not be overcome by peaceful
negotiation, she would take no chances but would
strike. I thought the Kaiser himself and most of his
immediate advisers did not want war, because they
wished Germany to expand commercially and grow
in wealth, but the army was militaristic and aggressive
and ready for war at any time.
" I told him there was a feding in Germany, which
I shared, that the time had come when England could
protect herself no longer merely because of her isolated
position ; that modem inventions had so changed
conditions that the Germans believed she would be
within striking distance before long, just as were her
Continental neighbours. Sir Edward replied, ‘ The idea,
then, is that England will be in the same position as the
Continental Powers.’ I said, ‘ Quite so.’
“ I gave my opinion of the German aerial strength
and what they might accomplish even now. I explained
268
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
the part we desired to play as pacificators and why I
felt we could do this better than they could do it them-
selves. I warned him that the present Chancellor of
Germany might go at any time and be replaced by von
Tirpitz, and a solution would then be a much more
difficult undertaking.
“ I feel that my visit has been justified, even if
nothing more is done than that already accomplished.
It is difficult for me to realize that the dream I had last
year is beginning to come true. I have seen the Kaiser,
and now the British Government seem eager to carry
on the discussion. It is hard to realize, too, that every
Government in the world may be more or less affected
by the moves we are making and every human being
may be concerned in the decisions reached from day
to day.
“ I told Sir Edward the Kaiser had said when his
name was mentioned that he. Sir Edward, had never been
on the Continent and therefore could not understand
Germany. Sir Edward replied that while this was not
literally true, it was nearly so ; a great many years ago
he went to India and crossed the Continent of Europe,
though practically without stopping, and the other day
he was in Paris with the King for several days.”
Colonel House to the President
London, June 17, 1914
Dear Governor;
... I found Sir Edward a willing listener and very
frank and sympathetic. I am to stay the week-end with
Tyrrell, and lunch with Sir Edward next Wednesday.
In the meantime he wUl doubtless discuss the matter
with his colleagues. . . .
I find here everything cluttered up with social
affairs, and it is impossible to work quickly. Here they
have their thoughts on Ascot, garden parties, etc., etc.
In Germany their one thought is to advance industrially
and to glorify war. In France I did not find the war
THE GREAT ADVENTURE 269
spirit dominant. Their statesmen dream no longer of
revenge and the reco^'e^y of Alsace and Lorraine. The
people do, but those that govern and know, hope only
that France may continue as now. Germany already
exceeds her in population by nearly fifty per cent., and
the disparity increases year by year. It is this new
spirit in France which fills me with hope, and which I
used to-day to some advantage. France, I am sure,
win welcome our efforts for peace.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
London, June 26, 1914
My dear Friend ;
I had a very interesting luncheon with Sir Edward
Grey Wednesday, The other guests were the Lord
Chancellor,* the Earl of Crewe, and Sir William Tyrrell.
Page had to go to Oxford to take his degree and could
not be with us.
I did not go into the details of my trip to Germany
a^ain, for I took it for granted that Sir Edward had
given them to both Haldane and Crewe.
I gave it as my opinion that international matters
could be worked out to advantage in much the same way
as individuals would work out private affairs, and I
thought that most of the misunderstandings were brought
about by false reports and mischief-makers, and if the
principals knew of the facts, what appeared to be a
difficult situation ^came easy of solution.
I illustrated this by mentionmg the service Sir
William Tyrrdl performed in America last autumn and
the consequent cordial relations between our two
countries.
The conversation lasted two hours, and it was agreed
that it should be renewed at a later date. In the mean-
time, the general idea was accepted; that is, that a
frank and open policy ^ould be pursued' between all
the parties at interest.
A Ijyid Haldane*
270 THE GREAT ADVENTURE
They told me that there was no written agreement
between England, France, and Russia, and their
understanding was one merely of sympathy and
the determination to conserve the interests of one
another. . . .
Sir Edward was in a most delightful mood and paid
you a splendid tribute. At our last meeting, he said
it was his purpose, at the proper time, in the House of
Commons to say publicly what he thought you had done
for international morals.^
I breakfasted with Lloyd George yesterday and had
a most interesting conversation with him. I found him
peculiarly ill-informed regarding America and its in-
stitutions. I will tell you more of this when we meet.
I am lunching with the Prime Minister on Thursday
of next week, and I will write you again when anything
further of importance follows. . • • ^
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
House not merely emphasized the negative aspect of
the problem, the necessity of removing the factors that
threatened war in Europe, but also urged the importance
of a positive policy of international co-operation with a
constructive purpose. It was the same plan he had
discussed with Page and Bemstorff, a plan designed to
bring the Great Powers of the world into a general
undertaking for the devdopment and protection of the
backward regions of the world, and it contained the
germ of the mandatory scheme later worked out in
the League of Nations. He suggested the plan one cool
evening as he sat with Sir Cedi Spring-Rice and Sir
"William T3nTeIl before the open fire in Tyrrell’s country
home. Spring-Rice and Tyrrell approved, and House
carried his plan to Grey.
^ A leference to the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption.
271
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
Colonel House to the President
London, June 26, 1914
Dear Governor :
There is another matter I have taken up, which I
hope may have your approval. I have suggested that
America, England, France, Germany, and the other
money-lending and developing nations, have some sort
of tentative understanding among themselves for the
purpose of establishing a plan by which investors on
the one hand may be encouraged to lend money at
reasonable rates and to develop, under favourable terms,
the waste places of the earth, and on the other hand
to bring about conditions by which such loans may be
reasonably safe.
I suggested that each of these countries should tell
its people that in the future usurious interest and con-
cessions which involve the rmdoing of weak and debt-
involved countries would no longer be countenanced ;
that the same rule must hereafter prevail in such invest-
ments as is now maintained in all civilized lands in regard
to private loans.
I brought this matter up at luncheon on Wednesday,
and Grey, Haldane, and Crewe were equally cordial in
their discussion of it. I told them I wanted to get their
views so that they might be laid before you when I
returned.
If this can be brought about, it will not only do away
with much of the international friction which such things
cause, but it wiU be a step forward towards bringing
about a stable and healthful condition in those unhappy
countries which are now misgoverned and exploited
both at home and abroad.
Your faithful and devoted
E. M. House
When Colonel House put a project before President
Wilson, he did not expect affirmative commendation.
He evidently took the President’s silence for consent.
272 THE GREAT ADVENTURE
for, as he once said, “ If the President did not object,
I knew that it was safe to go ahead, for he rarely agreed
in words ; while if he disagreed, he always expressed
himself.” With House the opposite was true ; we find
many phrases, in his memoranda, such as ” I showed by
my silence that I did not agree.”
In the present case, receiving no dissenting cable
from Wilson, the Colonel proceeded to elaborate his
plan. On July 3 he gathered the American Ambassadors
to St. James’s and Italy, the British Ambassador to the
United States, and Sir William TjrreU. Spring-Rice
had prepared a memorandum for Sir Edward Grey,
giving the main points of House’s proposal, so that the
Foreign Office might be fully informed of its bearing.
Colonel House to the President
London, July 4, 1914
My dear Friend :
... Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, Sir William Tyrrell,
Walter Page, and Thomas Ndson Page, who is now
here, took lunch with me yesterday to go into a more
detailed discussion. , . .
Tyrrdl told me that Sir Edward Grey was deeply
interested [in the suggestion] and approved entirely its
general purpose, and that you coma count upon this
Government’s co-operation.
It was the general consensus of opinion that a great
deal of friction in the future would be obviated if some
such understanding could be brought about in this
direction, and that it would do as much as any other one
thing to ensure international amity.
The idea, of course, is based entirdy upon your
Mobile speech, and it is merdy that we are trying to
- mould something concrete from what you have already
announced in general as your policy. I suggested that
it would be wdl to keep the matter absolutdy confidential
THE GREAT ADVENTURE 273
until after I had talked it out with you and you had
decided how best to bring all the other Governments
into agreement, if at all. I do not think it wise to
have it known that England was the first to accept the
proposal,
T3nTell thought that after we had worked out a plan
here which was acceptable to this Government, I could
take it to you for your approval and further suggestion.
You could then, if your judgment approved, take it to
the other Governments through Jusserand — ostensibly
because he is the dean of the Diplomatic Corps at
Washington, but really because the Central and South
American republics would feel more kindly towards a
proposal coming from a Latin nation.
Tyrrell, Spring-Rice, and I meet again on Wednesday
to bring the matter into final form. Page may or may
not be present. I think perhaps he had better not be,
for the reason that it would lend something of an official
character to it, which we wish to avoid.
I touched lightly upon this subject to the Kaiser and
I feel sure he, too, wiU approve. This was fortunate,
for the reason that it can be said it was brought to his
attention first.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
P.S. — ^As Page puts it, this is a concrete example of
what may be accomplished if a better international
understanding can be brought about.
Sir Edward Grey’s personal response to the sugges-
tions of House was enthusiastic, for he was as sincerely
anxious to do all that lay in his power to convince
Germany of the peaceful intentions of the British, as he
was to lay the foundations for a permanent system of
international co-operation. He may or may not have
realized that quick action was desirable. Unfortunately
quick action did not seem possible. He had to consider
I— 18
274 the great adventure
the sensibilities of the French and Russians, and Tyrrell
reported to House that Grey was meditating methods
of coming into touch with the Germans without offending
the other members of the Entente. Such were the
vices of the pre-war system of alliances which made
impossible straightforward conversations. Grey was evi-
dently not willing to go to Kiel, as House had suggested.
Furthermore, the major interest of the Cabinet lay in
the Irish crisis, and it was dif&cult to persuade them
that the international situation demanded immediate
attention if the explosion were to be prevented.
House chafed at the dday, but philosophically con-
tinued his round of social engagements which might
later be turned to diplomatic advantage. Sidney Brooks,
of the Times, asked him whether he wished to meet
“ politicians or gentlemen,” and it was with him that
House breakfasted with Lloyd George.
“ June 25, 1914 : Sidney Brooks called at nine o’clock
this morning [recorded House], and we went to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer's for breakfast. We were
a trifle late and Lloyd George was waiting for me. There
were also at breakfast Governor Clifford of the Gold
Coast country, and Lloyd George’s daughter. It was
a most informal affair, each of us going to a side table
and helping himself to whatever desired, as is the usual
English custom. The choice of food consisted of fried
sole, sausage, ham, eggs, fruit, coffee and tea. George
ate a very hearty breakfast. ...”
A week later he lunched with the Prime Minister and
Mrs. Asquith.
“ July 2, 1914 : After the ladies left the table,
Asquith asked me to come and sit by him so that we
might talk, which we did earnestly for fifteen or twenty
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
275
minutes. I did nearly all the talking. We first discussed
the merits of Cabinet officers sitting in Parliament or
Congress, as the case may be. ... I expressed the
feeling that it was better they should have seats, and he
also was inclined to this view. ... I felt very much at
home in London now, for the reason that his Government
was being abused in exactly the same terms and by the
same sort of people as were abusing the Wilson Adminis-
tration in the United States. This amused him. I
thought the purposes of the Liberal Government and of
the Democratic Party were quite similar ; that we were
striving for the same end, but if the Conservatives of
the two countries had their way, the end would probably
be that many of them would be stripped of their wealth
and hanged to lamp-posts. He agreed to this.
“ Mr. Asquith cast the usual slur upon Mr. Biyan. I
explained why the President had taken him into his
Cabinet. He understood that the President had acted
wisely and yet he considered it extremely unfortunate
that the necessity existed. This is the usual comment
I hear everywhere, in Germany, in France, and here.
They do not do Mr. Bryan justice, but it is absolutely
useless to fight his battles, because in doing so you
discredit the purpose you are striving for.”
VI
While House waited for Grey to give some definite
word which he might pass on to the Kaiser, the spark was
struck that ignited the pUe of combustible material
which the diplomatic conflict of a decade had heaped
up. On June 28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-
apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was mur-
dered by a Serb nationalist in Sarajevo, chief dty of
Bosnia. Presumably few Englishmen had ever heard
of the Archduke and fewer still could locate the pro-
vincial capital on a map, yet such was the diplomatic
net in which Europe was caught that within six weeks
276 THE GREAT ADVENTURE
British soldiers were meeting death on the Belgian
border.
The news of the Archduke’s assassination reached
London at the height of the Irish crisis and the feminist
agitation, and it created no more audible effect than a
tenor solo in a boiler-shop. Some days later the Foreign
Secretary expressed a sense of anxiety as to the situation
in South-eastern Europe, but domestic politics continued
to hold the attention of the Cabinet. In Berlin the danger
of a political crisis was openly discussed in the papers,
and privatdy the sanction of the German Government
was given to Austria for any retaliatory and repressive
measures that Vieima might choose to put into effect
against Serbia. But apparently there was little suspicion
that the carte hlanche so carelessly vouchsafed would end
in world war and the destruction of the Empire. The
higher officials of the army and navy were not recalled
to Berlin ; the Foreign Secretary remained on his honey-
moon ; plans for the Kaiser’s cruise were not interrupted.
Ambassador Gerard wrote cheerfully to House of his
return to the United States in August.
Awhassaior Gerard to Colonel House
Berlin, July 7, 1914
My dear Colonel :
. . . Have been on A.’s yacht at Kiel, and Mrs.
Gerard is stUl there. I came up for our Colony celebra-
tion of the 4th of July.
DinM with the Kaiser, and Itmched with von Tirpitz
before the news of the murder of Franz Ferdinand came.
They were both most enthusiastic about you. Von
Tirpitz thanked me for giving him the opportunity to
meet you. We have about decided to go to U.S.A.,
sailing August 12th on Vaterldnd — and I shall certainly
report to you, wherever you are, before my return.
THE GREAT ADVENTURE 277
Kaiser had asked me to sail a race on his racing
yacht with him at Kiel, but the murder in Bosnia
prevented my thus spending a day with him.
Tennis is responsible for this almost illegible hand-
WTiting.
When do you sail ? . . .
Berlin is as quiet as the grave. . . .
Yours ever
James W. Gerard
What more sinister, in the light of after-events, than
the last sentence : “ Berlin is as quiet as the grave.”
It was the eve of Armageddon.
Ironically enough, precisely at this moment when
Austria planned her attack upon Serbia, and Germany
blindly approved, while the wheels of war were already
being geared, the British Foreign Of&ce made definite
albeit rather Iselated response to the suggestions of House.
On July 3 the Colonel heard from Tyrrell that Grey
wanted him to let the Kaiser know of the peaceable
sentiments of the British in order that further negotia-
tions might follow. House at once wrote a long letter
to His Imperial Majesty.
Colonel House to the President
London, July 3, 1914
My dear Friend :
. . . Tyrrell brought word to me to-day that Sir
Edward Grey would like me to convey to the Kaiser the
impressions I have obtained from my several discussions
with this Government, in regard to a better understanding
between the nations of Europe, and to try and get a reply
before I leave. Sir Edward said he did not wish to send
an3rthing offidial or in writing, for fear of offending
French and Russian sensibilities in the event it should
become known. He thought it was one of those things
that had best be done informally and unofficially.
278
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
He also told Page that he had a long talk with the
German Ambassador here in regard to the matter and
that he had sent messages by him directly to the Kaiser.
So you see things are moving in the right direction
as rapidly as we could hope.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
Colonel House to the Kaiser
American Embassy, London
Jtdy 7, 1914
His Imperial Majesty,
Emperor of Germany,^ King of Prussia,
Berlin, Germany.
Sir :
Your Imperial Majesty will doubtless recall our
conversation at Potsdam and that with the President’s
consent and approval I came to Europe for the purpose
of ascertaining whether or not it was possible to bring
about a better understanding between the Great Powers,
to the end that there might be a continuation of peace,
and later a beneficent economic readjustment, which a
lessening of armaments would ensure.
Because of the commanding position Your Majesty
occupies, and because of your well-known desire to
maintain peace, I came, as Your Majesty knows, directly
to Berlin.
I can never forget the gracious acceptance of the
general purpose of my mission, the masterly exposition
of the world-wide political conditions as they exist to-day,
and the prophetic forecast as to the future which Your
Majesty then made.
I received every reasonable assurance of Your
1 The Kaiser was " German Emp^or ” and not “ Emperor of Germany.”
He always aspired to the latter title, which the jealousy of the German
Princes forbade. Is this unconscious or intentional flattery on the part of
Colonel House ? On the copy of the letter is an endorsement in House's
handwriting : " I wrote this letter and submitted it to Irwin Laughlin,
Counsellor of the Embassy, and he advised its stilted style, which I very
much dislike. — E. M. H.”
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
279
Majesty’s cordial approval of the President’s purpose,
and I left Germany happy in the belief that Your Majesty’s
great influence would be thrown in behalf of peace and
the broadening of the world’s commerce.
In France I tried to reach the thoughts of her people
in regard to Germany and to find what hopes she nursed.
My conclusion upon leaving was that her statesmen have
given over all thought of revenge, or of recovery of the
two lost provinces. Her people in general still have
hopes in both directions, but her better-informed
rulers would be quite content if France could be sure
of her autonomy as it now exists.
It was then. Sir, that I came to England and with
high hopes, in which I have not been disappointed.
I first approached Sir Edward Grey, and I found him
S5nnpathetic to the last degree. After a two hours’
conference, we parted with the imderstanding that we
should meet again within a few days. This I inferred
to mean that he wished to consult with the Prime
Minister and his colleagues.
At our next conference, which again lasted for two
hours, he had, to meet me, the Lord Chancellor, Earl
Crewe, and Sir William Tyrrell. Since then I have
met the Prime Minister and practically every important
member of the British Government, and I am convinced
that they desire such an understanding as will lay the
foundation for permanent peace and security.
England must necessarily move cautiously, lest she
offend the sensibilities of France and Russia ; but, with
the changing sentiment in France, there should be a
gradual improvement of relations between Germany
and that coimtry which England will now be glad to
foster.
While much has been accomplished, yet there is
something still to be desired in order that there may be
a better medium created for an easy and frank exchange
of thought and purposes. No one knows better than
Your Majesty of the unusual ferment that is now going
on throughout the world, and no one is in so fortunate
28o
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
a position to bring about a sane and reasonable under-
standing among the statesmen of the Western peoples,
to the end that our civilization may continue unin-
terrupted.
While this communication is, as Your Majesty knows,
quite unofficial, yet it is written in S3rmpathy with the
well-known views of the President, and, I am given to
understand, with the hope from His Britannic Majesty’s
Government that it may bring a response from Your
Majesty which may permit another step forward.
Permit me. Sir, to conclude by quoting a sentence
from a letter which has come to me from the President :
“ Your letter from Paris, written just after coming
from Berlin, gives me a thrill of deep pleasure. You
have, I hope and believe, begim a great thing and I
rejoice with all my heart.”
I have the honour to be. Sir, with the greatest respect.
Your Majesty's
Very obedient servant
Edward M. House
Thus was a last opportunity given to the Kaiser,
who had the assurance of a disinterested outsider that
if Germany sincerely desired peace she would have
the active assistance of the United States and the co-
operation of Great Britain. It was a definite answer
to the allegation that Grey’s policy aimed at the encircle-
ment and isolation of the Germans. Alas ! by the time
Colonel House’s letter reached Germany, Wilhelm II
was already on his cruise in Norwegian waters whence
he was recalled by the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia
and the war-clouds that immediately gathered.
The Great Adventure had ended in failure. But
House’s attempt to prevent the war was perhaps less
barren af consequences than superficial consideration
would suggest. His experience during these months
in Europe that ended with the sudden descent of the
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
281
horror he feared, taught him the need of international
organization and confirmed his belief in the necessity
of some positive purpose to be followed by this organiza-
tion. He was already, in essence, an advocate of a
league of nations, and his influence with Wilson in this
respect was to be an historical factor of vital importance.
Among House’s papers there is a significant memorandum
which he made of a conversation with the President
soon after the beginning of the war.
“ August 30, 1914 : I explained my plan about the
backward nations and how enthusiastically it was
received by the British Government, and how much
they thought it would do toward bringing about a better
understanding between the Great Powers. I believed
if we had had an opportunity to put this into effect,
in all human probabihty such a war as this would not
have occurred — ^because with the Powers meeting at
regular intervals, and with such a concrete example of
the good that might be accomplished by concerted
action, a conflagration such as was now going on would
have been impossible.”
Note. — ” ‘ The visit of Colonel House to Berlin and
London in the spring of 1914,’ Emperor William re-
marked to me at Doom, * almost prevented the World
War .’ " — George Sylvester Viereck.
CHAPTER X
WILSON AND THE WAR
He [Wilson] goes even further than I in his condemnation of Germany’s
part in this war, . . .
Extract from Diary of Colonel House, August 30, 1914
I
C OLONEL HOUSE sailed on Jnly 21 and arrived
in Boston eight days later. Immediately before
he left, word was carried to him that the British
Foreign Office had awakened to the serious character
of the international situation.
“ July 20, 1914 : T5rrrell brought me another message
from Sir Edward Grey, which was to the effect that he
wished me to know before I sailed that the Austro-
Serbian situation was giving him grave concern.”
The forebodings which the Colonel had experienced
in Berlin were indeed in process of realization. On
July 23, Austria sent to Serbia an ultimatum designed
to provoke war, and five days later, brushing aside the
Serbian reply as unsatisfactory, began the bombardment
of Belgrade. The civil rulers of Germany appreciated
suddenly the peril of the path down which they were
being dragged by their Austrian ally and their own
military clique ; stupidly, they refused to accept the
conference suggested by Grey, which would have per-
mitted a cooling-off period ; and as the crisis interxsified
with the mobilization of Russia in support of Serbia,
the army leaders seized control at Berlin. As House
282
WILSON AND THE WAR 283
had prophesied, they wasted no time but struck im-
mediately. Diplomatic and military complexities pro-
duced this paradox : that a Russo-German war set in
motion by an Austro-Serbian quarrel must begin with
a German attack upon France, prefaced by the cynical
and brutal onslaught upon Belgium. Great Britain,
committed to the defence of Belgium by legal, and to
that of France by moral, engagements, impelled by her
own national interest, could not stand aside. It was
the general war.
House reached Boston and went up to the North Shore
while the issue of the crisis was yet undetermined. He
still hoped that the assurances he had sent William II
of British good feeling might strengthen the Kaiser’s
peaceful inclination, and that England and Germany
might work together for a pacific solution, as they had
in 1913. If only the British had been less deliberate
in their consideration of House’s proposals, an under-
standing might have been reached before the murder of
the Archduke.
Colonel House to the President
Pride’s Crossing, Massachusetts
July 31, 1914
Dear Governor :
When I was in Germany, it seemed clear to me that
the situation, as far as a continuation of peace was con-
cerned, was in a very precarious condition; and you
will recall my first letter to you telling of the high tension
that Germany and Southern Europe were under.
I tried to convey this feeling to Sir Edward Grey and
other members of the British Government. They seemed
astonished at my pessimistic view and thought that
conditions were better than they had been for a long
time. While I shook their confidence, at the same time
284 WILSON AND THE WAR
I did not do it sufSciently to make them feel that quick
action was necessary; consequently they let matters
drag until after the Kaiser had gone into Norwegian
waters for his vacation, before giving me any definite
word to send to him.
It was my purpose to go back to Germany and see
the Emperor, but the conservative delay of Sir Edward
and his confreres made that impossible.
The night before I sailed. Sir Edward sent me word
that he was worried over conditions, but he did not
anticipate what has followed. I have a feeling that if
a general war is finally averted, it will be because of the
better feding that has been brought about between
England and Germany. England is exerting a restrain-
ing hand upon France and, as far as possible, upon
Russia ; but her influence with the latter is slight.
If the matter could have been pushed a little further,
Germany would have laid a heavy hand upon Austria
and possibly peace could have been continued until a
better understanding could have been brought about.
Russia has a feehng, so I was told in England, that
Germany was trying to project Austrian and German
influence deep into the Balkan States in order to check
her. She has evidently been preparing for some decisive
action since the Kaiser threw several hundred thousand
German troops on his eastern frontier two years ago,
thereby compelling Russia to relinqmsh the demands
that she had made in regard to a settlement of Balkan
matters. . . .
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
Pride's Crossing, Massachusetts
, August I, 1914
Dear Governor ;
There are one or two things that would perhaps be
of interest to you at this time and which I shall tell you
now and not wait until I see you.
Sir Edward Grey told me that England had no
WILSON AND THE WAR 285
written agreement with either Russia or France, or any
formal alliance ; that the situation was brought about
by a mutual desire for protection and that they dis-
cussed international matters with as much freedom with
one another as if they had an actual written alliance. . . .
The great danger is that some overt act may occur
which will get the situation out of control. Germany
is exceedingly nervous and at high tension, and she
knows that her best chance of success is to strike quickly
and hard ; therefore her very alarm might cause her to
precipitate action as a means of safety.
Please let me suggest that you do not let Mr. Bryan
make any overtures to any of the Powers involved.
They look upon him as absolutely visionary, and it
would lessen the weight of your influence if you desire
to use it yourself later. . . .
If I thought I could live through the heat, I would
go to Washington to see you ; but I am afraid if I reached
there, I would be utterly helpless. I wish you could get
time to take the Mayflower and cruise for a few days in
these waters so that I might join you.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
Even as House was writing these letters, the act
which he feared took place. Assailed by technical
arguments which he could not controvert, the Chancellor
was carried away by the military influence and threw
up his hands. Germany despatched to Russia the
ultimatmn that made war inevitable and flung into
Belgium the vanguard of the army designed to conquer
France.
Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House
Berlin, August j, 1914
My dear Colonel:
I beg to inform you that I laid the letter which you
addressed to His Majesty the Emperor from London
286 WILSON AND THE WAR
before His Majesty. I am directed to convey to you
His Majesty's sincere thanks.
The Emperor took note of its contents with the
greatest interest. Alas, all His strong and sincere efforts
to conserve peace have entirely failed. I am afraid that
Russia's procedure will force the old world and especially
my coimtry in the most terrible war ! There is no
chance now to discuss the possibility of an understanding,
so much desired, which would lay the foundation for
permanent peace and security.
With assurances of my high regard, I remain, my
dear Colonel,
Sincerely yours
ZiMMERMANN
From Ambassador Page in London there came a
veiled but emphatic reference to the efforts which House
had made to prevent the war. Mr. Page issued the
following announcement to the press :
“ One thing I want to make clear that a great many
people have talked to me about. Many seem to have
the impression that the United States missed a great
opportunity. The United States did everything possible
to avert war. If ever a job was done right up to the
hilt, it was that."
On the other hand. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British
Ambassador in Washington, went so far as to intimate
that, while it was the information that House brought
from Berlin which had opened Grey’s eyes to the serious-
ness of the situation, the Colonel’s endeavours might
have been one of the causes which precipitated that
crisis. " You came so near making a general war
impossible,” he told House, " that the war party in
Berlin and Vienna became alarmed. They probably
knew why you were in Berlin and what you said to the
WILSON AND THE WAR 287
Kaiser. They also probably knew why you went to
England, and they undoubtedly knew the contents of
your letter to the Kaiser. That, together with Sir
Edward Grey’s conversations with the German Ambassa-
dor in London, alarmed the war party and they took
advantage of the Archduke’s murder and the Kaiser’s
absence to precipitate matters, believing they were
coming to the end of the passage and that it was now or
never.”
The hypothesis is interesting, not entirely conclusive.
Eight months afterwards House made a private
memorandum, the gist of which accords in general with
the opinions of later historians who were able to study
the German official documents.
" April 15, 1915 ; I am often asked my views as to
the cause of the war [he wrote], and, while I never
give them, I might as well record them here.
“ It is clear to me that the Kaiser did not want war
and did not actually expect it. He foolishly permitted
Austria to bring about an acute controversy with Serbia,
and he concluded that by standing firm with his ally,
Russia would do nothing more than make a vigoroi^
protest, much as she did when Austria annexed Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The rattling of the scabbard and
the shining armour were sufficient in that case and he
thought they would be in this, for the reason that he ^d
not believe Great Britain would go to war concernmg
such a happening in the South-east. He had tried
England twice in the West and had found that he him-
self must give way, and there was not much danger of
his trying it again where England was involved. But
in this instance he thought Germany’s relations with
England had improved to such an extent that she would
not back Russia and France to the extent of making war
on Germany.
” And he went so far in what might be termed
288
WILSON AND THE WAR
‘ blufi[ ’ that it was impossible at the last moment to
recede because the situation had gotten beyond him.
He did not have the foresight to see the consequences,
neither did he have the foresight to see that the building
up of a great war machine must inevitably lead to war.
Germany has been in the hands of a group of militarists
and iSnanciers, and it has been to conserve their selfish
interests that this terrible situation has been made
possible.”
II
Wilson had to meet the political crisis at a moment
when he was overwhelmed with domestic trouble, for
his wife was at the point of death. “ His burdens are
heavier than any President’s since Lincoln,” wrote
House to Page on August 6. “ He has grown enorm-
ously in popularity within the last ten days and there
is scarcely a dissenting note throughout the country.
I believe he will live in history as one of the greatest
Presidents, if not the greatest, that this country has
brought forth.”
Such eulogistic phrases must have been inspired by
House’s general feeling of admiration for the President
rather than by what he did in the crisis, for there was
little he could do.- Urged by the Senate resolution
and against House's judgment, Wilson issued a formal
appeal to the belligerents, offering his services in the
cause of mediation. But it was, as might have been
expected, without effect.
Colonel House to the President
Pride's Crossing, Massachusetts
August 5, 1914
Dear Governor :
. - - . . . If a statement is made, let me suggest that you
make it clear that what you have done was at your own
WILSON AND THE WAR 289
instance. If the public either here or in Europe thought
that Mr. Bryan instigated it, they would conclude it
was done in an impracticable way and was doomed to
failure from the start.
I hate to harp upon Mr. Bryan, but you cannot know
as I do how he is thought of in this coimection. You
and I understand better and know that the grossest sort
of injustice is done him. Nevertheless, just now it is
impossible to make people think differently.
It may interest you to hear that Ohiey expressed
regret that he did not accept your tender of the Ambas-
sadorship to London. He said he had no idea it would
mean an3d:hing more than social activity.
My heart is full of deep appreciation for your letter
of August 3. I never worry when I do not hear from
you. No human agency could make me doubt your
friendship and affection. That my life is devoted
entirely to your interests, I believe you know, and I
never cease from trying to serve you.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
The President’s offer of mediation was merely an
expression of willingness to act. As sent to the monarchs
of the belligerent Powers, it read :
Sir :
As of&cial head of one of the Powers signatory to the
Hague Convention, I feel it to be my privilege and my
duty under Article 3 of the Convention to say to Your
Majesty in a spirit of most earnest friendship, that I
should welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of
European peace either now or at any time that might
be thought more suitable as an occasion, to serve Your
Majesty and all concerned in a way that would afford
me lasting cause for gratitude and happiness.
Woodrow Wilson
A fortnight after this offer. President Wilson issued
1—19
290 WILSON AND THE WAR
an appeal to the citizens of the Republic, requesting
their assistance in maintaining a state of neutrality. It
was later to draw upon the President the virulent attacks
of pro-Entente elements, especially on the Atlantic
seaboard, but at the moment, as Colonel House indicates,
general articulate opinion seemed to approve it heartily.
Wilson based the appeal, not upon indifference to the
war, but upon the danger that might arise for the United
States if factions should take form supporting the one
or the other of the belligerent groups.
“ It wiU be easy to excite passion [said the President],
and difl&cult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting
it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for
no less a thing than that the people of the United States,
whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its
Government should unite them as Americans all, bound
in honour to think first of her and her interests, may be
divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each
other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion
if not in action. . . . Every man who really loves America
will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which
is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness
to all concerned.”
Colonel House to the President
Pride’s Crossing, Massachusetts
August 22« 1914
Dear Governor :
Thinking that I might see you soon has caused me
to hope that I might tell you in person of how splendidly
I think you are meeting the difl&cult situations that
come to you day by day.
Your Address on Neutrality is one of the finest things
you have ever done, and it has met with universal
approbation. Every day editorials of the Republican
press speak of you as if you were of their party instead
of being the idol of ours.
WILSON AND THE WAR
291
The food investigation, the shipping hill, the war risk
insurance bill, and everything else that you are doing
give the entire nation cause for constant congratulation
that you are at the helm and serving it as no other m ari
could.
Of course the war continues to be a most disturbing
and uncertain element. I am sorry that Japan injected
herself into the general mtUe, for it will place an addi-
tional strain upon us not to become involved.
The saddest feature of the situation to me is that
there is no good outcome to look forward to. If the
AUies win, it means largely the domination of Russia
on the Continent of Europe ; and if Germany wins, it
means the unspeakable tyranny of mihtarism for genera-
tions to come.
Fundamentally the Germans are playing a r61e that
is against their natural instincts and inclinations, and
it shows how perverted men may become by habit and
environment.
Germany’s success will ultimately mean trouble for
us. We will have to abandon the path which you are
blazing as a standard for future generations, with per-
manent peace as its goal and a new international ethical
code as its guiding star, and build up a military machine
of vast proportions.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
President Wilson was harshly criticized in the follow-
ing year for not having adopted a more positive policy
at this time. As signatory to the Hague Convention,
his critics averred, the United States should have pro-
tested against the German invasion of Belgium and the
President should have made plain that in sympathy, at
least, the country stood on the side of the Entente
Allies. Such criticism disregards the fact that the
opinion of the whole country was by no means crystallized
at this time, and that the issuance of protests or expres-
WILSON AND THE WAR
292
sions of S5mapathy wotild be worse than futile, unless
the Government intended to abandon its attitude of
neutrality.
Few persons dared to suggest at that time that the
United States should enter the war. Theodore Roose-
velt, who was to become one of the most outspoken of
those who later demanded participation, writing in the
Outlook, congratulated the country on the separation
from Europe which permitted its neutrality.^ Ambas-
sador Page, who himself a few months later insisted that
the United States must break relations with Germany,
wrote to House on August 28, 1914 : “ . . . What a
magnificmt spectacle our country presents ! We escape
murder, we escape brutalization ; we will have to settle
it ; we gain in every way.” And the British Ambas-
sador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, wrote to the Colonel on
September 12, " I hope and believe that at any rate
one part of the world will keep out of it.”
One of the rare Americans who at the moment had
the courage to suggest that the United States should
adopt a positive policy in order to ensure the defeat of
Germany, was President Charles W. Eliot. His sugges-
tion is the more interesting in that Dr. Eliot displayed
then, as always, a mental poise which prevented Mm
from criticizing Wilson when the latter refused to take
action. Eliot admitted that neither he nor any American
^ “ Our country stands well-nigli alone among the great civilized
Powers in being unshaken by the present world-wide war. For this we
should be humbly and profoundly grateful. All of us on this continent
ought to appreciate how fortunate we are that we of the Western world
have been free from the working of the causes which have produced
the bitter and vindictive hatred among the great military Powers of the
Old World. ... It is certainly eminently desirable that we should
remain entirely neutral and nothing but urgent need would warrant
breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other."~0«rf/oofe,
September 23, 1914.
WILSON AND THE WAR
293
could know enough of the facts to insist upon the course
he first advised, and he also admitted that Wilson could
not be sure that public opinion in the United States
would support positive action. It even appears that
Eliot himself, after second thought, reached the same
conclusion as the President.
The historian may well ask, however, whether the
policy first advised by Dr. Eliot would not have shortened
the war by many months and perhaps have saved the
need of an American expeditionary force. Would it not
also have been a direct step toward a league of nations ?
President Wilson was so far impressed by his arguments
that he read the earher letter to his Cabinet and discussed
the suggestion carefully with House. He wrote to
Eliot, however, that he did not regard it as practicable.
Dr. Eliot to the President
Asxicou, Maine, August S, 1914
Dear President Wilson :
I have hesitated three days to mail the enclosed letter
to you, and should still hesitate to forward it while you
are overwhelmed with sorrow, did I not recall that
under such circumstances there is comfort and relief
for the sufferer in resolving that he will thereafter do
everything in his power to help other people who _ are
suffering or bereaved.
At this moment millions of men are apprehending
death or agonies for themselves or poverty and desolation
for their families, and millions of women are dreading
the loss of lovers, supporters, and friends ; and perhaps
you have the power to do something to stop these miseries
and prevent their recurrence.
In such an effort you would find real consolation.
With deepest S3nnpathy in your affliction, I am
Sincerely yours
Charles W. Eliot. .
WILSON AND THE WAR
294
Dear President Wilson : Maine, August e, 1914
Has not the United States an opportunity at this
naoment to propose a combination of the British Empire,
the United States, France, Japan, Italy, and Russia in
offensive and defensive alliance to rebuke and punish
Austria-Hungary and Germany for the outrages they are
now committing, by enforcing against those two countries
non-intercourse with the rest of the world by land and
sea ? These two Powers have now shown that they are
utterly xmtrustworthy neighbours, and military bullies
of the worst sort — Germany being far the worse of the
two, because she has already violated neutral territory.
If they are allowed to succeed in their present enter-
prises, the fear of sudden invasion will constantly hang
over all the other European peoples ; and the increasing
burdens of competitive armaments will have to be borne
for another forty years. We shall inevitably share in
these losses and miseries. The cost of maintaining im-
mense armaments prevents aU the great Powers from
spending &e money they ought to spend on improving
the condition of the people, and promoting the progress
of the world m health, human freedom, and industrial
productiveness.
In this cause, and under the changed conditions,
would not the people of the United States approve of
the abandonment of Washington's advice that this
country keep out of European complications?
A blockade of Germany and Austria-Hungary could
not be enforced with completeness ; but it could be
enforced both by sea and by land to such a degree that
the industries of both peoples would be seriously crippled
in a short time by the stoppage of both their exports
and their imports. Certain temporary commercial advan-
tages would be gained by the blockading nations — a
part of which might perhaps prove to be permanent.
This proposal would involve the taking part by our
navy in the blockading process, and, therefore, might
entail losses of both life and treasure ; but the cause is
worthy of heavy sacrifices ; and I am inclined to believe
WILSON AND THE WAR 295
that our people would support the Government in taking
active part in such an effort to punish international
crimes, and to promote future international peace.
Is it feasible to open pourparlers by cable on this
subject ? The United States is clearly the best country
to initiate such a proposal. In so doing this country
would be serving the general cause of peace, liberty,
and goodwill among men.
This idea is not a wholly new one to me. The recent
abominable acts of Austria-Himgary and Germany have
brought to my mind again the passages on the " Fear
of Invasion,” and the " Exemption of Private Property
from Capture at Sea,” which I wrote a year ago in my
report to the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, entitled Some Roads Toward Peace, pp. 16-17.
The outrageous actions of the last fortnight have re-
enforced the statements I then made, and have suggested
a new and graver application of the doctrines therein
set forth.
I offer this suggestion in entire submission to your
judgment as to its present feasibility and expediency.
It seems to me an effective international police method,
suited to the present crimes, and the probable issues of
the future, and the more attractive because the European
concert and the triple alliances have conspicuously
failed. It, of course, involves the abandonment by all
the European participants of every effort to extend
national territory in Europe by force. The United
States has recently abandoned that policy in America.
It involves also the use of international force to over-
power Austria-Hungary and Germany with all possible
promptness and thoroughness; but this use of force
is indispensable for the present protection of civilization
against a savagery, and for the future establishment
and maintenance of federal relations and peace among the
nations of Europe.
I am, with highest regard.
Sincerely yours
Charles W. Eliot
296 WILSON AND THE WAR
AsticoUj Maine, August 20, 1914
Dear President Wilson :
In revising a letter I had written you on August
17th, amplifying the proposal contained in my letter of
August 6th, I have come to the conclusion that it would
not be desirable “ to open pourparlers by cable on this
subject ” at the present moment, even if it were feasible.
Two considerations have led me to this conclusion :
(i) We apparently do not possess full information on the
real purposes and objects of either Russia or Germany ;
at least the thinking American public does not possess
this information, and therefore cannot justly fix on
Germany the chief responsibility for the present cata-
clysm. The extreme rashness of Germany’s action
cannot but suggest that elements of the situation, stiU
imknown to the rest of the world, were known to her.
I do not feel the confidence I then felt in the information
accessible when I wrote my letter to you of August
6th. (2) Communications between our Government and
the Governments of France and Great Britain, which
would necessarily be secret, are undesirable at the present
stage of the conflict. Indeed, secret diplomacy is always
to be disliked, whether used by free governments or
despotic. These are sufficient objections to the pour-
paners I suggested.
I am inclined to give new weight to certain reasons
for holding to our traditional policy of neutrality in
conflicts between other nations : (i) It seems probable
that Russia, Great Britain, and France together can
inflict ultimate defeat on Germany and Austria-Hungary
— the only tolerable result of this outrageous war. (2)
It seems possible that the seven nations now at war
can give the much-needed demonstration that the
military machinery which the last half of the nineteenth
century created ail over Europe cannot be set in motion
on a large scale without arresting production to a very
dangerous degree and causing an intolerable amount
of suflering and misery. The interruption of production
. and comm^ce which has already taken place since
WILSON AND THE WAR 297
July 31st is unexampled in the history of the world ;
and yet the destruction of life and property has hardly
begun. If seven nations can give this demonstration,
the other nations had better keep out of the conflict.
On reflection, I have also come to think that much
public discussion of the interest of free governments
in the reformation of the milita^ monarchies of Europe
will be necessary before American public opinion will
sanction forcible opposition to outrages committed by
those monarchies on weaker and freer neighbours.
I remain of the opinion that, in the interests of civiliza-
tion and peace, neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary
should be allowed to succeed in its present under-
takings.
Your address to your countrymen on the conditions
of real neutrality is altogether admirable in both form
and substance.
Sincerely yours
Charles W. Eliot
Asticou, Maine, Auffusf 22, 1914
Dear President Wilson :
My letter to you of August 20th crossed in the mails
yours of August 19th to me. Yours came to hand
yesterday, the 21st. I had already come to your con-
clusion. . . .
I am, with highest regard and confidence.
Sincerely yours
Charles W. Eliot
III
That President Wilson adopted a policy of neutrality
from a feeling of tenderness for Germany and from a
failure to appredate the moral issues involved ia the war
and in the German attack upon Belgium, is an assertion
which has been frequently put forward. It rests upon
supposition or prejudice, and not upon evidence. So
much is plain from House's account of his visit to the
298 WILSON AND THE WAR
President’s summer home at Cornish at the end of
August 1914.
August 30, 1914 : I was glad to find the President
situated so delightfully [recorded the Colonel]. The
house reminds one of an English place. The view is
superb, and the arrangement and furnishings are com-
fortable and artistic. The President showed me my
room himself. It was the one Mrs. Wilson used to occupy
and was next to his, with a common bathroom between.
We are in one wing of the house and quite to ourselves.
A small stairway leads down to his study, and it was there
that we sat and discussed matters imtil after one o’clock,
when lunch was announced.
" I told of my experiences in Europe and gave him
more of the details of my mission. He was interested
in the personalities of the people who are the Govern-
ments’ heads, and later said my knowledge of these men
and of the situation in Europe would be of great value
to him.
" The President spoke with deep feeling of the war.
He said it made him heartsick to think of how near we
had come to averting this great disaster, and he thought
if it had been delayed a little longer, it could never have
happened, because the nations would have gotten together
in a way I had outlined.
" I told in detail of my suggestion to Sir Edward
Grey and other members of the Cabinet, that the surest
guarantee of peace was for the principals to get together
frequently and discuss matters with frankness and free-
dom, as Great Britain and the United States were doing.
He agreed that this was the most effective method and
he again expressed deep regret that the war had come too
soon to permit the inauguration of such procedure. He
wondered whether things might have been different if
I had gone sooner. I thought it would have made no
diffe^ce, for the reason that the Kaiser was at Corfu
and it was impossible for me to approach him sooner than
I did. . , .
WILSON AND THE WAR
299
“ I was interested to hear him express as his opinion
what I had written him some time ago in one of my
letters, to the effect that if Germany won it would change
the comrse of our civilization and make the United States
a military nation. He also spoke of his deep regret, as
indeed I did to him in that same letter, that it would
check his policy for a better international ethical code.
“ He felt deeply the destruction of Louvain, and I
found him as unsympathetic with the German attitude
as is the balance of America. He goes even further
than I in his condemnation of Germany's part in this
war, and almost allows his feeling to include the German
people as a whole rather than the leaders alone. He
said German philosophy was essentially selfish and lacking
in spirituality. When I spoke of the Kaiser building
up the German machine as a means of maintaining peace,
he said, ‘ What a foolish thing it was to create a powder
magazine and risk someone's dropping a spark into it ! ’
“ He thought the war would throw the world back
three or four centuries. I did not agree with him. He
was particularly scornful of Germany’s disregard of
treaty obligations, and was indignant at the German
Chancellor’s designation of the Belgian Treaty as being
* only a scrap of paper.’
" I took occasion here to explain to him Sir Edward
Grey's strong feeling upon the question of treaty obliga-
tion, and his belief that he, the President, had lifted
international ethics to a high plane by his action in the
Panama tolls question."
But although the personal feeling of the President
was with the Allies, he insisted then and for many months
after, that this ought not to affect his political attitude,
which he intended should be one of strict neutrality.
He felt that he owed it to the world to prevent the spread-
ing of the conflagration, that he owed it to the country
to save it from the horrors of war. There was also some
truth in the popular impression that he looked upon
300 WILSON AND THE WAR
the wax as a distant event, terrible and tragic, but one
which did not concern us closely in the political sense.
He had not yet come to realize that his great opportunity
was to lie in foreign affairs.
Colonel House saw in the war a great chance to bring
about a revolution in international organization by
impressing upon the public min d the 'need of a new
standard of international morals. The code of conduct
for nations should be as high as that for individuals and,
if public opinion could be brought to realize this necessity.
House believed that a new spirit would inform inter-
national affairs. He tried to show the President how
much he might do by preaching this doctrine, which
later became the soul of Wilson's international policies.
He did not have a hopeful outlook," recorded House,
August 30. " I tried to make him see that reforms were
going forward with much more celerity than heretofore,
for man desired the commendation of his fdlow-man
more than anything else, and with public opinion set
towards higher purposes, individuals would naturally
strive to obtain the good opinion of society.”
Some weeks later House expounded his creed to his
friend Edward S. Martin, in whom he fotmd a sympathetic
auditor. It was henceforth the leitmotiv running
through all his diplomatic experiences.
“ I lunched with Martin to-day at the Century Club
[wrote House]. He had just written one of his illumin-
ating editoriite for Life, and we fell to philosophizing
upon international morals and governmental affairs.
I did most of the talking, trying to point out the funda-
mental error in international morals, inasmuch as they are
ujjon a different level from individual morals. No high-
■minded man would think of doing as an individual what he
seems perfectly ready to do as a representative of a state.
WILSON AND THE WAR 301
It has been thought entirely legitimate to He, deceive,
and be cruel in the name of patriotism. I endeavoured
to point out that we could not get very far toward a
proper international understanding until one nation
treated another as individuals treat one another. We
see the wreck individuals make of themselves by devoting
all their time to selfish interests, and, while they may
acquire things that seem to them worth while, in the
end they lose the regard of their fellow-men and find
themselves unhappy because of them.”
House beHeved that the United States should lead in a
crusade for such a revolution in international morals.
He found the President difficult to stir. Wilson was
profoundly interested in domestic problems and was still
slow to formulate a positive foreign poHcy. He seemed
to feel that he had already accompHshed his great work.
“ September 28, 1914 : The President [House noted]
declared if he knew he would not have to stand for
re-election two years from now, he would feel a great
load lifted from him. I thought he need not accept the
Presidency unless he wished to, even if the Democratic
Party demanded it, though I could understand why he
would feel it a duty to do so provided his health permitted.
I could not see what else he could do in Hfe that would
be so interesting. He replied that the thing that
frightened him was that it was impossible to make such
an effort in the future as he had made in the past, or to
accompHsh anything Hke what he had accomplish^ in a
legislative way. He feared the country would expect
him to continue as he had up to now, which would be
impossible. I thought the coimtry would neither expect
it nor want it. There were other things he wuld do
which woifid be far more deUghtful in accomplishment,
and would add even more to his fajne. I referred par-
ticularly to his foreign poHcy, which, if properly followed;
would bring him world-wide recognition.
302 WILSON AND THE WAR
“ I find the President singularly lacking in appreciation
of the importance of this European crisis. He seems
more interested in domestic affairs, and I find it diflicult
to get his attention centred upon the one big question.
" Congress will adjourn now within a few days, and
when it is out of the way it is my purpose to make a drive
at the President and try to get him absorbed in the
greatest problem of world-wide interest that has ever
come, or may ever come, before a President of the United
States.”
A month later House noted again :
" October 22, 1914 : I am sorry to say, as I have said
before, that the President does not seem to have a proper
sense of proportion as between domestic and foreign
affairs. I suppose it is the Washington atmosphere
that has gripped him as it does eveiyone else who lives
there, and the work of the day largely obscures the
tremendous world issues that are now before us.”
Wilson’s lack of appreciation of the opportunity
for a positive policy in fordgn affairs accounts in some
measure, perhaps, for his failure to perceive the immediate
necessity of developing the military and naval strength
of the nation. Colonel House, on the other hand, had
taken great interest in what came to be called “ pre-
paredness,” even before the outbreak of the European
war, and he seems to have been on terms of intimacy
with the outstanding apostle of the movement, Leonard
Wood.
" April 16, 1914 : I had a long talk with General
Wood about the army's preparedness. We discussed
the international situation, particularly regarding Japan
and the possibility of trouble there, and what would be
necessary to be done. He said Manila was now so fortified
that we could hold it for a year at the minimum, and that
WILSON AND THE WAR
303
within a short while Hawaii would be in a similarly
impregnable position. He thought the Panama Canal
was so near completion that it could be used in twenty
days in the event of an emergency. We promised to
keep in close touch with one another from now on."
If, as House hoped, the United States were to take the
lead in an international movement to prevent future
war or to render it less likely, it was of vital importance
that the moral influence of America should be based upon
an adequate material force, especially a strong army and
navy. Tliere was even the possibility that if the nation
were placed on a war footing as rapidly as possible, the
United States would be in a position to insist that the
belligerents stop fighting, by a threat of entering the war
against the side that refused reasonable terms. And
with Europe on the road to exhaustion, the combined
economic and military strength of America would permit
her to decide what were reasonable terms.
There was also the danger of a German victory, in
which case the United States, if unarmed, would find
herself facing an aggressive power capable of carrying
through by force an expansive policy in South and
Central America that might touch closely and adversely
our most important interests. In any event, it seemed
the part of wisdom to prepare a force sufhcient to support
the diplomatic demands we might be compelled to make
upon the belligerents, should either side disr^ard our
rights as a neutral.
Because of such factors Colonel House found himself
in complete agreement with the preparedness crusade,
and he urged that immediate steps be taken to strengthen
both army and navy. He found the President cold.
Wilson did not visualize the r61e America might play in
the same fashion as House ; he believed that the United
304 WILSON AND THE WAR
States should give an example of pacific idealism which
was at the other pole from mihtary preparation, and he
felt himself supported by the mass of public opinion
which, until aroused by the peril and the opportimity
of the situation, opposed the sacrifices necessary to
preparedness.
" Noven^er 3, 1914 : Loulie and I [recorded House]
lunched with Generjil and Mrs. Leonard Wood at
Governor’s Island. I wished to see the General before
I went to Washington. I am strongly of the opinion
that it is time for this Government to adopt some system,
perhaps the Swiss, looking towards a reserve force in the
event of war. I found General Wood receptive. He is
to send me, at the White House, memoranda and data
to hand the President for his information.
“ Wood is desirous of going to the war zone, and I
told him I would try to arrange it for the reason that we
have no military man who has had any experience in
the handling of large bodies of troops. . . .
“ November 4, 1914 [conference between Wilson and
House] : We passed to the question of a reserve army.
He baulked somewhat at first and said he thought the
labour people would object because they felt that a
large army was against thdr interests. He did not
believe there was any necessity for immediate action ;
he was afraid it would shock the country. He made the
statement that no matter how the great war ended, there
would be complete exhaustion ; and, even if Germany
won, she would not be in a conctition seriously to menace
our country for many years to come. I combated
this idea, stating that Germany would have a large
military force ready to act in furthering the designs
wMch the militaiy party evidently have in mind. He
said she would not have the mea. I replied that she
co^d not win unless she had at least two or three
.million men under arms at the end. He evidently
thought the available men would be completely wiped
out.
WILSON AND THE WAR 305
" I insisted it was time to do a great constructive
work for the army and one which would make the
country too powerful for any nation to think of attacking
us. He told me there was reason to suspect that the
Germans had laid throughout the country concrete
foundations for great guns, similar to those they laid in
Bdgium and France. He almost feared to express this
knowledge aloud, for, if the rumour got abroad, it would
inflame our people to such an extent that he would be
afraid of the consequences. General Wood has the
matter under investigation, and he asked me to caution
Wood to be very discreet.^
" I spoke of General Wood’s desire to be sent abroad
and asked him to let him go in order that we might have
at least one man in our army with some experience.
He said they would not accept him. I replied that Wood
thought otherwise and it was something for him to work
out in his own way.
“ In speaking of the building-up of our army, I
thought if the Allies were successful there would be no
need for haste ; but if the Germans were successful and
we then began our preparations, it would be almost
equivalent to a declaration of war, for they would know
we were directing our preparations against them. I
therefore urged that we start without delay, so that
we might be ready and avoid being placed in such a
position. . . .
" November 8, 1914 : The President desired me to
go to church with him, but I compromised by having
Loulie go. Mr. Bryan had just arrived from the West
and I felt it necessary to see him. I wanted to find out
what his views were regarding the army. I found him
in violent opposition to any kind of increase by the
reserve plan. He did not believe there was the
slightest danger to tMs country from foreign invasion,
even if the Germans were successful. He thought
a^r war was declared there would be plenty of time
^ Probably Briber Wilson nor House took such suspicious very
serioudy ; the investigation proved them to be without basis.
1—20
3o6 WILSON AND THE WAR
to make any preparations necessary. He talked as
innocently as my little grandchild, Jane Tucker.
He spoke with great feeling, and I fear he may give
trouble. . . .
“ November 25, 1914 [conversation with Wilson] :
We spoke of the ever-present topic of the war. I have
gotten from good authority that Italy would now be
with the Allies if she had been prepared. She found
her equipment was not sufficient to be effective, but she
is putting hersdf in shape to get into the war just as
soon as she is ready and can make her forces worth
while. I thought Roumania would also join the Allies.
He expressed pleasure at this, and hoped these two
countries would not delay too long.
" I again insisted that Germany would never forgive
us for the attitude we have taken in the war and, if she
is successful, she will hold us to account. . . .
" I spoke again of our unpreparedness and how
impractical Mr. Bryan was. I urged the need of our
having a large reserve force, and he replied, ' Yes, but
not a large army,’ an amendment which I accepted. I
particularly emphasized the necessity for greater artillery
plants and more artillery.”
The arguments of House produced no immediate
effect upon the Presideat, who in his annual message to
Congress refused to approve plans for a large reserve
force and the principle of compulsory training ; Wilson
insisted that any revolution in our established military
policy (if policy it might be called) would indicate that
we had been “ thrown off our balance by a war with
which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot
touch us.” Left thus without guidance, except of a
negative sort, public opinion was slow to perceive the
need of military efficiency, and in some quarters, as the
following letter indicates, Wilson's attitude received
the most enthusiastic approval.
WILSON AND THE WAR
307
Mr. George Foster Peabody to Colonel House
New York, December 16, 1914
Dear Colonel House :
As I am writing to you at the White House, I shall
venture to say to you that I think General Leonard
Wood’s address to the Merchants’ Association and others
respecting unpreparedness of our army most imsuitable
and also reflecting upon the President’s magnificent
presentation of the whole situation in his address to
Congress.
I hope that he may be promptly called down.
I cannot tell you how profoundly I was stirred by the
President’s address and by the deep and widespread
impression it made. I should have liked to write to
him to gratify my enthusiasm, but I have the impression
that in the press of such vitally important state problems
he has not had the time to see the later letters I wrote.
I should not want to burden him, much less intrude. . . .
Very truly yours
George Foster Peabody
Colonel House himself was not blind to the high cost
of military preparation, in the moral as well as in the
material sease, nor was he unaware of the evils which its
extravagance had brought upon Europe. Lord Grey,
in his memoirs, says : “ Every country [in Europe]
had been piling up armaments and perfecting prepara-
tions for war. The object in each case had been security.
The effect has been precisdy the contrary of what was
intended and desired. Instead of a sense of security
there had been produced a sense of fear, which was
yearly increasing. . . . Such was the general condition
of Europe ; preparations for war had produced fear,
and fear predisposes to violence and catastrophe.”^
AH this House appreciated, and he S3mipathi2ed with
^ Grey, Twenty-five Years, ii, 279.
WILSON AND THE WAR
308
Wilson’s dread that military preparation in the United
States might destroy the calm spirit necessary to the
rescue of the world from a spell of madness.
But although to this degree, and because of his horror
at the idea of mass slaughter. House regarded himself as
a pacifist, he could not avoid the fact that international
pacifism becomes mere anaemia unless organized to
include in its influence all the great Powers. In the
greatest crisis of history the United States was helpless
to play any rdle except that of passivity. To protect
our rights effectively, to aid the world to escape from the
nightmare in which it was caught, there was need of a
positive organization of our potential strength. This
House, as we shall see, did not fail to urge upon the
President.
Twelve months afterwards, in the autumn of 1915,
Wilson 3ddded to the logic of events and did not lack
the courage to confess that he had changed his mind ;
in a series of magnificent speeches he demanded vigorous
military preparation and he led through Congress the
largest naval bill of our history. But a precious year
had been lost and the Preadent encountered a padfistic
opposition which he himself had originally done some-
thing to foster. He paid a heavy price, for without
the material force necessary to the support of his dip-
lomacy, Wilson was destined later to miss the oppor-
tunity, if not of ending, at least of shortening, the war.
rv
Wilson’s sense of aloofness from Europe and the
war was quickly shattered by the march of circumstances,
and he was soon to learn that the war could touch us
. v^ dosdy. Ironically aiough, in view of later devdop-
ments, it was a dispute with the British over their control
WILSON AND THE WAR 309
of trade which first awakened a general sense of onr
national proximity to the fighting front. British super-
vision of war-time neutral trade has always been strict,
and its interpretation of the meaning of “ contraband’*
broad. From the British point of view it would have
been fiying in the face of Providence to surrender the
opportunities offered by the mastery of the sea. The
Entente Allies were naturally interested in preventing
the arrival in Germany, directly or indirectly, of any
articles that might help the enemy to prolong the war,
for in a modem war almost any article of common
necessity, such as cotton, oil, copper, or foodstuffs, may
be of as much military value as what was formerly
declared contraband of war. It was inevitable that
the Allies, under British leadership because of the
strength of the British navy, should seize and search
neutral vessels which might carry contraband ; it was
equally certain that they would extend the definition
of contraband.
On the other hand, as the largest of the neutral Powers ’
the United States was vitally concerned in preserving
open routes to the neutral countries of Europe and an
open market in Europe for non-contraband goods.
The situation contained dynamite, and it is not
pleasant to reflect that under existing international
usages it is one which the United States must confront
whenever Great Britain is at war with a Continental
Power.
“ September 30, 1914 [conference between Wilson and
House] : When we were discussing the seizure of vessds
by Great Britain, he read a page from his ‘ History of
the American People,’ telling how during Madison's
Adminis tration the War of i8i2 was started in exactly
the same way as this controversy is opening up. The
WILSON AND THE WAR
310
passage said that Madison was compelled to go to war
despite the fact that he was a peace-loving man and
desired to do everything in his power to prevent it,
hut popular feeling made it impossible.
“ The President said ; ‘ Madison and I are the only
"two Princeton men that have become President. The
circumstances of the War of 1812 and now run parallel.
I sincerely hope they will not go further.’
“ I told the British Ambassador about this con-
versation. He was greatly impressed, and said that
in his cablegram to Sir Edward Grey he would call
attention not only to the passage in the President’s
book, but to his comment to me upon it.”
In view of the strong sympathy for the Entente
cause in the United States, the danger of an actual
break was remote. Both Wilson and Grey were con-
vinced that the future wdfare of the world depended
upon Anglo-American friendship, and each was anxious
to yield as much to the other as might be necessary to
assure it. But unless care were taken, a point might
be reached beyond which neither could yidd.
Ambassador Page in London had fortunately won
the respect and affection of the British, and negotiations
were always facilitated by the cordiality of the rdations
he maintained with the Fordgn Of&ce. On the other
hand, he suffered from the defects of his virtues, pladng
such value upon Anglo-American friendship that he
was not inclined to present American protests with the
emphasis desired at Washington. Both Wilson and
the State Department were convinced that the avoidance
of future trouble could best be secured by letting the
British understand clearly at the very beg inning that
we regarded British Admiralty policy as infringing our
neutrsd rights and material interests.
Mr. Page looked at the problem in a different light.
WILSON AND THE WAR
311
He was willing to make allowance for the British re-
strictions on trade, and he evidently felt that in com-
parison with the defeat of Germany and the maintenance
of good feeling between Great Britain and America, the
losses and inconveniences of neutrals did not count.
" Everything is going well here, I think,” he wrote to
House, September 15, 1914. “ The British Government
is most considerate of us in all large ways. The smaller
questions of ships and prizes, etc., are really in the hands
of the Admiralty — really, tho’ not nominaJly — and they
are conducted on a war basis.”
It was with some irritation that the Ambassador
discovered that in the United States British seizure of
ships and prizes was not regarded as a “ smaller question,”
and he did not conceal his lack of sympathy with the
arguments drafted by the legal advisers to the State
Department in protection of American rights on the
seas.
Colonel House to the President
New York, October 21, 1914
Dear Governor :
I have received the following cablegram from Page,
through his son Arthur.
“ God deliver us, or can you deliver us, from library
lawyers. They often lose chestnuts while they argue
about bums. See our friend [President Wilson] and
come here immediately if the case be not already settled.^
Of utmost importance.” . . .
I hardly know to what he refers, but perhaps you
do. It may be the Declaration of London matter.
1 The British had refused the American demand that the Declaration
of London be generally accepted. The Declaration of London (1909),
which Great Britain had never ratified, left among other articles copper
and rubber on the non-contraband list and would have permitted the
importation of foodstuffs by Germany.
312 WILSON AND THE WAR
I notice that Northdiffe, in his papers, and the
London Post are demanding that the Government seize
neutral vessels can^ung reservists or contraband cargoes.
If you think I can be of any service, please wire me
and I will come to Washington immediately. Page is
evidently disturbed.
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
The President replied that if Page was disturbed by
the attitude of the State Department, he, Wilson, was
a little disturbed by that of the Ambassador. If Page
were to represent the American Government, he must
see the matters under discussion in the light in which
they were seen in the United States. Wilson insisted
that Page’s advice was of great value, but he expressed
the fear that Page’s intense feeling for the British case
might prove a danger. Wilson himsdf was sometimes
disparaging in his remarks about professional diplomats,
but he did not enjoy having the work of the State De-
partment, which emphasized the American point of
view, referred to as that of “ library lawyers.”
Colonel House shared Mr. Page’s conviction that
too much depended upon the friendship of Great Britain
and the United States to permit a quarrd over anything
that was not vital ; but he appreciated, as the Am-
bassador did not, the irritation caused in the United
States by the British methods of holding up American
cargoes, and he also realized that unless the United
States maintained her rights as a neutral with vigour
in the case of the seizure of cargoes, she would not be
able to protest effectivdy should more serious attacks
follow.
the othOT hand, he bdieved that through the
eserdse of care in the drafting of protests and by main-
WILSON AND THE WAR 313
taining close personal relations with the British Am-
bassador in Washington, much friction could be avoided.
“ September 27. 19 ^ 4 ' I took the 12.08 train to
Washington and was met at the station by McAdoo and
Eleanor. They went to the White House with me and
took dinner with us. After dinner we talked for a while,
until a large package of papers came from the State
Department marked ‘ urgent.’ This was the signal for
. . . the family to leave, and the President and I im-
mediately got down to work.
“ X had written a long letter to Page, concerning the
Declaration of London and its effect upon neutral
shipping. X’s letter of instruction to Page was ex-
ceedingly undiplomatic, and I urged the President not
to permit it to be sent. . . .
“ I then suggested that he permit me to have a
conference with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and get at the
bottom of the controversy. He expressed warm ap-
proval of this plan. After this we went to bed, pretty
tired and somewhat worried.
“ September 28, 1914 : I had Hoover^ arrange with
Billy Phillips * for the use of his home, and I asked Sir
Cecil Spring-Rice over the telephone to meet me there
at ten o’clock. The conference was a most interesting
one.
“ I showed the Ambassador the letter X had prepared
to send Page. He was thoroughly alarmed over some
of the diplomatic expressions. One paragraph in par-
ticular he thought amounted almost to a declaration of
war. He said if that paper should get into the hands
of the press, the headlines would indicate that war with
^ Chief usher at the White House.
» Mr. William Phillips was at this time Third Assistant Secretary of
State ; his ability and diplomatic qualifications enabled him to perform
services as important as they were unheralded. He was on terms of close
fnendship with Sir Cedi and it was at his house that House usually met
the British Ambassador. Phillips became First Assistant Secretary in
X9i5» later Minister to Holland and Ambassador to Belgium*
314 WILSON AND THE WAR
Great Britain was inevitable, and he believed one of
the greatest panics the country ever saw would ensue,
for it was as bad or worse than the Venezuela incident.
He said he did not know what I had accomplished in a
busy life, but he felt sure I had never done as important
a piece of work as in this instance. . - .
“ We discussed the best ways and means of getting
out of the difficulty, which he said would never have
arisen if the State Department had talked the matter
over with him frankly in the beginning. His Govern-
ment’s attitude had been known at the State Depart-
ment for a month, and yet not a word of objection had
been raised. If he had known what the feeling of this
country was, he would have taken it up with his Govern-
ment and their attitude would have been modified. As
it was, they had already published their intention of
doing the things to which our Government objected,
and it would be difficult to handle it now in a way to
save the amour-pYopre of his Government.
" We outlined a despatch for this Government to
send to Page, and then we outlined the despatch which
we thought he should send Sir Edward Grey. We
agreed to be absolutely frank with one another, letting
each know just what was being done, so there could be
no subterfuge or misunderstanding.”
It would be difficult to find in all history another
instance of diplomacy so unconventional and so effective.
Colonel House, a private citizen, spreads all the cards
on the table and concerts with the Ambassador of a
foreign Power the despatches to be sent the American
Ambassador and the Foreign Minister of that Power.
If there is criticism of the method, it is stifled by its
success.
As a result of this intervention, the threatened crisis
was tided over ; and during the next five weeks it proved
possible to approach the problem of neutral shipping
with equanimity, although no fundamental solution was
WILSON AND THE WAR 315
discovered. House himself said nothing of what he had
done.
Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page
New STork, October 29, 1914
Dear Page ;
When your cablegram came, I communicated with
the President, but found that everything was in process
of adjustment. I cannot see how there can be any
serious trouble between England and America, with all
of us feeling as we do ; but of course we must needs be
careful in the manner of doing things — ^for the American
people, as you know, are exceedingly sensitive regarding
certain questions, and it would not be advisable for
the President, with all his power and popularity, to go
counter to this sentiment. . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
London, November 9, 1914
My dear House :
... I want to thank you for what I suppose you did
when I telegraphed you thro’ Arthur. I sent the
telegram thro’ Arthur so that your name and mine
shd. not be on the same tde^ram and thereby possibly
excite suspicion. The situation is safe, but it can at
any time be made critical by a captious manner. I
did not and do not mean to criticize Lansing or anybody
else — only to make sure that things are seen in their
proper perspective.
Sir Edward values American friendship more than
anything else of that Mnd. He is not going to endanger
it. To this day, he hasn’t confiscated a single American
cargo, tho’ there are many that he might have confis-
cated within his rights. Our continued good relation-
s[hip] is the only thing that now holds the world
together. That’s the big fact. A cargo of copper, I
grant you, may be important ; but it can’t be as impor-
WILSON AND THE WAR
316
tant as our friendship. It’s the big and lasting things
that count now. I think of the unborn generations of
men to whom the close friendship of the Kingdom and
of our Republic will be the most important political
fact in the world. — Have stiff controversies ? Yes ;
I’m for them whole-heartedly, when we have a good
reason. But there’s no reason now ; and, if there were,
this is the time to be patient. There’ll be plenty of
time left to (juarrel when this dire period is past. . . .
It’s no time, then, to quarrel or to be bumptious
about a cargo of oil or of copper, or to deal with these
Gov’ts as if things were normal. Thank God, you are
3,000 miles from it. I wish I were 30,000. . . .
Yours heartily
W. H. P.
Unfortunately, the oil and the copper exporters in
the United States felt differently and protests poured
in upon the State Department in Washington. For
Mr. Page, who was in vital sympathy with the Allied
cause, the situation was worse than tr3dng. His nerves
became taut. As usual, the minor questions were the
more vexatious. What was dangerous was that, in his
misunderstanding and irritation with the State Depart-
ment, he should lose sight of the Washington point of
view, which he was sent to London to represent. It was
the more dif&cult to warn Mr. Page to be careful not to
display pro-Ally feeling in that he looked upon himself
as falling over backward in his neutrality, and was not
in a frame of mind to receive criticism philosophically.
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
London, Decefnib&r 12, 19x4
My dear House :
... I am tr3dng my best, God knows, to keep the
way as smooth as possible; but neither Government
hdps me. Our Government merdy sends the shippers’
WILSON AND THE WAR 317
ex-parie statement. This Government uses the Navy's
excuse.
Oh, well, praise God it goes as well as it does. I get
my facts as best I can — ^from other neutrals, from ship-
captains, etc. — and I do the best I can, getting thanks
for nothing, getting lectures for— nothing. I happened
a little while ago to telegraph that I “ conferred” with
the neutral Ministers, meaning, of course, that I talked
with them and found out what facts I could. It was
iheir ships that were stopped, with American cargoes.
I got back a despatch from Washington saying I had
no authority to be making shipping and trade agreements
with neutral Powers — ^they did that themsdves at
Washington ! Now what damfool in the State Depart-
ment supposed that I was making agreements with
any Govt, or that I was doing anything but tr3dng day
and night to get an American cargo released and to
prevent more from being stopped — I don't know, nor
care to know ; and I haven't a trace of a shade of a
dream of feeling about it. Anybody’s at liberty to
think anything about me he pleases ; I’ve long since
ceased to care a fig. A man in a difficult public place
must turn heaven and earth to do his very uttermost
<iuty — ^must try doubly and trebly hard at any cost and
must absolutdy exhaust every j^ossible effort and
resource and satisfy his most exacting conscience. He
wiU be blamed then. He will be misunderstood. He
win be misjudged. He must accejpt that and go on
without paying the least heed to it. I can do that
easily. I don’t care a fig. I’m incapable of resenting
any misunderstanding. But — ^but, you can’t help
doubting the intelligence of a man (whoever he is) that
breaks loose with a sermon about my making “ agree-
ments wfith other governments ” ; and you don't know
just how much dependence to put in the next telegram
about something else,that comes from the same source. . . .
Everybody here, so far as I have heard (and I shd.
hear, you may be sure), regards us all as neutrsd of
course, and so treats us — ^English, Germans, Austrians,
3i8 WILSON AND THE WAR
French, and neutrals. Of the neutral members of the
diplomatic corps I see much (in spite of my inability
to make “ agreements with other countries ”) ; and I
can't tell you to save my life what the leanings are of
any of them i I have felt no suspicion from any quarter
but Washington. Suspicion, I have noticed, generally
sleeps in the bed with Ignorance. . . .
Heartily yours
Walter H. Page
Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page
New York, December 4, 1914
Dear Page :
I have just returned from Washington. . . .
The President wishes me to ask you please to be
careful not to express any unneutral feeling, either by
word of mouth, or by letter, and not even to the State
Department. He said that both Mr. Bryan and Mr.
Lansing had remarked upon your leaning in that
direction, and he thought it would materially lessen your
influence.
He feels very strongly about this, and I am sending
the same message to Gerard,
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
London, December 15, 1914
Dear House ;
I’ll tell you a story : Within a week two Americans
who have lately come here have criticized me and the
Embassy for being pro-German, and I often hear such
remarks that come from the English.
And I’ll ask you a question :
Is an Ambassador a man sent to keep another
Government friendly and in good humour with your
Government so that you can get and give all sorts of
friendly services and make the world better ?
WILSON AND THE WAR
319
Or is his business to snap and snarl and play “ smart ”
and keep ’em irritated — damn ’em ! — and get and give
nothing ?
These I send you by Mrs. Page as my Xmas greeting.
W. H. P.
If the State Department had dif&culties in impressing
its point of view upon the American Ambassador in
London, there was also cause for some anxiety because
of petty misunderstandings with the British Ambassador
in Washington. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice was a diplomatist
of distinction and a scholar of charm. During the early
weeks of the war, his relations with our Government
were of the most cordial sort. House kept in close
touch with him, and the following letter indicates the
tone of their intercourse :
Ambassador Sfring-Rice to Colonel House
British Eubassv, Washington
November 5, 1914
My DEAR Colonel :
I hear you have come. How are you ? . . .
We hope that the exports will continue as at present.
But the evident intentions of the Germans are to get
some fast cruisers out of the North Sea and effect a
junction with those in the Atlantic, and so control for
a short time the trade routes. We suspect the ships in
United States ports of an intention to run out and get
converted into commerce destroyers, which would be
awkward. For this reason I am asking that ships in
New York harbour should be periodically inspected and
not allowed to leave unless their cargoes are innocent.
Do you gather that an attack be made on the
Administration in Congress for remissness about contra-
band matters? As a matter of fact, no American
exporter has suffered any loss and all the protests of the
Administration have been successftd. But owing to
changed conditions of modem war it is evident that the
WILSON AND THE WAR
320
definition of contraband must be changed — ^i.e., for
instance, it must include petroleum and copper (which
in Germany is entirely used for cartridges, bombs, etc.) ;
and the American doctrine of “ continuous voyage,” or
that the character of the goods is determined by its
ultimate destination, and not the port where it is landed,
is evidently applicable to certain ports like Genoa,
Rotterdam, and Copenhagen which are the back doors
of Germany. A just cause of complaint would be the
seizure of goods really destined for neutrals, and we are
making arrangements by which such goods will be hall-
marked by the sender here if he wishes it. I hope by
December these arrangements will be in working order
and no further inconvenience suffered. I am tdegraph-
ing about this now, and a man is arranging with the
copper men here for an amicable understanding. A
protest, reserving all rights, could be made at once in
cases of unreasonable or prolonged detention.
Yours sincerely
Cecil Spring-Rice
«
Unfortimately, Sir Cedi was in wretched health and
his nerves, even more than those of Page, were prone to
become frazded as unpleasant inddents arose. The
following excerpts from House’s memoranda indicate
the ddicacy of the situation as well as the extraordinary
activity of the Colond, for those were the days in which
he was negotiating with the South American- Ambas-
sadors the first draft of the Pan-American Pact.
” December 29, 1914 : I went from Naon to the home
of Billy Phillips to meet the British Ambassador. I
found him nervous and exdted because of the premature
publication and a garbled account of the protest made
by the President to the British Government concerning
the holding-up of neutral vessds. He did not mind the
note, for he and I had already threshed that out and
settled it long before it was sent. He had even recdved
WILSON AND THE WAR
321
a reply from Sir Edward Grey indicating that the Presi-
dent’s request would be granted. The note was merdy
a formal matter of routine after the real issue had been
met, but what he objected to was the way in which it
had been given publicity and the -manner in which our
press had treated it. . . .
I tried to explain to Spring-Rice how badly the
President fdt. He accepted that part, but blamed the
State Department most unreservedly and said it was
impossible to conduct diplomatic negotiations of a ddi-
cate nature through the newspapers. He daimed that
it was not the first time and that he hesitated to take
up further matters with them ; in fact, he intended to
absent himsdf from the Department in future. He had
no doubt we would all be pro-Germans within six months,
that the Germans were strong and had a thorough
organization, and they would finally break down any
anti-German sentiment which now existed. . . .
“ He talked so many different ways, in almost the
same sentence, that I conduded he was too upset for
me to have any profitable discussion with him, and I
therefore took my leave.”
As it turned out, the State Department was quite
guiltless of any indiscretion, but then, as generally, it
was made the scapegoat for the sins of others.
“ December 30, 1914 : I called up Phillips at the State
Department [recorded House] and told him I was sorry
Mr. Bryan was out of town, because I desired to suggest
to him that he soothe the ruffled fedings of the British
Ambassador. 1 asked Phillips to take part in this laud-
able endeavour. I said my trip to Washington had been
largdy nullified by the premature publication of the
President’s protest to the British Government and I
hoped they would get the Ambassador in a normal
frame of mind before I returned, for he blamed the
State Department for the leak. Phillips said they had
found exactly where the leak was, that it was not in the
I — 21
322 WILSON AND THE WAR
State Department, and indicated as nearly as he could
over the telephone that it was , a fact which I
already knew as well as I could know anything that
had not happened under my own eyes. . . .
“ December 31, 1914 ; I received the accompanying
letter from Spring-foce a few minutes ago. He is
evidently in good humour again. I am exceedingly
glad. ...”
Ambassador S'pring-Rice to Colonel Housed
I have just received copy of the note that is the
telegram to Page and it seems to me a very fair, just,
courteous, and firm presentment of the case to which
no objection whatever could be raised on the ground of
its form. I am sure it will create a very lasting impres-
sion and win remain on the records as an honourable
effort to solve in an amicable manner the question at
issue.
Such crises, flaring up and flickering down, wearied
the President beyond anything else, and were not con-
ducive to prompt settlement of the points at issue.
When House brought to Mr. Wilson the gist of his
various interviews, the President’s face, he recorded,
“ became grey.” The Ambassadors might have been
recalled, but there were strong arguments against such
a step. However unfortunate Mr. Page’s relations with
the State Department, it would have been impossible
to find anyone more capable of holding close personal
relations with Sir Edward Grey. Nor would it have
been easy to suggest to the British that they recall
Spring-Rice. Wilson’s solution was to send House to
^ Sir Cecil's letters to Colonel House were frequently unsigned and,
as in this case, without any superscription. When they carried a super-
scription he generally addressed Colonel House as “ Mr. Beverly." His
manner, both personal and epistolary, was sometimes apt to suggest the
mysterious.
WILSON AND THE WAR 323
England to explain personally the American case on
the holding-up of cargoes. He sympathized with the
British, and at the same time realized the force of the
view taken by the State Department. He was on
terms of intimacy with Sir Edward Grey and Sir
William Tyrrell.
Wilson’s decision was hastened by another factor
which assumed the first importance at the close of the
year. All through the autumn Colonel House had
engaged in frequent conferences with the German and
British Ambassadors concerning the possibility of Ameri-
can mediation. The question asked by the President
was whether this possibility might be changed to a
probability, and he saw no means of answering it except
through the European mission which House agreed to
undertake.
CHAPTER XI
PLANS OF MEDIATION
The most serious difficulty . . , is the deep-rooted distrust England has
for German diplomacy and promises. Something of this is also felt by the
Germans for England.
House to Wilson, September 22, 1914
I
C OLONEL HOUSE was not one of the multitude
which, so long as the war lasted, believed the
crippling of Germany as a great economic and
political Power to he an essential element of future
peace. On the contrary, he was convinced that a
strong, albeit demilitarized, Germany was necessary to
the economic stability of Europe and the welfare of the
world. He consistently opposed the political disintegra-
tion of Germany which was openly or secretly advocated
by her Continental enemies. In the opening week of
the war House foresaw Germany’s defeat, and he feared
the consequences if this defeat should prove overwhdm-
ing. To his .mind the greatest menace to civilization
lay in the possibility of the domination of Europe by
Tsarist Russia.
August 6, 1914 : It looks to me as if Germany was
ridm^ for a fall [he wrote], and it also seems to me that,
if this should happen, France and Russia will want to
rei^ her in twain. It is clearly to the interest of Eng-
land, America, and civilization to have her integrity pre-
■ served, shorn, however, of her military and naval power.
'M expect to see the British Ambassador and outline
this to him.”
334
PLANS OF MEDIATION
325
Ten days later, in a message to Ambassador Gerard,
House suggested the possibility of stopping the war
before passions became so inflamed that neither side
would consider laying down arms. It was no more than
a suggestion, and House himself did not believe that it
would lead to practical results. But the message is
significant, for it sketched what was, four years later, -
to be the American plan for lasting peace and in it, as
in the Pan-American Pact, is the principle of the League
of Nations Covenant — an organization to guarantee
territorial integrity and to provide for disarmament.
Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard
Fiude’s Crossing, Massachusetts
Augttsi 17, 1914
Dear Judge ;
. . . The Kaiser has stood for peace all these years,
and it would not be inconsistent with his past life and
services to be willing now to consider such overtures.
If peace could come at this hour, it should be upon the
general proposition that every nation at war should be
guaranteed its territorial integrity of to-day. Then a
general plan of disarmament should be brought about,
for there would be no need under such an arrangement
for larger armies than were necessary for police purposes.
Of course, this matter would have to be handled
very ddicately ; otherwise sensibilities might be
offended.
As far as I am concerned, I would view with alarm
and genuine regret any vital disaster to the German
people. The only feeling in America that has been
manifested against Germany has not been directed
against her as a nation, but merely against her as the
embodiment of militarism. Our people have never
admitted that excessive armaments were guarantees of
peace, but they have fdt, on the contrary, that in the
end they meant just such conditions as exist to-day.
326 PLANS OF MEDIATION
When neighbouring nations with racial differences and
prejudices vie with one another in excessive armaments,
it brings about a feeling of distrust which engenders a
purpose to strike first and to strike hard.
With Europe disarmed and with treaties guarantee-
ing one another’s territorial integrity, she might go
forward with every assurance of industrial expansion
and permanent peace.
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
The difi&culty was that the victorious advance of the
German armies through Belgium and northern France,
during the month of August, prevented any considera-
tion of peace in Berlin ; on the other hand, the treat-
ment they meted out to the invaded regions inflamed
the French, Belgians, and British and crystallized their
determination never to cease fighting until the damage
had been repaired and Teutonic war methods punished.
On the eastern front there was the same situation with
reversed rSles. The Russians advanced triumphantly,
while their devastation of East Prussia convinced the
Germans that the menace of the barbarous Slav must
be ended once for all.
But in September the Russians, while they were
able to continue the invasion of Galicia, were driven out
of East Prussia by Hindenburg, who immediately pro-
ceeded to threaten an attack upon Russian Poland. In
the west the Germans were defeated on the Marne, and
although they maintained themsdves on the line of the
Aisne it became obvious that the immediate and over-
whdming defeat of France, which their military leaders
had promised, was likdy to remain an unfulfilled dream.
As’the^autunm drew on, a condition of deadlock seemed
to have^been reached.
PLANS OF MEDIATION 327
German war plans had been based upon the assump-
tion of a short campaign, and the prospect of facing a
vast coalition through a long-drawn-out struggle was
one that appalled the army leaders ; some of them have
since confessed that with the battle of the Marne, and
the beginning of the deadlock on the western front, they
regarded the war as lost. Colonel House was of the same
opinion, and argued that if the Germans were wise they
would accept what terms they might, before the ultimate
consequences of defeat became apparent. At the very
moment of the decision on the Marne, he had written
to Zimmermann, suggesting that the time was approach-
ing when President Wilson's offer of mediation might be
taken in other than an academic sense.
Colonel House to the President
Pride's Crossing, Massachusetts
September 5, 1914
Dear Governor :
I am enclosing you a letter to Herr Zimmermann.
If you approve, will you not have it properly sealed and
sent to the German Embassy for transmission ?
Please criticize it frankly and return it to me for
correction if you think best.
I have a feeling that Germany will soon be glad to
entertain suggestions of mediation and that the outlook
is more hopeful in that direction than elsewhere.
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
Colonel House to Herr Zimmermann'^-
. Washington, D.C„ September $, 1914
Dear Herr Zimmermann :
Thank you for your letter of August i. I gave it to
the President to read and he again expressed his deep
^ The letter was approved by Wilson and sent to Zimmermann.
328 PLANS OF MEDIATION
regret that the efforts to bring about a better under-
standing between the Great Powers of Europe had so
signally miscarried.
He looks upon the present war with ever-increasing
sorrow, and his offer of mediation was not an empty one,
for he would count it a great honour to be able to initiate
a movement for peace.
Now that His Majesty has so brilliantly shown the
power of his army, would it not be consistent with his
lifelong endeavour to maintain peace, to consent to
overtures being made in that direction ? ^
If I could serve in any way as a medium, it would be
a great source of happiness to me ; and I stand ready
to act immediately upon any suggestion that Your
Excellency may convey or have conveyed confidentially
to me.
With assurances of my high esteem, I am, my dear
Herr Zimmermann,
Sincerely yours,
Edward M. House
At the same time House renewed his personal con-
tacts with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, of whom
he had seen much the previous summer on the North
Shore.
" Sefdemb&y 5, 1914 ; I am dining out to-night [he
wrote] to meet Ambassador Dumba. I am la3dng plans
to make myself persona grata to all the nations involved
in this European war, so that my services may be
utilized to advantage aiid without objection in the
event a proper opportunity arrives. I have been
assiduously working to this end ever since the war broke
loose. I do not believe in leaving tlungs to chance,
and then attribute failure to lack of luck or opportunity.
1 House’s rather florid tribute to the pacific tendencies of the Kaiser
must be read in connexion with Zimmennann's letter of August i (above^
~p. The implication of House’s phrase is, " If the Kaiser really loves
* peace as much as you say, now is the time to show it.”
PLANS OF MEDIATION
329
I am tr5dng to think out in advance the problems that
the war will entail and the obligations which will fall
upon this country, which I hope the President will
properly meet.”
Colonel House to the President
Pride's Crossing, Massachusetts
Dear Governor : September e. 1914
Last night I had a conference with the Austrian
Ambassador. He talked very indiscreetly and, if one
will sit still, he will tell all he knows. I sat very stiU.
I learned that the Germans were making a mighty
effort to gain a decisive victory in France and that,
when that was accomplished, they would be ready to
consider overtures for peace.
I also learned that their great fear was starvation.
Axistria is fairly self-sustaining and, because of her close
proximity to Roumania, she would not unduly suffer;
but Germany faces famine if the war continues.
England, it seems, lets no ship pass into neutral ports
without first ascertaining whether or not it contains
foodstuffs ; and when it does, she exercises her right to
purchase it.
What Dumba particularly wants, is for the American
ships to defy England and feed Germany. ...
He spoke of England’s enormous power and sdd
Germany’s military power was not to be compared with
that which England exercised over the entire world
because of her navy. He forgot to add that England
is not exercising her power in an objectionable way, for
it is controlled by a democracy.
He strongly deprecated the Weir and said if he had
been Foreign Minister in Austria it would never have
occurred. He intimated that Germany and Austria
felt that Russia would have been prepared in 1915, and
therefore it was necessary to anticipate her. . . -
He deprecated the use of bombs.
Your very affectionate
E. M. House
330
PLANS OF MEDIATION
ir
Colonel House was under no illusion as to the diffi-
culty of beginning parleys. He had observed the
pathetic failure of the attempt of Mr. Oscar Straus, who
had engaged in peace discussions with Count BemstorfE
and hoped to pass a German offer to the Allies through
Mr. Wilson ; someone talked, and all hope of success
immediately evaporated. The fiasco did not enhance
House’s respect for the discretion of the German Ambas-
sador, nor would it tend to facilitate other attempts.
Furthermore, although House argued that were he in
the shoes of the German leaders he would make every
concession for peace, he did not place great confidence
in their political good sense. On September lo he
wrote : “ England will not stand for peace unless it also
means permanent peace, and that, I think, Germany
is not yet ready to concede.”
Nevertheless, when BemstorfE asked for an inter-
view, the Colonel agreed to discuss the matter, for he
did not want to leave any possible opening untried. If
the German Government would actually authoriz;e
BemstorfE to make a reasonable offer, it would be good
sense for the Allies to consider it carefully. In House’s
mind at this time a “ reasonable offer ” seems to have
meant evacuation of invaded territory and full compensa-
tion to Belgium.
Colonel House to the President
New York, September i8, 1914
Dear Governor :
BemstorfE came to see me this afternoon. I suggested
that he meet Sir Cecil Spring-Rice at dinner. He is
willing.
PLANS OF MEDIATION 331
I am writing Sir Cedi, asking if it would be con-
venient for him to come to New York within the next
day or two, but making no mention of my conferences
with Bernstorff. If we can get these two together, we
can at least make a start.
For the moment, England dominates her allies.
Later, she may not. She would probably be content
now with an agreement for general disarmament and an
indemnity for Belgium. Germany, I think, would be
glad to get such terms. Shall I go on, or shall I give
Sir Cecil some satisfactory reason for wanting to see
him ?
Now that I am in touch with Bernstorff, I hope to
persuade him to close his mouth for a while. He
promises that no human being shall know of these
negotiations.
The world expects you to play the big part in this
tragedy — and so indeed you will, for God has given you
the power to see things as they are.
Your faithful^and affectionate
E. M. House
“ I found Bernstorff [Colonel House recorded in a
separate memorandum] in a different attitude from when
I last saw him, which was in the spring. He was then
debonaire and cocksure of himself and of his country.
After telling him something of my visit to Germany
and of my purpose in making it, and after speaking of
the charming manner in which the Kaiser received me
at Potsdam, I began to talk of the peace negotiations.
I asked if he had met Sir Cecil Spring-Rice since
hostilities began. He said he had not, that it was
against diplomatic usage to do so. I thought the best
thing that could be done now was for the two of them
to meet, and I asked if he was willing to do so provided
I could bring it about. He hesitated for a moment
and then said he would be willing to do so provided it
was known only to the three of us. I agreed that
the President would be the only one informed. If any-
332 PLANS OF MEDIATION
thing developed from the conference, I promised per-
mission from our Gk)vemment for him to use code
messages direct to his Government, which of course up
to now he has not been able to do. He said if nothing
came from the conference, he would not mention it to
his Government or to anyone dse.”
Fortunatdy House was, even as early as this, on the
most intimate terms with the British Ambassador. The
two had already gone over important despatches to Page
and Grey, together working for the elimination of un-
diplomatic phrases. Spring-Rice wrote to House in a
private code, and the latter felt free to call on him at
any time when the importance of the business in hand
warranted. From him the Colonel had already gathered
that the Allies would not consider a makeshift peace.
“You will understand that no peace is any good which
simply means an armed truce with another war at the
end of it.” Thus wrote the Ambassador to House on
September 12. “ We want not only the end of a war
but the end of all wars ; and unfortunatdy no treaty has
now the slightest importance. We have suffered too
severdy by trusting in treaties, and if we were to allow
Bdgium to suffer what she has suffered without com-
pensation, we should be pretty mean quitters. It is an
awful prospect for the world and I see no immediate
remedy.”
None the less. House fdt it worth while to attempt
to arrange a meeting between Bemstorff and Spring-
Rice — ^a highly unconventional proceeding, but House
recked little of conventions ; and when Spring-Rice
tdephoned that he could not leave Washington at the
moment. House insisted that he must come at once.
“ I wiU take the midnight train,” answered the Ambas-
sador. It is hard to repress a smile at the thought of
PLANS OF MEDIATION
333
the diplomatists taking orders from the quietly persua-
sive Colonel.
“ Septemher 20, 1914 : I met Sir Cecil [recorded
House] at seven-thirty at the Pennsylvania. I did not
get out of the car for fear of being seen.^ We immedi-
ately took up the subject in hand. I found him im-
willing to confer with Bemstorff, whom he considers
thoroughly unreliable. He says he has a bad reputation
not only in England but in Germany, and that he was
sent to America because it was thought he could do no
harm here. . . .
“ I explained to Sir Cecil the situation as I saw it.
First, that at this time Great Britain dominated the
Allies, which perhaps she would not do later. Second,
that Great Britain could probably obtain from Ger-
many, for the Allies, a disarmament agreement with
compensation for Belgium. This was what Great
Britain wanted and not the dismemberment of Germany,
which would surely follow even over her protests, pro-
vided the Allies were si^aUy victorious.
“ He agreed to all this, but said the Germans were
so unrdiable, that their political philosophy was so
selfish and so unmoral that he hesitated to open up
negotiations with them. He was also afraid the time
was not ripe for peace proposals.
“ He said it would be necessary for all the Allies to
be approached simultaneously, for it would not do for
Great Britain to begin secret negotiations, even if thejr
were willing, because Germany would not play fair
and would later denounce Great Britain as being
treacherous to her allies. Then there was difitculty with
France’s and Russia’s representatives here. Jusserand,
he said, had an extremely bad case of nerves at present,
^ Spiing^Hice a horror of spies. Evidently he preferred that his
interview with House should not be generally known, for House noted :
Around eleven o'clock Sir Cecil went to the Majestic Hotel to see Sir
Courtenay Bennett, the British Consul-General. He merely did this to
give an excuse for his trip to New York in the event it became known/*
334 PLANS OF MEDIATION
and the Russian Ambassador was a reactionary of the
worst tjTpe and was little less than mad.
“ He told me of despatches that had passed between
Sir Edward and himself, and we discussed at great
length what was best to do in the circumstances and
what was best to tell BemstorfE. ... He is frank and
honest, and is a high-minded scholarly gentleman.
" He thinks the best thing for the present is for the
President to keep constantly in touch with the situation
and to give repeated assurances to the different Govern-
ments that he stands ready to act whenever they feel the
moment has arrived. He believes it would not do for the
President to make any proposals as to terms, but merely
to hold himself in an absolutely neutral position. . . .
“ I was successful in making Sir Cecil see that it was
not wise for Great Britain to take any big gamble in this
conflict. If she could get disarmament and compensa-
tion for Belgium, she had better accept it and not risk
the stupendous consequences of defeat. I also made him
see that if the Allies won and Germany was thoroughly
crushed, there would be no holding Russia back and the
future situation would hardly be less promising than
the past.”
The cable which Spring-Rice sent to Sir Edward Grey
as the result of this conversation, embodying the Ameri-
can point of view, was as follows :
Ambassador Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey
B[emstoiff] was willing that he should enter into
communication with S.-R. direct. S.-R. answered that
as three Powers were bound to make peace simultane-
ously, he could not receive a communication.
I think B. was not acting without instructions or
knowledge of his Government. Conversations here are
likely to be difficult.
But following considerations seem to force themselves
on the attention of the world :
If war continues, either G[ermany] becomes supreme
PLANS OF MEDIATION 335
or R[ussia]. Both alternatives would be fatal to the
equilibrium of Europe. Consequently the present
moment is more propitious to an agreement favourable
to the principles of equilibrium.
President may therefore (from this point of view) be
anxious to faciUtate negotiations now. The basis for
these might well be Sir E. G.’s two principles ; (i) End
of militarism and permanent peace. (2) Compensation
to Belgium.
If other Powers are willing to make suggestions in
order to effect an agreement on the basis of these two
principles, then negotiations could begin. If they have
other proposals to make, it would be as wdl that they
should be made known as soon as possible for reasons
given above, and the P[resident] would be perfectly
willing to facilitate exchange of ideas as friendly inter-
mediary, without expression of opinion.
G[ermany] is doing her best to put E[ngland] in the
wrong by causing a belief that E[ngland] is rejecting
G[erman5r’s] friendly overtures.
It would be dangerous for E[ngland] to persist in
non possumus attitude. Although it is fully understood
that she cannot negotiate without knowledge of other
two, it would be to advantage of all three that G[ermany]
should be forced to show her hand.
E. G.’s two principles would have sympathy of
world.
Colonel House to the President
New York, September 22, 1914
Dear Governor :
Bemstorff came to see me again yesterday in order
to hear the outcome of Spring-Kce’s visit.
I told him that Sir Cecil hesitated to go into a con-
ference without the consent of his Government and
without the knowledge of their allies. Bemstorff
thought this reasonable. He justified his own action
by sa3dng that he thought the instructions from his
Government warranted mm in taking up negotiations
of this sort. . . .
33<i PLANS OF MEDIATION
Bernstorff thought it was not too early to begin
conversations, for the reason that they could hardly
brin^ results in any event for some months.
Sir Cecil and I agreed that the Kaiser would probably
be willing to accept such terms as England would be
glad to concede, provided the German war party would
permit him. The most serious difficulty that will be
encountered during negotiations is the deep-rooted
distrust England has for German diplomacy and
promises. Sometliing of this is also felt by the Gennans
towards England.
Another difficulty was expressed by Bernstorfi, to
the effect that neither side wished to be placed in the
position of initiating peace proposals. This can be
avoided, however, in some such way as is being done
now, for they will soon find themselves talking about it
and will not be so sensitive. . . .
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. House
Dear Goverkor ;
Dumba came to see me and handed me the enclosed
article, which he has written for publication in the
World's Work for November. He wanted you to see it
in advance.
He hardly tried to disgmse his eagerness for peace
measures to begin. I told him I did not think the Allies
would want to commence , conversations of this sort as
loi^ as the German forces occupied their territory. He
replied, “ Perhaps, then, a German defeat at this time
might not be an immixed evil.”
I told him how anxious you were to be of service,
but that you Mt you had gone as far as it was wise to go
without some encouragement.
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
Whatever the private protestations of Bemstorff
and -Dumba, the public announcements of the German
PLANS OF MEDIATION
337
and Austrian Governments were in a directly opposed
sense and did not facilitate the beginning of peace
negotiations. Public opinion in the Central Empires
had been encouraged to expect a smashing victory, and
their of&cial spokesmen continued to promise it. The
Allied leaders echoed such sentiments on their side with
a shade of increased intensity. The British felt, and not
without some justification, that it was hard to reconcile
Bemstorff’s suggestions of peace with the campaign of
hate against England which Berlin was whipping up.
Ambassador Spring-Rice to Colonel House
Washington, D.C., September 24, 1914
My dear Colonel :
. . . The message went to its destination and is being
considered by the big bugs there. In the meanwhile
I note that the assurance made to you and others by your
friend [Bemstorfi] has been publicly and officially
repudiated by his employers, so that he cannot be re-
garded as either authorized or responsible. Any sug-
gestions from this quarter that one member of the firm
[the Triple Entente] alone should discuss conditions
with him, can obviously only be made with a view to
sowing distrust among them. Anyone who wants the
terms of an arrangement to be discussed, must approach
all the members of the firm simultaneously. . . .
I notice that our own selves are at the present moment
the object of the most virulent attacks from the person
who talked to you [Bernstoiff] and from his friend and
associates. There is no sign whatever of any peaceful
intention and everything is done to envenom the situa-
tion, especially and very particularly as far as we are
concerned.
I enjoyed our talk most of any I have had for a long
time and I hope we shall have another one. . . .
Yours ever
C. S.-R.
1—22
338 PLANS OF MEDIATION
Mf, H. C, Wallace’s memofandum of a conveysafion with
Ambassador von Bernstorff
September 25 , 1914
I was lunching alone at the Ritz Carlton to-day and
he came up and asked to sit with me.
He was anxious to know whether there were any
subsequent developments, and I said I thought the
difficulty was the necessity of talking with the partners
[France and Russia].
During the conversation I asked whether he believed
the time was propitious for negotiations to begin ; and
he answered there was not the slightest doubt, provided
an opening wedge could be started on the Island [Eng-
land]. In Ms opinion, a full -co-operation could be
counted on in Ms country, but he told me tMs was in
strictest confidence. He said if negotiations could
start on the Island and could be kept absolutely secret,
that he could arrange for a favourable ' reception and,
visit to his country. His principal apprehension was
public opinion on Island and partners — whence necessity
of secrecy.
He also believed that unless sometMng was done soon,
the ^air would be long-drawn-out, as nothing really
decisive could occur for at least six months and probably
a year; and, further, that 'if something occurs wMch
makes either side particularly happy, public opinion
would harass, if not defeat, plans short of subjugation.
He also told me in confidence that Ms people had re-
frained from doing a number of very disagreeable things
to avoid inflaming that nation.
If Winston [Churchill] voices the feeling of Govern-
ment, it is usdess to make effort ; but I told Mm G[rey]
had different views, and he replied that if that were
true, great accomplishment might be made by sending
someone from the P[resident] to the Island first and
then across the Channel.
“ Septend}ey 29, 1914 [Spring-Rice and House in
conference] : He said the cablegram to Sir Edward
PLANS OF MEDIATION 339
Grey, which we composed together, September 20, was
being considered by his Government and they were
discussing it with the Allies. When I pushed him, he
admitted that perhaps it would be some time before
we heard from it. I gathered that they intend doing
nothing until what they consider a propitious time, and
then they will use it as a means of beginning peace
conversations. I could see that Sir Cecil was thoroughly
of the opinion that Germany should be badly punished
before peace was made. There was something of resent-
ment and almost vindictiveness in his attitude. He
said to forgive Germany now and to make peace, was
similar to forgiving a bully and making peace with
him after he had knocked you down and trampled upon
you pretty much to his satisfaction.”
Ill
From the American Ambassadors in London and
Berlin, House received confirmation of the fact that
both sides were determined to carry the conflict to a
finish. Mr. Page sympathized entirdy with the popular
point of view in England, which at that time saw no
way of ending German militarism without annihilating
Germany in the political sense. House did not agree,
but maintained then and always that German militarism
had failed -at the battle of the Marne and that the only
sure way to resuscitate it was to threaten the German
people with political destruction and force them to accept
a military dictatorship.
Mr. Page’s letters displayed at times a prescience
and, again, a surprising misreading of the future.
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
London, September 15, 1914
Dear House ;
. . . You needn’t fool yourself ; they are going to
knock Germany out, and nothing will be allowed to
340 PLANS OF MEDIATION
stand in their way. And unless the German navy
comes out and gets smashed pretty soon, it will be a
longer war than most persons have thought. It’ll be
fought to a finish, too. Pray God, don’t let . . . the
Peace Old-Women . . . get the notion afloat that we
can or ought to stop it before the Kaiser is put out of
business. That would be pla3dng directly into Bemstorff’ s
hands. Civilization must be rescued. Well, there’s no
chance for it till German militarism is dead. . . .
Yomrs heartily
W. H. P.
My dear House : Sept^er 22. 1914
..." The war will begin next spring " — so said
Kitchener yesterday. And probably that’s true. The
French will do all they can till cold weather comes, and
the Russians will smash Austria. Then in the spring
the English will, go in with a million and a half fresh
men and get the fox’s tail. That’s what Wellington did
at Waterloo. That’s the English way. — ^Look at their
diplomatic management. Of course the war is really
between Germany and England ; but England made
sure that Russia and France were both in before she
went in. Germany has only Austria to help her. Italy
failed, and Austria is already whipped. — Grey and
Kitchener are too much for them.^
In fact the blindest great force in this world to-day
is the Prussian war party — blind and stupid. Well,
the most weary man in London just this hour is
Your humble servant
W. H. P.
but he’ll be aU right in the morning.
My dear House ; London, November 9. 1914
. . . Peace ? I fear not for a very long time. The
Germans feel as the woman feels whose letter I enclose.
^ ^ These statements do not do justice to the Ambassador's historical
knowledge pr Ids prophetic instincts.
PLANS OF MEDIATION
341
Their Gov’t canH stop so long as the people feel so and
so long as it has food and powder and men. The English
can’t stop till the Germans are willing to reinstate
Belgium and to pay for its awful rape. — ^Yet, I pray
Heaven, I am mistaken ; for the sheer awfulness of
this thing passes bdief. We say to one another, Rocke-
feller is worth 400 or 500 or 1,000 millions of dollars.
That means nothing ; it is too big. If a man be worth
$100,000, or half-a-million, or a million, or even ten
millions, we can comprehend it. So, when I say that
perhaps 3,000,000 men have been killed — that means
nothing. We have no experience to measure it by.
Hence this unbelievable carnage goes on. . . . We have
lost our common human bearings, and all the old measure-
ments of things are thrown away, and we have no new
measurements ; we are simply dazed. . . .
Yours heartily
W. H. P.
The Ambassador’s estimate of the killed was exag-
gerated, but his conclusion is of poignant interest, for
it suggests the soul of the tragedy, Europe helpless to
prevent the war in the first place, equally helpless to
stop it : " simply dazed.”
In Germany as in England the only feeling was that
of the necessity of endurance. The German people,
like all the belligerents, regarded the war as one of
self-defence. “ Their principal concern,” so ran a letter
written from Leipzig by an American correspondent
in August, “ is that America shall understand that they
resisted war as long as they could do so with honour.
My association with all kinds of Germans bears out
their assertion that war was undesired. The general
belief among them that they were forced into it by
Russia, is perfectly sincere.”
With this consciousness, it was hopeless to expect
from them a willingness to make sacrifices in order
PLANS OF MEDIATION
342
to secure peace. Even in the midst of their suffering,
the Germans were buoyed up by the feeling that they
fought for a sacred cause.
Countess von MoUke to Colonel House
Creisau (Schlesien), October 7, 1914
Dear Mr. House :
I have so often thought of your remark to me in
Berlin in May : “ Europe is in a dangerous state.”
How dangerous I never realized ; I wonder if you did ?
The present state of affairs seems like a bad dream ;
one can hardly realize that this embittered struggle is
a fact. . . .
Only one great value has this war brought with it
to us in Germany at least — all that was best and noblest
in the nation has risen to the surface ; materialism,
luxury, and selfishness have slipped from us, and each
one of us feels that we are better men and women than
before. But it is a hard price to pay.
My husband is away fighting like everyone else.
The spirit among the troops is very sober but most
confident. Everyone, even the Social Democrats,
feels that Germany did not want war, that therefore
they are absolutdy right in defending their country,
and they all have unbounded confidence in those in
command, in their ability and trustworthiness. . . .
Our only consolation is that we in Germany are
making the best possible use of its lessons and growing
morally in an astonishing way. Germany is being
new-born, but the travail is heart-breaking. ...
Yours very sincerely
Dorothy Moltke
Awhassador Gerard to Colonel House
Berlin, November 1914
My dear Colonel :
... I had a long talk with the Chancellor to-day,
who sent for me as he was here a few days from the
Front. He says he sees no chance of peace now. Ger-
PLANS OF MEDIATION
343
many is much worked up over Americans selling muni-
tions of war to France and England. Also over the
condition of German prisoners in other countries, par-
ticularly Russia. The hate here against England is
phenomenal — actual odes of hate are recited in the
music-halls. The people are still determined, and seem
to be beating the Russians in spite of reports from the
Allied press. On the French Front there is nothing to
report. The Reichstag voted another large credit and
then adjourned. Only Liebknecht objected, and since
then his own party has reproved him. Life seems
perfectly normal here and provisions are only slightly
higher. Women send their only sons of fifteen to fight,
and no mourning is worn and it is etiquette to con-
gratulate a family who has lost a son on the battle-field.
The losses to date here alone are 4,500 officers and
83.000 men IdUed — ^about 280,000 wounded and about
100.000 prisoners. Not great, by any means, out of a
possible twelve millions. The finances are in perfect order
and the country can continue the war indefinitely — ^a war
which is taken quite coolly by the people at large.
We still have lots of work. I have been especially
engaged in getting cotton in and chemicals and dye-
stuffs out. We have to have cyanide to keep our mines
going and dyestuffs to keep endless industries, and the
Germans know this and want to use this as a club to
force us to send cotton and wool in. So they only let
us have about a month's supply at a time. Also they
fear lest we should re-sell to the English. ...
My job is made harder by these sales of munitions
by U.S.A. to France and England and by the articles
and caricatures in American papers ; but I stiU seem
O.K. with the Government, and the Kaiser has inti-
mated he wants me to visit him at the Front. . . .
Yours ever
J. W. Gerard
House realized acutdy that it would not do to press
the Allies unduly for a categoric response to the suggestion
344 PLANS OF MEDIATION
of parleys which he had sent to Grey through Spring-
Rice. Such pressure might easily be construed as a move
to save Germany from the defeat which many optimists
believed would be inflicted upon her in the spring. The
Colonel himself wanted to see Germany sufficiently
beaten so that the issue of militarism would be settled
for all time to come.
But he felt strongly that unless some beginning
were made towards peace in the early winter, the most
favourable opportunity would be lost. For the moment,
military movements had reached a deadlock. In the
spring each side would see the chance of victory and would
refuse conversations until they had tried out their new
armies. The end of the autumn was necessarily the
psychological moment for negotiations.
There was at least one German who, in his belief that
his country was headed towards destruction and could be
saved only by an early peace, laboured incessantly to
begin negotiations. This was Count von Bemstorff.
The distrust which his early career had awakened in the
British was perhaps not entirely unmerited; yet the
record of the following months was to prove the complete
sincerity of his efforts for peace and for the preservation
of friendly relations between Germany and the United
States. House had been prejudiced against him and
was never able to negotiate with him on the basis of
complete frankness he used with the British. But he
ended by admitting both the ability and the essential
honesty of the German Ambassador.
IV
It may have been diplomatic wiles, it may have been
. sdi-deception ; at all events, Bemstorff reiterated the
willingness of Berlin to make terms that would satisfy
PLANS OF MEDIATION 345
the British. Perhaps his Government was willing to let
Bernstorff make promises, and repudiate him at their
convenience. Certainly a letter which House received
from Zimmermann in December did not indicate clearly
any change of the oflScial German heart, although there
was a hint that, if the other side made advances, Germany
might not be unreasonable.
Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House
Berlin, December 3, 1914
My dear Colonel :
Please pardon me for allowing so much time to elapse
before answering your letter of September 5 th, which was
besides long delayed in reaching me. I read what you
wrote with great interest, but it seems to me that con-
sidering the turn events have taken so far and the
apparently unabated zeal of our opponents, the question
of mediation has not yet reached the stage for action.
When I say “ imabated zeal of our opponents,” I
have in mind such utterances as appeared for instance in
the London correspondences of the New York Sun of
October 9 and the New York Tribune of October 16,
announcing that “ to no voice of the kind (i.e. mediation)
whl England, France, or Russia now listen.”
On the other hand, you are fully aware of the fact
that we have greatly appreciated the President's and
your own good of&ces. You may be perfectly sure that
the President’s offer of mediation was received exactly
in the spirit in which it was meant and that it was not
for a moment considered an empty one.
Germany has always desired to maintain peace, as
she proves by a record of more than forty years. The
war has been forced upon us by our enemies and they axe
carrying it on by summoning all the forces at their dis-
posal, including Japanese and other coloured races. This
makes it impossible for us to take the first step towards
making peace. The situation might be different if such
overtures came from the other ade.
346 PLANS OF MEDIATION
I do not know whether your efforts have been extended
in that direction and whether they have found a w illing
ear. But as long as you kindly offer your services in a
most unselfish way, agreeing to act upon any suggestion
that I convey to you, so it seems to me worth while
trying to see where the land lies in the other camp.
Needless to say, your communications will always be
welcome and considered confidential. . . .
Sincerely yours
ZiMMERMANN
Bemstorff insisted that if House would go to Ger-
many, he would find the Berlin Government entirely
reasonable. The two had lunch together in Was hing ton
in mid-December.
" December 17, 1914 : We took up the question of
European peace proposals [recorded House]. I informed
him of the President’s decision to leave the matter to me ;
that is, as to the proper time and as to the question of
procedure. He said there would be no objections from
his Government ; that it would not be necessary to go to
Germany first ; that if I could get the Allies to consent
to parleys, I would find the Germans willing. I replied
that there was no use taking it up with the Allies excepting
upon a basis of evacuation and indemnity of Belgium and
drastic disarmament which might ensure permanent
peace. He thought there would be no obstacle in that
direction,
" I congratulated him upon this position, and thought
it would have a fine effect and would show it was not
Germany’s fault if peace parleys were not started, I
asked him to confirm this by cabling to his Government.
He has maintained that he has no means of communica-
tion with his Government excepting through our State
Department ; but I said, ‘ Of course I know that you can
communicate with your Government when you desire, for
any intelligent man can see that it would be impossible.
PLANS OF MEDIATION 347
under modem conditions, to prevent this.’ He then
admitted that he could reach them.
“ I regard my conversation with Bernstorff as satis-
factory, although should actual parleys commence I may
have difficulty in holding him to any verbal agreements
they may make. However, I kept this misgiving well
under cover.”
Three days later House received the message from
the British for which he had waited so long. It was not
entirely unequivocal, but it indicated at least that there
might be some chance of British consideration of a
German offer.
” December 20, 1914 ; At 9,45, Phillips of the State
Department telephoned to say the British Ambassador
desired to see me in the morning about a matter of
importance. I told Phillips I was leaving for New York
to-night and to ask the Ambassador to come immediately
to his house, and I would be over within five minutes.
I excused myself to the President and went to P hillip s’s
and met Spring-Rice. He had word from Sir Edward
Grey concerning our peace proposals, and thought it
would not be a good thing for the Allies to stand out
against a proposal which embraced indemnity to Belgium
and a satisfactory plan for disarmament. Sir Edward
wished me to know that this was his personal attitude.
“ I returned to the White House. The President . . .
was much elated and wanted to know whether I could go
to Europe as early as the coming Saturday. I stated that
I could go at any time. He . . . thought before I left
we could button-up our South American matters so as to
leave me free. . . .
“ December 23, 1914 : When I met Spring-Rice, he
said he had received another cablegram from Sir Edward
Grey and, while he was personally agreeable to the
suggestion made, he had not yet taken it up with his own
Cabinet, much less with the Allies. He fdt there would
be difficulties with France and Russia, and great difficulty
348 PLANS OF MEDIATION
in effecting a plan by which a permanent settlement might
be brought about. Sir Cecil wanted to go into a dis-
cussion of what such a settlement would entail. It
seemed to me footless to undertake such a discussion at
this time, for it would probably cover a period of weeks,
if not months, even after the Powers had begun parleys.
I told him it was not my idea that they should stop
fighting, even after conversations began, and that an
armistice need not be brought about until at least a
tentative understanding as to what would constitute a
permanent settlement was weU within sight.
“ He thought France would probably desire the
French part of Lorraine, and he thought Russia would
like Constantinople. He wondered if Germany would
accede to the former request. I thought that was
something to be threshed out later, and that the conversa-
tions should begin upon the broad lines of an evacuation
and indemnity for Belgium and an arrangement for a
permanent settlement of European difficulties, including
a reduction of armaments.
“ I was surprised to hear him say that the indemnity
to Belgium could be arranged, for all the Powers might
be willing to share the damages done that brave little
nation. I was also surprised to hear him say that he saw
signs of what he called ‘ a general funk among the
European nations,’ and he thought perhaps ‘ most of
them feared revolutions.’ . . .
“ He could not understand why Germany would
consent to peace parleys now when they seemingly were
so successful, and he did not believe the German military
party or the German people as a whole would permit
such conversations being brought to satisfactory con-
clusions. That was also my opinion, as far as those
two elements were concerned ; but I thought the Kaiser,
the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, and their entourage
knew that the war was already a failure and did not
dare take the risk involved, provided they could get out
of it whole now. . . .
“ Sir Cecil said he would cable Sir Edward Grey to-
PLANS OF MEDIATION
349
night and tell him of our conversation, and ask him to
feel out the Allies and let us know as soon as possible
whether it was advisable for me to come to London.
“ I asked him to explain that we had no disposition
to force the issue, but it would be inadvisable to let the
Germans have the advantage of having expressed a
willingness to begin parleys upon such terms, and then
have the Allies refuse. . . .
" Returning to the White House, I found the Pre-
sident anxiously awaiting me. After telling what had
passed, we discussed what was best to do regarding
Bemstorff, and we came to the conclusion that it would
be well to leave him alone until I had heard something
direct from the Allies ; and then we could put the ques-
tion squarely up to Bemstorff by telling him I was
ready to go to London, but he must not let me go only
to find Germany repudiating what he had said.”
V
Until December, Wilson had displayed more enthu-
siasm than House for the proposed mission to be attempted
by the Colonel. House understood the British distrust
of German sincerity and partly shared it. He realized
more keenly than the President the difficulties involved
in persuading war-blinded belligerents that compromise
was better than the risk of annihilation. And he sym-
pathized too thoroughly with the Allied point of view
to desire a compromise peace, if it meant the continued
life of German militarism.
But the crisis in our relations with the British that
threatened to result from the dispute over restrictions
on neutral trade, added a new factor. If the friendly
understanding with the British were broken, there would
be no possibility of American mediation. Furthermore,
German opinion, which during the early weeks of the
war had been friendly, wa.s becoming hostile because of
PLANS OF MEDIATION
350
the export of American munitions to the Allied countries.
Obviously no further progress towards mediation could
be made through the Ambassadors in Washington. If
he went abroad, more positive results might be secured
from the chiefs of government ; and House could at
least help to appease the anti-American sentiment that
was becoming apparent in all the belligerent nations.
He was confirmed in this feeling by messages from Gerard
and Sir Edward Grey.
Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House
Berlin, December 29, 1914
My dear Colonel :
. . . Thanks for the “ tip ” about the German
ladies (American-bom) who write home about this
Embassy.^ One is doubtless a Frau von , who
threatened me (and in writing) that she would complain
to the President because we would not accept her invita-
tion to dinner or invite her here. As a matter of fact,
we declined her invitations because we were tired, and
would have invited her here in time were it not for her
extraordinary outburst ; and now, of course, we cannot
be sand-bagged or black-jacked or blackmailed into
inviting anyone — and, anyway, the “hand of Douglas
is his own." . . .
Prospects of peace seem very dim. But in about
three months more, the plain people in every land are
going to be very sick of the business and then, unless one
side has some startling success (which all hope for in
the spring). Peace will come, grudgingly, slowly; and
we hope to see you here in the r61e of the Angel thereof.
The Germans are a little irritated just now at our
sale of munitions to the Allies. Also, because of an
^ Hoxise had waxaed Gerard, as he had Page, to be careful not to
express unneutral feeling. Complaints had come to Washington that the
American Embassy in Berlin was anti-German. It is interesting to
compare Gerard's placid reception of the warning with Mr. Page's reaction
as related in the preceding chapter*
PLANS OF MEDIATION 351
extraordinary order that “ American Ambassador shall
not inspect or visit prisons, camps, etc.,” issued by State
Department ; and they naturally feel that we cannot
protect their interests in France, England, and Russia
without such inspection. Also, they are quite " sore ”
because Chandler Anderson from our Embassy in
London was allowed to come here and inspect places
where English were confined, but when we (and this
was an express condition of allowing Anderson here)
sought to send someone from here to look at English
camps, we were met by this order (see my long cable
to Department). Have been working hard getting
cotton in and dyestuffs out.
The Emperor has been sick for a few days, but
neither I nor anyone else saw him. They say he is
quite angry at Americans over the sale of arms, but I
don't think he would shut up Krupps’ factory if we
were at war with Japan, and during the Spanish War
many munitions from Germany foimd their way to
Spain. There is no doubt, however, that a real neutrality
would stop the sale, but would our people “ stand ”
for such a curtailment of American industry ? . . .
Sincerely yours
J. W. G.
Berlin, January 20, 1915
My DEAE Colonel :
Hope you can read my writing ; but, as most of my
stenographers are doubtless in the pay of the Foreign
Office, it is safer than t3q)ewriting. . . .
Great talk in the newspapers and many anon5mious
letters, etc., coming here about sale of arms by U.S.A.
to Allies. But you never could satisfy the Germans
unless we joined them in war, gave them aU our money
and our clothes and the U.S.A. into the bargain. Besides,
it would be uimeutral to change the rules after the game
had commenced, and, anyway, the German Government
has not protested. Germany sold arms to Spain in 1898
and to Russia in the Russo-Japanese Wax, and to Huerta
PLANS OF MEDIATION
352
when we were having trouble with him ; and, in any
event, as I have said, we cannot satisfy the Germans.
They write many articles accusing the President
of being against Germany and say that Secretary
Bryan is unneutral because his son-in-law is a British
oflftcer. . . .
In the meantime, however, I seem to be getting
through most of the matters I have in hand, in spite of
the unpopularity of Americans. Why was an order sent
me from the State Department telling me not to visit
or inspect the camps of British prisoners here ? ^ That is
the only way I can get good treatment for the prisoners.
Is it because Page in London doesn't want to visit the
camps in England ? The Spanish Ambassador visits
the camps of the French and Russian prisoners, and it
is considered an essential part of the duty of an Ambas-
sador who takes over the interests of another coimtry
to inspect personally or by members of the Embassy.
Hundreds of poor devils have died already from neglect,
which I might have prevented. Germany makes no
pretence of keeping the Hague Convention about the
treatment of prisoners. I buy clothes (with funds from
English Government) for these prisoners — ^many of
whom, captured in August, have only summer clothes,
no change of underwear, and are alive with vermin.
The food given is not sufficient and the officers are sub-
jected to petty annoyances to make them revolt and get
in fights with officers of their allies. In some camps the
commanders are gentlemen as well as officers, and these
annoyances do not occur.
If business lets up a little, I shall try to see the
Emperor soon at the front and report how he feels.
Everyone here still confident, and the organization is so
wonderful I don’t see how they can lose. They will
soon undoubtedly try to blockade England with sub-
marines and attack the ports with Zeppelins as soon as
-the weather is more favourable. Zimmermann is still
^ The order was rescinded and Ambassador Gerard was permitted to
inspect the prison camps.
PLANS OF MEDIATION 353
in charge of Foreign Of&ce, as von Jagow is at the front.
I get on very well with Zimmermann. . . .
Best wishes to Mrs. House from us both.
Ever yours
James W. Gerard
German antagonism towards the United States, com-
bined with confidence in military victory, would not
facilitate a plan for American mediation. Still more
disheartening was a message from Sir Edward Grey
passed on to House by the British Ambassador in
Washington. Grey stated frankly that the British
were disappointed by the attitude of the United States
Government and were inclined to be suspicious of the
motives that actuated President Wilson.
Sir Edward Grey to Ambassador Spring-Rice
January 22, 1915
Your message received.
It win give me great pleasure to see him [House]
and talk to him freely. Of course, he understands that
all that can be promised here is that if Germany seriously
and sincerely desires peace, I will consult our friends as
to what terms of peace are acceptable.
Before, however, setting out on his journey, it is as
well that he should be informed as to the state of public
opinion here. I fear it is becoming imfavourably and
deeply impressed by the trend of action taken by the
United States Government and by its attitude towards
Great Britain. What is felt here is that while ^rmany
deliberatdy planned a war of pure aggression, has
occupied and devastated large districts in Russia,
Belgium, and France, inflicting great misery and wrong
on iimocent populations, the only act on record on the
part of the United States is a protest singling out Great
Britain as the only Power whose conduct is worthy of
reproach. . . .
1—23
354
PLANS OF MEDIATION
At the beginning of the wax there was, no doubt, a
distinct and purely American sentiment which was
stirred by the wrong done to Belgium and which approved
of our action in going into war. This feeling was no
doubt genuine and widespread and founded rather on
ideals of conduct than on race, history, or language.
But we feel that the Germans regard themselves as
partisans, that they work actively in America as every-
where else by all means in their power, for the success
in Europe of the German arms, and that they aim one
way or another at making their influence felt in the
press, in business, and in every branch of the Govern-
ment. Upon their action and upon the success which
has attended it so far, Germany founds hopes that the
attitude of the United States Government will be in-
creasingly disadvantageous to the Allies and, it may be
added, more especially to Great Britain. . . .
I can hardly believe that such a policy is deliberately
desired by any but the German- Americans in the United
States. There is, however, an impression in Europe that
there is a danger of the United States Government
insensibly drifting into such a policy. If this apprehen-
sion is realized then there can be no hope of a speedy
conclusion of the war. Germany will not relax her hold
on Bel^um ; and as for Great Britain, not to speak of
the Allies, she cannot give up the restoration of Belgium
unless and until she has exhausted all her resources and
has herself shared Belgium’s fate.
This is what people here are beginning to feel, and I
should like him [House] to know it. The feeling has
not yet found widespread public expression, but it is
there and it is growing. In the struggle for existence
in which this country is at stake, much store is set in
England on the good-wiU of the United States; and
people cannot beheve that the United States desires to
paralyse the advantage which we derive from our sea
power, while leaving intact to Germany those military
and scientific advantages which are special to her.
I think it is only fair that he shoifid be warned that
PLANS OF MEDIATION 355
shoTild people in England come to believe that the
dominant influence in United States politics is German,
it would tend to create an untoward state of public
opinion which we should greatly regret.
The above is purely personal and must be so regarded ;
but I think it is my duty under the circumstances to
give this personal and friendly warning as to the probable
trend of public sentiment.
E. Grey
British opinion, as expressed by Grey, of the official
attitude assumed by the United States, was to a large
degree unjustified and rested more upon emotion than
upon fact. If the only protests raised by America had
been directed against the British, this was because the
only flagrant interference with American neutral rights,
thus far, proceeded from the application of the British
Orders in Council. British fear of German intrigues
that might influence the policy of the United States was
without foundation. If it was true that the German-
Americans were agitating for an embargo upon munitions
of war, it was equally true that the Government stead-
fastly refused to permit the embargo ; thus the United
States had not merely asserted their neutral rights of
export as against the demands of Germany and German-
Americans, and incidentally incurred German ill-will,
but at the same time supplied what Grey himself termed
the “ need of the Allies.”
These facts were evidently not clearly appreciated
by the British Government or people. There was all
the more reason for sending to England someone capable
of emphasizing them and explaining the American point
of view.
Early in January, House decided to make the ven-
ture.
356
PLANS OF MEDIATION
VI
“ January 12, 1915 : I took the 12.08 for Washington.
I found Samuel Huston Thompson of the Department of
Justice, and H. C. Wallace on the train. At Baltimore,
Davies and Harris, Director of the Census, met me ; so,
altogether, I had no rest.
“ McAdoo and Grayson were at the station to meet
me. After I had dressed for dinner, I went into the
President’s study ; and m a few minutes he came in.
We had exactly twelve minutes’ conversation before
dinn er, and during those twelve minutes it was decided
that I should go to Europe on January 30. I had
practically decided before I came to Washington that
this was necessary, and I was certain, when I gave my
thoughts to the President, he would agree with me it
was the best thing to do.
“ I thought we had done all we could do with the
Ambassadors at Washington, and that we were now
travdhng in a circle. It was time to deal directly with
the principals. I had a feeling we were losing ground
and were not in as close touch with the Allies as we had
been, and that it was essential to take the matter up
directly with Loudon and afterwards with Berlin.
“There were no visitors for dinner. After dinner
the President read from A. G. Gardiner's sketches of
prominent men imtil half-past eight, when Senator La
FoUette came. When he left, the President resumed
his reading. I was surprised that he preferred to do
this rather than discuss the matters of importance we
had between us. He evidently had confidence in my
doing the work I came to Washington for, without his
help. . .
“ Jarmary 13, 1915 : After breakfast this morning
the President and I strolled from the elevator to his
study, in which time I told him of my plans for the day ;
^ The primary reason for this trip to Washington was to confer with
Naon, da Gama, and Snarez upon the Pan-American Pact, for House was
at this time carrying on a three-ring drcus of negotiations.
PLANS OF MEDIATION 357
that is, I should see the South American Ambassadors,
the British Ambassador, and Mr. Bryan. I considered
it important for us to decide what reason to give Spring-
Rice for my going over. I thought it was best to tell
him I wanted to try out the Germans, and the President
said, ‘ Of course, if you stop over in London and see
the British Government in the meantime, that would be
expected and could not offend the sensibilities of the
British Ambassador.'
“ I met Spring-Rice at Phillips' at 10.45. I found
him in rather a sulky mood. He began to talk about
this country's attitude towards the Allies, and indicated
that the Allies would not receive the good of&ces of the
President cordially. I soon got him in a good humour
by teUing him what a wonderful thing it would be to
have the United States throw its great moral strength
in behalf of a permanent settlement, and it was my
purpose not to discuss terms with Germany so much
as to discuss a plan which would ensure permanent
peace.
“ He thought this fine, and said I had hit the nail on
the head. I told him how strongly the President felt
upon obtaining a permanent settlement, and that it
was not his intention to suggest any cessation of fighting
until this condition had been agreed to by all the bel-
ligerents. He approved this programme, and thought
if I explained it to Sir Edward Grey when I went to
London, he would cordially approve. He wanted me
to talk to the Russian and French Ambassadors and tell
them of my purpose, as they might take offence at not
being called into conference. My judgment was, not to
see them ; b\it I yielded to his advice. We agreed that
we should all meet at Phillips' at four o'clock. . . .
“ I was the first to arrive, then came Spring-Rice and,
later, Jusserand and Bakhmetieff [^e French and
Russian Ambassadors]. I had asked Sir Cedi to inform
the other two Ambassadors of om conversation in the
morning and to get them into a receptive frame of
mind. He evidently had not done so, and he was not
PLANS OF MEDIATION
358
particularly nice in helping me out. It was rather
awkward at first. Both Jusserand and Bakhmetieff
were violent in their denunciation of the Germans and
evinced a total lack of belief in their sincerity. They
thought my mission would be entirely fruitless.
“ Later, I brought them around to the view that at
least it would be well worth while to find how utterly
unreliable and treacherous the Germans were, by expos-
ing their false pretences of peace to the world. That
suited them better, and it was not a great while before
we were all making merry and they were offering me
every facility to meet the heads of their Governments.
I foirnd them somewhat sensitive about my going to
London and Berlin ; each thought Petrograd and Paris
should also be visited. I agreed to this, but made a
mental reservation that it would be late in the spring
before I could get as far as Russia. . . .
“ I gave Mr. Bryan a summary of my day’s work
with the European Ambassadors and of what the Presi-
dent desired me to do. He was distinctly disappointed
when he heard I was to go to Europe as the peace
emissary. He said he had planned to do this him-
self. . . .
“ I replied that the President thought it would be
unwise for anyone to do this officially, and that his
going would attract a great deal of attention and people
would wonder why he was there. . . .
“ He was generous enough to say that, if he did not
go in an official way, I was the one best fitted to go in
an unofficial way. . , .
“ The President and I got down to work. We agreed
upon a code to be used between us in sending cable
messages while I am abroad. I thought he should write
me a letter of instructions — ^something that I need not
let go out of my hands, but which I might show in the
event it was necessary for me to go to countries where
I was not well known.
" Together we outlined what this letter should con-
tain, and he is to send me a draft of it in a day or two
PLANS OF MEDIATION
359
for me to look over and make suggestions which seem
pertinent. He said he would write it himself on his
little typewriter, so that not even his confidential steno-
grapher would know of it. . . .
" January 14, 1915 : Count von Bemstorff called at
2.30. We had an interesting and satisfactory talk, and
he expressed pleasure that I was going to Europe so
soon and said he would notify his Government at once.
I told him frankly of my meeting with the Alhed Ambas-
sadors yesterday, and that none of them thought the
Germans were sincere in their desire for peace. . . .
" I suggested he advise his Government not to make
useless and sensational raids upon England by Zeppelins
or otherwise, for they could do nothing effective from a
military standpoint and would merely destroy non-
combatants, and that such raids would have a very bad
effect upon my endeavours. . . .
" January 20, 1915 : I asked the German Ambassador
to come to see me this morning at twelve. . . .
“ I asked him again, for the love of Heaven, to stop
his people from killing non-combatants in England by
dropping bombs. The attempt yesterday upon San-
dringham, had it been successful, would have made
impossible any discussion of peace. He promised to
send this view to his Government, although he could
not promise definite results, for the reason that the
military and not the civil authorities dominated. He is
to inform his Government of my expectation to be in
Berlin soon after the middle of next month.”
VII
House returned to New York for his final prepara-
tions. He had many affairs to wind up, for besides the
negotiations he had been conducting with the European
diplomats regarding the possibility of mediation, and
with the South Americans regarding the Pan-American
Pact, he had also on his hands many details of local
politics which, with his continued residence in New
36o plans of mediation
York, were gently steered in his direction. He did not
expect to remain long in Europe. As matters turned
out, he stayed there for nearly six months.
Nothing illustrates so exactly the President’s purpose
in sending him abroad as the letter of credentials which
House was to carry. In this letter Wilson emphasizes
the fact that House was representing not an oflSicial
attempt at mediation, but merely the desire of the
President to serve as a channel for confidential com-
munication through which the belligerent nations might
exchange views with regard to terms upon which the
present conflict might be ended and future conflicts
rendered less likely. He disclaimed himself any desire
to indicate terms or to play the part of judge, but merely
that of the disinterested friend who had nothing at
stake except interest in the peace of the world.
European despatches which at the last moment the
President forwarded to House, gave cause for both
hope and anxiety. The temper of the Germans was not
reassuring. The British were likely to be reasonable,
but they must always reckon with the territorial am-
bitions of France and Russia, which would prove a
stumbling-block to a peace based on the status quo ante.
Ambassador W. H. Page to Secretary Bryan
London, January 15, 1915
I lunched to-day with General French^ who came
here secretly for a council of, war. He talked, .of course,
in profound confidence.
He says the military situation is a stalemate. The
Germans cannot get to Paris or to Calais. On the other
hand, it will take the Allies a year, perhaps two years,
and an incalculable loss of men, to drive the Germans
through Belgium. It would take perhaps four years
^ Commaader-in-Chief of the B.E,F,
PLANS OF MEDIATION
361
and an unlimited number of men to invade Germany.
He has little confidence in the ability of Russian aid in
conquest of Germany. Russia has whipped Austria and
will whip Turkey, but he hopes for little more from her.
Speaking only for himself and in the profoundest
confidence, he told me of a peace proposal which he said
the President, at Germany’s request, has submitted to
England. He tells me that this proposal is to end the
war on condition that Germany gives up Belgium and
pays for its restoration. French's personal opinion is
that England would have to accept such an offer if it
should be accompanied with additional offers to satisfy
the other allies, such, for example, as the restoration
to France of Alsace-Lorraine and the agreement that
Russia shall have Constantinople. . . .
American Ambassador, London
Ambassador Gerard to the President
Berun, January 24, 1915
I do not think that the people in America realize how
excited the Germans have become on the question of
selling munitions of war by Americans to the Allies.
A veritable campaign of hate has been commenced
against America and Americans. ...
Zimmermann showed me a long list, evidentiy
obtained by an effective spy system, of orders placed with
American concerns by the AUies. He said that perhaps
it was as well to have the whole world against Germany,
and that in case of trouble there were five hunted
thousand trained Germans in America who would join
the Irish and start a revolution. I thought at first he
was joking, but he was actually serious. The fact that
our six army observers are still here in Germany ^d not
sent to the front is a noteworthy indication. Zimmer-
mann’s talk was largely ridiculous, and, impossible ^
it to us, it would not surprise me to see this
maddened nation-in-anns go to lengths however extreme.
Gerakd
362 PLANS OF MEDIATION
VIII
Before sailing. House spent another twenty-four
hours in Washington, partly to make final arrangements,
chiefly to have the pleasure of personal farewell with
the President, who at no time in his career showed
himself more appreciative of the Colonel’s efforts.
“ January 24, 1915 : I left to-day on the 12.08 for
Washington. There was no one I knew on the train
and I had a quiet and restful trip. Dr. Grayson met
me in a White House car. The President was waiting
for me and we immediately began to work and remained
at it continuously for more than an hour, dela3dng dinner
ten or fifteen minutes, which is a most unusual thing
for the President to do. . . .
“ He insisted upon arranging for my expenses abroad
and for those of my secretary. Miss Denton. I let him
know how trustworthy she was, so he would not think
me indiscreet in writing through her about matters of
an important and confidential nature. He asked me
to tell Sir Edward Grey his entire mind, so he would
know what his intentions were about everything. . . .
He said, ‘ Let him know that while you are abroad, I
expect to act directly through you and to eliminate all
intermediaries.’
“ He approved all I had in mind to say to Sir Edward
and to the Germans. He said, * There is not nrmr.'h for
us to talk over, for the reason we are both of the same
mind and it is not necessary to go into details with you.’
“ I asked if it would be possible for him to come over
to Europe in the event a peace conference could be
arranged and in the event he was invited to preside
over the conference. He thought it would be well to
do this and that the American people would desire
it.i ...
“January 25, 1915: I went to Phillips’ at ten
^ As events developed, when it came to the actual decision in the
autumn of 1918 Colonel House did not favour Wilson's going to Europe.
PLANS OF MEDIATION 363
o'clock to meet the British Ambassador. He seemed
pleased that I was holding to my intention to leave on
Saturday. I again requested that he arrange with Sir
Edward Grey, by cable, an engagement immediately
upon my arrival. He said Sir Edward left Saturday
afternoons and did not return until Monday morning,
but, if I thought best, he knew Sir Edward would remain
in town. I did not consider this necessary, for my boat
would probably get in Saturday and I would not be
in London until Sunday ; therefore Monday would be
time enough. He is cabling Sir Edward to ask me for
lunch on Monday.
“ Spring-Rice talked optimistically one minute, and
pessimistically the next, absolutely contradicting him-
self. ... He warned me that I should probably encounter
sentiment in England hostile to my mission, based upon
the belief that it was possibly actuated by a desire to
help Germany. He said there was a party there which
would seize upon any excuse for an early peace, and
that they resembled the ‘ Copperheads ' of the North
during our Civil War. I replied that he need not worry
about my giving them comfort. . . .
" Phillips explained the arrangements he had made
concerning money for my expenses. I dislike taking
money even for them. I have never been paid by
either a state or national Government for my services,
and, while I am not being paid for them now, I have
heretofore paid my expenses. I do not feel able to meet
the expenses of such a trip as this, and it lifts a load
from me to have the Government pay them. It was
agreed that $4,000 should be placed to my credit at
once. I have a feeling this will last for six montfe. . . .
“ It then came time to say good-bye. The President’s
eyes were moist when he said his last words of farewell.
He said : ‘ Your unselfish and intelligent frien^hip
has meant much to me,' and he expressed his gratitude
again and again, calling me his ‘ most trusted friend.'
He declared I was the only one in all the world to whom
he could open his entire mind.
364 PLANS OF MEDIATION
" I asked if he remembered the first day we met,
some three and a half years ago. He replied, ‘ Yes,
but we had known one another always, and merely
came in touch then, for our purposes and thoughts
were as one.’ I told him how much he had been to
me ; how I had tried all my life to find someone with
whom I could work out the things I had so deeply at
heart, and I had begun to despair, believing my life
would be more or less a failure, when he came into it,
giving me the opportunity for wliich I had been longing.
“ He insisted upon going to the station with me.
He got out of the car and walked through the station
and to the ticket office, and then to the train itself,
refusing to leave until I entered the car. It is a joy to
work for such an appreciative friend.”
CHAPTER XII
A QUEST FOR PEACE
If every belligerent nation had a Sir Edward Grey at the head of its
affairs, there would be no war. . . .
Extract from Diary of Colonel Hotcse, February 7, 1915
I
O N January 30, 1915/ Colonel House sailed from
New York upon the Lusitama. It was one of
the last of her voyages. For House it was one of
thefirst of the adventurous missions in which he attempted
to translate into fact his doctrine that a new code of
international ethics must be impressed upon the nations
by demanding from Governments the same standard
of morals as that which applies to individuals. This
doctrine had proved the soul of his first mission of the
year before, the Great Adventure, when he tried to bring
about an understanding between the European States
which would prevent the war he foresaw. He kept
it constantly in mind as he approached the war zone in
this attempt to discover some means by which a path
to peace could be blazed and bases of pamanent peace
be laid.
House left no trace of overconfidence. The emotions
aroused in Europe were of such intensity that no well-
informed person could be hopeful of fin di ng a pacific
opening ; and the Colonel was extremely well informed.
The complexities were such that the least gaucherie
would produce an "inddent” that might not merdy
ruin the influence of the United States, but even endanger
365
366 A QUEST FOR PEACE
her friendly relations with a bdligerent Power. For
this reason, if for no other, the mission must be unofficial.
Mr. Bryan had told the Colonel that he was the one best
fitted for the task. “ I hope he may be right,” wrote
House, ” for I am leaving with much trepidation. The
undertaking is so great, and the difficulties are so many,
that to do it alone and practically without consultation
or help from anyone, is as much of a task as even I,
with all my willingness to assume responsibility, desire.”
However difficult and delicate. Colonel House re-
garded the attempt as necessary. No matter how slight
the chance of peace, that chance should be pursued upon
every occasion. Europe was caught in a horror from
which she could not rescue herself ; if an outsider could
help, the duty was imperative. Furthermore, as the
war proceeded, feeling in the belligerent countries
turned against the neutrals and especially the greatest
neutral, the United States. ” He that is not with me is
against me.” No one was better fitted than House to
explain the motives of the United States Government,
for he was the closest friend of the President.
Whatever the Colonel's trepidation, and a brave
man always confesses nervousness, he must have been
heartened by the confidence of a man who had watched
him in the political crises of Texas for thirty years, the
captain of Rangers, Bill McDonald.
Captain W. J. McDonald to Colonel House
Dallas, Texas, February 6, 1915
My dear Ed :
... If I could have seen you before you left for
Europe, I would have tried my utmost to persuade you
not to take this trip on account of the waters being
mined as well as other dangerous conditions in that
A QUEST FOR PEACE 367
Country. Don’t suppose it would have done any good,
though, after you decided to go, as you and I are very
much alike when we make up our minds to go against
anything. I am not certain of your mission there, but
am sure you will make a success as you generally do when
you take hold.
Wishing you a pleasant time and a safe return to
Texas, I am
As ever yours
W. J. McDonald
In view of the tragic fate of the Lusitania, three
months later, the voyage of House in February holds
some sentimental interest.
" February 5, 1915 : Our voyage has about come to
a close. The fost two days we had summer seas, but
just after passing the Banks a gale came shrieking down
from Labrador and it looked as if we might perish. I have
never witnessed so great a storm at sea. It lasted for
twenty-four hours, and the Lusitania, big as she is,
tossed about like a cork in the rapids.
“ This afternoon, as we approached the Irish coast,
the American flag was raised. It created much excite-
ment, and comment and speculation ranged in every
direction. . . .
“ February 6, 1915 : I found from Mr. Beresford,
Lord Decies' brother, who crossed with us, that Captain
Dow had been greatly alarmed the night before and had
asked him, Beresford, to remain with him on the bridge
all night. He expected to be torpedoed, and that was
the reason for raising the American flag. .I_can see
many possible complications arising from this incident.
Every newspaper in London has asked me about it, but,
fortunately, I was not an eye-witness to it and have been
able to say that I only knew it from hearsay.
“ The alarm of the Captain for the safety of his boat
caused him to map out a complete programme for the
saving of passengers, the launclumg of lifeboats, etc., etc.
368 A QUEST FOR PEACE
He told Beresford if the boilers were not struck by the
torpedoes, the boat could remain afloat for at least an
hour, and in that time he would endeavour to save the
passengers.
“Ambassador Page met us upon our arrival. So
also did the representatives of nearly every New York
paper. They wished to know when they might have a
talk with me. I told them they could do so then, for
I would tell them as much as I would later — ^which
would be nothing at all.”
Colonel House had all the advantage of being already
upon intimate terms with the British statesmen, so that
he need not waste time in preliminaries. Characteristic-
ally, however, he waited until he learned the essentials
of the European situation as the British saw them,
before he suggested the possibility of peace negotiations.
And always he gave the impression of one who came to
discover methods rather than as a meddler with an
id^e fixe.
Colonel House to the President
London, February 9, 1915
Dear Governor:
We arrived here Saturday afternoon, and I immedi-
ately arranged a private conference with Grey for eleven
o'clock Sunday morning. We talked steadily for two
hours and then he insisted upon my remaining for lunch,
so I did not leave until two-thirty.
We discussed the situation as frankly as you and I
would have done in Washington, and, as far as I diuld
judge, there was no reservation. He said several times,
" I am thinking aloud, so do not take what I say as
^al, but merdy as a means of reasoning the whole
subject out with you.”
I gave him your book, which pleased him, and he
regretted that the only thing he could give you in return
was a book he had written on angling.
A QUEST FOR PEACE 369
We went into every phase of the situation, he te lling
me frankly the position the Allies were in, their diffi-
culties, their resources, and their expectations. That
part of it is not as encouraging as I had hoped, particu-
larly in regard to Italy and Rumania. There is no
danger of their going with Germany, but there is con-
siderable doubt whether they will go with the Allies.
Germany’s success has made them timid and there is
also difficulty in regard to Bulgaria. Up to now it has
been impossible to harmonize the differences between
Bulgaria and Serbia. Germany is making tremendous
efforts at present to impress Itiy and Rumania to keep
them from participating. If the differences between
Bulgaria and Serbia could be adjusted, Rumania would
come in at once and so probably would Greece ; but
they are afraid to do so as long as Bulgaria is not satisfied.
The difficulty with Russia is not one of men, but of
transportation. They have not adequately provided
for this, while Germany has to the smallest detail. It
prevents them from putting at the front and maintaining
more than one and one-hali million to two million men.
The most interesting part of the discussion was what
the final terms of settlement might be and how the
difficult question of armaments could be adjusted. . . .
He went into the discussion of what Russia and
France would demand. I told him if France insisted
upon Alsace-Lorraine, I would suggest that a counter-
proposition should be made to neutralize them in some
such way as Luxembourg now is. This would prevent
the two [France and Germany] from touching any-
where and they could only get at one miother by sea.^
He thought that Russia might be satisfied with Con-
stantinople, and we discussed that in some detail. ^
I let Wm know that your only interest was in bringing
them together and that you had no desire to suggest
terms, and that what I was saying was merely my per-
sonal view, expressed to him in confidence and as be-
tween friends.
* Compaxe tiie dexnilitaxized zone finally arranged in 1925.
I — 24
370
A QUEST FOR PEACE
There was one thing Grey was fairly insistent upon,
and that was that we should come into some general
guaranty for world-wide peace. I evaded this by
suggesting that a separate convention should be par-
ticipated in by aU neutrals as well as the present belli-
gerents, which should lay down the principles upon
which civilized warfare should in the future be con-
ducted. In other words, it would merely be the assem-
b^g at The Hague and the adopting of rules governing
the game. He did not accept this as our fuU duty, but
we passed on to other things. . . .
I am making a point to influence opinion over here
favourably to you and to America. There has been
considerable criticism of us, and I was told that at a
public meeting the other day, when the name of the
United States was mentioned, there was some hissing.
I find, though, that intelligent people over here are
wholly satisfied with your course. I took tea yesterday
with one of the editorial writers of The Times and dined
with the Managing Editor last night. To-night I dine
with our friend A. G. Gardiner. I shall write you about
that later.
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
In a separate memorandum, Colonel House noted :
" When we had finished tzilking. Sir Edward smiled
and said, ‘ Here I am helping to direct the affairs of a
nation at war, and yet I have been talking for three and
a half hours like a neutral.’ . . .
“ I put questions to him with great rapidity, so as
to find what dif&culties were necessary to overcome.
He answered with the utmost candour, teUing me the
whole story as he would to a member of his own Govern-
ment. It was an extraordinary conversation, and I
fed complimented beyond measure that he has such
confidence in my discretion and integrity.
“ .1 have many times expressed my high regard for
A QUEST FOR PEACE 371
the character of Sir Edward Grey, but I wish to reiterate
it here. If every belligerent nation had a Sir Edward
Grey at the head of its affairs, there would be no war ;
and if there were war, it would soon be ended upon
lines broad enough to satisfy any excepting the pre-
judiced and selfish.”
The conversation is significant, not merely because
it indicates the embarrassment which the territorial
aspirations of France and Russia then and always caused
the British, but also because of Grey's suggestion that
the United States should co-operate at the end of the
war in a general organization designed to guarantee peace.
Even more significant was the reiteration by House
of his earlier plan, providing for a scheme of Hmiting
armaments and a guaranty of territorial integrity.
The two men who sat discussing these questions
before and after lunch, were destined to play a large part
in the creation of the League of Nations. Grey from
the very beginning of the war insisted that it might have
been prevented if the conference he had proposed had
been accepted by Germany ; he never wavered in his
conviction that until some international mechanism were
established capable of providing a permanent inter-
national conference, the world would not be safe from the
menace of war. Through Colonel House the conviction
was ultimately impressed upon President Wilson and
was finally translated into the Covenant of the League.
And in the drafting of that Covenant the ideas and the
diplomacy of Colonel House became of the utmost
importance.
n
Colonel House arrived in England at the moment
that Germany embarked upon a momentous course,
372 A QUEST FOR PEACE
which still more envenomed the feeling between the
belligerents and intensified the difficulties of his mission.
The military events of the autumn had disarranged
German plans, for the surprising speed of the Russian
mobilization, the success of the Russian invasion of
Austrian Galicia, and the incursion into East Prussia
compelled Germany to make a counter-attack in the
East at the moment when the Germans had hoped to
concentrate their main force upon the defeat of F^rance.
Hindenburg triumphantly drove the Russians out of
East Prussia, but his attack on Russian Poland failed.
In order to rob the Russians of further offensive power,
it seemed necessary to carry through the conquest of
Poland and to liberate Galicia. This attack upon the
Russian armies was the more important in that negotia-
tions for an Austro-Italian settlement were not proceed-
ing smoothly and there appeared imminent danger that
Italy might join the Allies. To meet this new enemy,
Austria must be freed from the threat of Russian attacks.
If Germany mobilized her main strength in the East,
she would be rmable to push a vigorous offensive against
the French and British in the West. But here she
possessed one great advantage, a superiority of muni-
tions, and upon this she coimted. It was vital that
Great Britain, slow in the production of her own muni-
tions, should not be permitted to import them from
America, which always refused to lay an embargo.
Hence Germany's determination to utilize the submarine.
Taking as a pretext the British restrictions upon
the entrance of foodstuffs into Germany, a new depar-
ture which the Germans regarded as worthy of retaliation,
they proclaimed a "war zone" around the British
Isles to take effect upon February i8, 1915. After that
date, they threatened, German submarines would
A QUEST FOR PEACE 373
destroy any enemy merchant ship in this zone, without
regard for the safety of the passengers or crews of the
vessels attacked. They warned neutral shipping of the
peril that would attend entrance into the war zone,
since mistakes might occur, especially if belligerent
ships continued the practice of raising neutral flags.
The response of the American Government was
prompt and definite. It warned Great Britain of the
peril inherent in the unauthorized use of the American
flag. In more solemn phrases it warned Germany that
if submarines should " destroy on the high seas an
American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it
would be difficult for the Government of the United
States to view the act in any other light than as an
indefensible violation of neutral rights. . . . The Govern-
ment of the United States would be constrained to hold
the Imperial German Government to a strict "Siccount-
ability for such acts of their naval authorities and to
take any steps it might be necessary to take to safe-
guard American lives and property and to secure to
American citizens the fuU enjoyment of their acknow-
ledged rights on the high seas.”
These new developments complicated House’s mis-
sion, but did not alter his underlying purpose, which was
to proceed to Berlin after his conversations with the
British, provided he received a direct intimation that
the Germans would receive him. The Colonel refused
to go to Germany unless invited. At Washington,
Bemstorff kept insisting that his Government wanted
House and through him would express their desire for
a “ reasonable ” peace. On February 13, Wilson cabled
House that he was stimulating German interest in peace
through Bemstorff, who was confident that a letter of
invitation was on the way..
374
A QUEST FOR PEACE
House spent long hours almost daily with the ofi&cials
of the Foreign Of&ce, for he realized that a complete
understanding was necessary both as regards trade
disputes and the possibility of peace discussions. His
proposed trip to Germany would be fruitless unless the
British approved. He was anxious also to discuss the
bases upon which a permanent world peace could be
founded, something beyond the ending of the war and a
settlement of the territorial aspirations of the warring
States.
" February lo, 1915 : I limched with our Ambassador
[the Colonel recorded] to meet Sir Edward Grey and
Sir William Tyrrell. I wish I could give in detail every
word of the conversation, for it was freighted with
importance. We discussed at length the question of
whether Germany was in earnest about beginning peace
parleys. I maintained that she was, and that she was
sparring for advantage ; that she desired me to come
on Bemstorff's invitation, unsolicited by the Govern-
ment, in order that they might say, in the event nego-
tiations failed, that they had never been a party to them.
“ Sir Edward thought the Germans were not ready
for parleys, but were fencing for the purpose of getting
the Allies at a disadvantage so that they might say to
Ferdinand of Bulgaria and others that the Allies were
making overtures for peace. I took the view that,
while it was doubtful whether the military party was
-yet ready for peace, I felt certain the Kaiser and his
entourage were.
" Sir Edward said he had told Delcass 4 , French
Minister for Foreign Affairs, of my visit and of our
conversations of Sunday. Delcass^ thought that the
Allies had not yet achieved sufficient military success
to begin negotiations, and he believes with Sir Edward
that the Germans are insincere.
" Among other things. Grey told me that the British
Ambassador [Sir Francis Bertie] at Paris had sent him
A QUEST FOR PEACE 375
a despatch advising him of my presence in London and
suggesting that he get in touch with me. This amused
us all very much.
“ Grey and I did practically all the talking, Page
and Tyrrell joining in every now and then. We went
over some of the ground we had covered Sunday, regard-
ing a permanent settlement, and Sir Edward reverted
to his view that our Government should be a party to
the making of peace. Much to my surprise. Page
thought this would be possible and advisable. I told
Sir Edward more directly than I did on Sunday that we
could not do so ; that it was not only the unwritten
law of our country but also our fixed policy, not to
become involved in European affairs.^
“ Tyrrell said we had not always followed this policy
reciting the Algeciras incident. Page also cited the
Perry and Morocco Pirates incident. I held, neverthe-
less, that it would be impossible and that all we could
do would be to join the neutrals and belligerents in a
separate convention after the peace covenant was drawn
up and signed by the belligerents. I told Grey that it
would be impossible for our Government to take part
in such questions as what should become of Alsace-
Lorraine and Constantinople, and that we could not be
a party to the making of the actual terms of peace, which
this first convention must necessarily cover. I felt
sure, though, that our Government would be willing to
join all nations in setting forth clearly the rights of
belligerents in the future and agreeing upon rules
of warfare that would take away much of the horror of
war.
" I suggested that this covenant should forbid the
killing of non-combatants by aircraft, the violation of
neutral territory, and the setting forth of certain lanes
^ House was evidently uncertain of Wilson's willingness to become
entangled in European politics and realized the national prejudice against
such entanglements. The covenant he proposed would not involve
the United States in any purely European problems. Our participation
in the war^ naturally^ altered his opinion as to the necessity of participating
in a peace cojiference.
376 A QUEST FOR PEACE
of safety at sea in order that shipping of all countries,
both belligerent and neutral, would not be subject to
attack when they were in those lanes.
“ Sir Edward amended this latter suggestion by
sa3dng he thought Great Britain would be w illing to
agree that all merchant shipping of whatever nature,
belligerent or neutral, would be immune. I accepted
the amendment and was pleased to know that Great
Britain stood ready to go so far.
“ February ii, 1915 : I lunched with Sir William
Tyrrell to-day and we had a most interesting conversa-
tion. He spoke with entire frankness. . . .
" Tyrrell believed that in the convention I suggested
yesterday, if an agreement should be made between all
the Powers, neutral and belligerent, to establish rules
governing future warfare. Great Britain would consent
to the absolute freedom of merchantmen of all nations
to sail the seas in time of war unmolested. This was
brought out in our conference yesterday, but T3nTell
developed in his conversation to-day that Great Britain
recognized that the submarine had changed the status
of maritime warfare and in the future Great Britain
would be better protected by such a policy than she has
been in the past by maintaining an overwhelming navy.” ^
The conversations were significant, for this is the
germ of the idea soon to be developed by House, which
he later termed the " Freedom of the Seas.” As Grey
and TjrrreU realized, the practical application of the
idea would be of immense value to Great Britain, an
island depending for its life upon the continuity of its
merchant trade. But House saw that the Germans,
blockaded as they were and also largely dependent upon
overseas trade, would be attracted by it. It might
•serve as the beginning of negotiations.
The fact which must touch the sense of humour of
^ Gx&z already advocated this policy in his instructions to the
British Delegation to the Second Hague Conference, 1907.
A QUEST FOR PEACE 377
the historian is that the " Freedom of the Seas,” later
so bitterly opposed by the British and regarded gener-
ally as a German trick, was first suggested by the British
Foreign Of&ce as a means of furthering British interests.
in
On February 12 House received the invitation from
the Germans for which he had been waiting. It was
not entirely satisfactory, for Zimmermann demurred
at the suggestion of an indemnity for Belgium, but it gave
the opening if the Colonel thought best to use it.
Herr Zimmermann to Colond House
My dear Colonel : bzsus. February 4 , 1915
... I read with interest what you were good enough
to write with reference to the desired interchange of
opinion. While we are quite ready, as I wrote you
before, to do our share to bring about the desired termina-
tion of the war, at the same time there are certain Emits
which we are unable to overstep.
What you suggest concerning the pa3nng of an
indemnity to Belgium seems hardly feasible to me. Our
campaign in that coimtry has cost the German nation
such infinite sacrifices of hmnan lives that an3d:hmg in
the form of such a decided 3delding to the wishes of our
opponents would cause the most bitter feeling among
our people.
I heard that you are on your way to England at this
moment and that a trip to Germany is in view. I shall
be most happy to see you, should you cany out your
intention, and shall hope for a personal interview more
satisfactory than is possible through correspondence by
letter.
With kindest regards, I am
My dear Colonel
Sincerely yours
Zimmermann
378 A QUEST FOR PEACE
" February 13, 1015 : I lunched alone with Sir Ed-
ward Grey [recorded House] at 33 Eccleston Square,
which, by the way, he leases from Winston Churchill.
We had a very simple lunch, and I made it a point not to
talk business while we were at the table. We talked
of nature, solitude, Wordsworth. ... He told of Roose-
velt’s visit with him in the New Forest, and how it
occurred. Roosevelt sent him word he would like very
much to hear the song-birds of England, and Sir Edward
undertook to gratify this wish. He said they heard
forty-one distinct voices, no one of which Roosevelt
recognized excepting the golden-crested wren, which I
believe we also have in America.
“ In speaking of Wordsworth, I asked if he went often
to the English lake district. He replied that he had
never been, that his country home was so much more
attractive to him than any other place on earth that
when he had time he always went there. He is the
least travelled man of prominence I have ever known.
" When we went to the library, I showed him Zimmer-
mann’s letter and we discussed it long and carefully. I
thought it was up to him and to me to decide when to
begin negotiations for peace. As far as I was concerned,
I did not want them to begin one moment before the
time was ripe for a peace that would justify the sacrifices
of the brave who had already given their lives, for it
was even better for others to die if the right settlement
could be brought about in no other way. On the other
hand, neither of us would want to sacrifice one single
life uselessly; and if we could accomplish now the
desired result, we should do it.
" We went over the entire ground and discussed it
in this spirit. I had a feeling that the sooner I went,
the better — for our relations with Germany were growing
worse, and soon I might not be welcome. I was afraid
some foolish or wanton outrage, either by air or sea,
might be committed which would so set opinion against
Germany as to make it impossible for his Government
to begin any discussion.
A QUEST FOR PEACE 379
" "We sat by the fire in his library, facing one another,
discussing every phase of the situation with a single
mind and purpose. He had information that Germany
was starting an enveloping movement upon the Russian
front with a view of impressing the Balkan States and,
if she was successful in this, it might be that Bulgaria
would come into the war — ^not, perhaps, against &eat
Britain or Russia, but against Serbia, which would be
much the same thing.
“ He told me of the plan to convey Enghsh troops
to Salonika and to take them that way into Serbia. He
thought if as many as 200,000 British troops could be
safely taken there, Greece would gladly join the Allies.
He did not think it fair to Greece to let her come into the
war without some protection. The difficulty, he ex-
plained, was the maintenance of the troops after they
were there, since only a single track railway ran into
Serbia.
“ He said they had never tried to influence Holland
to come into the war, for they had not been able to send
sufficient troops there to protect her from an invasion
in the event she declared war on Germany. He thought
if Germany succeeded in the present enveloping move-
ment [in the East], she would then turn to the West and
again try to break through the lines and reach Paris.
" In conclusion, he did not think it wise for me to
undertake a peace mission to Germany until after this
enveloping movement had either succeeded or failed, for
he did not believe the civil Government would be able
to do anything in the direction of peace until von Hinden-
burg and the other military men had tried out their
different campaigns.
'* It was finally agreed that we should defer a decision
until after I had lunched with the Prime Minister on
Wednesday. He had told none of the Cabinet about our
conversations, but he had made notes and it was his
purpose to discuss them with the Prime Minister and no
one else at present. . . .
“ February 14, 1915 ; Sir Edward Grey told me
38o a quest for PEACE
yesterday that when this war was over, he intended to
retire for a year and rest. I advised retiring perman-
ently, for he would probably have taken so great a part
in this European conflict, that to do anything else after-
wards would be like a great artist going out in his back
yard and painting the fence. He . . . looked at me
wide-eyed and serious.”
Colonel House to the President
Dear Governor :
... I am still undecided as to what to do about
Berlin. The difficulties are these : This Government
[the British] has to be extremely careful about giving
us any encouragement whatever. They do not dare
say what they actually fed, not only because it might
make England’s position misunderstood in Germany,
but also because it would meet with a storm of disap-
proval here, for the reason that no one believes that
anything like the kind of terms that England will demand
will be met now.
As a matter of fact, there is no feeling whatever,
excepting among a very small circle, for anything out
of the war excepting a permanent settlement, evacua-
tion, and indemnity to Bdgium ; but no one believes
that Germany is ready for such terms.
Germany, on the other hand, is now controlled
almost wholly by the militarists. There is a peace party
there as there is here, and both, strangdy enough, are
conducting the civil Governments. Those here are
much more powerftil to act than those in Germany,
where I believe they have but little power. As long as
the military forces of Germany are successful as now,
the militarists wiU not permit any suggestion of peace
I am formulating in my own mind, and am unravel-
ling it from time to time to Grey and others in authority,
to see how far it is feasible, a plan for a general conven-
tion of all neutral and belHgerent nations of the world,
at which you wiU be caUed upon to preside and which
should be caUed upon yomr invitation.
A QUEST FOR PEACE 381
It could meet concurrently with the peace conference,
or, if peace is not in sight by August, it could then be
called and it might be used as a medium of bringing
about peace between the belligerents. This second
convention-, of course, would not deal with any of the
controversies between the belligerents, but it would go
into the rules of future warfare and the rights of neutraJs.
It would be of far-reaching consequence — more far-
reaching, in fact, than the peace conference itself. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
As a result of his conference with Grey and Asqiuth,
House decided that the trip to Germany should be
postponed, at least for a few weeks. The Colonel would
reply to Zimmermann in such a way that, if Berlin were
really serious, the door could be kept open. A message
from Gerard, urging immediate action, did not change
this decision, since it was plain that the Germans thought
they were winning the war and Gerard himself found it
difi&cult not to agree with them. So long as they were
in this frame of mind, negotiations would be fruitless,
for the Germans would merely utilize conversations for
diplomatic purposes, without any real intention of
making peace.
Colonel House to Herr Zimmermann
London, Fehnmy 17, 1915
My DEAR Herr Zimmermann :
Thank you for your kind letter of February fourth.
I thought I should be able to go to Berlin early next
week, but it now seems best to remain here until I can
have another word from you.
All of our conversations with the Ambassadors in
Washington representing the belligerent nations were
based upon the supposition that Germany would consent
to evacuate and indemnify Belgium and would be willing
to make a settlement looking towards permanent peace.
382 A QUEST FOR PEACE
I can readily understand the difi 5 culty which your
Government would encounter in regard to an indem-
nity ; therefore, if that question might for the moment
be waived, may we assume that your Government would
let the other two points mark the be ginning of con-
versations ?
If we could be placed in so fortunate a position, I
feel confident that parleys could at least be commenced.
I need not teU you. Sir, what great moral advantage
this position would give Germany, and how expectantly
the neutral nations would look towards the Allies that
they would meet so fair an attitude.
Your favourable reply to this wiU, I believe, mark
the beginning of the end of this unhappy conflict.
I am, my dear Herr Zimmermann
Sincerdy yours £. M. House
Ambassador Gerard, to Colonel House
My dear Colonel : Berlin. February 15, 1915
I received your letter from London. I saw Zimmer-
mann also. He told me he had written you sa3nng they
would be glad to see you, etc., which is, of course, all they
can do.
It is felt here that we are partial to England.
They are serious here about this submarine blockade,
but are willing to withdraw it if food and raw materials
are allowed to enter — ^in other words, if England wiQ
adopt either the Declaration of London or of Paris —
but they say they will not stand having their civil
population starved.
Make no mistake, they will win on land and probably
get a separate peace from Russia, then get the same from
France or overwhelm it, and put a large force in Eg3q)t,
and perhaps completely blockade England.
Germany will make no peace proposals, but I am sure
if a reasonable peace is proposed now (a matter of
days, even hours), it would be accepted. (This on my
authority.)
A QUEST FOR PEACE 383
The Allies should send a peace proposal or an offer
to talk peace, to me verbally and secretly here. If it is
accepted, all right ; if not, no harm done, or publicity for
the proposal — ^for I would only make it in case I learned it
would he accepted. But Germany will pay no indemnity
to Belgium or anyone else. But, as I told you, this
peace matter is a question almost of hours. The sub-
marine blockade once begun, a feehng will come about
which may make it impossible until after another phase
of the war. If you can get such an intimation from
the Allies and then come here, it will go, to the best
of my belief. I do not think the Kaiser ever actually
wanted the war.
The feeling, as I said, just now is very tense against
America. The sale of arms is at the bottom, and the
fact that we stand things from England that we would
not from Germany (according to the Germans) is the
cause. But it is ve^ real and makes us all very un-
comfortable.
Hope to see you soon.
Yours ever
James W. Gerard
P.S. I am sure of acceptance of proposal.
Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard
London, March i, 1915
My dear Judge :
. . . These are slow-moving people [the British], and
when I undertook to tell them of your opinion that
quick action was necessary and it was a question of
hours rather than days, I saw that it was hopeless. Of
course, though, this is inevitable no matter how fast
they wished to move, for the reason that they cannot
act alone ; and it takes an incredible time to get any
satisfactory communication with the Allies, especially
with Russia.
I see no insuperable obstacle in the way of peace
and I feel if the belligerents would begin to talk, they
might soon come to an agreement.
384 A QUEST FOR PEACE
The army and navy machine here is now under a
tremendous momentum and your prediction as to the
final outcome is not shared by anyone here, from the
highest to the lowest. If this war lasts six months
longer, England will have a navy that will be more
than equal to the combined navies of the world. That
is something for us Americans to think of ; in fact, it
is something for everybody to think of. . . .
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
Colonel House to the President
London, February i8, 1915
Dear Governor :
... I had a conference with Sir Edward Grey last
Tuesday evening, and again yesterday at which the
Prime Minister and Page were present.
Both Asquith and Grey thought it would be footless
for me to go to Berlin until the present German envelop-
ing movement in the East is determined. It looks, for
the moment, bad for the Russians ; and they do not
want me to be in Berlin at such a time. If this movement
fails and things get again deadlocked, they think I should
take that opportunity to go there. . . ,
I put the matter plamly to both Asquith and Sir
Edward, asking their advice as to what to do, telling
them we were all interested alike in bringing about the
desired result, and it was a question of how best to do
it. They accepted this position and Sir Edward thought,
at the moment, I should write to Zimmermann along
the lines that I did.
The idea was that unless they at least conceded these
two pomts,^ the matter had as well be dropped until they
were willing to do so.
Sir Edward said that England would continue the
war indefinitely unless these cardinal points were agreed
to. . . .
I told them at yesterday’s conference that it would
^ Evacuation of invaded territory and guarantees for permanent peace*
A QUEST FOR PEACE 385
not do to close the door too tightly, for we must leave
it ajar so it could be widely opened if Germany really
desired peace. Asquith smiled and said, “ You will be
a very clever man if you can do that successfully.”
The situation grows hourly worse because of the
German manifesto in regard to merchantmen^ and the
sowing of mines. I tried hard to get Sir Edward, and
afterwards Asquith, to meet this situation before to-day ;
but with the usual British slowness, they put it off until
Thursday or perhaps next Tuesday.
The psydiological time to have ended this war
was around the end of November or the first of December,
when everything looked as if it had gotten into a per-
manent deadlock. You will remember we tried to
impress this upon Sir Cedi and tried to get quicker
action, but without success. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
” February 18, 1915 : I went to 33 Ecdeston Square
at 7.30 to see Sir Edward Grey and was with him a
half-hom:. I handed him Gerard's letter and also one
from Penfield. ...
” Sir Edward talked as frankly as usual and said
the terms Gerard proposed would only be entertained
by Great Britain in the event aU the things he predicted
would happen, had already happened ; that is, that
Russia and France were completely beaten and Eg3rpt
and other British territory occupied by the enemy.
” I again urged upon him better co-ordination
between the eastern and western fronts. He did not
think this possible, because of the Russian governmental
system. It seems to me perfect folly not to work more
in harmony ; that is, when the Germans are attacking
in the East, they should be severely pressed in the West,
and vice versa. . . .
^ On the day on which letter was written, the German threat of
February 4 was to come into effect : that every enemy merchant ship
found in the war zone would be destroyed without its being always
possible to avert the dangers threatening Ihe crews and passengers.-
1—25
386 A QUEST FOR PEACE
** February 20, 1915 : I called on Sir Edward Grey
at 33 Ecdeston Sc[uare at 7.15. Lord Kitchener was
with him when I arrived, but he left within a few minutes.
“ Sir Edward said that the Allies intended forcing
the Dardanelles and that perhaps it would take them
three or four weeks.^ This is not only a spectacular
movement, but, if successful, will have far-reaching
effect upon the eastern situation, besides giving Russia
an outlet and inlet. He also told me that Kitchener
said his reports from Russia were that the Germans had
not captured more than one division, and the situation
in the East was nothing like as bad as represented. Sir
Edward qualified this, however, by saying that Russian
news was never quite reliable. He thought after matters
had quieted down upon the eastern front and a deadlock
had once more been arrived at, and the Dardandfles had
been forced, it would be well for me to go to Germany."
Colonel House to the President
London, February 23, 1915
Dear Governor:
In reply to your cablegram of the 20th, indicating
that you thought there was danger of my yielding too
far to the wishes of this Government in deferring my visit
to Berlin, I tried to give you some explanation in my
reply which I sent yesterday.
Up to now, aU we know is that Germany refuses to
indemnify Belgium and refuses to make any proposition
herself. She may or may not be willing to evacuate
Belgium and consider proposals looking to permanent
peace. But even if she concedes these two cardinal
points, it is well to remember that neither Russia nor
France is willing now to make peace on any such terms.
When the Russian Minister of Finance and the
French Minister for Foreign Affairs were here. Sir Edward
told them of your letter and of my presence. He also
told them what I thought might be accomplished now,
^ “ It is inteiestiiig to note how far afield this prophecy was.” (Note
by E. M. H,]
A QUEST FOR PEACE 387
and he asked them whether or not they would like to
have a conference with me. They both preferred not
doing so, stating that the time was not opportune for
peace proposals, for the reason that it was certain that
Germany, being so far successful, would not acquiesce in
such terms as their Governments would demand.
The British public and a majority of the Cabinet
would not look with any greater favomr upon the only
terms that Germany would now concede, than would
France and Russia.
Since the war has begun and since they consider that
Germany was the aggressor and is the exponent of
mditaiism, they are determined not to cease fighting
until there is no hope of victory, or until Germany is
ready to concede what they consider a fair and permanent
settlement.
It is almost as important to us to have the settlement
laid upon the right foundations as it is to the nations of
Europe. If this war does not end militarism, then the
future is full of trouble for us.
If there was any reason to believe that Germany
was ready to make such terms as the Allies are ready to
accept, then it would be well to go immediatdy ; but
all our information is to the contrary, and the result of
my visit there now would be to lose the sympathetic
interest which England, and through her the Allies,
now feel in your endeavours and wi&out accomplishing
any good in Germany.
You may put it down as a certainty that Germany
will only use you in the event it suits her purposes to do
so ; and she will not be deterred from this il at any time she
sees that it is to her advantage to accept your good offices.
Asquith told Page yesterday that he sincerely hoped
that I would not make the mistake of going just now.
That simply means, if I do go they wiU probably cease
to consider you as a medium.
If Zimmermaim replies to my letter, then I shall
go to Berlin and have a conference with him j but it
will accomplish nothing for the moment, for he will not
388 A QUEST FOR PEACE
now go further ; and the Allies will not be willing to
begin parleys upon such a basis.
Sir Edward is extremely anxious for England to take
the highest possible grounds and not ask for anytliing
excepting the evacuation and indemnifying of Belgimn
and a settlement that will ensure permanent peace.
But, there again, he comes in conflict with colonial
opinion. The South African colonies have no notion
of giving up German Africa which they have taken, as
they say it will be a constant menace to them to have so
powerful and warlike a neighbour.
The same applies to . . . the Caroline Islands, Samoa,
etc., which the Australians have taken.
Sir Edward is trying assiduously to work up an
opinion upon broader hnes, and he may or may not be
successful ; but he is not now in a position to say that
his wishes wfll prevail. . . .
Germany may be successful. If France or Russia
^ves way, she will soon dominate the Continent ; and
it is not altogether written that one or the other will
not give way. Even if the Allies hold together, there
is a possibility that the war may continue another year. . . .
I try very hard not to think of it any more than I
did at home, and I try to talk of it as little as possible,
so that my mind may be clear to look at the situation
dispassionatdy.
The one sane, big figure here is Sir Edward Grey ;
and the chances are all in favour of his being the dominant
personality when the final settlement comes, and I
believe it is the part of wisdom to continue to keep in
as close and sympathetic touch with him as now. . . .
I note now with interest that occasionally Sir
Edward speaks of " that second convention which the
President may call.” He has come to look upon it as
one of the hopes for the future and, if we accomplish
nothing else, you will be able to do the most important
world’s work within sight.
I have reason to believe that this Government will
be ready to make great concessions in that convention
A QUEST FOR PEACE 389
in regard to the future of shipping, commerce, etc.,
during periods of war.^ It is my purpose to keep this
“ up my sleeve " and, when I go to Germany, use it
to bring favomrable opinion to you by intimating that
I believe when the end comes you will insist upon this
being done ; in other words, that with your initiative
and with Germany’s co-operation. Great Britain can be
induced to make these terms. This, I think, will please
the Germans and may go a long way towards placating
their feelings towards us. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
rv
As one might expect. Colonel House took care to
come into contact with everyone who might give in-
formation or assistance in Ids mission of good will:
politicians of aU parties and shades of opinion, men of
business, journalists.
" February 14, 1915 : I lunched with Lady Paget,
and in the afternoon Sidney Brooks took tea with me.
He said there was much curiosity in London as to the
purpose of my visit, and he had explained that my
trousers had worn out earlier this year than usual and
I had come to have Poole renew them. He asked
seriously if I desired anything said of my visit or whether
I wished The Times to comment at all upon Anglo-
American relations. I asked him to please say nothing
for the moment. He said The Times was at my disposal
whenever I wished to use it for the purpose of my mission,
whatever that mission was. . . .
" February 20, 1915 : I went to the Embassy and
found Hoover discussing with Page the difficulties he is
encountering from day to day in his Belgian relief work.
He is a resourceful fdflow, and needs to be, for he has a
most complex situation to contend with, having the
German, the Belgian, and British (iovemments at
cross-purposes.
^ Another reference to the plan of the " Freedom of the Seas,”
390 A QUEST FOR PEACE
" February 25, 1915 : I lunched with Lord Bryce
to-day at his apartment at No. 3 Buckingham Gate.
We had a most delightful time. He arranged for us to
be entirely alone, not even Lady Bryce being there.
“ He inquired after the President, and I told of the
President’s having read me Gardiner’s sketch of him
in Pillars of Society, the opening sentence of which I
remember was ; ‘ If one were asked to name the greatest
living Englishman I think it would be necessary to admit,
regretfully, that he is a Scotsman bom in Ireland.’
“ Bryce smiled and said he had not read it, and was
afraid to do so for fear his head might be turned ; at
the same time, I noticed he asked me again the title of
the book.
“ We gradually drifted into a discussion of the war
and of the problems for its solution. It seemed to me
a good opportunity to test the wisdom of my views upon
so clear and subue a political mind ; and I told him
forthwith, though in strict confidence, pretty much
what I had planned. This embraced, of course, the
proposition regarding the cessation of the manufacture
of armaments for a period of years, the calling of the
second convention by the President, and its scope
and character.
" Bryce was visibly interested. I told him, too,
what I had tried to do towards preventing the war, at
least between the Western Powers. He was as in-
terested in this as in the other, and agreed that it might
have been possible if war had been deferred a short while
longer. He had also heard that Great Britain and
Germany were on the eve of a settlement concerning the
Bagdad Railroad and a division of the sphere of influence
in ^rica. This convention was yet to be signed when
the war burst forth. . .
Colonel House to Mr. Gordon Auchindoss
Dear Gordon : Ix)ndon, March 2, 1915
... I am lunching and dining with some one of
importance every day. On Tuesday I go into the Con-
A QUEST FOR PEACE . 391
servative camp further than I have yet done, by dining
to meet Balfour, Lord Curzon, and several others. . , .
4 U’s^ and I keep in constant communication by
cable ; but so far as I can see, my main object now must
be to mark time and not offend by overdoing. . . .
Unless one has undertaken such a job himself — and
there has been none like it up to now — ^he caimot possibly
imagine the pitfalls that lurk on every hand. It keeps
one side-stepping every moment ; and if I succeed in
doing nothing more than keeping out of trouble, I shall
consider I have been fortunate.
I have succeeded in keeping my name absolutely
out of the European press, which is a good beginning,
and I remain in as much obscurity as is possible for one
having such work in hand. No one, of course, not
even Page, knows when I see the different Ministers
or personages of importance ; and my comings and
goings are as unchronicled as if I were a cross-sweeper.
Paternally yours
E. M. House
" March 4, 1915 [conference between House and A. J.
Balfour] : We got along famously together, I doing most
of the talking, although at times he would become
enthusiastic and would get up and stand by the fire
and declaim to me just as earnestly as I had to him.
I took a liking to him at once, and have a sincere desire
that it should be reciprocated. I like the quality of his
mind. It is not possible to allow one’s wits to lag when
one is in active discussion with him. In that respect,
he reminds me somewhat of the President. I am in-
clined to rank him along with the President and Mr.
Asquith in intellectuality, and this, to my mind, places
him at the summit.”
Colonel House to Mr. Gordon Auchincloss
Dear Gordon : London. March 5, 1915
... I have seen almost every Liberal of importance
in the Kingdom, and for the past week I have devoted
' An obvious representation of W. W.
392 A QUEST FOR PEACE
myself to the Conservatives, as it will be very helpful,
not only to the Government, but to me individually
in the final negotiations.
Balfour was very complimentary in regard to the
suggestions I have made, and said they were unique
and practicable as far as he could see at the moment.
I have seen for a long while that the limiting of
armaments was the insuperable obstacle in the way of
a permanent settlement, and I have not been able to
thinlf of a way that was satisfactory to me until I was on
the Lusitania with my mind free to devote to the subject.
It then occurred to me that if all the important nations,
belligerents and neutrals, should agree to cease the manu-
facture of munitions of war for a period of ten years or
more, the question then of how large an army Germany
should have, or France should retain, or the size of Ger-
many’s or Great Britain's navy, need not be discussed.^
The armies and the navies would remain as they are
at the end of the war ; but without the manufacture of
any further battleships or munitions of war, everything
would automatically become obsolete in a few years.
What we need to do is to play for time. Time wiU
make Germany democratic and there wiU be no more
danger in that direction than from the United States,
England, or France. Russia is another problem, which
may or may not have to be dealt with in the future.
T his plan would involve the shutting-down of Krupps’
and of Armstrong’s and other manufacturers, and it
would leave the world at the end of ten years on a peace
footing. The money that it would save to each nation
every year would be sufficient to pay the interest on
the great war debts that they are piling up.
All this, of course, is not to be mentioned except
to Sidney and Martin,* from whom I keep nothing. . . .
Paternally yours
E. M. House
^ Tlie proposal is obviously based upon the assumption of a military
stalemate, which at that time seemed probable to House*
* Dr. Sidney Mezes, and Mr. E. S. Martiu, editor of Life,
A QUEST FOR PEACE 393
" March 5, 1915 : Sidney Brooks called in the after-
noon. He was on his way to the Foreign Office to offer
his services in an effort to present the British side of
questions arising between the United States and Great
Britain. He hopes to be able to do better work than
has been done. He said up to now the Foreign Office
had done it as badly as human ingenuity could suggest.
He asked if I thought they could have done it worse.
I thought not, and Brooks seemed pleased at this tribute
to their efforts. . . .
" Chalmers Roberts and I took supper at Scot’s.
Afterwards I went to the Ambassador’s, as he wished
to show me Colonel George O. Squier’s diary, which he
said I must keep in the deepest confidence. It em-
barrassed me to have to tell him that I had had a copy
of the diary for more than two weeks.
“ We talked of home, of the President, McAdoo,
and conditions, and we had a genuinely good time. I
like Page. He is direct and without guile. . . .
“ March 8, 1916 : I dmed with Lord Lorebum.
John Bums was the only other guest. They are both
sane, reasonable, able men, and we talked of the war
and of the jingoes and of the difficulties of peace. I
told them of the demands of France and of those of
South Africa concerning the German African colonies.
Bums thought the latter could be met, but considered
those of France more serious. . . .
" March 9, 1915 : We dined with Lady Paget.
She had a notable gathering. The other guests were
Lord Curzon, Mr. A. J. Bahour, Sir John Cowan, Mr.
Cust (who will be Lord Brownley), Lord and Lady
Desborough (Lady-in-waiting to the Queen), Duchess
of Marlborough, Mrs. John Astor, and Mrs. George
Keppel.
“ Curzon and I had considerable talk together when
coffee was served, and I found him the worst jingo I
have met. He wants to make peace in Berlin no matter
how long it takes to get there. He is an able man,
expressing himself forcefully and wdl. We got along
396 A QUEST FOR PEACE
to see what happens with relation to the latest English
declaration about the blockade of Germany. I have as
yet no ofi&cial information.
The Chancellor is not boss now. Von Tirpitz and
Falkenhayn (Chief of Staff) have more influence, especi-
ally as the Chancellor bores the Emperor, and there are
great mtrigues going on among all these conflicting
authorities. The people who were in favour of accept-
ing a reasonable peace proposal were, strange to say^
the military general staff end, and it was von Tirpitz who
did not want our last proposals accepted.^ . . .
I hate to write in these spy times and do most
earnestly hope you are coming soon, or, if you are going
to Italy, I will run down and report to you there if you
want. . . .
Ever yours
James W. Gerard
" March 7, 1915 [conference with Grey] : We both
think the time has come for me to go to Germany.
I have decided to go via France, and I asked his opinion
as to whether I should see Delcasse. At flrst he thought
not. He said Delcasse was decidedly of the opinion,
when he was here, that it was no time for peace parleys,
and he did not believe he had changed this point of view.
I was afraid he would consider it a discourtesy if I did
not see him. Looking at it from that viewpoint. Grey
thought I was right and it would be best to see him,
though he cautioned me to be guarded in what I said.
I assured him he need have no fear of my being indis-
creet.
" Grey thought France would insist upon Alsace-
Lorraine. The French believe the Allies win and
that they can impose terms of peace upon Germany ;
later, perhaps, they would find that to impose peace
conditions upon Germany would necessitate continuing
^ The United States proposed that Germany should give up the sub-
marine war zone around Great Britain, provided the British relinquished
the food blockade.
A QUEST FOR PEACE 397
the wax for a number of years and, when that was
realized, they might be willing to make concessions.
“ He did not know the mind of Russia, but he be-
lieved by giving them Constantinople and the Straits,
they would be willing to acquiesce in almost any other
terms that might be agreed upon. . . .
" The difficulty I expect to find here in the final
negotiations is, there is no man who dominates the
situation. ... In Germany I shall find the situation
even more uncertain. If there were a Palmerston or a
Chatham here, and a Bismarck in Germany, it would
be easier.”
The Quest for Peace had thus far revealed nothing
but the unwiQmgness of any of the belligerents to yield
an iota of their aspirations. Yet the mission had not
been wasted. House had established relations with the
British which not merely helped to tide over the diffi-
culties of the present, but which must prove invaluable
in preventing misunderstanding for the future. The
memoirs of the British Foreign Secretary indicate how
thoroughly the Colonel had succeeded in establish-
ing a sjmipathetic understanding. “ It was not neces-
sary,” writes Grey, “ to spend much time in putting our
case to him. He had a way of saying, ‘ I know it ’ in
a tone and manner that carried conviction both of his
sympathy with, and understanding of, what was said
to him." And again : “ Our conversations became
almost at once not only friendly but intimate. I found
combined in him in a rare degree the qualities of wisdom
and sympathy. In the stress of war it was at once a
relief, a delight, and an advantage to be able to talk
with him freely. His criticism or comment was valu-
able, his suggestions were fertile, and these were all
conveyed. with a sympathy that made it pleasant to
listen to them. After a day that began about seven in
398 A QUEST FOR PEACE
the morning I broke off work by seven in the evening
and took things easily at my house for an hour before
dinner. It was arranged that in this hour House should
come whenever he wanted to have a talk.” ^
The Colonel’s mission would have been worth while
if only because of this close personal understanding
with the Foreign Secretary, and it was one of the im-
ponderables that weighed heavily in the diplomatic
history of the following years.
Appreciative of Grey’s honesty and moderation,
fearful of the demands of France, suspicious of German
sincerity, yet determined if possible to find a thread to
throw across the chasm ; such were the feelings of
House when on March ii he left England for Paris and
Berlin.
* Grey, Twenty-Five Years (Frederick A. Stokes Company), ii, 124,
CHAPTER XIII
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
If peace parleys were begun now upon any terms that would have any
chance of acceptance, it would mean the overthrow of this Government
and the Kaiser.
Zimmermann to House, March 21, 1915
I
Colonel House to the President
Paris, March 14, 1915
D ear governor :
We arrived here Thursday night. A de-
stroyer accompanied our boat a good part of the
way, and we passed one floating mine about one hundred
yards away. Otherwise the trip was without incident. . . .
I have just returned from my interview with Del-
casse.^ The interpreter was the Assistant Secretary
for Foreign Affairs.* I let him read your letter and told
him I came to present your compliments, but that you
did not desire to intrude yourself upon them or to hurt
their sensibilities in any way by making an immature
suggestion of peace.
I said this before he had a chance to say anything,
for I knew quite well what was in his mind. He was
visibly pleased when this suggestion was made, and it
placed us on a good footing.
I then told him that you had foreseen for a year or
^ Minister for Foreign Affairs. Theophile Delcass6 had been a prime
mover in the Entente with Great Britain, and largely responsible for the
energetic foreign policy of France from 1904 on. He was the h&te noire of
the Germans^ who regarded him, as the collaborator of Edward VII and
Grey in the attempt to " encircle ” Germany.
* Jaquin de Margeiie, at that time Director of Political Affairs of the
Foreign Office ; in the post-wax period appointed French Ambassador to
Germany.
399
400 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
more that, unless something was done to prevent it,
some spark might caiise the present conflagration, and
you had sent me to Europe last May for the purpose of
seeing what could be done to bring about a better under-
standing ; that I had gone to Germany and had come
to France, but they were changing Government at the
time and it was impossible to talk to them.
I wanted to let him know that you had had the
threads in your hands from the beginning and that you
understood the situation thoroughly. . . .
In reply he said that France greatly appreciated
your keen interest and noble desire to bring about peace,
and he was glad I had come to Paris and would look
forward with interest to seeing me when I returned from
Germany. He said he would then tell me in the frankest
way what France had in mind and was willing to do. I
did not press him to tell me this then, because I happened
to know what they have in mind and I did not want to
go into a footless and discouraging discussion.
I had accomplished more than I anticipated, for it
was not certain that I would be received cordially.
Even Sir Edward was a little worried. The main thing
accomplished was that France has at least tentatively
accepted you as mediator ; and that, I think, is much. . . .
Gerard tells me, through Winslow, that he does not
believe the Germans would hesitate a moment to go to
war with us. On the other hand, Winslow says that
when you sent them the note to Germany which was
almost an ultimatum,^ he saw a distinct change for the
better at the German Foreign Office the very next day.
They had been insolent before, but were all right after-
wards.
They all seem to think that the Germans have
literally gone crazy. I am not so sure of it myself. I
can see gleams of sanity in much they are doing.
I shall be exceedingly careful about cabling you or
^ A reference to Wilson’s note of February lo, warning the German
Government that in case of the destruction of an American vessel or
American lives it would be held to a " strict accountability,”
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 401
even writing from Berlin, for it is dangerous to the last
degree. Winslow tells me that their system of espionage
is something beyond belief and that one can never be
sure that papers have not been tampered with.
I find that the ruling class in France do not desire
peace, but that a large part of the people and the men
in the trenches would welcome it. This, I think, is also
true of Germany. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
P.S. Gerard also sent word that he thought the
Kaiser would be deposed in the event Germany was not
successful in this contest.
“ March 14, 1915 : Willard Straight called this
morning. He is a great friend of Casenave^ and also of
Margerie, and Margerie is a friend of Casenave and
Delcass6, so the circle is fairly complete. I told Straight
some things I wished told to Delcasse through Casenave
and Margerie. This Straight promised to undertake. I
wish Delcass 4 to know that in my opinion France is taking
a big gamble in demanding peace terms that Germany
will never accept unless the Allies reach Berlin. I am
sorry I am not on such terms with Delcasse to tell him
these things myself, for I do not like using third parties.
“ Straight is to convey the thought that it will be of
advantage to the Allies to have the goodwill of the
President, and that the best way to get it is through
me. Another idea I wished conveyed was that the
really essential thing and the big thing, was to strive for
a permanent settlement and not for any small terri-
torial advantage, which in itself would leave wounds
which in time would lead to further trouble."
Colonel House to the Presideni
Dear Governor : park. March 15, 1915
De Casenave came to see me to-day. He is at the
head of the Press Bureau and his principal duties are
^ In charge of the Press Bureau at the Foreign OjQBice*
I — 26
402 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
to see that the French papers contain the proper kind
of reading matter in regard to England, America, and
other nations. . . .
I asked him to be very frank and to tell me of French
opinion. He said the French people at large thought
that America had nothing in mind further than a dollar.
He said a few Frenchmen had gone to America, had
stayed there some weeks, not knowing the lan^age,
had visited such places as the pork packeries of Chicago,
and had come away to write books concerning the
avarice of our people. He said this had been done to
such an extent that the opinion was fixed in France that
we were guided entirely by mercenary motives.
He said when he gave to the French papers directions
as to what to say in regard to America, they smiled and
shrugged their shoulders. . . .
I am trying to make a friend of de Margerie of the
Foreign Office. He has lived in America, speaks English
well, and is said to be almost as much of a force in the
Foreign Office as Delcass6, besides being in Delcass6’s
confidence. I have some mutual friends on this job and
I will remain here long enough upon my return to try and
clinch it.
I shall attempt the same thing in Germany, probably
using Zimmermann as a medium. If I can establish
such relations, the situation can scarcely get away from
us. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
II
All his conversations in Paris merely confirmed the
forebodings which House had experienced in England.
The aspirations of the French for territorial annexations
put out of court immediately the bases for peace which
he had discussed with Grey. A message from G^ard
indicated that the Germans were equally determined
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 403
upon wide annexations. “ He was sure,” House noted
after receiving the message, “ that they were not in a
frame of mind to consider such peace terms as the Allies
would think of offering. . . . The French not only want
Alsace and Lorraine, but so much more that the two
countries are not within sight of peace. If it is brought
about, it will be through the sanity and justice of
Sir Edward Grey and British opinion.”
House might have given up his proposed trip to
Germany then and there. But he saw the chance of
placing German-American relations on a better footing,
through personal conversations, and did not wish to
lose the opportunity of indicating to the Germans some
basis of future compromise with the British. He
determined, however, that it would be worse than use-
less to raise the question of immediate peace parleys in
BerHn.
Colonel House to Mr. Gordon Auchindoss
Berlin, March 21, 1915
Dear Gordon :
We left Paris at eight o’clock Wednesday morning.
We went close to the firing line, somewhere between ten
and twelve miles. Soldiers boarded the train as we
passed through this territo;ty and pulled down all shades
and stationed themselves in the corridors so we could
not look out. We were within hearing of the guns.
The different Governments are always notified of
our coming, before we reach the borders, and every
facility has been extended to us. If this were not done,
travelling would be practically impossible — that is,
where we have gone.
At Basle I had a conference with Minister Stovall
from Berne and Consul-General Wilbur from Zurich,
and at Frankfort with Consul-General Harrison.
We arrived in Berlin yesterday morning in a snow-
404 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
storm. Gerard met us and brought us to bis house. I
have had a conference with Zimmermann and he was
exceedingly cordial and delightful. I have always liked
him and I am glad we have resumed our friendly rela-
tions.
I cannot write you very fully, excepting to say that
there is nothing that even looks like peace within sight.
However, I am accomplishing many things that I have
in mind and I hope I am doing some good. It looks as
if there would have to be a decisive victory on one side
or the other before parleys can begin.
If I succeed in establishing cordial relations at the
different belligerent capitals, I will have done all that
I expected at this time. . . .
Paternally yours
E. M. House
Colonel House to the President
Berlin, March 20, 1915
Dear Governor :
. . . We arrived in Berlin this morning and Gerard
immediately arranged a private conference for me vdth
Zimmermann. I let him read your letter, which im-
pressed him favourably as it does everyone. I told
him frankly what I had done in England, whom I had
met there, in what way, and my conclusions.
He was surprised to hear of the lack of bitterness
in England towards Germany and was equally surprised
when I told him that the dif&culty was with France.
They have evidently tried to cultivate good relations
with both France and Russia, for the purpose of making
separate terms with them. I think I convinced him
that England did not desire Germany crushed and that,
in the final analysis, terms would have to be agreed upon
between these two countries. This is so patent that 1
wonder they do not recognize it. It is fortunate it is
true, for the difference between the two is not great and
they could get together now if it were not for the fact
that the people in both Germany and England have been
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 405
led to expect much more than is possible of realization.
Neither Government can fulfil these expectations. If
they attempted to make peace upon a different basis
from that which the people have been led to believe will
ultimately come about, there is a possibility that the
Governments would be overthrown. That is the real
trouble now. Just how it can be overcome, is the
question.
I am trying to get everyone to soften down through
the press and create a better feeling. Zimmermann tells
me that the main thing Germany wants is a settlement
which will guarantee permanent peace. It is the same
cry in each of the belligerent states.
I showed Zimmermann the different points where
our interests and theirs touched, and expressed a desire
that we work together to accomplish our purposes. I
brought up the second convention [for organizing per-
manent peace] in this connection, and he received it
most cordially. I told him in particular that we as well
as Germany desired that some guaranty should be had
in the future as to the protection and uninterruption of
our commerce, either as neutral or as belligerent. I told
him that we recognized England had a perfect right to
have a navy sufficient to prevent invasion, but further
than that she should not go.
He was exceedingly sympathetic with this thought,
and I think it will have a tendency to put us on a good
footing here.
The Chancellor is out of town for a few days, but
Zimmermann is to arrange a meeting as soon as he
returns. He also suggested that the Emperor might
want to see me. Gerard says this is impossible, that he
has not seen him for months because of his intense feeling
against us on account of our shipment of munitions of
war to the Allies. It is not important now whether I
see him or not, and I shall leave it to Zimmermann's
judgment. . . .
I airi somewhat at a loss as to what to do next, for
it is plain at the moment that some serious reverse wifi.
4o6 the freedom OF THE SEAS
have to be encountered by one or other of the belligerents
before any Government dare propose parleys. I can
foresee troublous times ahead, and it will be the wonder
of the ages if all the Governments come out of it intact.
The world has been strained as never before in its
history, and something is sure to crack somewhere before
a great while.
It looks as if our best move just now is to wait until
the fissure appears.
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
Berlin, March 21, 1915
Dear Governor:
I anti gradually getting at the bottom of things here
and, while I cannot write with perfect freedom, I can tell
enough to give you a fair idea of it.
I am seeing a great many people, just as I did in
England, and I hope to have soon a composite picture
that may be of value.
I met last night an able and sane man by the name of
Dr. Rathenau.^ I am told he is a great power in com-
mercial Germany. He has such a clear vision of the
.situation and such a prophetic forecast as to the future
that I wonder how many there are in Germany that think
like him. It saddened me to hear him say that as far
as he ^ew, he stood alone. He said he had begun to
wonder whether all the rest were really mad, or whether
the madness lay within himself. . . .
It was almost pathetic to hear him urge us not to
cease in our efforts to bring about peace. He said it
was the noblest mission that was ever given to man and
that he would pray that we would not become discouraged.
I hear this note struck in all countries. Mothers and
wives, fathers and brothers, have spoken in the same
* The dominating figure of the ezxly post^ellum German Republic.
Foreign Secretary from January 31, 1922, to June 24, 1922 ; Germany’s
representative at the Genoa Conference, 1922 ; assassinated by reaction-
aries, Jime 24, 1922.
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 407
strain and have seemed to feel that the only hope lies
in our endeavours.
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
" It is a sad commentary,” added House, ” that the
Governments of each of the belligerents would probably
welcome peace negotiations, and yet none of them are
able safely to make a beginning.” For each Government,
in order to evoke the belligerent enthusiasm necessary
to a prosecution of the war, had created a Frankenstein
which emphatically vetoed any whisper of peace. Zim-
mermann stated, wrote House on March 24, " that if
peace parleys were begun now upon any terms that would
have any chance of acceptance, it would mean the
overthrow of this Government and the Kaiser.”
Colonel House to the President
Berlin, March 26, 1915
Dear Governor :
While I feel I have accomplished much of value here,
I leave sadly disappointed that we were misled into
believing that peace parleys might be begun upon a
basis of evacuation of France and Belgium.
I have been cordially received and have added many
new friendships to the old. I find the civil Government
here as sensible and fair-minded as their counterparts
in England, but they are for the moment impotent.
It is a dangerous thing to inflame a people and give
them an exaggerated idea of success. This is what has
happened and is happening in almost every country
that is at war. ...
If those that are in charge of the civil Government
now hold their power when peace comes, there will be
no doubt of their co-operation — ^provided, of course, our
relations grow no worse, and without actual war they
could not be worse.
This is almost wholly due to our selling munitions of
war to the Allies. The bitterness of their resentment
4o8 the freedom OF THE SEAS
towards us for this is almost beyond belief. It seems
that every German that is being killed or wounded is
being killed or wounded by an American rifle, bullet, or
shell. I never dreamed before of the extraordinary
excellence of our guns and ammunition. They are the
only ones that explode or are so manufactured that their
results are deadly.
I have pointed out the danger of such agitation
against us and have tried to show how much it would
lessen our influence in helping Germany when our help
is needed. I have indicated where our interests touched
at various points and how valuable it would be to both
nations to work in harmony rather than at cross-
purposes. . . .
There is a general insistence here, as elsewhere, that
when a settlement is made it must be an enduring one ;
but ideas as to how this may be brought about are as
divergent as the poles. . . .
Gerard has been exceedingly helpful here. He has
not interfered in the slightest and has insisted upon my
seeing the different Cabinet Ministers and influential
Germans alone. He is very courageous, and is different
from some of our representatives, inasmuch as his point
of view is wholly American.
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
As in London, House made a point of meeting varied
types, although he sought out especially those who repre-
sented the moderate point of view. He had long talks
with Rathenau and von Gwinner,^ with Solf, the Minister
for the Colonies who later played a major rdle in the final
armistice negotiations, with Helfferich — " a yoimg man,”
House noted, “ who is considered one of the rising powers
in Germany” — ^with the Foreign Minister, von Jagow,
and with the Chancellor.
^ Banker, and promoter of the Bagdad Railway.
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
409
III
Apart from his desire to obtain information and create
an atmosphere friendly to the United States, House
wished to try out on the Germans the plan which he
believed might serve as the basis for a future com-
promise between Germany and Great Britain. It was
the plan which came to be called the " Freedom of the
Seas.”
The problem presented itself in the following aspects
to Colonel House. Existing maritime regulations per-
mitted the capture of private property of neutrals on the
high seas, if it came within the category of contraband,
and it was inevitable under conditions of modern warfare
that the definition of contraband should be progressively
extended to include practically all materials and articles
of industrial life. In any war between Great Britain
and a Continental Power, the first thought of the British
was naturally to use their control of the sea so as to
interrupt the direct and indirect imports of the Con-
tinental enemy. A quarrel between Great Britain
and the United States, the largest exporting neutral,
must necessarily follow, for British restrictions meant
the destruction of American trade. The events of 1914
and 1915, as well as those that led to the War of 1812,
offered a practical example of this ever-recurring factor
of discord, the sole factor that seriously threatened the
cordial relations of the two countries.
Apart from the peril of complications with America,
there were other elements in the situation which did not
seem to favour Great Britain. The British, living on
an island, dependent for their lives upon trade with the
outside world and especially with their colonies, were in
a position of real danger that was not clearly recognized.
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
410
They had believed that so long as their fleet remained
supreme, they were perfectly safe. But the introduction
of the submarine raised the question whether Great
Britain’s ocean-going trade, carried as it was by British
ships, could not be destroyed and the nation be deprived
of the foodstuffs and raw materials which entered her
ports, even though her surface fleet remained intact.
Such a threat to the security of national life became very
lively in 1917.
Germany was dependent, although not to the same
degree, upon overseas trade. In their struggle with
England, the Germans counted upon the neutral ports
of Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. But the
British, in control of the sea, could confiscate or seriously
harass trade bound for these ports, and thus threaten the
starvation of Germany. So much the Germans them-
selves, in their protests against the British food blockade,
admitted.
What House proposed was that the contraband list
should be restricted so as to include only actual imple-
ments of warfare ; ever3rthing else should be placed upon
the free list. The trade of merchant vessels, whether
belligerent or neutral, should be allowed to proceed freely
outside territorial waters so long as they carried no
contraband. They might even enter any belligerent
port without hindrance, unless that port were actually
and effectively blockaded by the eneniy’s fleet. Such a
blockade in the case of England would be practically
impossible, because of the multitude of available harbours
and the strength of the British fleet. An effective block-
ade was equally impossible in the case of Germany, as the
events of the war demonstrated.
For what, then, could a fleet be used, one will ask.
Simply for purposes of defence. Colonel House replied ; to
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 411
prevent the landing of a hostile military force and to keep
essential ports open.
The proposal was less revolutionary than many
thought, and it had behind it the force of both British
and American traditions. Sir Edward Grey had in-
structed the British delegation to the Second Hague
Conference in 1907 to work for a restriction of the contra-
band list, and it was at his inspiration that the delegation
carried the idea to its logical limit and expressed a
willingness to abandon the principle of contraband of war
entirely In their talks with House in February, Grey
and Tyrrell had approved also the principle of the
i mmuni ty of belligerent merchant shipping in time of
war; in fact, it was that approval which lay at the
bottom of House’s present suggestion.
What is equally striking is that in 1907 Elihu Root,
then Secretary of State, in his instructions to -the United
States delegates to the Hague Conference, advocated
almost precisely what House now suggested, the exemp-
tion from capture of belligerent private property, although
he said nothing about the restriction of contraband.
“ The private property of all private citizens or
subjects of signatory Powers [so ran his instructions],
with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt
from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by
the armed vessels or by the military forces of any of the
said signatory Powers, but nothing herein contained shall
extend exemption from seizure of vessels or their cargoes
which may attempt to enter a port blockaded by the
naval forces of any of the said Powers.”
1 The following declaration was made on the part of Great Britain :
In order to diminish the difficulties encountered by neutral commerce in
time of war the Government of is prepared to abandon the principle
of contraband in case of war between the Powers whi<ffi may rign a conven-
rion to that effect. The right of visit would be exercised only in order
to ascertain the neutral character of the merchantmen."
412 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
This was in entire consonance with the Final Act of
the First Hague Conference, which gave preference to
“ inviolability of private property in naval warfare.”
It was only the use of the term ” Freedom of the
Seas ” as applied to this suggestion which was new ; and
this, it appears, was originated by Colonel House.
Grotius in i6og used the term mare liberum, and the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became accustomed
to such slogans as “ a free sea or war,” ^ " free ships,
free goods,” ” free flag, free goods.” The phrase ” free-
dom of the seas ” was itself used in 1798 by the French
Revolutionary leader, Bar^re, in his famous summary of
French foreign policy : ” Freedom of the seas, peace to
the world, equal rights to all nations.” But it remained
for Colonel House to utilize the phrase as applicable to
what Choate had called, in 1907, “ immunity of private
property at sea,” and to include the proposal of a rigid
restriction of contraband of war.
House’s plan for the Freedom of the Seas was thus
based upon the approval of both British and American
authorities. It carried with it immediate and ultimate
advantages which in the case of the United States would
eliminate practically all factors of complication with
European belligerents. If contraband were restricted,
the trade of the United States might proceed with almost
as much freedom in time of war as in that of peace. The
advantages to the world at large were still more obvious,
since the role of a navy would become chiefly defensive
and naval disarmament might proceed apace.
Germany would undoubtedly gain much by the
Freedom of the Seas. An enemy possessing a strong
fleet, like Great Britain, would stiU be free to blockade
German ports if it could jreach them, but could not cut off
^ In England, on the eve of the Wax of Jenkins* Ear,
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 413
the foodstuffs and raw materials ' which the Germans
received through neutral ports and contiguous countries.
Great Britain would thus lose an offensive weapon, of
doubtful legality. But as compensation, how greatly
British defensive strength would be enhanced ! The
disadvantages of her island position would largely dis-
appear, her food supply would be secure, and her com-
merce with the farflung portions of the Empire would
be assured without the protection of a costly fleet.
Submarines would not be able to prey upon merchant
shipping. Under the principle of the Freedom of the
Seas, the Power with the most colonies and the widest
overseas trade stood to gain most.
So much was plain to Colonel House, although he was
careful not to whisper in Berlin that he believed the
British would win the lion’s share of advantage. To him
the great irony of the war was that his proposal was so
eagerly swallowed by the Germans, so scornfully refused
by British opinion.
The weak point in House’s plan lay in the danger that
an unscrupulous nation, after accepting its principle,
would proceed to disregard its engagements. The British
could not escape the fear that Germany, which had
broken its promises in the Belgian treaty, was quite
capable of agreeing to the Freedom of the Seas and
after securing the partial disarmament of Great Britain
thereby, might embark upon a wholesale destruction of
British merchant shipping. To meet this danger. House
was insistent upon an association of nations bound to
unite forcibly against any nation that violated its inter-
national promises.
The Colonel believed that the acceptance of the
Freedom of the Seas, as a principle of international law,
was essential to stability of relations between the United
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
414
States and European Powers. He also believed that
the idea could be used as a means to start peace negotia-
tions between the belligerents. If the British would agree
to his proposal, with all its ultimate advantages for them,
he planned to present this fact to the Germans as a
diplomatic victory for Germany that would justify peace
parleys and satisfy German public opinion.
Colonel House to the President
Berlin, March 27, 1915
Dear Governor :
Some way has to be thought out to let the Govern-
ments down easy with their people. That is almost, if
not quite, our hardest problem.
It occurred to me to-day to suggest to the Chancdlor
that, through the good offices of the United States,
England might be brought to concede at the final settle-
ment the Freedom of the Seas, and to the extent I have
indicated to you. I told him that the United States
wo'uld be justified in bringing pressure upon England in
this direction, for our people had a common interest with
German3r in that question.
He, like the others I have talked to, was surprised
when I told him the idea was to go far beyond the Declara-
tion of Paris or the proposed Declaration of London. I
said that someone would have to throw across the chasm
the first thread, so that the bridge might have its
begiiming, and that I knew of no suggestion that was
better fitted for that purpose than this ; That if England
would consent, this Government [the German] could
say to the people that Belgium was no longer needed as
a base for German naval activity, since En^and was
being brought to terms.
I have sown this thought of the Freedom of the Seas
very widely since I have been here, and already I can see
theresidts. . . . I think I can show England that, in the
long run and Iqolding at the matter broadly, it is as much
to h^ interest as it is to the other nations of the earth. .
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
415
The Chancellor seems to think, and so does Zimmer-
mann, that I have offered in this suggestion the best idea
as a peace beginning. . . .
I have told them frankly and with emphasis that they
could not expect us to lay an embargo on the exportation
of munitions of war, and that they must soften their
press and people on this point. They have promised to
do this. I have told them I would help them in the big
thing later and that they must be content with our
efforts in that direction.
I leave here fairly satisfied with the situation, as we
now have something definite to work on and as the
warring nations have tentatively accepted you as their
mediator. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
Unfortunately, the Germans did not possess either the
discretion or the tact necessary to the development of
House's plan for the Freedom of the Seas. He hoped to
win British approval, for he knew of Grey’s S3nnpathy.
All he wished from Germany, for the moment, was an
acquiescent silence. But the Germans lost no time in
advertising the idea as their own and thereby immediately
ruined all chance of success. In the United States, Herr
Demburg, in charge of German propaganda, announced
that if England granted the Freedom of the Seas, Germany
would retire from Belgium ; if England refused, Germany
would establish a permanent fortified base on the English
Channel. Englishmen were entirely ignorant as to what
the Freedom of the Seas meant, or whether it would be
advantageous or not to refuse it ; but coming in this
fashion as a threat, public opinion immediately decided
that it was something made in Germany and that every
true Britisher would spill the last drop of his blood before
considering it . From that moment began the unreasoning
4i6 the freedom OF THE SEAS
prejudice against the idea, which ultimately became
invincible.
IV
In the meantime House had left Germany, passing
back to Paris through Nice and Biarritz, where he
engaged in conferences with the American Ambassadors
to Italy and to Spain.
" A-pril 2, 1915 [Nice] : Page^ and I have continued
our talks. He has given the Italian situation in detail,
going into the intricacies of Italian politics, especially
as to the rivalry between the present Premier, Salandra,
and the late Premier, Giolitti. Page thinks Italy is
acting in a wholly selfish way and that it matters little
with her whether she supports the Allies or the Dual
Alliance, provided she is on the winning side. The
aristocracy are favourable to Germany and the people
to the Entente. Nowhere throughout Italy is the feeling
against Germany anything like as bitter as it is against
their old-time enemy, Austria.
Page does not believe Italy would last long in the
conflict, and that if she had entered at the beginning of
the war she would probably have been easily defeated
and disarmed. He believes she will finally enter the
war on the side of the Allies when she can see the end of
the struggle within a few months.
He thinks England has made something of a mistake
in not giving her some assurance as to her aspirations
for new territory, or, we might say, old territory which
she seeks to recover. This would include a portion of
Austria, around what the Italians term the Gulf of
Venice, the twdve islands which she has long coveted,
and a sphere of influence in Asia Minor. . . .*
1 Thomas Nelson Page.
* At that moment, negotiations were being carried on which ended
with the Treaty of London, a guaranty by the Entente that Italy should
receive the territories she claimed.
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 417
“ Afril 8, 1915 [Biarritz] ; Ambassador Willard came
from Madrid to-day, arriving at 2.30. ... He says the
King dominates Spain and at heart he is an advanced
Liberal. He is well informed and is altogether an intelli-
gent and up-to-date ruler. His Ministers are not nearly
so progressive, and hold him back to a considerable degree.
“ The King desires to figure in peace overtures, but
is willing to 2 dow the President to take the lead and
will co-operate with him in a secondary capacity. I
told Willard I did not see how he could figure in it jointly,
since it would have to be done by one or the other and,
uMess the situation changed, it would doubtless be the
President. However, the situation could change to the
disadvantage of the President, for, if all the belligerents
become dissatisfied and embittered with our neutral
policy, they might conceive the idea that anyone would
be preferable to the President as a mediator. I explained
to Willard that I was appealing to the self-interests of
both sides, and that in itself would probably induce
them to accept Wilson.
“ Willard said the King was pro-French, but not
especially pro-British; that he was anti-German, but
pro-Austrian. His reason for not being strongly pro-
British, even though his wife is English, is because he
feels that he has not been very courteously treated by
the British upon his several visits to England. Then,
too, there is always Gibraltar to sting Spanish pride ”
Colonel House io the President
Dear Governor ; paws, Afmi u, 1915
This is the first time I have had an opportunity to
write you freely since I left here. My visit in Berlin
was exceedingly trying and disagreeable in many ways.
I met there no one of either high or low degree who did
not immediately comer me, and begin to discuss our
shipment of munitions to the Allies, and sometimes
their manner was almost offensive.
Upon the streets one hesitated to speak in English,
for fear of being insulted. . . .
1—27
4i8 the freedom OF THE SEAS
I fed, however, that with the Government and with
the influential people with whom I talked, a better
understanding of our purposes was brought about ; and
I hope this feeling will sooner or later reach the people
at large. . . .
The trouble with Germany is that it is antiquated in
some of its ideas. They started upon the rule of force
at a time when the most advanced nations were going
in the opposite direction.
I endeavoured to make it clear to the German
Government that their best interests could be served by
working along harmoniously with us. If we can keep
this view before them, they will probably want you as
mediator, for they are narrowly selfish in their purposes
and have no broad outlook as to the general good of
mankind.
I found a lack of harmony in governmental circles
which augurs ill for the future. The civil Government
are divided amongst themsdves. . . . The military and
civil forces are not working in harmony.
The Emperor is still in absolute authority, although
he is criticized pretty generally by both the civil and
military branches of the Government. Falkenhayn and
von Tirpitz seem to have more influence with him
than anyone, but Falkenhayn is not popular with the
army in general.
The Crown Prince seems to be left out of all important
councils and is generally ignored by both the dvil and
military Governments, though he seems to be more
popular with the people than his father because he is
said to be without egotism and more democratic in his
manner.
Hindenburg is the popular hero and is the only one
that dares to assert himself against the Emperor, I
bdieve there are troublous times ahead for the Kaiser
and that one dlnouement of the war may be a more
democratic Germany. . ,
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
419
At Paris Colonel House did not raise the question of
peace, for there was less chance of it than ever. In the
East, the Germans were driving the Russians out of
Poland, In the West, the French were planning a great
drive in the Champagne regions. The British were
developing the attack upon the Dardanelles. Italy was
on the point of joining the Allies. Both sides were
trying to win over Bulgaria. Everyone hoped for
victory. House confined himself to securing information
and solidifying his personal relationships, especially with
Delcass6 and Poincar6, House met Poincard for the first
time on this occasion. An American diplomat warned
him not to be disappointed by the coldness of manner
characteristic of the French President. “ I replied,”
wrote House, ” that his coldness and silence would not
embarrass me if it did not embarrass him, and I could
be as quiet, and for as long, as anybody.”
Colonel House to the President
[Telegram]
Paris, April 13, 1915
In a private conference with Delcass6, he was good
enough to express his satisfaction at the way negotiations
have been carried on up to now. He said that I had
given Berlin a correct idea of France’s attitude and he
approved what I had said and done there. . . .
He wished me to convey to you the appreciation of
France for the fairness with which you have maintained
our relations with the belligerents. I shall see Poincar6
before I leave.
E. M. House
Colonel House to the President
Dear Governor : Paris, Apm 17, 1915
I have just cabled you of my interview with Poincar6.
I had been told that he was austere in his manner and
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
420
I was quite unprepared for the warmth with which he
welcomed me.
He seemed to understand my relation to you and he
expressed his appreciation of your having sent me to
France.
When I wrote the cable to you on Thursday, I made
a request that you send some message that could be
repeated to him and to Ddcass6. I afterwards struck
this out, for fear lest it might give you too much trouble.
When I received your cablegram yesterday, sending
messages to them both, it seemed like a case of telepathy.
Poincar4 was visibly pleased. I have not seen
Delcass^ since, but will do so in a day or two in order
to discuss with him the second convention. There is
nothing you could do that would promote better feeling
than occasionally to send some word that I may repeat
to those in authority in the country in which I happen
to be. We are all susceptible to these little attentions.
I find your purposes badly misunderstood in France.
They believe the American public largely sympathetic to
the Allies ; but there is a feeling, which I am sorry to
say is almost imiversal throughout France, that you
personally are pro-German. It is the most illogical
conclusion that one could imagine, and 1 can scarcely
keep within the bounds of poUteness when 1 discuss
it. . . .
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
Colond House to Secretary Bryan
Paris, April 15, 1915
Dear Mr. Bryan :
^ . . Everybody seems to want peace, but nobody is
willing to concede enough to get it. They all also say
that they desire a permanent settlement so that no such
^saster may occur hereafter, but, again, there is such a
divergence of ideas as to how this should be brought
about that for the moment it is impossible to harmonize
the differences.
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
421
Germany is not willing to evacuate Belgium at all,
nor even France, without an indemnity, and Coimt von
Bemstorfi's suggestion that this could be arranged was
wide afield. The Allies, of course, will not consent to
anjdhing less ; and there the situation rests.
With warm regards and good wishes for Mrs. Bryan
and you, I am
Faithfully yours
E. M. House
“ April i6, 1915 : I can see from my interviews
[wrote House], not only with Delcass6 and Poincar^ but
with others, that I would have made a mistake if I had
attempted to talk peace at this time. France as a whole
has an idea that the President is not altogether in
S3mipathy with the Allies and that he is inclined to be
pro-German, and that it is for that reason he has tried
to push peace measures and in order to save Germany's
face. It is very discouraging to have to talk to intelli-
gent people and argue with them about such a matter,
but that is what I have to do.
“ Another impression they have here is that the
President is catering to the pro-German vote. I explain
to them that a man of the President’s intelligence would
hardly cater to fifteen per cent, of the' American vote
in order to lose eighty-five per cent, of it. This they had
never thought of. In fact, it seems to me they do not
think much at all.
“ The ignorance of Europe concerning itself, to say
nothing of America, is appal£mg.
“ France, to-day, does not understand England, her
purposes, or her forces in the war. TTiey have an idea
that they, themsdves, are doing it all and that England
is idling. Only a few Frenclunen who have been in
England understand the momentum gathering force
there, and the indomitable energy and tenacity which
in the end will probably turn the scales in favour of the
AlUes.”
422
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
Colonel House to President S. E. Mezes
PariSi April i8, 1915
Dear Sidney ;
. . . We lead a busy and interesting life and do not
get time to thoroughly enjoy the bombs that drop be-
fore and after us. We just missed them in Paris and
also missed them as they were dropped on the stations
and railway sheds along our journey. Now that the
weather is milder, we have a better sporting chance, as
all the bdligerents promise that an acceleration of their
activities in this direction will soon commence.
Martin is evidently looking forward with interest to
a bomb catching me somewhere on the Allies’ territory
— as he bdieves that would bring about war with Ger-
many, which he considers would be worth d5dng for.
On the other hand, the St. Louis Ghhe-Democrat writing
editorially hopes I may be spared, for the reason that,
desirable as my taking off would be, the price of a war
with Germany would be too great to pay. . . .
Fraternally yours
E. M. House
" April 19, 1915 : Last night Ambassador and Mrs.
Sharp gave a ^nner. The ^ests besides ourselves were,
the Infanta Eulalia of Spain, the Spanish Ambassador
and his wife. Ambassador Willard, Robert Bliss, Mrs.
Crosby, and Mr. and Mrs. Tuck. I sat by the Infanta
and immediately caught her attention by complimenting
her recent article in an American magazine, on the
Kaiser. I thought she had written charmingly of him,
and anyone who knew him would recognize how truth-
ful it was. She said she was fond of the Kaiser, and had
tried to make the Frraich people understand that he was
not the ogre they imagined. We had a spirited talk
about the war and its outcome. She knew the situa-
tion in Italy thoroughly and of the dangerous position
in which the King was. She also knew that the King
and aristocracy were for Germany, but the people were
in favour of the Allies. . . .
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 423
“ She spoke of the petty jealousies and differences
among Royalty, and laughingly said that when the
family silver spoons were to be divided, it was always
a question as to who should have this spoon and who
should have the other. In talking of the Kaiser, I
thought he had not surrounded himself with an efficient
Cabinet. She said that was one of his faults, for he
wanted to do everything himself and did not desire
any dominant figure on the boards excepting himself ;
consequently he had been badly served.”
Colonel House to the President
Paris, April 20, 1915
Dear Governor :
. . . The Spanish Ambassador told me that the King
of Spain wished him to meet me and ask me to come to
Madrid. He confirmed what Willard had said, and
that is, the King would like to take some part in peace
negotiations and is willing to follow your lead.
I told the Ambassador that you did not desire me,
at the moment, to visit the neutral countries and that
I was confining myself to the belligerents, and that we
were not making any peace overtures, but were simply
studying conditions.
I told him, however, that after visiting Russia I
might go to San Sebastian and meet the King. This
makes it indefinite and many things may happen to
prevent my going. . . .
Evidence still comes to me each day of the misunder-
standing which the French people at large have of our
position. They are very much afraid that peace will be
made overnight and that the Germans will not receive
the punishment for their misdeeds which they feel they
so richly deserve.
In the course of the next two or three months, the
conviction will break in upon them that the wonderful
things they expect the army to do, have not happened ;
and they will then become more reasonable in thdr
attitude.
424
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
I notice that Dernburg has taken the cue from Berlin
and is saying that Belgium must be retained unless the
" Freedom of the Seas ” is established. Yesterday I
noticed that a prominent Hamburger said the same
thing, and it looks as if the German Government had
accepted my suggestion that this was the best way to
save their faces before the people.
I took lunch to-day with Joseph Reinach. He is a
German-French Jew whose people have lived in France
some sixty years. He is said to be thoroughly patriotic
and is a man of influence.
He writes for the Figaro, and I outlined some things
I thought it would be wdl for him to incorporate in his
next article. I drew his attention to the fact that it
was more to France’s interest to have the United States
come in at the final settlement and exercise its moral
influence than it was to ours.
I also made him the same talk I have made to others
concerning you and your purposes. . . .
Reinach gets German papers from friends in Switzer-
land, and he said he saw a great change within the last
two weeks in their attitude towards En|;land. I am
wondering whether what I said to them m Berlin has
begun to bear fruit and they see the wisdom of modifying
their hate campaign in that direction.
Your affectionate
E. M. House
House left Paris for London on April 28. His visit
to France had been without result so far as haste ning
the chance of peace was concerned, but he had solidified
the personal relations which were later to be of immense
^plomatic value. In England he at once renewed his
intimacy with British friends and created new contacts
of interest and importance.
“ May 5, 1915 ; I lunched with Lord Northdiffe,
The only other guest was L. J. Maxse, of the National
Review.
“ Northdiffe spoke freely about the war and criticized
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 425
the Government without stint. He thought Kitchener
too old for the job and that he did not understand the
sort of warfare he was now engaged in. He did not
think the British appreciated the magnitude of the task
before them, or that they were meeting the situation
with anything like the determination and ability the
occasion required. Neither Northdiffe nor Maxse
thought there was a big man connected with either the
Government or army. He told of the number of men
they had in France at this time and the number in
every place. It was most indiscreet to tell these facts,
if, indeed, they are facts. I do not wonder the Germans
get so much information, for I hear the most profound
secrets of the army and navy repeated in a way that
makes me shiver. . . . ‘
“ May 6, 1915 : I dined with General Sir Arthur and
Lady Paget. The others present were Mrs. McGuire,
daughter of the late Lord Peel, Lady Fingall, Arthur
Balfour, and Sir Horace Plimkett.
“ During dinner the conversation drifted upon the
subject of whether Great Britain was doing her full
duty, and was performing as important a part in the
war as her resources and position demanded. I allowed
the talk to run along for a few minutes, and then I broke
in by saying that of all the belligerents Great Britain had
performed her part best. Germany was considered the
dominant military nation of the world, and Great Britain
the dominant naval power. Germany had failed to
maintain her dominance on land, while Great Britain
had asserted her supremacy at sea and was the undis-
puted master of it within a week after hostilities began.
In addition to this, she had raised an enormous army,
something it was thought would not be required of her,
and she was the only belligerent with a world-wide
vision of the war and its consequences — differing from
France, Germany, and even Russia, who looked upon it
* Mr. L. J. Maxse. No reflection of any kind upon the honour and
patriotism of Mr. L. J. Maxse is intended by the words appearing on
this page.
426 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
from local points of view and as to its effects upon them.
" When Great Britain entered the war, every neutral
country felt that Germany was doomed to defeat, and I
was sure Germany herself had the fear of God in her
heart. I was interrupted from time to time by the
English ‘ hear, hear,’ and when I had finished Balfour
said, ‘ That is the most doquent speech I have ever
heard-’ This, of course, was polite. . . .
“ When the ladies left the table. Sir Arthur told us of
his recent visit to Russia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia,
and Greece, from which countries he has just returned.
He was with the Grand Duke for ten days, and he gave
a better idea of his ability and character than I have yet
had. He spoke glowingly of the Russian army, and
regretfully of Russian corruption which prevented the
Grand Duke from equipping his army properly. He
said the Grand Duke was displeased at the manner of
Joffre’s insistence that he change his plan of campaign
and attack Prussia, at a time when the Grand Duke
thought he should merely fortify himself against the
Prussians and direct his entire energies against Austria.
This change of policy he claims has caused Russia to
lose innumerable men and treasure.
“ May 7, 1915 : I went to Sir Edward Grey’s at ten
o’clock. I handed him the King’s invitation to call at
11.30. . - - I decided, however, to go with Grey to Kew
and get a glimpse of it. Before we started, I showed
him some telegrams and letters — one from Ambassador
Willard bearing on the Spanish situation, one from
Thomas Nelson Page on the Italian situation, and, most
important of all, the President’s cable concerning the
retention of American cargoes. . . .
" The gates of Kew Gardens were not open when we
arrived, but we got through by the porter’s lodge. I
have never seen the gardens so beautiful ; it is to me
one of the superlativdy beautiful spots in England.
Grey showed me the different trees and told something
of them. The blackbirds were sluing, and we talked
of how different they were to those in far-away Texas.
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 427
“ Grey’s eyesight is failing, the doctors having
warned him that unless he stops reading he will lose his
sight to the extent of not being able to read again. He
said he supposed this was the sacrifice he had to make
for his coimtry and he was going on in that spirit, know-
ing well what lay before him.”
V
In the meantime House had taken up again with
Sir Edward the question of the Freedom of the Seas,
concerning which the two had corresponded while House
was still in Paris, and which, as House wrote Wilson, he
hoped to use as a means of starting negotiations between
the belligerents. Grey was suspicious of the Germans,
perhaps not without justification, and he wished to
make sure that if England accepted the Freedom of the
Seas, Germany would agree to general military disarma-
ment.
Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey
Paris, April 12, 1915
Dear Sir Edward :
... I did not find conditions in Berlin favourable
for any discussion looking towards peace ; consequently
I did not remain long or say much. The visit, however,
had ^eat value and I feel that I now know the true
conditions there, making a more intelligent line of action
possible,
I found but few points where our interest and theirs
touched strongly enough for me to create a sympathetic
feeling, but one of these was what we might term the
Freedom of the Seas. It was upon that subject alone
that I awoke sufficient enthusiasm to warrant the, hope
that in it lies the way to peace.
Looking at the matter from a narrowly selfish stand-
point, they could not believe that England would concede
enough in this direction for Germany to consent to those
438 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
things without which no peace can ever be possible. But
from my conversations with you, I knew that you saw a
future more secure and splendid for England in this new
direction than in the old. I gave no sign of this, but left
them thinking what concessions they might make in order
to reach so promising an end.
While I am eager to discuss this and other matters
with you, still I feel that it is well to move leisurely and
to assume a certain indifiEerence as to time. . . .
Your very sincere
E. M. House
Colonel House to the President
Paris, April 12, 1915
Dear Governor;
. . . What I want to do, is to get Sir Edward’s
consent to what might be termed a paper campaign. If
he agrees to this I will write to him, even though in
London, and have him reply. Copies of this correspon-
dence will be sent either to the German Chancellor direct,
or to him and Zimmermann through Gerard.
This will necessitate replies, and we may have them
talking to one another before they realize it. . . .
Your afectionate
E. M. House
Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House
33 Eggleston Square, London,
April 24, 1915
Dear Colonel House :
. . . Your news from Berlin is not encouraging ; it
reduces BemstorfE’s peace talk at Washington to
“ Fudge.”
What you hear from Berlin and found there is con-
firmed to me from another source — ^neutral but not
American.
As to ” freedom of the seas,” if Germany means that
her commerce is_^to go^ree^upon the sea in time of war.
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 429
while she remains free to make war upon other nations at
will, it is not a fair proposition.
If, on the other hand, Germany would enter after this
war some League of Nations where she would give and
accept the same security that other nations gave and
accepted against war breaking out between them, their
expenditures on armament might be reduced and new
rales to secure “ freedom of the seas ” made. The sea
is free in times of peace anyhow.^
Yours sincerely
E. Grey
Colonel Home to the Presideni
Dear Governor : London. Apni 30. 1915
I arrived here Wednesday night. I have already had
two conferences with Sir Edward Grey, and I am to have
the first formal one with him, by appointment through
Page, this afternoon at five o’dock.
Of course no one is to know but you of the other two
conferences.
I have outlined to him the full plan of the Freedom
of the Seas and how best it can be brought to Berlin’s
attention and what concessions they must give in return.
I shall not let them know how receptive he is to the idea,
but shall try to impress upon them how hard we are
working to accomplish the desired end and give them little
driblets of hope from time to time. The thing thus is
hdd within our hands.
Sir Edward tells me that public opinion here will have
to be educated in this direction, particularly the Conser-
vatives, and I shall endeavour to do this. . . .
We will have to keep this prggramme absolutdy
confidential between yoursdf. Sir Edward, and mysdf ;
and even the men I shall discuss these things with, will
not know our full purposes. . . .
^ A curious irrelevancy, in view of the fact that war-time trade was the
subject under discussion. Perhaps Grey had in mind an argument, which
Wilson later accepted, that with a league of nations to prevent war the
question of war-time trade became academic.
430
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
I told Sir Edward I felt sure that the Berlin Govern-
ment wanted peace and that they were deterred mainly
by German public opinion, which will have to be educated
to the making of concessions. . . .
Your affectionate
E. M. House
Even as early as this, the historian will observe.
House had begun to make plans for the Peace Conference,
for he believed in being prepared. A note which he made
after this conversation with Grey throws light on what the
Colonel wanted to have accomplished by the Paris
Conference in 1918 and 1919.
“ Afril 30, 1915 : I told Grey . . . how I planned to
organize this convention by getting the material that was
to come before it thoroughly prepared and digested, in
order that nothing should be left to chance. I would try
to get the commissioners from each of the neutral states,
and from as many of the belligerent states as possible, in
accord with us before they came to the convention.
“ I explained my methods of organization in political
conventions in the past ; that while they were seemingly
spontaneous, as a matter of fact nothin g was left to
chance. While measures were apparentiy drawn by
different delegations, in the end it was foimd they fitted
into the jilatform like a mosaic.^ I could see Grey was
intensely interested in this programme. I showed why
no opposition could withstand such thorough organization.
. . . We would be actuated by unselfish motives and
^ The illness which laid Colonel House low just before the meeting of
the Paris Peace Conference prevented him from carrying through the
organization he planned. Henry Wickham Steed, foreign editor of The
Times, says in this connexion : " One serious misfortune — ^which proved
to be a dieter — befell the Conference through the illness of Colonel House.
A severe attack of influenza incapacitated him for any work during this
critical formative period. Consequently his guiding influence was absent
when it was most sorely needed ; and, before he could resume his activities,
things had gone too fax for him to mend." — Through Thirty Years, ii, 266.
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 431
would not propose anything that was merely to the
advantage of Great Britain or the United States, but
would advocate only such things as would redound to the
good of the entire world. If we held to this principle, with
thorough preparation and organization we would be able
to do great and lasting good — ^good which would be limited
only fy the extent of our ability to conceive and execute
it.
“ In order to get the proper material and to prejpare
for an intelligent discussion of the questions which might
come before the peace conference, I desired to see some
of the best minds in England as to particular subjects.
I mentioned Lord Lorebum as being one with whom to
advise on Admiralty questions. Grey approved Lore-
bum, but suggested, in addition. Lord Mersey, and said
Balfour could also be of service.
“ Grey makes the point dear that whatever guaranty
of good faith the Allies would wish from Germany,
Germany would receive a like guaranty from the Allies.
His mind and mine run nearly paralld, and we seldom
disagree, I know in advance, just as I know with the
President, what his views will be on almost any subject.
I often come in contact with very able men whose minds
run in an opposite direction from mine, and I find it
difficult to agree with them upon any question. It is
therefore my good fortune that Fate has given me two
such friends as Woodrow Wilson and Edward Grey.
“ Grey came to Pace’s at five, I took the precaution
to remain downstairs in order to meet him when he first
came in and to walk up to the drawing-room with him.
In this way there was no embarrassment nor any pretence
of not having met before.
“ He stayed for a half-hour and the conversation was
unimportant, as we had covered most of it before. I
merely filled in the gaps by telling something fiurther of
my recent travels. I told Page that one of the General
Staff in Berlin had said that Sir Edward’s ambition was
to be a George Washington, a Lincoln, a Bismarck, and a
Napoleon. Page thought this very amusing, but Sir
432 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
Edward . . . took it seriously and argued upon the
peculiar bent of the German mind that could com-
pare Washington and Lincoln with Bismarck and
Napoleon.”
Colonel House to the President
Loxdoit, May 3, 1915
Dear Governor :
... I saw Lord Lorebum this morning. He is not
only a man that can be thoroughly trusted, but I believe
he is my friend. He told me that he thought if we could
bring about the Freedom of the Seas, it wotdd be the
greatest act of statesmanship that had been accomplished
in centuries. He thought it would be of 100 per cent,
value to other nations and 120 per cent, to England,
though we would have great difficulty in getting the
English mind to see this.
He spoke of Balfour as having great ability, but
thought his mind was too feminine to grasp the signifi-
cance of such a measure. He advised, just as Sir Edward
did, that I see Bonar Law, who he said had an inferior
mind , but who was practical and could probably be
convinced sooner on that account.
He said if we could incorporate this idea into the peace
convention, it would not only be a great act of statesman-
ship, but it would be perhaps the greatest jest that was
ever perpetrated upon an xmsuspecting nation — Shaving,
of course, Germany in mind.
I told him I sluvered in Berlin when I proposed it to
the Chancellor and the Foreign Office, for fear they would
see that it was more to England’s advantage than their
own and would therefore not be willing to make con-
cessions because of it. . . .
Lord Lorebum is one of the warmest admirers you
have in Great Britain, which is naturally a great bond of
S3nnpathy between us.
Your affectionate
E. M. House
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
433
Colonel House to Herr Zimmermann
London, May i, 1915
My dear Herr Zimmermann :
Since I saw you in Berlin, I have been to Switzerland
and France and came here a day or two ago. I have
carried out my plans as expressed to the Chancellor and
you and have seen many of our representatives at the
different European capites, who came by appointment to
meet me, and I have discussed with them the questions I
had in mind.
I have seen Sir Edward Grey and have mentioned
to him the interest which the United States and Germany
had in the Freedom of the Seas, and I am pleased to teU
you that he was at least witling to listen to the suggestion.
He explained to me, however, that if he himsdf could
be brought to the idea, it would only be upon an agree-
ment that would guarantee the making of aggressive
warfare on land as impossible as it was intended to make
it upon the sea. In other words, if the commerce of the
world, even in time of war and even between belligerents,
was to go free and to have access to its own ports and to
neutral ports without molestation, the land should be as
free of menace as the sea.
He did not undertake to commit himself to the
suggestion, and he particularly wanted me to know that
he was speaking for himself and not for the Government
or for the people.
He has promised to discuss the matter with his
colleagues, and I shall undertake to get some estimate
of the general sentiment in regard to such a proposal.
Of course, you imderstand that the conversation was
predicated upon the evacuation of Belgium and France
and upon the consent of all the Allies.
If the belligerents really desire to make an honourable
peace that will be of far-reaching good, not only to them-
selves but to the entire world, I think the opportunity
will soon be here.
If you will give me some assurance that you consider
these questions at least debatable, it will go a long way
1—28
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
434
to aid us in our endeavours. I shall imderstand that no
commitments are made, either directly or indirectly,
and that everything is unof&cisd ; but this seems to me
to be the most promising starting-point.
It will take a long whUe to make a successful campaign
in England in regard to the Freedom of the Seas ; but
we will undertake it with both pleasure and enthusiasm,
provided our efforts are cordially seconded by the other
nations at mterest.
Please present my very warm regards to their Excel-
lencies, the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, and bdieve me, my dear Herr Zim-
mermann,
Very sincerely yours
E. M. House
VI
The chief difficulty that obstructed the development
of House’s plan was obviously the inability of the British
to comprehend the advantages they would derive from
the Freedom of the Seas. This lack of comprehension
rested in part upon a false sense of security and a failure
to realize the extent of the danger threatened by the
German submarine. It was also based upon a natural
emotion, aroused by the war, which compelled the average
citizen to believe that anything acceptable to Germany
must ipso facto be inacceptable to Great Britain. Any
intensification of the bitter feeling between the two
countries would inevitably speU failure for House’s
hopes.
Precisely at this moment, the German navy committed
the outrage upon humanity which a modem Talleyrand
must certainly have pronounced " worse than a crime, a
blunder," and which immediately rendered hopdess any
attempt to reconcile the belligerents.
It was not ^tirely unforeseen by House, who on
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 435
May 5 received a cable from Wilson asking him for advice
in view of the attack upon an American oil-boat.^ House
warned him that the German threat of using submarines
recklessly might have to be taken at its face value.
Colonel House to the President
[Telegram]
London. May 5, 1915
I believe that a sharp note indicating your deter-
mination to demand full reparation, would be sufi&cient
in this instance.
I am afraid a more serious breach may at any time
occur, for they seem to have no regard for consequences.
Edward House
On the morning of May 7, House and Grey drove out
to Kew. " We spoke of the probability of an ocean
liner being sunk,” recorded House, “ and I told him if
this were done, a flame of indignation would sweep across
America, which would in itself probably carry us into
the war.” An hour later. House was with King George
in Buckingham Palace. ” We fell to talking, strangely
enough,” the Colonel wrote that night, ” of the prob-
ability of Germany sinking a trans-Atlantic liner, . . .
He said, ‘ Suppose they should sink the Lusitania with
American passengers on board. . . .' ”
That evening House dined at the American Embassy.
A despatch came in, stating that at two in the afternoon
a German submarine had torpedoed and simk the
Lusitania off the southern coast of Ireland. Many lives
had been lost.
Thus did Germany interpret the Freedom of the Seas.
1 The Gulflight, torpedoed by a Gennan submarine on May i, but not
sunk. The master died of heart failure the next morning, and two sailors
were drowned.
CHAPTER XIV
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
I think we shall find ourselves drifting into wax with Germany. . , .
House to Wilson, June i6, 1915
1
T he sinking of the Lusitania destroyed all hope of
beginning negotiations with Germany and Great
Britain. It was now, rather, a question as to
whether the United States itself could remain out of
the war. Ambassador Page regarded immediate inter-
vention as inevitable, and cabled Wilson to that effect.
" Page strongly urges the President,” House recorded,
“ to bring us into the struggle upon the side of the Allies,
stating that he does not believe we can retain the good
opinion of anyone if we fail to do so.”
Colonel House himself believed that the United States
could not long stand aside, in view of Germany’s reckless
course. ” It seems dear to me,” he wrote on May 9,
" that the Lusitania is merely the first incident of the ^d
and that more will follow, and that Germany wiU not
give any assurance she will discontinue her policy of
sinking passenger-ships filled with Americans and non-
combatants.” That the United States must receive
such an assurance or enter the war to enforce it, he
believed then and always. On May 9 he sent the Presi-
dent a carefully pondered cable. It is historic, for Mr.
Wilson read it to his Cabinet at the same time that he
read them his note of protest to Germany.
436
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 437
Colonel House to the Presideni
[Telegram]
London, ‘May 9, 1915
It is now certain that a large number of American
lives were lost when the Lusitania was sunk.
I believe an immediate demand should be made upon
Germany for assurance that this shall not occur again.
If she fails to give such assurance, I should inform her
that our Government expected to take such measures
as were necessary to ensure the safety of American
citizens.
If war follows, it will not be a new war, but an en-
deavour to end more speedily an old one. Our inter-
vention will save, rather than increase, the loss of life.
America has come to the parting of the ways, when she
must determine whether she stands for civilized or
imcivilized warfare. We can no longer remain neutral
spectators. Our action in this crisis will determine the
part we will play when peace is made, and how far we
may influence a settlement for the lasting good of
humanity. We are being weighed in the bdance, and
our position amongst nations is being assessed by man-
kind.
Edward House
London, May 11, 1915
Dear Governor:
... I cannot see any way out unless Germany
promises to cease her pohcy of making war upon non-
combatants. If you do not call her to account over the
loss of American lives caused by the sinkin|f of the
Lusitania, her next act will probably be the sinking of
an American liner, giving as an excuse that she carried
munitions of war and that we had been warned not to
send ships into the danger zone.
The question must be determined either now or later,
and it seems to me that you would lose prestige by
deferring it.
438 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
Germany has one of two things in mind. She may
believe that we will not go to war under any provocation ;
or that we will be impotent if we do and she desires us
to enter. The first is more understandable than the
second, although she probably thinks if we became
involved we would stop the shipment of munitions in
order to equip ourselves.
She may also think that in the peace conference we
would be likely to use our influence to settle upon broader
and easier terms for Germany.
Or she may think that being able to torpedo our
ships would contribute to the isolation of England.
If, rmhappily, it is necessary to go to war, I hope you
will give the world an exhibition of American efi&dency
that will be a lesson for a century or more. It is gene-
rally believed throughout Europe that we are so unpre-
pared and that it would take so long to put our resources
into action, that our entering would make but little
difference.
In the event of war, we should accelerate the manu-
facture of munitions to such an extent that we could
supply not only ourselves but the Allies, and so quickly
that the world would be astounded.
You can never know how deeply I regret the turn
affairs have taken, but it may be for the nltimate good.
My heart goes out to you at this time as never before,
andT think of you every hour of the day and wish that
I was by your side. My consolation is that I may be
of greater service here.
Your affectionate
E. M. House
Colonel House’s conversations in London make it
clear that both he and his British friends believed that
Germany had embarked upon a course which would
inevitably bring the United States into the war. The
Colonel discussed with Kitchener the value of American
intervention to the AUies.
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 439
May 12, 1915 : Lord Kitchener has asked to meet
me and invited me to come to the War Office or to York
House as I preferred. I seldom go to any of the offices,
so I met him at York House at six o’clock. . . ,
“ He was very cordial. When I put the question as
to whether it would be of benefit to the Allies for the
United States to come in on their side, he said, ‘ Nobody
but a damn fool could think it would not be of benefit
to us, and I am surprised that any E nglishman could
question it.’ This was apropos of the editorial I showed
him from the Si. James's Gazette, and of conversations
I had had with some of his countr5unen.
" He said, ' God forbid that any nation should come
into such a war,’ and he asked me to say to the President
that he did not want him to think that Great Britain
either made the request or had a desire for us to enter,
but if we considered it necessary to do so, in his opinion
it would greatly shorten the war and would save mnume-
rable lives, not only of the Allies, but of the Germans as
well.
“ He said the war was one of attrition and the moment
we entered, the Germans, imless they were totally mad,
would know that the end was a certainty and would
endeavour to make the best terms they could. It was
a case of a mad dog turned loose, and everyone tr5dng
to do his share towards stopping him. If we entered,
and I would let him know, he would at once put his mind
upon the problem and would aid us not only as to organi-
zation but in any other way we desired. He paid a
ma^ificent tribute to American valour and said :
* With American troops joined with the British, we will
not need French troops on the West Front, but can keep
them as a reserve.’
" He has 2,200,000 men under arms, and of these
500.000 are now in France and 650,000 are ready to go
the monaent they are needed. In addition, there are
120.000 in the Dardanelles. He spoke of the army and
the war as if it were his army and his war, and very
much as a monarch would speak.
440 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
“ We talked for the best part of an hour, although
I tried to leave repeatedly because I knew how busy he
must be and how valuable his time was to his country.
When I got up to leave, he arose, but continued to walk
up and down the room and talk. He repeated time and
again that the war would be shortened enormously if
the United States entered, and that it would be helpful
to an extent which no one but a man of his experience
could estimate. He said the coming in of Italy was as
nothing compared to that of the United States, even
though she had a large trained army. . . .
“ He was greatly interested when I gave it as my
opinion that the Germans did not have a man of the
‘ fibrst class ’.in ofBicial life. He was also interested in
von Tirpitz and Falkenhayn. The latter, I thought,
was a much abler man than von Tirpitz and an abler
man than von Moltke, whom he superseded. Kitchener
spoke several times of their method of warfare, and said
he did not dream that a nation claiming to be civilized
would stoop to the things they had done. He was
especially bitter concerning asphyxiating gases and said
the only thing he could do was to reply in kind.
“ This is the first time I have met Kitchener, and he
seemed to me to be forceful and able, though, perhaps,
without the spark of genius — ^unless, indeed, his great
power of organization might be termed that.^ I was
impressed by his fairness and the impartial way he dis-
cussed our possible entry into the war. While it was the
clever way to talk to me, he did not do it for that reason,
^ Kitchener's organizing ability, however, was better fitted to the
crises of his earlier career than to that which he faced as Secretary of War
in 1915. The value of Kitchener's name was inestimable and he built up
a great army, but he was used to a situation that could be handled by
himself as dictator and he never understood the need of an able General
Staff at the War Office. His conception of work/ ' wrote Grey, " was that
it must be a one-man job. He shouldered the responsibility and did the
work of a Titan ; but he did not realize that general responsibility must be
shared with the Cabinet, and strategic responsibility with the most inde*
pendent and expert military brains, organized in a General Staff and
working with him. — Tweniy^Five Years, ii, 246.
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 441
for how could he know what would or would not influence
me ? He doubtless realizes, as the King does, that my
advice to the President will be a potent influence in this
crisis, but there was nothing of eagerness .or urging in
his remarks. He took no pains to hide his opinion that
our entry would be decisive, and yet he said no word
to hasten that decision. Kitchener is not the greatest
intellect with which I have come in touch, but he has a
manner indicating great reserve force, and if I were
going tiger hunting I would gladly have him for a com-
panion.
“ May 13, 1915 : I lunched with Arthur Balfour.
We had a most interesting talk. I told of my interview
with Kitchener and of my advice to the President regard-
ing the Lusitania incident and read him my cablegram,
which he complimented warmly. I talk to Balfour with
more freedom than any man in Great Britain with the
exception of Grey, for I trust him implicitly. Grey and
Balfour are two great gentlemen, and I feel sure of their
discretion.
“ Balfour criticized the Government for depending
so much upon America for munitions of war. He
thought at the very outset they should have accelerated
the manufacture of munitions to such an extent that
by now they would have needed no outside aid. . .
During the six days that followed the sinking of the
Lusitania, Colonel House received no intimation of the
action that President Wilson planned. He did not
seriously suspect him of an inclination to avoid the issue
which Germany had raised, but he did confess some
anxiety as a result of a speech which was generally
interpreted as proof of Wilson’s invincible pacifism.
On May ii he recorded :
“ Page and all of us are distressed by the President’s
speech at Philadelphia, in which he is reported to have
said, ‘ There is such a thing as being too proud to fight.’
442 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
Page sent him a long cablegram, which he submitted to
me for criticism.”
Mr. Wilson faced a choice of two alternatives : to
break diplomatic relations forthwith, on the ground that
the sinking of the Lusitania and her thousand passengers
was a crime against civilization, or to demand an official
disavowal and the assurance that inhuman acts of such
a kind would not be repeated. To break relations with-
out giving Germany any chance to alter her submarine
methods was contrary to the President’s instincts, and
it is unlikely that the nation would have supported him
with the degree of xmity which such a decided step
demanded.
He chose the second alternative, and on May 13
he sent to Germany a note conceived and expressed
with vigour, but avoiding both the form and tone of an
ultimatum. Rehearsing the earlier attacks made by
submarines that had resulted in the loss of American
lives, " a series of events which the Government of the
United States has observed with growing concern,” he
demanded that the Germans should
” disavow the acts of which the Government of the
United States complains, that they will make repara-
tion so far as reparation is possible for injuries which
are without measure, and that they will take immediate
steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously
subversive of the principles of warfare. . . . Expressions
of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction
of neutral ships simk by mistake, while they may satisfy
iatemational obligations, if no loss of hfe results, can-
not justify or excuse a practice, the natural and neces-
sary ^ect of which is to subject neutral nations and
neutral persons to new and unmeasurable risks.”
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 443
The note did not satisfy the bellicose insistence of
Mr. Roosevelt for an immediate break with Germany.
Another ex-President, however, William Howard Taft,
described it as " admirable in tone . . . digpiified in the
level the writer takes with respect to international
obligations ... it may well call for our earnest con-
currence and confirmation.” Mr. Page himself ex-
pressed satisfaction and telegraphed to the President,
“ May I be allowed to express my personal congratula-
tions on the note.” And he added that most of the
members of the British Government, as well as Lans-
downe, Balfour, and Bonar Law of the Opposition, gave
“ private expressions of praise.” ^
Articulate opinion, indeed, with rare exceptions both
at home and abroad, commended the note ; it was only
later, after many months of German diplomatic evasions,
that critics with the advantage of hindsight complained
that Wilson should have issued an ultimatum and set
down for Germany a time-limit — a. course which might
or might not have led her to give up the submarine cam-
paign immediately. Sidney Brooks, writing in The
English Review, insisted that ” this note ranks with the
greatest diplomatic literature. It seems as if one could
see the President wrestling with the Wilhelmstrasse for
the soul of Germany.” The Times dedared that ” no-
thing less than the conscience of humanity makes itself
audible in his [Wilson’s] measured and incisive sen-
tences.” From France, it is true, Whitney Warren
wrote to House that there was a growing inclination
to believe that “ the President has been influenced in
the past and is stiU influenced by German tradition and
inspiration.” And the depatriatized Americans of Paris,
always hostile to Wilson, attacked him bitterly for
1 Life and LeUers of Walter H. Page, iii, 245-
444 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
truckling to Germany. But official opinion both there
and in England agreed that the President had acted not
merely wisely but adequately.
Ambassador Sharp to Colonel House
Paris, June 2, 1915
My dear Mr. House :
. . . While practically everybody over here has
endorsed the President’s note to Germany, following
the sinking of the Lusitania, yet it makes a loyal Ameri-
can rather “ hot under the collar,” as we say, to read
little squibs like those I have marked. . . . However, those
in authority in the French Government fully imderstand
and appreciate the attitude of President Wilson and have
great confidence in the integrity of his purpose.
Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador, told me
the other day that he was very much in hopes that we
would not go to war with Germany, as we could be of
very much more assistance to the Allies out of the war
than actively in it. . .
Very truly yours
William G. Sharp
Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey^ to Colonel House
London, June i, 1915
My dear Colonel House :
... As I was walking home here just now I was
thinking to myself — ” We don’t want America to come
in.” The thought of dragging our own kith and kin
into this hideous struggle is odious, but I do wish that
the Americans could tell the Germans ” if you dare to
destroy Westminster Abbey, America will never forgive
you. It is ours as well as theirs.”
And yet with these lunatics that might after all be
the worst way of protecting it. I suppose it is childish,
^ In his private papers the British Ambassador expressed quite the
contrary opinion.
> Editor of The Spectator.
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 445
but I would rather see half London smashed than the
Abbey and Westminster Hall destroyed. Except for
that, Zeppelins will never give me a bad night.
Yours very sincerely
J. St. Loe Strachey
II
’ Colonel House evidently did not believe that Ger-
many would alter her methods of naval warfare imless
some more potent factor than the protests of the United
States could be brought to bear. On May 18, he wrote
to Secretary McAdoo : “ The German mind seems not
to understand anything excepting hard knocks, and they
have a curious idea that we will not fight under any
circumstances. As a matter of fact, this idea is pre-
valent throughout Europe and will sooner or later
involve us in war.” A fortnight later, after another
submarine attack, he recorded : "I have concluded that
war is inevitable.”
Both House and Page agreed that unless Germany
3delded to the demands set forth in Wilson's note and
ceased the torpedoing of ships without warning, the
United States could not avoid intervention.
Unlike Page, however. House shared the sentiment
of President Wilson that war with Germany could not
be justified imless every possible means to secure a
peaceful settlement were first attempted ; and he worked
assiduously to discover a plan by which Germany might
be induced to give up the cruel and illegal submarine
warfare. He had the co-operation of Sir Edward Grey,
who, with a singular largeness of view rare amid the
passions of war, was ready to consider any reasonable
compromise.
446 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
Colonel House to the PresidetU
V London, May 14, 1915
Dear Governor :
I took lunch with Sir Edward Grey to-day. The
principal topic of our conversation was the Lusitania
disaster and the action you might take.
Grey told me he did not see how you could do dif-
ferently from what you have done, and he intimated
that if we had done less we would have placed ourselves
in much the same position in which England would have
been placed if she had not defended Belgian neutrality.
In oiher words, he thought that we would have been
totally without friends or influence in the concert of
nations, either now or hereafter. I am sure that this
is true.
If we had failed to take action in a determined way
it would have meant that we would have lost the friend-
ship of the Allies on the one hand, and would not have
mitigated any of the hate which Germany feels for us.
Sooner or later we would have had to reckon with Ger-
many unless she is completely crushed, and we would
not have had a sympathetic friend among the great
nations.
Grey asked me what I thought Germany’s reply
would be. I told him that if I were writing Germany’s
reply I would say that if England would lift the embargo
on foodstuffs, Germany would consent to discontinue her
submarine policy of sinking merchantmen. Grey replied
that if Germany would consent not only to discontinue
that mode of warfare, but would also agree to discontinue
the use of asphyxiating gases and the ruthless kining of
non-combatants, England would be willing to lift the
embargo on foodstuffs.
I am rushing a cablegram to you, outlining this. It
distresses me that I cannot have you, Grey, and Berlin
within talking distance. If that could happen, so much
could be accomplished that is impossible under present
conditions.
I am writing this hastily, in order to catch to-night's
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 447
mail. It may interest you to know that Italy has signed
an agreement with the Allies to come into the war before
the 26th.^ This agreement will be carried out unless
the Italian Parliament refuses to sanction it. I have
had this information for ten days or more, but have not
written it because there seemed so many slips between
the agreement and its completion. . . .
Your affectionate
E. M. House
The conversation with Grey suggested the possibility
of an arrangement which might go far towards settling
the dispute with England over the holding-up of cargoes
and also might avert the livelier danger of an open break
with Germany, over the submarine. The European
War, as it touched the United States, had now become
a struggle between German submarine and British
blockade. Both weapons infringed American neutral
rights. If the belligerents could be induced to give up
their use, much of our difficulties would disappear. And
to many the compromise seemed fair, for if the British
food blockade threatened to starve Germany out, the
German submarine threatened to destroy British com-
merce.
The suggestion was not new. In February, President
Wilson, following a hint of Ambassador Bemstorff, had
made a similar proposal to the British. Since the Ger-
mans averred that the submarine war zone was merdy
retaliation for the British attempt to starve non-com-
batants, Wilson argued that, if the British would permit
^ The Treaty of London, signed April 26, 1915, one of the “ secret
treaties." It did not set a date for Italy's entrance into the war, providing
merely that she should use all her resources in making war with the Allies
upon all their enemies. On May 23, Italy declared war against Austria,
but did not declare war on Germany until August 27, 1916. On April 30,
X917, Mr. Balfour explained the details of the treaty to President Wilson.
448 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
foodstuffs to pass, Germany ought to give up her illegal
submarine warfare. Grey had approved the proposal.
Talking to House on February 27, he pointed out that
with an agreement of this kind the British could carry
on the war indefinitely. British public opinion, how-
ever, did not appreciate how dangerous a weapon the
submarine might become, and felt that Great Britain
would be sacrificing too much by lifting the embargo
upon food. Ambassador Page himself held this opinion
and, regarding the President’s suggestion as something
made in Germany, did not push it vigorously.
“ I went to the Embassy to see the Ambassador [wrote
House]. He did not return from his week-end with the
Prime Minister until 12.15. , . . Page told of the two
tmhappy da}^ he had spent in the country. One of the
perquisites of the Prime Minister is the use of an old
castle near Dover, and in it Page was lodged for two cold,
wet, miserable nights. There were no fires excepting
one here and there, and, though Page is a vegetarian,
there seemed nothing to eat excepting meats of many
varieties. . . .
" Page was inclined not to make a personal appeal
to Grey in behalf of the acceptance of the President’s
proposal concerning a compromise with Germany on
the question of the embargo. I called his attrition to
the President's cable to me requesting me to say to Page
that he desired the matter presented with all the emphasis
in his power. He then said he would make an appoint-
ment with Grey and do so, though one could see he had
no stomach for it. He did not consider the suggestion
a wise one, nor did he consider its acceptance favourable
to the British Government. I argued to the contrary,
and tried to convince him that the good opinion gained
from the neutrals would be compensation enough for
any concessions this Government might make, and that
the concessions were not really more than those made
by Germany.”
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 449
Evidently the British Cabinet, with the exception of
Grey, shared Page's behef that it was preferable to retain
the offensive weapon of the food blockade against Ger-
many, even if it meant braving the threat of the sub-
marine, the danger of which then and even later they
did not fuUy realize. On March 15, they refused the
compromise.
The crisis of May was so much more acute than that
of February, that House seized eagerly upon the chance
of renewing the proposal that Germany give up the
submarine warfare provided that Great Britain would
relax the food blockade. He was sincere in his belief
that the British would gain both a moral and a material
advantage thereby, and he was convinced that it offered
the sole means of preventing American intervention,
which otherwise would be inevitable as the result of
German submarine attacks.
" Grey was very fine about it [recorded Colonel
House]. He said of course it would be to the advantage
of Great Britain for the United States to enter the war,
and if he agreed to do what we requested it would mean
that the United States would remain neutral. Neverthe-
less, he wanted to do what we considered to be for our
best interests and what, indeed, he thought was in the
long run for Great Britain’s best interests.
“ We discussed this feature at length, I maintaining
that Great Britain was taking long chances upon being
isolated by German submarine warfare, and if her com-
merce could be free from this menace, she could carry
on the war indefinitdy without fear of ultimate defeat,"
President Wilson immediately cabled to House ex-
pressing deep interest in the suggestion. He looked
upon it, not merely as a means of ending the crisis in
German-American relations, but also as affording a
I — 29
450 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
possible solution of the quarrel with England over the
blockade. For the sake of diplomatic consistency, he
asserted, he would soon have to address a note to Great
Britain regarding the interruption of American trade
with neutral ports. It would be a great stroke on
England’s part, said the President, if she would of her
own accord relieve the situation and put Germany wholly
in the wrong, a small price to pay for the ending of
submarine outrages.
Colonel House to the President
London, May 20, 1915
Dear Governor:
When your cable of the i6th came, I asked Page to
make an engagement with Grey in order that we might
protest against the holding-up of cargoes and find
definitely whether England would agree to lift the
embargo on foodstuffs, providing Germany would dis-
continue her submarine policy. Page promised to make
the appointment. He ^d not do so, and finally told
me that he had concluded it was useless because, in his
opinion, the British Government would not consider
for a moment the proposal to lift the embargo.
It was then I sent you the discouraging cable. How-
ever, when your second cable of Tuesday came, I went
to see Sir Edward without further consultation with
Page.
I found Grey was even more receptive of the sugges-
tion than when I saw him last, and he promised to use
aU his influence in favour of such a proposal, provided
one was made by Germany. He added, however, that
the discontinuance of asph 3 ^ating or poisonous gases
must also be included in any agreement made.
He explained that the Cabinet was in dissolution and
that he could only speak for himself and that he did not
want me to consider that he spoke for the Government.
I expressed a willingness to accept his personal assurance
in regard to his own endeavours, with the understanding
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 451
that it committed no one but himself. He said that in
ordinary times if the Cabinet refused to acquiesce in his
view, he would resign ; but that he did not feel justified
in doing this in time of war. I took occasion to express
your high regard for him and to assure him that we
would consider his resignation a calamity.
He dictated, while I wrote, the imderstanding between
us, which was literally this :
ist. Permitting staple foodstuffs to go to neutral
ports without question.
2nd. All foodstuffs now detained to be brought
before the prize court as quickly as possible.
3rd. Claims for cotton cargoes now detained to be
made as soon as shippers certify as to each cargo, that
they are the real owners to whom pa5rment should be made.
Should England agree to the first proposition, Ger-
many was to cease submarine warfare on merchant
vessels and discontinue the use of asphyxiating or
poisonous gases.
Propositions two and three are matters between this
Government and ours and have no reference to Germany
and will be carried out at once.
I told Grey that I would immediately cable Gerard,
a sking Germany to withhold her answer to your note
imtil I could communicate with him fmrther. I also
told him I would suggest to the German authorities,
through Gerard, that they answer the note by making
the proposal in question. ...
I assumed the entire responsibility, so if things go
wrong, you and Sir Edward can disclaim any connexion
with it.
If Germany refuses to consider this proposal, it will
place you in the position of having done ever3d:hing
possible to avert war between the United States and
Germany.
Sir Edward took a copy of the memorandum I made,
so that there might be no misunderstanding between us.
Of course there would be none, anyway, for he remembers
well what he says and never recedes from his word. . . ,
452 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
It is unfortunate that the Cabinet is to be reformed,
for I am confident with the present members the plan
would go through, provided Germany makes the proposal.
The new element to go in is less apt to favour the
proposal than those already there.
Affectionately yours
E. M. House
Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard
[Telegram via Copenhagen]
London, May 19. 1915
. . . Can you not induce the German Government to
answer our note by proposing that if England will
permit foodstuffs in the future to go to neutral ports
without question, Germany will discontinue her sub-
marine warfare on merchant vessels and will also dis-
continue the use of poisonous gas ? Such a proposal
from Germany at this time will give her great advantage,
and in my opinion she will make a grave mistake if she
does not seize it.
Edward House
” May 19, 1915 : Page thought I was making a
mistake in doing anything [wrote House], and that it
would result in bad feeling between England and the
United States provided Germany assented and Sir
Edward Grey could not get his Government to agree. I
answered that this was a matter I could not control ;
that my purpose was to place the United States and
the President clearly in the right, so if trouble came
between Germany and ourselves the President would
have done everything within his power to prevent war,
and could maintain his position taken in the note with
a clear conscience and with the certain approval of the
American people.
" I took dinner with Lord Haldane. By conunon
consent we dined alone, so as to discuss matters freely.
... He showed me the diary he kept during his memorable
visit to Berlin on February 9 and 10, 1912. He was
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 453
sent over, as the world knows, as the representative of
the King and British Government, to try to bring about
a better understanding with Germany and to draw up a
tentative treaty to that effect. ...
“ I took it as an indication of his confidence that he
let me read this. He explained, however, that he felt
I should know everything that had passed between the
German and British Governments, in regard to Asia
Minor, the African Colonies, and the larger relations
concerning the Triple Entente, and what Great Britain
might do in the event either Germany or England should
become involved with nations other than themselves.
" Grey had spoken to Haldane about my proposal
concerning the hfting of the embargo on foodstuffs and
the discontinuance of the submarine campaign. He
said his own influence would be in favour of the proposal,
but he did not know what action the new Ministry
would take.
“ He spoke of himself and of his years of service to
his country, and his voice saddened when he told of how
he had been maligned and misunderstood since the war
with Germany began.* He gave me two of his books,
and we talked at length of Germany, her future, and the
German people. I mentioned my proposal as to the
Freedom of the Seas. He thought it splendid, and I
understood that I could count upon his influence in
behalf of that measure when the proper time came. . . .
" May 21, 1915 : I lunched with Grey and read him
the President’s despatch. ... He has seen nearly all
the present Ministry and enough of the Opposition who
would probably be in the Cabinet, to be able to say that
* Haldane, as Minister of War in the Asquith Cabinet, had created the
territorial organization and made possible the immediate despatch of an
efficient Expeditionary Force. " But for his work,” wrote Grey to Asquith,
** this Force would not have been available at a moment's notice. , . .
That Haldane of all people should have been . . . accused of lack of
patriotism or public spirit is an intolerable instance of gross ignorance, or
malice, or of madness.” (Grey, Twenty-Five Years, ii, 244.) But the
Conservatives made Haldane's exclusion from the new coalition Cabinet
a condition of their own participation.
454 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
in his opinion, if Germany made the proposal I had
suggested it would be considered by his Government.
“He is always cautious in his statements, and I
conclude that what he says means that the British
Government will accept the proposal. It will be a great
diplomatic triumph for the President if brought about,
and it will settle our contentions with both Govern-
ments. . . ’’
Whatever the ultimate decision of the British Cabinet
might have been, the German Government put an end
to any chance of a compromise settlement by a brusque
refusal to consider House’s suggestion. In public the
plaintiveness of German protests against the cruel
starvation of women and children by the British was
not diminished, but in private the German leaders were
evidently imwilling to pay the price necessary to raise
the blockade. They were determined to make full use
of the submarine, and they were the less mdined to heed
American warnings in that they were not convinced
the United States would support such warnings by
other than verbal factors. Tw'O messages from Am-
bassador Gerard to Colonel House carried the news of
the failure of the proposed compromise and indicated
the cause.
Colonel House to the President
[Telegram]
London, May 24, 1915
Gerard cables me as follows : “ Zimmermann told
me yesterday that Dumba, Austrian Ambassador, had
cabled him that Bryan told him that America was not
in earnest about Lusitania matter.” Of course Mr.
Bryan did not say that, but I think you should know
what Zimmermann told Gerard. . . .
Edward House
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 455
Ambassador Gerard learned of the cable from Dumba
in a curious fashion. Zimmermann had come to lunch
with him and after his customary two quarts of Moselle
was talking freely to an American lady, wifd of a German.
He assured her that there would be no break with the
United States over the Lusitania, since Wilson was not
serious in his protest. The Ambassador, as soon as he
learned the gist of the conversation, called upon Zimmer-
mann and demanded the source of his information.
Zimmermaim at once pulled out the cable from Dumba
and laid it before him. Mr. Gerard faced a problem.
It was essential that he inform Wilson, and he could
hardly do so through the State Department, since his
cable would go straight to Mr. Bryan. Thus he turned
it over to House, knowing that he would at once inform
the President. Dtunba’s message carried disastrous
effects, since it convinced the Germans that they could
carry on their submarine campaign with impunity.
Hence their refusal of the compromise that House
suggested.
Colonel House to the President
[Telegram]
London, May 25, 1915
I have following cable from Gerard :
“ I gave your suggestion to von Jagow this morning.
This proposition of permitting the passage of food in
return for the cessation of submarine methods has
already been made and declined.
“ If raw materials are added, the matter can perhaps
be arranged. Germany is in no need of food.”
Of course the conditions they make are impossible.
This does away with their contention that the starving
of Germany justifies their submarine policy. I think
this strengthens your already unassailable position.
Edward House
456 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard
[Telegram]
London, May 25, 1915
The Allied would never agree to allow raw materials
to go through ; therefore I can do nothing further and
there is no need for Germany further to delay acting
on our note
I am terribly sorry, because the consequences may be
very grave.
Edward House
“ May 26, 1915 : I lunched with Sir Edward Grey
again to-day. I read him aU the telegrams that had
passed between the President, Gerard, and myself since
we last met. We first discussed Gerard’s cable sa3dng
Berlin had refused to accept my suggestion. Grey
thought it had at least placed Great Britain in a more
advantageous position, and he expressed himself as
being glad it had been sent, for it settled the German
contention that they were compelled to wage their submarine
policy against Great Britain because she was endeavouring
to starve sixty-five million German non-combatants.
" In talking to other members of the Government,
he said some of them had thought in the event Germany
accepted the proposal it would mean that she was actually
running short of food and it would not be well for
England to relax. Grey, however, argued that there
were too many advantages on the other side to let that
one prevail. He said, too, he was anxious for us to
know that England was doing what she could to keep
us from war with Germany, and not trying to push us in.
My admiration and affection for him grows.”
Thus ended the most favourable opportunity for
settling the controversy that later was to exercise momen-
tous effect upon the course of the war and the fate of
Germany. Had Berlin accepted the compromise, not
merely would Germany have obtained the food of which,
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 457
as she complained, her starving civilian population was
deprived by an illegal blockade, but she might have
avoided the quarrel with the United States that brought
America into the war. " Whom the * Gods would
destroy ”
III
Germany’s refusal to seize the opportxmity that had
thus been offered her convinced Colonel House that
further stay in Europe was useless. The chance of
beginning peace negotiations between the belligerents, if
it had ever existed, had completely disappeared. On
both sides emotion was so thorougUy envenomed that
any suggestion of a pacific arrangement was regarded as
criminal. House was also convinced that German
policy meant American intervention and he wished to
be near the President so as to urge him to wage war with
vigour.
“ I have concluded that war with Germany is inevit-
able [he wrote on May 30] and this afternoon at six o’clock
I decided to go home on the ss. St. Paid on Saturday.
I sent a cable to the President to this effect.
“ I discussed the matter with Wallace, who will go
with us, and I also discussed it with Page, who advised
our going if we cared to §et home within the year. Page
is always a candid adviser. . . .
“ June I, 1915 : I told Plunkett I was leaving for
America and my reasons for doing so. I said it was my
purpose to persuade the President not to conduct a
milk-and-water war, but to put all the strength, all the
virility, and all the energy of our nation into it, so that
Europe might remember for a century what it meant
to provoke a peaceful nation into war.
“ I intended to suggest a commission, with perhaps
a member of the Cabinet as chairman, to facilitate the
manufacture of munitions of war and war materials.
458 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
Plunkett wanted me to see some of the British Cabinet
and talk with them before I left. He arranged for me
to meet Lloyd George at six o’clock. . .
«
A letter from the American Ambassador in Berlin
indicated that Germany had embarked upon the new
course with confidence, and strengthened House’s con-
viction that war could not be avoided.
Afyiba&saiof Gerard, to Colonel House
Berlin, June i, 1915
My dear Colonel ;
I am afraid that we are in for grave consequences.
This country, I fear, will not give up the torpedoing
without notice of merchant and passenger steamers ;
and their recent victories over the Russians have given
them great confidence here. They seem also to be hold-
ing their lines in the Dardanelles and their lines in
France and Belgium with ease, and probably Italy will
be defeated.
The only thing that can gain the war for the Allies
is universal service in England and the throwing into the
balance of at least two million new English troops. If
the English knew what the Germans have in store for
England in case of success, the very dead in the grave-
yards would volunteer for the war.
It is the German hope to keep the Lusitania matter
“ jollied along ” until the American people get excited
about baseball or a new scandal and forget. Meantime
the hate of America grows daily.
As to food and even raw materials, the Germans have
enough for war purposes. They need raw materials for
the trades, but have everything needed for the manu-
facture of munitions ; and as they are spending all the
money for war supplies in their own coimtry their
financial situation is good for the present. They expect
some other country to pay the cost of the war.
In governmental circles there is no talk of giving up
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
. 459
Belgium. They want to keep it and exact great indem-
nities from other countries.
They are building new and great submarines (2,800
tons), and are putting so many in the wates that I think
they will soon become a serious menace to England.
That is why a great land army is necessary. . . .
Will cable if anything comes up. Best wishes to
Mrs. House.
Yours as ever
James W. Gerard
If, contrary to expectations, Germany agreed to
abandon or modify the submarine warfare or if the crisis
should be tided over. House was equally desirous of being
in the United States and near the President, for in that
case the dispute with Great Britain over the holding-up
of American cargoes would certainly become acute.
The difference was serious enough at best, and mutual
misunderstanding threatened to make it worse.
Colonel House was anxious that President Wilson should
comprdiend the difficulties which Sir Edward Grey
faced, how hard he was pressed by British opinion and
the Admiralty, and how important it was that the
United States remain on friendly terms with the Allies.
Whatever the irritation caused by the restriction of
American trade. House never wavered in his conviction
that our welfare was bound up in German defeat. All
this Ambassador Page had urged in many long letters.
But the very number and length of the letters, touched
as they were by pro-Ally emotion, lessened the influence
of the Ambassador, who, in Washington, seemed more
like the spokesman of Allied interests than the repre-
sentative of the American Government. As House
realized acutdy, a pmrdy objective summary of the
situation with emphasis upon American interests would
carry more weight.
. 46o . SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
“ March 4, 1915 : Yesterday [wrote House], when
Page was drawing up his despatch to the President
asking that he do nothing for the moment concerning
the proposed blockade of Germany, he had a lot of
things in it which I advised eliminating. It was the
strongest sort of pro-British argument, and I knew it
would weaken his influence both with the State Depart-
ment and with the President. He reluctantly cut it
down to a short statement. . . .”
Colonel House to the President
Dear Governor : = 5 . 1915
. . . There is nothing new to report here, and it looks
as if things might be settling down for a long war. ... I
want very much to see you and to go over the situation
in person. There are so many things that cannot be
written, and I think it would be well worth while for me
to make the trip even if it is necessary to return within
a short time.
There is no doubt that the position you have taken
with both Germany and Great Britain is correct ; but
I feel that our position with the Allies is somewhat
different, for we are bound up more or less in their
success, and I do not think we should do anything that
can possibly be avoided to alienate the good feding that
they now have for us. If we lose their good wiU, we will
not be able to figure at all in peace negotiations, and we
will be sacrificing too much in order to maintain aU our
commercial rights.
The situation, I know, is most tr3dng and difficult,
and you have acted with extraordinary patience and
good judgment.
Afiectionatdy yours jj
Colond House had constantly impressed upon his
British friends the importance of recognizing the irrita-
tion and loss caused in the United States by the holding-
up of American cargoes and mails. From the moment
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE . 461
of his arrival in February 1915, he emphasized the fact
that, even though this was the only serious cause of
friction between the two countries, it was nevertheless
one that would lead to grave results unles's eclipsed by
the dispute with Germany. The latter infringed the
rights of humanity, whereas the controversy with Great
Britain was of a far less vital sort. But it touched the
pockets and the sensibilities of many Americans.
Furthermore, it was impossible for the President to
protest with vigour against German infractions of the
law of nations, so long as the Germans had some ground
for complaint that he permitted the British to alter
maritime regulations at wiU. Letters from the Presi-
dent and Cabinet members gave House a clear picture of
the diffi culties which they faced in Washington. The
friendly tone of the President’s message goes far to
answer the criticism that the gaucherie of American
protests tended unnecessarily to embitter Anglo-Ameri-
can relations.
He reiterated his emphasis upon the change that was
coming over American opinion because of British inter-
ference with neutral trade and expressed the fear that
it might be impossible to prevent the passage by Con-
gress of an embargo upon shipments of arms. Wilson
intimated that he would try to prevent it, but he wished
Grey to realize the danger. He conveyed the warning
through House rather than Page because he wished it
to be absolutely unofficial and spoken merely in personal
friendship. Secretary Lane expressed similar sentiments.
Secretary Lane to Colonel House
My dear Colonel : Washington. 19x5
I am glad to receive your note. There is little that
I can say as to conditions here. The President is bearing
462 . SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
the burden well. Notwithstan ding all the insults of
Germany, he is determined to endure to the limit, to
turn the left cheek and then the back, if necessary ;
but of coursa, he cannot suffer insult after insult to the
point of humiliation, for the country would rise in rebel-
lion. We are a sensitive people, as our English friends
discovered a hundred years ago.
And the English are not behaving very well. They
are holding up our ships ; they have made new inter-
national law. We fiiave been very meek and mild under
their use of the ocean as a toll road. Of course, the
sympathy of the greater part of the country is with the
English, but it would not have been as strongly with
them, not nearly so strongly, if it had not been for the
persistent short-sightedness of our German friends. I
cannot see what England means by her policy of delay
and embarrassment and hampering. Her success mani-
festly depends upon the continuance of the strictest
neutrality on our part, and yet she is not willing to let
us have the rights of a neutral.
You would be interested, I think, in hearing some of
the discussion around the Cabinet table. There isn’t
a man in the Cabinet who has a drop of German blood
in his veins, I guess. Two of us were bom under the
British flag. I have two cousins in the British army,
and Mrs. Lnne has three. The most of us are Scotch
in our ancestry, and yet each day that we meet we boil
over somewhat, at the foolish manner in which England
acts. Can it be that she is trying to take advantage
of the war to hamper our trade ? . . .
If Congress were in session, we would be actively
debating an embargo resolution to-day. . . .
After all, our one great asset is the confidence of the
people in the President. They do not love him, because
he appears to them as a man of the cloister. But they
respect him as a wise, sane leader who will keep them out
of trouble, and whatever fool things are done they are
willing to blame on Bryan, which is gravdy unjust.
I am growing more and more in my admiration for Bryan
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE . 463
each day. He is too good a Christian to run a naughty
world and he doesn’t hate hard enough, but he certainly
is a noble and high-minded man, and loyal to the Presi-
dent to the last hair. ...
As always yours
F. K. L.
Even in England there were a number of thoughtful
persons who felt that interference with neutral cargoes
bound for neutral ports, even though the goods were
ultimately destined for Germany, was not worth the
difficulties it would provoke. Such opinion, although
held by a minority, was not entirely confined to pacifist
circles.
“ March 3, 1915 ; Both Brooks and PoUen^ [wrote
Colonel House] agreed with me that Great Britain was
entering into a dangerous phase of warfare in under-
taking to establish a paper blockade against Germany,
an actual blockade being seemingly impossible. I
argued the point very earnestly, for I wanted thdr in-
fluence and that of their papers in the trouble I can see
looming up between our two countries.
“ March 4, 1915 : Francis W. Hirst, editor of The
Economist, called this morning for the second time. I
missed him yesterday when he was here. I found in
him an entirdy new t3rpe of Englishman. ... He is
antagonistic to the Government, though a Liberal. He
criticized Grey and Asquith severely, though Asquith is
a near relative. ... He is against the war, and claims
he is far from being alone, for he believes the war un-
popular in England, and if public opinion could find
expression it would be shown to be. He desires me to
meet Lord Morley and the former Lord Chancellor, Lord
Lorebum. He says both of them are against the war
and they believe peace should be brought about now.
“ Hirst thinks the President should take an active
stand against the proposed blockade, bdieving if he
^ A* H. PoUen, journalist and naval authority.
464 . SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
would prohibit all exports to all the belligerents, he could
force this Government to do practically what he desired.
He wished the President to lay down a new international
code of laws' and insist upon every nation living up to
it. I tried to point out some of the difficulties of such
a procedure.
“ He said that his predecessor on The Economist,
Richard Bagehot, whom the President admires so much,
declared that England should have done this in 1870.
“ March 9, 1915 ; Mr. Robert Donald, editor of The
Daily Chronicle, took tea with me. He is an able and
reasonable Scotchman. We talked of the embargo,
and of war and everything relating thereto. He is a
great friend of Lloyd George and thinks he is the greatest
man in the Kingdom. He thought it a mistake for
Great Britain to declare a blockade against Germany,
and believed if it is enforced our Government would be
justified in placing an embargo on munitions of war.
He is to touch upon this matter cautiously in his paper,
and will try to influence the Government in the direction
we desire. . . .”
IV
Colonel House to the President
London, May 7, 1915
Dear Governor :
Your cablegram concerning the delaying of cargoes
came to me yesterday. I already had an engagement
with Sir Edward Grey this morning, so I did not make
an earlier appointment.
I read him your message and told him that in my
opinion the situation was critical and that it would not
do to temporize with the matter ; that the Germans
were doing everything possible to embarrass you and
to force you to place an embargo upon arms.
He said he understood the situation perfectly. He
took a memorandum, which he read to me afterwards
and which was to be sent- to each member of the Cabinet
in the form of a communication. He put it strongly
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 465
and urgently, and he told me he would do all that was
possible.
He said he had to contend with public sentiment here
that demanded a complete blockade of^ Germany. I
think, too, he has opposition in the Cabinet wth Kitchener
and Winston Churchill. . . .
Sir Edward wants to do everything that is possible,
and he desired me to let you know that he had great
dif&culties here to contend with. . . .
I have seen a great many people since I last wrote
you, among them the Russian Ambassador. I found
him a very able man, but as ignorant of your purposes
as the people of France. . . .
When I came over here it was practically the universal
opinion in France and England and, I find now, in
Russia also, that you were inclined to be pro-German
even though the American people as a whole were other-
wise. I have a feeling that Sir Cecil ^ has fostered this
sentiment, because what I have heard here sounds very
much like what he said to me on several occasions. He
told Norman Hapgood that the Administration was
pro-German, and he has told others the same thing.
I took occasion to tell Sir Edward that Sir Cecil was
very nervous and was constantly seeing spooks and that
he had told me that we would ^ be pro-German before
the end of the war. I did this because I was sure he
had written the same thing to Sir Edward. . . .
Your affectionate
E. M. House
London^ Ma ^ 27^ 1915
Dear Governor :
I saw Sir Edward Grey yesterday and discussed the
holding-up of cargoes.
As to cotton, he said this Government, following
precedent, had a right to make it contraband of war just
as our Government did during our Civil War. But out
of consideration for our wishes they had not done so,
and therefore he hoped we would be lenient,
^ Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, Biitisli Ambassador in Washington.
1—30
466 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
He also said they were doing everything that was
possible now to avoid friction with us and that orders
had gone out to pass upon all questions speedily, so they
could no longer be charged with delay.
He told me some things of interest concerning the
Balkan States. One was that Rumania had agreed to
come in, provided the Allies would give her certain
Hungarian territory.^ Sir Edward refused to consider
such terms, for the reason that what she wanted would
be unfair to Serbia. His reply was that since Great
Britain went into this war to defend the rights of one
small nation, it would not transgress upon the rights of
another, even though great advantage to the Allied
cause might accrue.
If it were not for Ferdinand, Bulgaria would probably
come in with the Allies, and, if she did, then Greece
would also. They all fear lest some one of the Balkan
States will remain out and be in a condition to take
advantage of the exhaustion that may occur. . . .
I am glad Balfour is in the new Cabinet. He is a
man of the Grey type, and I feel sure that there
will be less trouble with the holding-up of cargoes
now than wh'en the Admiralty was administered by
Churchill.®
Sir Edward leaves Monday to be gone a month, and
Lord Crewe will probably act for him during his absence.
He is to arrange with Crewe for me to see him at any
time I desire, and at his home. He lives close by. I
never go to the Foreign OjSice or any of the other Govern-
ment Offices on account of the publicity. They all
understand my reasons for this. . . .
Your affectionate
E. M. House
^ The Banat of Temesvar and the Transylvanian toreiands. Serbia’s
Claim to the south-western portion of the Banat was insistent. The Peace
Conference in 1919 recognized much of Serbia's claim., dividing the Banat
between that Power and Rumania.
* An unfulfilled prophecy, despite the calm good sense of Mr. Balfour
and his friendly feeling towards the United States.
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE ^ 467
Before leaving for the United States, Colonel House
entered many long conferences with members of the new
Cabinet and with others of influence, in order that no
misunderstanding should mar Anglo-American rdations^
In most of these conversations he laid strong emphasis
upon the blockade problem, for he regarded it as vital
that the British should appreciate the American point
of view.
“ May 22, 1915 : Lord Bryce called at ten o’clock.
I told of some of the troubles between Great Britain
and the United States, regarding the holding-up of
cargoes. He expressed a willingness to use his influence
with the Foreign Ofiice, but I asked him to do nothing
for the moment, for I am sure^he cannot do more than
I have already done with Grey.
“ We agreed that it was not the Foreign Office at
fault, but the War and Admiralty Departments. I talked
to him about the Freedom of the Seas, and he asked
if it had to do with ‘ capture and search at sea.’ He did
not seem in favour of it, saying he had heard that Dem-
burg very much desired it. I replied that I was the
instigator of it in Germany, and the Germans were
merely echoing the thought I had given them. He
laughed and said he felt better, for, if we were doing it,
he was quite sure it was not a bad thing, and that in
the future he would look at it with more friendly eyes.
“ June 2, 1915 : I met Lloyd George at ten, as
previously arranged. I was surprised at the freedom
with which he criticized the War Department. He said
Great Britain should now have all the shells they could
use, since they were the largest engineering country
excepting the United States, and had all sorts of factories
that could be made to turn out exjplosives. He showed
me a list of shrapnd and explosive shells that were
used by the British in recent battles.. In one battle,
50,000 shrapnel were fired and only 1,600 high explo-
sives, while it should be the reverse.
468 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
•
“ He said he had found soldiers to be sdf-opinionated
and unsatisfactory, but he indicated his intention of
putting an impetus on munition production that would
revolutionize the situation. He had a list of firms and
corporations from whom thejr were getting munitions in
the United States. While important, it was not as
large as I had thought. . . .
“ He stated that it would be a serious menace to the
Allied cause if we should stop the shipment of munitions
of war at this time. . . .
“ This was, I believe, George’s first day as Minister of
Munitions in his new Whitehall quarters. There was no
furniture in the room except a table and one chair. He
insisted upon my taking the chair, which I declined to
do, declaring that a seat on the table was more suitable
for me than for a Cabinet official. ’
“ He spoke again and again of ‘ military red-tape,’
which he declared he would cut out as speedily as pos-
sible. He was full of energy and enthusiasm, and I feel
certain something will soon happen in his department.
He reminds me more of the virile, aggressive type of
American politician than any member of the Cabinet.
. . . He has something d3mamic within him which his
colleagues have not and which is badly needed in this
great hour. . . .
" After Itmch I went to keep an appointment with
the new Chancdlor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna.
... I took occasion to tell him that Germany had saved
England from a good raking over the coals because of
her embargo policy, which was entirely illegal and to
which we submitted merdy because Germany was so
prodigal in greater infractions. I urged him to use his
influence at Cabinet meetings to modify thdr actions in
this direction. If they did not, and we composed our
differences with Germany, I assured him we would hold
his Government to a stricter accoimtability It was not
a question of what the President thought of the contro-
versy between the bdligerents, but what he had to do
in justice to a large portion of the American people.
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 469
who were insisting that their rights were being in-
fringed.
“ He entirely agreed with this and hoped the differ-
ences could be ironed out satisfactorily. It was also
agreed that in the event we came into the war on the
side of the Allies, he would communicate with me un-
officially, in order that I might help in facilitating the
solution of financial questions arising between the two
Governments. . . .
“ At half-past five, I went to Lansdowne House to
call on the Marquis of Lansdowne. ... I spoke strongly
of his Government’s policy in holding-up neutral cargoes,
and let him know that, if Germany was not acting so
much worse, they would be called to an accounting. I
did not believe Great Britain, under similar circumstances,
would permit it for a moment, and the President had
bent almost to the breaking point in order to avoid a
disagreeable controversy with them.
“ I gave a sketch of the President in which I depicted
him as a Scotchman with all the tenacity of purpose of
that race, and bade him remember that-while the Presi-
dent at heart sympathized with the Allies and their
purposes, yet he was President of the United States,
and our people did not differentiate between those
violating international law, and he had of necessity to
maintain an equitable attitude,
“ June 3, 1915 : Lord Crewe and I lunched alone, in
order to have a farewell talk about matters which
could not be discussed before a third party. . . .
“ I read him the President’s despatches to me
regarding the shipping controversy, and urged him to
impress upon his colleagues the necessity of straightening
this out, provided we did not immediately drift into
war with Germany. I told him the President was being
criticized for writing one kind of note to Germany and
demanding an immediate answer, and writing another
kind to Great Britain and having no reply for months.
I considered it necessary for them to prepare an answer
at once to the note sent in February concerning the
470 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
stoppage of cargoes, and to hold it in readiness for
delivery in the event it was asked for. On the other
hand, I would advise the President not to ask for it until
the German submarine controversy was settled one way
or the other ;* and if it was settled by war, there would
be no need for an answer. But if our differences with
Germany were settled, then an immediate answer should
be forthcoming. I spoke of how pressed the President
was in this matter, and that it would not do to act in
the future as they had acted in the past.
“ June 4, 1915 : I read the King one or two cables
I had sent the President, principally about the inter-
ference with our shipping. I wish all of&cial England
to understand our Government’s attitude upon this
question, in order that there may be no misunderstanding
should it be necessary to act with vigour later.
“ His Majesty talked of the recent Zeppelin raid and
thought a very much more serious one would occur
soon, believing they would attempt to bum London. I
showed him the last cartoon in Life which Martin sent
in advance of publication, which depicts his distinguished
cousin Wilhelm hanged at the end of a yardarm. I was
not sure of the wisdom of showing this, but he seemed to
enjoy it thoroughly. The more I see of the King, the
better I like him ; he is a good fellow and deserves a
better fate than being a king. . . .
“ I lunched with Mr. Balfour. The only other
guest was Sir Horace Plunkett, who has our confidence.
Balfour said he intended to have the St. Paul convoyed
as effectively as the British navy could do it. . . .
“ There is a distinct feeling of depression in England
at present, largely due to the lack of high explosives,
and also to the fact of Russia’s continued defeat because
she, too, lacks munitions of war.
“ He said that what the navy needed most now was
torpedo-boat destroyers, ' and he was contracting for a
large number of other small fast boats of this t3q)e.
They have plenty of battleships. He spoke of how
fortunate they had been with their transports, saying
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 471
they had not lost one. He reached over, like any good
American, and knocked on wood.
“ I went into our shipping troubles as I have with
other members of the Government, and I think I made
him understand just what dificulties ouf Government
was labouring under.”
V
House sailed on the St. Paul, June 5 - Arriving in
the United States a week later, he summarized for the
President his impressions of European affairs and
emphasized the gravity of the crisis which the American
Government must face.
Colonel House to the President
Roslyn, Long Island
June i6, 1915
Dear Governor ;
The situation, as far as the Allies go, is not encour-
aging. Much to their disappointment and to the surprise
of the Germans, they have not been able to make the
progress which they thought the spring and summer
weather would bring about. They have made two
cardinal errors. One was the attempt to force the
Dardanelles by sea only. They found this was impossible
and, before they could send a land force to co-operate
with the fleet, the Turks under the direction of German
officers had time to make the Straits almost impregnable.
They will finally get through, but at a terrible cost.^
The second mistake was in not accderating during
the winter months the manufacture of high explosives.
When the spring campaign opened and they attempted
to storm the German trenches, they found that they not
only had insufficient ammunition, but what they had
was of the wrong kind. This mistake was more largely
made by the English than by the French.
^ The prophecy was not fulfilled, for, although the cost was paid, the
Allied expedition withdrew from Gallipoli in the following winter.
472 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
«
The Germans, through their espionage system,
evidently knew the weakness of the Allies ; consequently
their great concern regarding the munitions of war
coming from ^erica. When I was in Berlin in March,
it seemed to me that they were talking nonsense when
they said that if we would stop the shipment of munitions
the war would end within a short time.
The English have been unable to do more than hold
their ground, and the Russians have .been utterly unable
to withstand the German onslaught, for the reason that
they have neither sufficient arms nor ammimition. It
has resolved itself into a war of munitions rather than
one of men.
Germany was much more willing for peace in the
autumn than she has been since. I am enclosing you a
letter from Gerard bearing upon this phase.
There was the greatest possible concern in England
when I left, although they are confident of ultimate
victory if the Allies hold together ; but it be delayed
longer than mticipated, and perhaps it would not come
at all if their American supplies were for any reason
shut off.
I need not tell you that if the Allies fail to win,
it must necessarily mean a reversal of our entire
policy.
The sinking of the Lusitania, the use of poisonous
gases, and other breaches of international laws, made it
impossible for me to continue the discussion in England
of the Freedom of the Seas or the tentative formation of
a peace covenant. If these things had not happened, I
could have gone along and by midsummer we woiild
have had the belligerents discussing, through you, the
peace terms.
The difficulty is not with the German civil authorities,
but with the military and naval as represented by the
Kaiser, von Tirpitz, and Falkenhayn. The feeling is
not good between the Foreign Office and von Ti^itz,
for their diffCTences'are irreconcilable. In my opinion,
von Tirpitz will continue his submarine policy, leaving
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 473
the ‘Foreign Office to make explanations for any “ un-
fortunate incidents ” as best they may.
I think we shall find ourselves drifting into war with
Germany, for there is a large dement in the German
naval and military factions that consider *it would be a
good, rather than a bad, thing for Germany.
Regrettable as this would be, there would be com-
pensations. The war would be more speedily ended,
and we would be in a strong position to aid the other
great democracies in turning the world into the right
paths. It is something that we have to face with
fortitude, being consoled by the thought that no
matter what sacrifices we make, the end will justify
them.
AfEectionatdy yours
E. M. House
The mission of Colonel House had not accomplished
the mirade of peace, which in 1915 was a practical im-
possibility. But he had accomplished what few persons
guessed — a thorough understanding with those who
guided the fortunes of the Allies. Henceforth, whatever
the disputes of State Department and Fordgn Office,
the personal rdations he had created would preserve an
underlying cordiality. He had been given a private code
that would permit him to communicate speedily and
informally with Sir Edward Grey, and the British
Fordgn Secretary promised to write him frankly and
frequently. House had obviously won the confidence
of the British Government at a moment when public
opinion in England was turning against America. He had
made a host of friends abroad who would send him con-
stant and rdiable information. And President Wilson,
supposed to be ill-informed and isolated, was through
Colond House kept in dose touch with the inner currents
of European politics.
474 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
Sir Horace Plunkett to the President
Tbe Plttnkbtt House, Dublin
June 4, 1915
Dear Mr. President :
. . . Colonel House, in his own quiet, tactful, and
marvellously persuasive way, has, to my certain laiow-
ledge, rendered an inestimable service to the Government
of this country by his counsel and advice in regard to
its attitude to the United States in this crisis. What
sinoilar service he may have rendered to you, and to his
people, in other European countries you will know. He
sails to-morrow, and I can wdl bdieve that, as he cannot
be in Europe and America at the same time, it may be
better that he should now be at your side. As I have
had the privilege of introducing him to some people
he wished to meet over here, and of explaining to them
some aspects of American public life wmch it was neces-
sary for them to know in order to appreciate the value
of Colonel House’s help, I have offered to be of any
assistance in my power, should misunderstandings arise
in his absence which informed unofficial intervention
may be best qualified to remove. I have also offered
to keep him advised of any events or movements of
opinion, which, from the possession of his confidence, I
feel he ought to know. I merely wish to assure you,
Mr. President, that something will be done to n^mize
the loss to us over here which must be set against the
gain to you and to the United States in having Colonel
House at Washington.
I am, with deep respect
" Yours sincerely
Horace Plunkett
It was, therefore, with his eyes fuUy opened to all
aspects of the European ajtuation, that President Wilson
faced the long-drawn-out ’‘c;Asis in our relations with
Germany which follow^ the sinking of the Lusitania.
ENi> OF VOLUME I
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